State v. Quesnel

DA 06-0332
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2007 MT 188N
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
KODIAK QUESNEL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause No. DC 02-148
Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Kodiak Quesnel, pro se, Deer Lodge, Montana
For Respondent:
Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Tammy Plubell,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
George Corn, County Attorney, Hamilton, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 16, 2007
Decided: August 6, 2007
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be
cited as precedent. It shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court and shall be reported by case title, Supreme Court cause number and result to the
State Reporter Publishing Company and West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable
cases issued by this Court.
¶2 Kodiak Quesnel (Quesnel), pro se, appeals from the order of the Twenty-First
Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, denying his motion to withdraw guilty plea. We
affirm.
¶3 When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, this
Court reviews the district court’s findings of fact to determine if they are clearly
erroneous and its conclusions of law to determine if they are correct. State v. Leitheiser,
2006 MT 70, ¶ 12, 331 Mont. 464, ¶ 12, 133 P.3d 185, ¶ 12.
¶4 On April 17, 2006, Quesnel, pro se, moved to withdraw his guilty plea in Cause
No. DC 02-148. In that cause, Quesnel pled guilty to sexual intercourse without consent,
a felony, and to sexual assault, a felony, on March 3, 2004. The court accepted Quesnel’s
pleas and filed its written judgment on August 9, 2004, imposing a six-year deferred
sentence upon Quesnel with numerous conditions. Thereafter, three petitions to revoke
were filed, the first two resulting in revocation and re-sentencing. The third, resulting
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from Quesnel’s escape from a Billings pre-release center, was dismissed on motion by
the State to expedite Quesnel’s placement at Montana State Prison on other charges.
¶5 At the time Quesnel entered his guilty pleas, § 46-16-105(2), MCA (2003),
provided:
At any time before judgment or, except when a claim of innocence is supported
by evidence of a fundamental miscarriage of justice, within 1 year after judgment
becomes final, the court may, for good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty or
nolo contendere to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.
¶6 Here, the District Court filed its written judgment on August 9, 2004. Quesnel had
sixty days in which to appeal his conviction, but did not do so. See M. R. App. P. 5(b).
Consequently, Quesnel’s judgment became final on October 9, 2004, and pursuant to
§ 46-16-105(2), MCA (2003), he had one year from that date to file his motion to
withdraw guilty plea. Quesnel filed his motion on April 17, 2006, well after the one-year
statute of limitations under § 46-16-105(2), MCA (2003), had expired.
¶7 Although claiming a miscarriage of justice that would allow filing of his motion
beyond the time set forth in the statute, Quesnel has failed to demonstrate that he is
actually innocent of the crimes to which he pled guilty. Accordingly, we hold that the
District Court properly determined that Quesnel’s motion to withdraw guilty plea was
time-barred under § 46-16-105(2), MCA (2003).
¶8 Having reviewed the record in this matter, it is appropriate to decide this case
pursuant to our Order of February 11, 2003, amending Section I.3 of our 1996 Internal
Operating Rules and providing for memorandum opinions. It is manifest on the face of
the briefs and the record before us that the appeal is without merit because the findings of
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fact are supported by substantial evidence, the legal issues are clearly controlled by
settled Montana law which the District Court correctly interpreted, and there was clearly
no abuse of discretion by the District Court.
¶9 We affirm.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JOHN WARNER
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