Matter of C.M.R.

No. DA 06-0834
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2007 MT 142N
IN THE MATTER OF C.M.R.
A Youth in Need of Care,
APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. BDN 2005-019,
Honorable Jeffrey M. Sherlock, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant Mother:
Jim Wheelis, Chief Appellate Defender, Lisa S. Korchinski, Assistant
Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellate Father:
Nancy G. Schwartz, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General, Mark Mattioli,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Leo Gallagher, Lewis and Clark County Attorney, Carolyn A. Clemens,
Deputy County Attorney, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 25, 2007
Decided: June 12, 2007
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be
cited as precedent. Its case title, Supreme Court cause number, and disposition shall be
included in this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific
Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 C.M.R., the daughter of A.R. (mother) and C.R. (father), was born September 18,
2005. On September 28, 2005, the Department of Public Health and Human Services,
Child and Family Services Division (“the Department”) filed a petition requesting that
C.M.R. be determined to be a youth in need of care. On December 8, 2005, the District
Court granted the petition and declared C.M.R. to be a youth in need of care and also
granted temporary legal custody to the Department. The District Court approved
treatment plans for A.R. and C.R. on February 13, 2006. The Department filed a petition
on July 7, 2006, because the professionals who evaluated A.R. and C.R. found that the
couples’ parenting skills were not likely to improve significantly in the near future. The
Department sought permanent legal custody of C.M.R. and termination of the parental
rights of A.R. and C.R. On December 6, 2006, the District Court terminated the parental
rights of A.R. and C.R. as to C.M.R.
¶3 A.R. and C.R. appeal from the District Court’s December 6, 2006 Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order terminating their parental rights. A.R. and C.R.
appeal separately, but raise essentially the same three issues on appeal. First, A.R. and
C.R. briefly argue that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) applies to termination
2
cases. However, their appeals primarily center around the Department’s management of
their case. Second, they argue that the Department failed to comply with the District
Court’s order that the case management service providers should, “if possible,” have
some training or experience in working with developmentally disabled persons.
However, the Department assigned a caseworker with no specialized training in working
with parents with developmental disabilities. Lastly, A.R. and C.R. argue that the
Department failed reasonably to accommodate their disabilities. The District Court
ordered that the Department provide assessments and services which take into account
the intellectual developmental level of the parents. As part of the assessments and
services, the District Court assigned treatment plans, which were developed by the
Department and agreed upon by A.R., C.R., and their legal guardians. However, A.R.
and C.R. argue that the treatment plans were unsuccessful because of a failure of the
Department to accommodate their disabilities.
¶4 The State argues that the ADA does not apply in proceedings for the termination
of parental rights of developmentally disabled parents. Further, the State also argues that
even if the ADA applies, the record demonstrates that the Department considered the
developmental disabilities of A.R. and C.R. and reasonably accommodated them. The
State also maintains that, as in all termination proceedings, the best interests of the child
are of primary concern. The State suggests that A.R. and C.R. failed to comply with their
treatment plans in many ways that were not directly related to their disabilities. The State
contends that A.R. and C.R. were unwilling to change their conduct and behavior to
parent their child safely.
3
¶5 The District Court found that while A.R. and C.R. complied with parts of their
treatment plans, the treatment plans were not fully complied with and were not
successful. The court concluded that because the parenting skills of A.R. and C.R.
improved very little, it was not likely that continuing with the treatment plans would
make a significant difference within a reasonable amount of time. The severity and
chronic nature of the emotional and personality disorders exhibited by A.R. and C.R.,
combined with a lack of improvement in parenting skills, indicated that they would need
constant supervision to raise C.M.R. This was not recommended because C.M.R. would
be confused as to with whom she should bond. The court noted that the Department
accommodated the disabilities of A.R. and C.R. in creating treatment plans and that there
were no additional accommodations that were available or were reasonable for the
Department to make in this case. The court also noted that there were no other programs
that were not tried that could have given A.R. and C.R. the parenting skills they needed
within a reasonable time. Finally, the court found that although the social worker for the
Department was not specially trained to work with persons with cognitive disabilities, the
social worker conferred with experienced professionals. The court concluded that there
was clear and convincing evidence to establish that the best interests of C.M.R. would be
served by termination of the parent-child legal relationship. The court also concluded
that it was unnecessary to determine the applicability of the ADA because the
Department made accommodations for the parents’ disabilities in devising the treatment
plans and providing services.
4
¶6 We review a district court’s findings of fact to determine whether the “findings of
fact are clearly erroneous, whether the conclusions of law are correct and whether the
court abused its discretion in ordering termination.” In re J.B.K., 2004 MT 202, ¶ 13,
322 Mont. 286, ¶ 13, 95 P.3d 699, ¶ 13 (citing In re J.V., 2003 MT 68, ¶ 7, 314 Mont.
487, ¶ 7, 67 P.3d 242, ¶ 7); accord In re A.N.W., 2006 MT 42, ¶¶ 28-29, 331 Mont. 208,
¶¶ 28-29, 130 P.3d 619, ¶¶ 28-29. “[W]hen determining whether to terminate parental
rights, a district court must make specific factual findings in accordance with the
requirements set forth in § 41-3-609, MCA.” In re L.H., 2007 MT 70, ¶ 13, 336 Mont.
405, ¶ 13, 154 P.3d 622, ¶ 13 (citing In re Custody of C.F., 2001 MT 19, ¶¶ 11-12, 304
Mont. 134, ¶¶ 11-12, 18 P.3d 1014, ¶¶ 11-12). Based on our review of the record, we
conclude that the District Court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence
and are not clearly erroneous, and that its conclusions of law are correct.
¶7 Finally, while we note that this case raises issues regarding the applicability of the
ADA to parental rights termination proceedings and issues regarding the Department’s
obligations in working with developmentally disabled parents, our Opinion here should
not be read as resolving those issues one way or the other. Rather, on the facts of this
case, we are satisfied that the District Court’s decision was correct as a matter of law.
We will defer addressing the two aforementioned matters to a future case.
¶8 Therefore, having reviewed the record in this matter, we have determined to
decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of our 1996 internal operating rules,
as amended in 2003, which provides for memorandum opinions. It is manifest on the
face of the briefs and the record before us that the appeal is without merit because the
5
court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly
erroneous. Additionally, the legal issues are clearly controlled by settled Montana law,
which the District Court correctly interpreted.
¶9 Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s Order entered December 6, 2006.
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
We Concur:
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ JIM RICE
6