State v. Babb

No. 02-755
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2003 MT 256N
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CODY BABB,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Dawson, Cause No. DC 2001-015.
Honorable Richard A. Simonton, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
John Houtz, Attorney at Law, Forsyth, Montana
For Respondent:
Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Tammy K. Plubell,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Scott W. Herring, County Attorney; Mark Murphy, Special Deputy
County Attorney, Glendive, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 10, 2003
Decided: September 23, 2003
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(i), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules (Memorandum Opinions), we determine that the legal issues raised in this
appeal are clearly controlled by settled Montana law; that the issues are factual and there
clearly is sufficient evidence to support the findings of fact below; and that the court's
conclusions of law are correct.
¶2 Cody Babb (Babb) appeals from the District Court’s failure to dismiss the charge of
Aggravated Kidnapping by Accountability and the sentence imposed that exceeded the terms
of the plea agreement. We affirm.
¶3 Babb pleaded guilty on December 4, 2001, to Aggravated Kidnapping by Account-
ability and Criminal Distribution of Dangerous Drugs in exchange for the dismissal of a
charge of Deliberate Homicide by Accountability. Babb filed a Notice of Appeal from the
District Court’s sentencing order entered “August 28, 2002, and September 3, 2002.”
¶4 We will not address issues raised on appeal that were not raised in the district court.
State v. Whitehorn, 2002 MT 54, ¶ 24, 309 Mont. 63, ¶ 24, 50 P.3d 121, ¶ 24 (citations
omitted); § 46-20-104(2), MCA; § 46-20-701, MCA. The record is void of any motion by
Babb to dismiss the Aggravated Kidnapping by Accountability charges. Therefore, we will
not address that issue.
¶5 Because Babb pleaded guilty, he can only attack the voluntariness and intelligent
character of his guilty plea; all nonjurisdictional claims are waived. State v. Gordon, 1999
MT 169, ¶ 23, 295 Mont. 183, ¶ 23, 983 P.2d 377, ¶ 23 (citing State v. Wheeler (1997), 285
2
Mont. 400, 402, 948 P.2d 698, 699). Babb has not raised a jurisdictional claim (such as
whether the district court could determine that the government lacked the power to bring the
indictment from the face of the indictment or from the record at the time the guilty plea was
accepted). Hagan v. State (1994), 265 Mont. 31, 36, 873 P.2d 1385, 1388; U.S. v. Cortez
(9th Cir. 1992), 973 F.2d 764, 767. Hence, the only issue we consider is the sentence
imposed.
¶6 We have stated in the past that when a district court accepts a guilty plea pursuant
to an agreement between the defendant and the State, the court is not bound by the plea
agreement. State v. Miller (1991), 248 Mont. 194, 196, 810 P.2d 308, 309 (affirmed on
appeal). The plea agreement in the instant case plainly states it is not binding upon the court.
The State made the agreed upon sentence recommendation. The court acted within its
powers and imposed a sentence not in accordance with the sentence recommendation but
within the statutory boundaries.
¶7 We review a district court’s criminal sentence for legality only, addressing whether
the sentence imposed is within the parameters provided by statute. State v. Muhammad,
2002 MT 47, ¶ 18, 309 Mont. 1, ¶ 18, 43 P.3d 318, ¶ 18 (citing State v. Pritchett, 2000 MT
261, ¶ 6, 302 Mont. 1, ¶ 6, 11 P.3d 539, ¶ 6). The sentence imposed by the District Court
is clearly within these parameters. We affirm.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
3
We concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JIM RICE
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM REGNIER
4