State v. Cheatam

No. 05-583
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2006 MT 260NSTATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
GABRIEL ROY CHEATAM,
a/k/a GABRIEL ROY SHELL and
GABRIEL ROY SNELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Hill, Cause DC 04-115,
Honorable David G. Rice, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Randy H. Randolph, Attorney at Law, Havre, Montana
For Respondent:
Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Joslyn M. Hunt,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Cyndee L. Peterson, County Attorney, Havre, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: July 26, 2006
Decided: October 10, 2006
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be
cited as precedent. It shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court and shall be reported by case title, Supreme Court cause number and result to the
State Reporter Publishing Company and West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable
cases issued by this Court.
¶2 Appellant Gabriel Roy Cheatam (Cheatam) appeals from the judgment of the
Twelfth Judicial District Court, Hill County. We affirm.
¶3 This action arises out of Cheatam’s driving under the influence (DUI) arrest on
August 14, 2004. Cheatam was also charged with threats in official matters, a felony, in
violation of § 45-7-102(1)(a)(iii), MCA, for allegedly threatening harm to Havre Police
Officer Aaron Wittmer (Officer Wittmer), with the purpose of influencing him to violate
his duties as a police officer, during the course of the DUI investigation. Cheatam pled
not guilty to the charge. On February 1, 2005, Cheatam filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing that the State had not alleged facts sufficient to charge him with the felony
violation pursuant to § 45-7-102, MCA. The District Court denied the motion. On
March 29, 2005, a jury found Cheatam guilty of the offense of threats in official matters
in violation of § 45-7-102(1)(a)(iii), MCA. The District Court sentenced Cheatam to
Montana State Prison for five years, crediting him for 154 days previously served and
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designating him a persistent felony offender. As such, he was committed to Montana
State Prison for an additional five years. Cheatam filed a timely notice of appeal.
¶4 Cheatam argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss, that
the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence, and that the District Court erred in
denying his proposed jury instruction regarding disorderly conduct as a lesser included
offense. We review a district court’s grant or denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.
State v. Mallak, 2005 MT 49, ¶ 13, 326 Mont. 165, ¶ 13, 109 P.3d 209, ¶ 13. “Our
standard of review is plenary, and we determine whether a district court’s conclusion is
correct.” Mallak, ¶ 13. “We review the sufficiency of evidence to support a verdict to
determine whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Debus, 2002 MT 307, ¶ 15, 313 Mont. 57, ¶ 15, 59
P.3d 1154, ¶ 15. We review jury instructions in a criminal case as a whole to determine
whether they fully and fairly present the law to the jury. State v. Earl, 2003 MT 158, ¶
22, 316 Mont. 263, ¶ 22, 71 P.3d 1201, ¶ 22.
¶5 It is appropriate to decide this case pursuant to our Order of February 11, 2003,
amending Section 1.3 of our 1996 Internal Operating Rules and providing for
memorandum opinions. It is manifest on the face of the briefs and the record before us
that the appeal is without merit because the findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence, the legal issues are clearly controlled by settled Montana law which the District
Court correctly interpreted, and there was clearly no abuse of discretion by the District
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Court. From a review of the statutory elements of the crime, the offense was properly
charged, the jury was properly instructed, and disorderly conduct is not a lesser-included
offense thereof.
¶6 We affirm the judgment of the District Court.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
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