State v. Reinhard

February 9 2010
DA 09-0482
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2010 MT 32N
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER D. REINHARD,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DC 08-0223B
Honorable Mike Salvagni, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Robert J. Quinn, Quinn Law Office, Bozeman, Montana
For Appellee:
Hon. Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; Mardell Ployhar, Assistant
Attorney General; Helena, Montana
Martin D. Lambert, Gallatin County Attorney; Eric Kitzmiller, Deputy
County Attorney; Bozeman, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 20, 2010
Decided: February 9, 2010
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Michael E Wheat delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, as amended in 2006, the following memorandum decision shall not be cited
as precedent. It shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and
its case title, Supreme Court cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s
quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Christopher Reinhard appeals from the order of the Eighteenth Judicial District Court,
Gallatin County, denying his motion to suppress three previous DUI convictions. We affirm.
¶3 The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred by denying Reinhard’s motion
to suppress evidence of his three previous DUI convictions.
¶4 The facts in this case are not in dispute. Reinhard hit a parked truck with his vehicle
in July 2008. Officers at the scene of the accident asked Reinhard to perform field sobriety
tests. Reinhard agreed to perform two of the three tests, and his performance indicated that
he was intoxicated. Reinhard was arrested and transported to the Gallatin County Detention
Center. Reinhard was eventually charged with DUI, fourth offense, which is a felony under
Montana law. Section 61-8-731, MCA.
¶5 Reinhard filed a motion to suppress evidence of his three previous DUI convictions.
His previous convictions occurred in North Dakota in 2004 and 2005. He argued that the
convictions were invalid because he was not advised of the rights he was waiving by
pleading guilty. Reinhard also maintained that he was not advised of his right to “present
evidence” pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
2
¶6 The State argued in response that Reinhard knowingly and voluntarily waived his
rights by pleading guilty. The State relied on an affidavit from Judge Grosz, the judge in
North Dakota who had presided over all three of Reinhard’s change-of-plea hearings. Judge
Grosz stated in his affidavit that he had advised Reinhard of an extensive list of rights, and
that Reinhard had “verbally acknowledged on the record that he fully understood the nature
of each charge and the maximum and minimum penalties and that he fully understood all of
the foregoing rights which were verbally administered to him by me.”
¶7 This Court reviews a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress to determine
whether its findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its interpretation and
application of the law is correct. State v. Ellington, 2006 MT 219, ¶ 9, 333 Mont. 411, 143
P.3d 119 (citing State v. Pierce, 2005 MT 182, ¶ 12, 328 Mont. 33, 116 P.3d 817).
¶8 It is well settled “that the State may not use a constitutionally infirm conviction to
support an enhanced punishment, such as felony DUI. When a defendant attacks a prior
criminal conviction that can be used to enhance punishment, a presumption of regularity
attaches to such conviction.” State v. Snell, 2004 MT 334, ¶ 25, 324 Mont. 173, 100 P.3d
503. The defendant may overcome the presumption with direct evidence of irregularity. Id.“Once a defendant produces such direct evidence, the burden then shifts to the State to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that it did not obtain the prior conviction in violation of
the defendant’s rights.” Id.¶9 The District Court concluded that although Reinhard had produced sufficient evidence
to shift the burden to the State, the State had met its burden to prove that Reinhard was
3
advised of his rights because Judge Grosz’s affidavit “shows that he advised [Reinhard] of
the fundamental constitutional rights that are recognized in § 46-12-210, MCA.” The
District Court also concluded that Reinhard was advised of his right to present evidence
because Reinhard “was advised of his right to testify, to call witnesses on his own behalf,
and to subpoena witnesses and force them and come and testify for him at trial.” We find no
reason to disturb the District Court’s decisions on these matters.
¶10 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of our
1996 Internal Operating Rules, as amended in 2006, which provides for memorandum
opinions. It is manifest on the face of the briefs and the record before us that the appeal is
without merit because the court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, and
because the legal issues are clearly controlled by settled Montana law, which the District
Court correctly interpreted.
¶11 Affirmed.
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
We Concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ JIM RICE
4