Marriage of Burke

November 13 2012
DA 11-0608
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2012 MT 256N
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
TERESA STUBER BURKE,
Petitioner and Appellee,
and
DANIEL BRIAN BURKE,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DR 07-463
Honorable Robert L. Deschamps, III, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Patrick G. Sandefur, Attorney at Law; Missoula, Montana
For Appellee:
Gail H. Goheen, Attorney at Law; Hamilton, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: October 24, 2012
Decided: November 13, 2012
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules,
this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as
precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s quarterly
list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Daniel Brian Burke (Daniel) appeals from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order entered by the District Court on June 2, 2011, dissolving the marriage between him and
Teresa Stuber Burke (Teresa), and from the District Court’s Amended Order entered on June 15,
2011, which noted an error in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and clarified the
earlier order. The parties were married approximately 19 years beginning in 1988, and have two
children.
¶3 Prior to their marriage, the parties entered a premarital agreement which addressed
property issues and listed the parties’ separate assets and their values. Daniel owned net assets
valued at approximately $36,000 and Teresa owned net assets valued at approximately $8,000.
The District Court found that, in May 2010, the marital estate held assets valued at $689,276 and
liabilities of $450,451, for a net value of $238,825. The court distributed Daniel’s life
insurance, Teresa’s Putnam Account, and both parties’ retirement accounts to the respective
party as titled, which the court found would give each party a roughly equal value of these assets.
Of the remaining $133,334, the court determined that Daniel was entitled to $27,400 pursuant to
the terms of the premarital agreement, leaving a balance of $105,934. Of this amount, one-half,
or $52,947, was distributed to each party. $18,200 of Teresa’s share was distributed to Teresa in
vehicles and personal property, and the remaining $34,767 of her share was ordered to be paid to
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Teresa by Daniel, who would retain most of the marital assets, including the parties’ business
interests.
¶4 Daniel challenges the distribution of the marital estate, arguing the District Court gave
him insufficient property pursuant to the premarital agreement. There is no challenge to the
Parenting Plan adopted by the District Court. Daniel argues the District Court failed to enforce
the premarital agreement, erroneously interpreted the agreement, and improperly divided
property subject to the agreement, asserting that “[t]he plain language of the premarital
agreement fully supports Dan’s argument that his claimed separate property should be excluded
from the district court’s consideration in its apportionment of the marital estate.” He also takes
issue with the District Court’s finding that Teresa made substantial contributions to the property
subject to the premarital agreement, particularly, the businesses he started up with assets he
owned prior to the marriage.
¶5 We review a district court’s findings of fact in dissolution proceedings to determine
whether they are clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of Crilly, 2009 MT 187, ¶ 9, 351 Mont. 71,
209 P.3d 249. A finding is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence, the
district court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or our review of the record convinces us
the district court made a mistake. Crilly, ¶ 9. Absent clearly erroneous findings, we will affirm a
district court’s division of property and maintenance award unless we identify an abuse of
discretion. Crilly, ¶ 9. “A district court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily without
conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice.”
Crilly, ¶ 9.
¶6 The premarital agreement provided an interpretational challenge for the parties and the
District Court, leading to an extensive on-the-record discussion among them which eventually
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led to an in-court oral stipulation or agreement concerning the application of the agreement
which would govern the case. In its Findings of Fact, the District Court described it as follows:
“The parties agreed at pp. 91-96 of the trial transcript that, under § 40-4-202, MCA, despite the
premarital agreement, Dan must show a lack of statutory equitable contribution by Teresa to
prevail on his separate property argument.” Teresa did not challenge Daniel’s valuations of the
investments or business entities which he claimed were his separate property, but asserted that
she had contributed to their value. The District Court agreed that Teresa had contributed to these
assets.
¶7 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for noncitable memorandum opinions. The District
Court’s findings of fact, including those regarding Teresa’s contributions, are supported by
substantial evidence and the legal issues are controlled by settled Montana law, which the
District Court correctly interpreted. The District Court properly found that the parties had
entered an in-court stipulation which governed the application of the premarital agreement. A
party is bound by his or her judicial stipulations or admissions. In re Marriage of Caras, 2012
MT 25, ¶ 28, 364 Mont. 32, 270 P.3d 48. Further, an abuse of discretion by the District Court in
the distribution of the marital estate has not been established.
¶8 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
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/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
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