City of Deer Lodge v. Tim Fox

05/30/2017
DA 16-0698
Case Number: DA 16-0698
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2017 MT 129
CITY OF DEER LODGE, ZANE COZBY,
TERRY JENNINGS and GERALD BENDER,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
TIM FOX, ATTORNEY GENERAL
FOR THE STATE OF MONTANA, and the
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Defendants and Appellees.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Third Judicial District,
In and For the County of Powell, Cause No. DV 16-61
Honorable Ray Dayton, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
David C. Dalthorp, Jackson, Murdo & Grant, PC, Helena, Montana
For Appellees:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Patrick M. Risken, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 22, 2017
Decided: May 30, 2017
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Dirk M. Sandefur delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 The City of Deer Lodge, its mayor, one of its City Council members, and a private
citizen (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) appeal from the Third Judicial District Court’s judgment
in favor of the Montana Department of Justice and its department head, Attorney General
Tim Fox. Plaintiffs assert that the Department failed to comply with the public notice and
participation requirements of Title 2, chapter 3, MCA, as triggered by its decision to close
the Deer Lodge office of its Title and Registration Bureau (TRB). The dispositive question
on appeal is whether Plaintiffs’ claims are moot.
¶2 Due to changed circumstances that preclude this Court from affording effective
relief, we hold that Plaintiffs’ claims are moot. We therefore dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
¶3 Throughout the 1990s, the Deer Lodge TRB office and its staff of 65 to 70
employees distributed license plates manufactured at the Montana State Prison; processed
and printed title documents; and issued placards for handicapped parking. Since 2000, the
Department has been “modernizing” the TRB. To that end, the Department has reassigned
many of the Deer Lodge TRB office’s functions to other offices within the Motor Vehicle
Division (MVD). The size of the Deer Lodge TRB office waned along with its
responsibilities through attrition and reallocation of TRB positions to other offices in the
MVD. On June 17, 2016, MVD Administrator Sarah Garcia met with the 35 remaining
employees of the Deer Lodge TRB office and informed them that the office would be
formally closed and all positions would be relocated to Helena.
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¶4 Prior to the June 17 meeting, the Department had not formally announced its
intention to close the Deer Lodge TRB office, nor had it afforded any opportunity for public
input. Plaintiffs filed suit in the District Court, alleging violations of the public’s rights to
know and participate. Plaintiffs ultimately sought an order setting aside the Department’s
decision to close the TRB office. Although their complaint requested a preliminary
injunction to stop the Department from closing the Deer Lodge TRB office, Plaintiffs also
filed a separate motion for a preliminary injunction. The Department filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to M. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). Following a telephonic status conference with the District Court, the parties
stipulated to treatment of their respective motions as cross-motions for summary judgment
under M. R. Civ. P. 56.
¶5 The District Court entered judgment in favor of the Department. Plaintiffs timely
appealed, but did not move to stay the District Court’s judgment in either the District Court
or this Court. The Department proceeded with its relocation of TRB functions to its Helena
offices. As of the submission of this appeal, the Department has finished relocating TRB
staff and operations to Helena.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6 On its face, the present appeal concerns the District Court’s grant of a motion for
summary judgment, which we review de novo. State v. Butte-Silver Bow Cnty., 2009 MT
414, ¶ 17, 353 Mont. 497, 220 P.3d 1115. Mootness, however, is a threshold issue that
must be resolved before addressing the underlying dispute. Alexander v. Bozeman Motors,
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Inc., 2012 MT 301, ¶ 28, 367 Mont. 401, 291 P.3d 1120. Mootness is a question of law
we review de novo. Alexander, ¶ 20.
DISCUSSION
¶7 Are Plaintiffs’ claims moot?
¶8 Courts can decide only justiciable controversies—those that are “definite and
concrete, touching legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests and admitting of
specific relief through decree of conclusive character.” Reichert v. State, 2012 MT 111,
¶ 53, 365 Mont. 92, 278 P.3d 455 (internal quotations omitted). Mootness is one of a
handful of doctrines categorized under the broad umbrella of justiciability. Reichert, ¶ 54.
A question is moot if the controversy at the outset of the action has ceased to exist, or if
the court is unable to grant effective relief due to a change in circumstances. Alexander,
¶ 28. Thus, a question that was not moot when posed to a district court may be mooted on
appeal by changed circumstances that prevent this Court from fashioning effective relief.
Henesh v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 2007 MT 335, ¶ 6, 340 Mont. 239, 173 P.3d 1188 (citing Turner
v. Mt. Engr. & Constr., Inc., 276 Mont. 55, 63, 915 P.2d 799, 804 (1996)); Povsha v. City
of Billings, 2007 MT 353, ¶ 23, 340 Mont. 346, 174 P.3d 515 (citing Shamrock Motors,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 1999 MT 21, ¶ 19, 293 Mont. 188, 974 P.2d 1150). If a question
presents a risk of becoming moot while pending appeal, it is incumbent upon the appellant
to move to stay the judgment in either the district court or this Court pursuant to M. R.
App. P. 22. See Henesh, ¶¶ 5-6; Povsha, ¶ 2.
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¶9 Plaintiffs rely on Bryan v. Yellowstone Cnty. Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 2002 MT 264,
312 Mont. 257, 60 P.3d 381, to assert that this Court can remedy the Department’s alleged
violation of the rights to know and participate by simply voiding the Department’s
decision. In Bryan, a school district’s Board of Trustees decided to close several schools.
Bryan, ¶ 14. The Board based its decision on a spreadsheet prepared by one of the trustees
that ranked schools on a variety of metrics. Bryan, ¶¶ 9-10. The spreadsheet was
distributed among the Board, but not to the public. Bryan, ¶¶ 12-14. The Board discussed
the spreadsheet and its rankings at a public meeting before deciding which schools to close.
Bryan, ¶ 14. Although concerned parents attended the meeting to provide input, they did
not receive copies of the spreadsheet until the day after the Board made its decision. Bryan,
¶ 14. We concluded that the Board effectively violated the right to know and participate.
Bryan, ¶¶ 39, 46.
¶10 To remedy the violation, we considered two options: voiding the Board’s decision,
or simply issuing a declaratory judgment and allowing the decision to stand. Bryan, ¶ 51.
Based on the facts of the case “and its implications on future conduct,” we opted to void
the Board’s decision pursuant to § 2-3-114, MCA, but did not require the Board to reopen
the closed schools. Bryan, ¶¶ 52-55. Instead, we remanded the matter so the Board could
provide the public an opportunity to rebut the school rankings, which may or may not have
led the Board to reconsider its prior decision. Bryan, ¶ 55.
¶11 Unlike Bryan, the facts of the present case do not persuade us that the decision at
issue could be undone or modified by the Department. Not only is the TRB’s former office
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space no longer under the Department’s control, but the Department has finished relocating
staff and reorganizing the Deer Lodge TRB office’s core functions within the structure of
the MVD. For the Department to unwind the nearly two-decades-long process of
“modernizing” the TRB would likely necessitate a restructuring of the MVD as well. Had
Plaintiffs pursued a stay of the District Court’s judgment, this Court conceivably could
have ordered the public notice and opportunity for participation that the Department
neglected to provide. At this point, however, the change in circumstances precludes
effective relief that would meaningfully remedy the Department’s alleged disregard of the
public notice and participation requirements of Title 2, chapter 3, MCA.
¶12 Although we decline to reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, we are sensitive to the
risk that state agencies will hurry through decision-making in an effort to moot potentially
valid public notice and participation claims. A plaintiff’s lack of knowledge could
conceivably support a claimed violation of the public’s rights to know and participate, as
enshrined in Article 2, Sections 8 and 9 of the Montana Constitution, codified at
§ 2-3-103(1), MCA.1 We believe, however, that a motion to stay the judgment of a district
court can adequately preserve the justiciability of these types of claims during appeal,
thereby mitigating the risk of governmental abuse.
1
The Attorney General has also issued an advisory opinion regarding the public’s right to know
of and participate in discussions, determinations, and deliberations on matters of significant
public interest. 47 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 13 (1998).
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CONCLUSION
¶13 We hold that Plaintiff’s claims are now moot. We therefore dismiss the appeal.
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
We concur:
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
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