Sampson v. Snow

No. 81-177
IN THE SURPEMF, COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1981
ARTHUR SAMPSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs .
JAYNE SNOW,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula.
Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Datsopoulos, MacDonald & Lind, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Williams Law Firm, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on briefs: July 2, 1981
Decided :
Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
the Court.
T h i s a c t i o n i n v o l v e s an a u t o m o b i l e a c c i d e n t t r i e d i n
t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of the
S t a t e o f Montana, i n and f o r t h e C o u n t y o f M i s s o u l a . The
jury delivered a special verdict for the defendant.
Plaintiff-appellant f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l which was
d e n i e d , and t h i s a p p e a l r e s u l t s .
On J u l y 1, 1 9 7 6 , a p p e l l a n t a t t e m p t e d t o make a l e f t
t u r n from t h e n o r t h b o u n d l a n e o f R e s e r v e S t r e e t , C o u n t y o f
Missoula, into t h e westbound lane of t h e Wheeler Village
Road. Respondent, traveling north on Reserve Street,
attempted t o pass a p p e l l a n t on t h e l e f t a s a p p e l l a n t was
turning. They collided. There were no signs or road
markings prohibiting a pass, and the collision occurred
s h o r t l y a f t e r 10:OO a . m . , on a c l e a r d a y , and on a d r y r o a d .
A t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t , a p p e l l a n t was e n g a g e d i n
his duties as a r u r a l mail carrier for t h e United S t a t e s
Postal Service. H e turned north onto Reserve S t r e e t a f t e r
making a s t o p , and t r a v e l e d a t a b o u t t h i r t y m i l e s p e r h o u r
behind an a s p h a l t t r u c k . According t o h i s v e r s i o n of the
accident, a p p e l l a n t checked h i s mirror and turned on h i s
left turn indicator about 100 to 150 yards before the
Wheeler V i l l a g e Road intersection. He testified that he
s l o w e d down a s h e a p p r o a c h e d t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n and m o t i o n e d
an ice cream d e l i v e r y t r u c k , which was s t o p p e d on Wheeler
V i l l a g e Road w a i t i n g t o t u r n n o r t h o n t o R e s e r v e S t r e e t , to
e n t e r t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n and t u r n . The Wheeler V i l l a g e Road
i s s l a n t e d s o a s t o make a t u r n g r e a t e r t h a n 90 d e g r e e s .
After the ice cream truck had cleared the intersection,
a p p e l l a n t began h i s t u r n . H e was moving a t from f i v e t o t e n
miles an hour, when he was hit on the side of his car by
respondent's vehicle. The first contact occurred toward the
rear of appellant's vehicle and respondent's vehicle then
slid along the side of appellant's vehicle.
According to respondent, she was traveling on Reserve
Street at thirty-five to forty-five miles an hour, accel-
erated to fifty miles an hour to pass a truck, and then
returned to the northbound lane as she approached the
Wheeler Village Road intersection. After that pass, she saw
a car and a truck well ahead of her. She testified that she
approached the vehicles at approximately forty to forty-five
miles an hour and decided to pass them. She accelerated to
fifty to fifty-five miles an hour and began her pass approx-
imately 100 feet behind the appellant's vehicle, which was
near the intersection. She intended to pass both appellant
and the truck in front of him. Respondent testified that
appellant did not signal for a left turn; that she did not
see the ice cream truck turn onto Reserve Street; and that
appellant was traveling between thirty and thirty-five miles
an hour at the time of the impact. The visibility was clear
for three miles south of the intersection according to the
testimony of respondent.
There was conflict in the respondent's testimony over
whether appellant turned into her or she hit appellant.
Appellant argues that respondent's testimony was that he
turned while safely out in front of her. Testimony also was
given that when respondent got out of her vehicle, the first
thing she said to appellant was, "You doff, you cut right in
front of me."
Photographs of the vehicles introduced at the trial
showed the left front bumper of appellant's vehicle was
pushed o u t , b u t t h e l e f t f r o n t h e a d l i g h t was n o t damaged.
The greatest damage to appellant's vehicle was the left
f r o n t fender just i n f r o n t of t h e l e f t door. The p h o t o -
g r a p h s a l s o show t h a t t h e r i g h t f r o n t g r i l l o f r e s p o n d e n t ' s
v e h i c l e was p u s h e d i n and t h a t t h e g r e a t e s t damage t o h e r
v e h i c l e was on t h e r i g h t f r o n t f e n d e r i m m e d i a t e l y a b o v e t h e
wheel. T h e r e w e r e some s c r a t c h e s a l o n g t h e r i g h t s i d e o f
h e r v e h i c l e which was 1972 J e e p Commando.
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e two p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d i n t h e a c c i -
dent, two w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f i e d a b o u t t h e c o l l i s i o n . Bruce
Brooks, who drove the ice cream truck, testified that
appellant slowed and motioned him into Reserve Street.
Brooks testified that appellant somehow indicated h e was
turning left, but Brooks did not recall how. He did
testify, however, that in a statement to an investigator
from the Postal Service who conducted an investigation
several days after the accident occur red that appellant
signaled.
The other witness was Frank Hazelbaker, who was
d r i v i n g a bread d e l i v e r y t r u c k toward the intersection a t
t h e time of t h e a c c i d e n t . H e t e s t i f i e d he d i d n o t s e e t h e
c o l l i s i o n o c c u r b e c a u s e he was l o o k i n g a t a p a s s e n g e r a t t h e
time. H e did hear the c o l l i s i o n , saw t h e s c e n e a n i n s t a n t
after the collision, and at that time saw respondent's
vehicle airborne. H e n o t e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s t u r n s i g n a l was
on w i t h i n f i v e s e c o n d s a f t e r t h e c o l l i s i o n . He t e s t i f i e d ,
however, he d i d n o t s e e a p p e l l a n t ' s t u r n s i g n a l b e f o r e t h e
c o l l i s i o n b e c a u s e r e s p o n d e n t ' s v e h i c l e was i n h i s way.
Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d f o r o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n :
1. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r in instructing the jury
that t h e mere fact that an accident occurred, considered
a l o n e , does n o t r a i s e a l e g a l i n f e r e n c e of negligence?
2. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n r e f u s i n g t o s e t a s i d e
t h e v e r d i c t on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e d i d n o t j u s t i f y
it?
The f i r s t i s s u e concerns t h e g i v i n g of Instruction
No. 32 o v e r a p p e l l a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n . This i n s t r u c t i o n reads:
"The mere f a c t t h a t a n a c c i d e n t h a p p e n e d ,
considered alone, does not give r i s e t o l e g a l
i n f e r e n c e t h a t i t was c a u s e d by n e g l i g e n c e o r
t h a t any p a r t y t o t h i s a c t i o n was n e g l i g e n t
or otherwise a t fault."
Appellant's o b j e c t i o n was made on the grounds the
instruction is inappropriate where there is substantial
evidence of negligence beyond the mere happening of an
accident. The g i v i n g o f t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n c a n be c o n f u s i n g
t o a jury, and i n t h e f u t u r e we recommend t h a t i t n o t b e
given. W e f i n d , h o w e v e r , no p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r n e c e s s i t a t i n g
r e v e r s a l b e c a u s e t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was g i v e n i n t h i s c a s e .
Appellant argues that this i n s t r u c t i o n h a s been
e x p r e s s l y d i s a p p r o v e d i n c a s e s i n which r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r i s
a p p l i c a b l e . H e l m k e v . Goff ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 597 P.2d
1131, 36 S t . R e p . 1104, and Hunsaker v. Bozeman Deaconess
F o u n d a t i o n (1978 ) , Mont . , 588 P.2d 493, 35 S t . R e p .
1647. H e l m k e involved a s i n g l e c a r a c c i d e n t i n which t h e
p a s s e n g e r , t h e p l a i n t i f f , was i n j u r e d . The c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d
t h e j u r y on b o t h o r d i n a r y n e g l i g e n c e and r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r .
The t r i a l c o u r t a l s o gave a "mere h a p p e n i n g " i n s t r u c t i o n .
This Court held t h a t a r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r i n s t r u c t i o n and a
"mere happening" instruction are so incompatible as to
r e q u i r e r e v e r s a l b e c a u s e t h e j u r y may c o n s i d e r i t s e l f f o r e -
closed from c o n s i d e r i n g t h e evidence provided by t h e hap-
pening of the accident i t s e l f . Appellant argues here t h a t
t h e q u e s t i o n b e f o r e t h e Court is whether t h e C o u r t ' s r u l i n g
i n Helmke s h o u l d b e e x t e n d e d t o o r d i n a r y n e g l i g e n c e c a s e s .
Respondent argues that the statement of law g i v e n in the
instruction is clearly correct in an ordinary negligence
c a s e a n d s h o u l d be a l l o w e d .
T h i s Court has d i s c u s s e d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , o r one l i k e
i t , i n numerous n e g l i g e n c e c a s e s f r o m a t l e a s t 1 9 1 5 t h r o u g h
1976 i n a v a r i e t y o f f a c t u a l t e x t s . See Erickson v. P e r r e t t
( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 9 Mont. 167, 545 P.2d 1074; Campbell v. Bozeman
Community H o t e l ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 1 6 0 Mont. 327, 502 P.2d 1141; F r i e s
v. Shaughnessy (1972), 1 5 9 Mont. 307, 496 P.2d 1159;
Flansberg v. Montana Power Co. ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 1 5 4 Mont. 53, 460
P.2d 263; Negaard v. E s t a t e of Feda ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 2 Mont. 47,
446 P.2d 436; MacDonald v. Protestant Episcopal Church
(1967), 1 5 0 Mont. 332, 435 P.2d 369; Jackson v. William
D i n g w a l l Co. ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 1 4 5 Mont. 127, 399 P . 2 d 236; Stocking
v. Johnson Flying Service ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 1 4 3 Mont. 61, 387 P.2d
3 1 2 ; W y r i c k v . H o e f l e ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 1 3 6 Mont. 172, 346 P.2d 563;
S t a t e v. B a s t ( 1 9 4 4 ) , 1 1 6 Mont. 3 2 9 , 1 5 1 P.2d 1 0 0 9 ; B a a t z v .
Noble ( 1 9 3 7 ) , 1 0 5 Mont. 59, 69 P.2d 579; Cowden v . Crippen
( 1 9 3 6 ) , 1 0 1 Mont. 187, 53 P.2d 98; Mellon v. Kelly (1935),
99 Mont. 1 0 , 4 1 P.2d 49; L e s a g e v . L a r g e y Lumber Co. (1935),
99 Mont. 3 7 2 , 43 P.2d 8 9 6 ; A u t i o v . M i l l e r ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 92 Mont.
1 5 0 , 11 P.2d 1 0 3 9 ; a n d Lyon v . C h i c a g o , M . & St.P. Ry. Co.
( 1 9 1 5 ) , 50 Mont. 5 3 2 , 1 4 8 P. 386.
Respondent n o t e s t h a t i n none o f t h e s e c a s e s s t a t i n g
the general rule was the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applicable. I t h a s been o n l y r e c e n t l y t h a t t h i s C o u r t h a s
h a d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o n s i d e r t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f a "mere
happening" instruction in a case where the jury is also
properly instructed on the d o c t r i n e of res ipsa loquitur.
Hunsaker v. Bozeman Deaconess Foundation, supra. In
Hunsaker, t h i s Court considered a c a s e involving c l a i m s of
medical malpractice. The C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t i n t h e c o n t e x t
of professional malpractice, a "mere fact of an injury"
instruction is proper, e v e n w h e r e --- i p s a l o q u i t u r
res is
i n v o l v e d b u t i m p l i e d t h a t s u c h a n i n s t r u c t i o n would n o t be
proper i n an o r d i n a r y r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r t y p e o f c a s e .
This implication in our Hunsaker o p i n i o n was made
explicit in Helmke v. Gaff, supra, where t h e Court con-
s i d e r e d t h e p r o p r i e t y o f a "mere h a p p e n i n g " i n s t r u c t i o n i n a
res ipsa loquitur case involving only simple, i.e., not
professional, negligence. The C o u r t , in a closely divided
o p i n i o n , h e l d i t was n o t p r o p e r t o g i v e a "mere h a p p e n i n g "
i n s t r u c t i o n i n a r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r c a s e because t h e r e , the
p e c u l i a r n a t u r e o f t h e a c c i d e n t and t h e s u r r o u n d i n g c i r c u m -
s t a n c e s a l l o w t h e j u r y t o i n f e r n e g l i g e n c e from t h e happen-
ing of the accident itself. Thus, the "mere happening"
i n s t r u c t i o n and t h o s e on t h e d o c t r i n e o f res ipsa loquitus
were t o t a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e .
W n o t e t h a t n e i t h e r Hunsaker n o r Helmke o v e r r u l e a n y
e
prior c a s e s on on the i s s u e of negligence. Nor do t h e y
r e p r e s e n t a break i n o u r l o n g s t a n d i n g t r a d i t i o n a l law t h a t
t h e mere h a p p e n i n g o f an accident, considered alone, does
n o t g i v e r i s e t o an i n f e r e n c e t h a t i t was c a u s e d by n e g l i -
gence. The c a s e s simply recognize t h e obvious--that a -
res
i p s a l o q u i t u r c a s e is an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e .
Appellant has s t a t e d the issue, "The q u e s t i o n p o s e d
by t h i s c a s e i s w h e t h e r t h e C o u r t ' s r u l i n g i n H e l m k e s h o u l d
be e x t e n d e d t o o r d i n a r y n e g l i g e n c e c a s e s . " Our a n s w e r t o
that is n o . Such a n extension would change the law of
negligence in this state in a very fundamental way. It
would be unacceptable to hold that the "mere happening"
i n s t r u c t i o n i s a c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t of t h e law a p p l i c a b l e t o
t h e c a s e b u t t h e n h o l d t h a t t h e j u r y s h o u l d n o t be i n f o r m e d
a s t o t h i s p a r t i c u l a r r u l e o f law.
Here the challenged instruction does not tell the
jury that they could find neither driver negligent. It
merely s t a t e s t h a t t h e jury cannot i n f e r t h e negligence of
e i t h e r t h e p l a i n t i f f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t from t h e s i n g l e f a c t
t h a t t h e two c o l l i d e d on a highway.
I n l i g h t of t h e f a c t s of t h i s case, the other jury
instructions and the jury's special verdict, it is c l e a r
t h a t t h e g i v i n g o f t h e "mere h a p p e n i n g " i n s t r u c t i o n h e r e was
reversible
not/error. T h i s i s a c l a s s i c p a s s i n g and t u r n i n g c a s e . It
i s c l e a r from t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d t h a t
t h e a r e a where t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d was s t r i p e d t o a l l o w
p a s s i n g and t h a t no s i g n s o r m a r k i n g s w e r e p r e s e n t t o p r o -
h i b i t passing. By t h e u n c o n t r a d i c t e d e v i d e n c e t h e roadway
i n t o which plaintiff was intending to t u r n was simply a
p r i v a t e d r i v e w a y , open t o t h e p u b l i c u s e , w i t h n e i t h e r t h e
s t a t e n o r t h e c o u n t y h a v i n g any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o m a i n t a i n
it. Thus, i t i s c l e a r t h a t r e s p o n d e n t had a r i g h t t o p a s s
appellant at the particular time and p l a c e and a l s o t h a t
a p p e l l a n t had a r i g h t t o make a l e f t t u r n i n t o t h e d r i v e w a y .
The j u r y was e x p l i c i t l y and c o m p l e t e l y i n s t r u c t e d on
t h e v a r i o u s d u t i e s i n c u m b e n t on e a c h d r i v e r i n a passing-
turning situation. There were no objections to these
i n s t r u c t i o n s made on a p p e a l . In particular we note t h a t t h e
j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d on t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f the passing
driver :
". . . no v e h i c l e s h a l l be d r i v e n t o t h e l e f t
s i d e of t h e c e n t e r o f t h e roadway i n
o v e r t a k i n g and p a s s i n g . . . unless . . .
such o v e r t a k i n g o r p a s s i n g can be completed
without interfering with the s a f e operation
of . . . any v e h i c l e o v e r t a k e n . " Instruction
No. 1 5 .
". . . when a v e h i c l e is t r a v e l i n g a t a s l o w
r a t e o f s p e e d and i n d i c a t e s a l e f t t u r n by a n
a u t o m a t i c s i g n a l 1 0 0 f e e t o r more b e f o r e
turning, the d r i v e r of the following vehicle
must y i e l d t h e r i g h t of way t o t h e t u r n i n g
vehicle." I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 6 .
"The d r i v e r o f a motor v e h i c l e i s presumed t o
s e e t h a t which he c o u l d s e e by l o o k i n g . He
w i l l n o t be p e r m i t t e d t o s a y t h a t h e d i d n o t
s e e what h e m u s t h a v e s e e n had h e l o o k e d .
The d u t y t o k e e p a l o o k o u t i n c l u d e s a d u t y t o
see t h a t which i s i n p l a i n s i g h t . " Instruc-
t i o n No. 20.
"A p e r s o n o p e r a t i n g . . .
a vehicle . . .
s h a l l d r i v e i t i n a c a r e f u l and p r u d e n t
manner . .. and he s h a l l d r i v e i t s o a s n o t
t o unduly o r unreasonably endanger t h e l i f e ,
limb, property, or other r i g h t s of a person
e n t i t l e d t o t h e use of t h e s t r e e t o r high-
way.
"The d r i v e r o f a v e h i c l e s h a l l d r i v e a t a n
a p p r o p r i a t e r e d u c e d s p e e d when a p p r o a c h i n g
and c r o s s i n g a n i n t e r s e c t i o n . . ." Instruc-
t i o n No. 1 0 .
H e r e , t h e j u r y was a l s o p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d i n d e t a i l
a s t o t h e d u t i e s of the turning driver. In addition, the
j u r y was g i v e n a l l t h e s t a n d a r d i n s t r u c t i o n s on n e g l i g e n c e ,
violation of statutes and proximate cause. The j u r y was
c l e a r l y and e x p l i c i t y i n s t r u c t e d a s t o t h e a c t s and omis-
s i o n s of respondent t h a t would c o n s t i t u t e negligence. It
was a l s o i n s t r u c t e d a s t o t h e l e g a l meaning o f n e g l i g e n c e ,
and t h e s t a n d a r d by which i t was t o be m e a s u r e d .
W h i l e t h e e v i d e n c e was in some c o n f l i c t on c e r t a i n
critical points--most importantly, whether appellant had
a c t i v a t e d h i s t u r n s i g n a l p r i o r t o t h e t i m e o f impact--there
was s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e on b o t h s i d e s w h i c h , if believed,
could j u s t i f y a v e r d i c t f o r e i t h e r p a r t y . The j u r y r e t u r n e d
a s p e c i a l v e r d i c t i n which t h e y a n s w e r e d "no" t o t h e f i r s t
question asked, "Was t h e d e f e n d a n t n e g l i g e n t ? " They f o u n d
specifically that r e s p o n d e n t was not negligent. For the
r e a s o n s a b o v e g i v e n , w e f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e g i v i n g o f t h e
instructions.
The s e c o n d i s s u e is w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n
r e f u s i n g t o s e t a s i d e t h e v e r d i c t on t h e g r o u n d s t h e e v i -
dence d i d n o t j u s t i f y it.
The b a s i c p r i n c i p l e f o r t h i s Court i n viewing evi-
d e n c e i s t h a t "where a f a c t i s s u e o r i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d
b e f o r e a c o u r t s i t t i n g w i t h a j u r y , and t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l
evidence t o support t h e jury v e r d i c t , s u c h v e r d i c t i s con-
c l u s i v e on a p p e a l . " Holm v . P a r s o n s ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. ,
588 P.2d 5 3 1 , 533, 36 S t . R e p . 11, 1 3 . H e r e t h e r e was s u b -
s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i n s u p p o r t of t h e v e r d i c t . The a c c i d e n t
o c c u r r e d when a p p e l l a n t began t u r n i n g l e f t o n t o t h e Wheeler
V i l l a g e Road j u s t a s r e s p o n d e n t was p a s s i n g . The r e c o r d i s
c l e a r t h a t t h e r e w e r e no r o a d m a r k i n g s o r s i g n s o r a n y t h i n g
on t h e roadway t o p r e v e n t r e s p o n d e n t from p a s s i n g a p p e l l a n t
where s h e d i d . T h e r e was no a c t u a l i n t e r s e c t i o n b e t w e e n two
p u b l i c highways. Wheeler V i l l a g e Road i s a c t u a l l y a d r i v e -
way a s i t i s n o t m a i n t a i n e d by t h e s t a t e o r t h e c o u n t y . All
p a r t i e s were w i t h i n t h e a p p l i c a b l e speed l i m i t s , and t h e r e
was no e v i d e n c e t o show t h a t e i t h e r was d r i v i n g u n r e a s o n -
ably.
The one s u b s t a n t i a l c o n f l i c t i n t h e e v i d e n c e was t h e
issue of whether appellant activated his turn signal.
Respondent s a i d t h a t he d i d n o t . Witness Hazelbaker, the
d r i v e r of t h e bread d e l i v e r y t r u c k , was n o t p o s i t i v e . He
d i d n o t remember s e e i n g any t u r n s i g n a l flashing but tes-
t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t a t u r n s i g n a l was o n . B r o o k s ,
t h e d r i v e r of t h e ice cream t r u c k , t e s t i f i e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t
i n d i c a t e d he was t u r n i n g , b u t d i d n o t t e s t i f y t h a t t h e t u r n
s i g n a l was o n . W e find t h a t respondent presented substan-
t i a l evidence along with her own t e s t i m o n y which q u a l i f i e d
the case for submission to the jury. The jury was in-
structed, without objection, that "the d i r e c t evidence of
one w i t n e s s who i s e n t i t l e d t o f u l l c r e d i t i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r
t h e p r o o f o f any f a c t i n t h i s c a s e , " and "you a r e n o t bound
t o d e c i d e i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f a n y number
o f w i t n e s s e s n o t p r o d u c i n g c o n v i c t i o n i n y o u r minds a g a i n s t
a l e s s e r number or a g a i n s t a presumption o r o t h e r evidence
s a t i s f y i n g your m i n d s . " T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n is t h e law of t h e
case, and under it t h e jury could believe respondent and
d i s b e l i e v e a p p e l l a n t , a s it a p p a r e n t l y d i d .
There being substantial evidence in the record to
s u p p o r t t h e j u r y v e r d i c t , t h e judgment o f t h e l o w e r c o u r t i s
a f f irmed.
W concur:
e
? dd ,
A &+g
Chieef J u s t i c e