State v. Cardwell

No. 80-314
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1981
THE STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs .
CURTIS CARDWELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Gallatin.
Hon. W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
A. Michael Salvagni argued, Bozeman, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Chris Tweeten appeared, Assistant Attorney General,
Helena, Montana
Donald White, County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana
Michael Lilly argued, Deputy County Attorney, Bozeman,
Montana
Submitted: February 17, 1981
Decided: MAR 2 4 1981
Filed: MljR 24.1!?8f
v I Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
the Court.
C a r d w e l l a p p e a l s h i s c o n v i c t i o n by a G a l l a t i n County
j u r y o f t a m p e r i n g w i t h a w i t n e s s and misdemeanor a s s a u l t .
,
I n S t a t e v. C a r d w e l l ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - Mont. - 609 P.2d
1230, 37 St.Rep. 750, we reversed the defendant's first
c o n v i c t i o n s on c h a r g e s o f a i d i n g and a b e t t i n g a n o t h e r i n t h e
commission o f the offense of t a m p e r i n g w i t h w i t n e s s e s and
aggravated assault. In doing so, we ruled that section
46-11-403, MCA, allowing the amendment of a criminal
information without leave of court, was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .
Af t e r t h e o p i n i o n was e n t e r e d , Cardwell asked this
C o u r t f o r a n o r d e r d i s c h a r g i n g him from t h e s t a t e p r i s o n .
W o r d e r e d him r e l e a s e d
e and bound o v e r t o G a l l a t i n C o u n t y
authorities for rearraignment on t h e o r i g i n a l charges.
Defendant moved the District Court for dismissal on the
g r o u n d s o f d o u b l e j e o p a r d y and s p e e d y t r i a l v i o l a t i o n s . The
m o t i o n was d e n i e d .
The c a u s e went t o t r i a l on J u n e 1 0 , 1980. The j u r y
r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t o f g u i l t y on t h e l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e s
of misdemeanor assault and tampering with a witness, a
felony. This appeal follows.
The u n d e r l y i n g f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e h a v e no b e a r i n g on
t h e i s s u e s i n v o l v e d i n t h e a p p e a l and w i l l n o t be r e c i t e d .
They can be found in our first Cardwell opinion, cited
above.
Defendant o f f e r s t h r e e i s s u e s f o r our review:
1. Did t h e s e c o n d t r i a l v i o l a t e d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t t o
be p r o t e c t e d a g a i n s t d o u b l e j e o p a r d y a s g u a r a n t e e d by t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n ?
2. Did t h e a c t i o n o f t h i s C o u r t and t h e s u b s e q u e n t
d e t e n t i o n and t r i a l v i o l a t e d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t s u n d e r t h e d u e
process c l a u s e s of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e
Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n ?
3. Was d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l d e n i e d ?
Double Jeopardy
This Court's remand order in State v. Cardwell,
supra, provided: "The cause is r e v e r s e d and t h e amended
i n f o r m a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t is o r d e r e d d i s m i s s e d . "
Cardwell m a i n t a i n s t h a t h i s second t r i a l v i o l a t e d h i s
constitutional rights against double jeopardy. Benton v.
Maryland (1969), 395 U.S. 784, 89 S . C t . 2056, 23 L. Ed. 2d
707. See a l s o A r t . 11, S e c t i o n 2 5 , 1 9 7 2 Mont. C o n s t .
D e f e n d a n t c i t e s numerous d e c i s i o n s b y t h i s C o u r t f o r
the proposition that double jeopardy e x i s t s whenever this
C o u r t f a i l s t o o r d e r a new t r i a l . S t a t e v . Hodgson ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,
Mont. , 603 P.2d 246, 36 S t . R e p . 2121; S t a t e v.
Holliday (1979), Mont . , 598 P.2d 1 1 3 2 , 36 S t . R e p .
1535; S t a t e ex r e l . Nelson v. Ellsworth ( 1 9 6 2 ) , 1 4 1 Mont.
78, 375 P.2d 316. W do n o t a g r e e t h a t s u c h a r u l e c a n be
e
found i n t h e s e d e c i s i o n s .
In Ellsworth, supra, t h i s Court explained that the
r u l e o f l a w was c l e a r : " ... a r e v e r s a l o f a judgment o f
conviction upon appeal and a retrial does not constitute
double jeopardy." 1 4 1 Mont. a t 81.
The r u l e i n E l l s w o r t h was b a s e d on t h e c a s e o f S t a t e
v. Aus (1937), 105 Mont. 82, 69 P.2d 584. Cardwell
underscores the language of Aus for the purpose of
emphasizing several points: ( 1 ) when a new trial is
g r a n t e d , t h e d e f e n d a n t is n o t p l a c e d i n d o u b l e j e o p a r d y b u t
m e r e l y s u b j e c t e d t o t h e same j e o p a r d y h e was i n d u r i n g t h e
first trial; ( 2 ) t h e d e f e n d a n t may n o t be t r i e d a g a i n f o r
t h e same o f f e n s e e x c e p t i n t h e c a s e w h e r e a new t r i a l is
granted or ordered; and ( 3 ) a person convicted of a crime
w a i v e s h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t b e i n g twice i n
j e o p a r d y where a t h i s r e q u e s t t h e v e r d i c t a g a i n s t him i s s e t
a s i d e and a new t r i a l g r a n t e d .
Defendant Cardwell admits that if this Court had
o r d e r e d o r g r a n t e d a new t r i a l , a s i n Aus and i t s p r o g e n y ,
h e would n o t h a v e b e e n a b l e t o c l a i m t h a t h e was p l a c e d i n
double jeopardy by the second trial. Cardwell concludes
that the salient d i s t i n c t i o n between the precedent cases
cited and h i s c a s e is t h e a b s e n c e o f an e x p r e s s o r d e r of
t h i s C o u r t d i r e c t i n g t h e new p r o c e e d i n g .
The i s s u e b e f o r e u s i s more p r o p e r l y framed i n t e r m s
o f w h e t h e r t h e f a i l u r e t o s p e c i f i c a l l y and e x p r e s s l y o r d e r a
new t r i a l n e c e s s a r i l y p r e c l u d e s f u r t h e r a c t i o n . I t is our
o p i n i o n t h a t it does n o t .
Cardwell c o r r e c t l y r e c i t e s t h e c a s e law a p p l i c a b l e t o
f o r m e r j e o p a r d y p r o t e c t i o n s a s t h e y h a v e b e e n i n t e r p r e t e d by
t h i s C o u r t i n t h e Aus l i n e o f c a s e s . W a r e not persuaded
e
by d e f e n d a n t ' s logic, however, t h a t t h e remand o r d e r m u s t
o r d e r a new t r i a l f o r one t o o c c u r . Our remand o r d e r s do
not exist in the abstract, independent of the supporting
opinion. I n t h e body o f t h e C a r d w e l l o p i n i o n , we w r o t e :
" S e c t i o n 46-11-403(1) b e i n g u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ,
t h e amended i n f o r m a t i o n s h o u l d h a v e b e e n
d i s m i s s e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on t h e
o r i g i n a l m o t i o n by C a r d w e l l , and h e s h o u l d
n o t h a v e p r o c e e d e d t o t r i a l on t h e c h a r g e s i n
t h e amended i n f o r m a t i o n . Since the D i s t r i c t
Court failed to dismiss the amended
i n f o r m a t i o n , we m u s t d o s o now. However,
------- g -----------------------------
orderin t h e d i s m i s s a l o f t h e amended
i n f o r m a t i o n , we d o n o t mean t o p r e c l u d e - e -
th
It is u n r e a s o n a b l e t o u r g e t h i s C o u r t t o d i s r e g a r d
i t s own l a n g u a g e . Clearly, i t was o u r intention t o leave
t h e d o o r open t o r e t r i a l . Any a m b i g u i t y c r e a t e d b e c a u s e o f
the wording of the remittitur order is eliminated by
r e f e r r i n g t o t h e above l a n g u a g e . W conclude,
e therefore,
t h a t a new t r i a l was i n d e e d g r a n t e d by t h e o r i g i n a l o p i n i o n ,
and w e a r e c o m p e l l e d by t h e p r e c e d e n t c i t e d by d e f e n d a n t t o
hold t h a t h i s former jeopardy r i g h t s w e r e n o t v i o l a t e d by
h i s second t r i a l .
Due P r o c e s s
On A p r i l 23, 1 9 8 0 , C a r d w e l l p e t i t i o n e d t h i s C o u r t f o r
an order discharging him from c u s t o d y i n compliance w i t h
s e c t i o n 46-20-707, MCA.
In a May 1, 1980, order this Court discharged
Cardwell from the state prison and directed that he be
returned to Gallatin County for rearraignment on the
o r i g i n a l charges. C a r d w e l l now o b j e c t s on t h e g r o u n d t h a t
he was denied due process of law, citing the Fifth and
F o u r t e e n t h Amendments t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and
A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 1 7 , o f t h e 1 9 7 2 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n .
Cardwell m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h i s Court d i d n o t have t h e
authority to order him rearraigned under the original
c h a r g e s i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a new t r i a l o r d e r i n t h e o r i g i n a l
opinion of t h i s Court. A s with d e f e n d a n t ' s double jeopardy
argument, h i s i n i t i a l p r e m i s e t h a t w e d i d n o t g r a n t a new
t r i a l is e r r o n e o u s . Only i f w e were p e r s u a d e d of t h a t f a c t
would Cardwell's due process c l a i m s have any p o s s i b l e
validity. W a r e n o t so persuaded.
e
The s t a t u t e we a r e c h a r g e d w i t h d i s r e g a r d i n g , s e c t i o n
46-20-707, MCA, provides t h a t , " [ i ] f a judgment a g a i n s t t h e
defendant is reversed w i t h o u t o r d e r i n g a new t r i a l , " this
Court must direct that the defendant be discharged from
custody. T h i s argument a g a i n u r g e s t h i s C o u r t t o d i s r e g a r d
t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e o r i g i n a l o p i n i o n s t a t i n g u n q u e s t i o n a b l y
that the r e v e r s a l of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s judgment on t h e
amended i n f o r m a t i o n d i d n o t p r e c l u d e t h e r e f i l i n g o f c h a r g e s
against t h i s defendant. I n l i g h t of t h e f a c t t h a t we d i d
indeed grant a new trial, our action was beyond the
p a r a m e t e r s o f s e c t i o n 46-20-707, MCA, and t h i s C o u r t was n o t
bound by i t s p r o v i s i o n s .
Cardwell f u r t h e r argues t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l information
had no effect since it became functus officio upon the
f i l i n g of t h e amended information. 42 C.J.S. Indictments
and I n f o r m a t i o n s B 238 a t 1 2 4 8 . T h e r e f o r e , when t h e amended
i n f o r m a t i o n was dismissed, there was no information then
e x i s t i n g and C a r d w e l l was i l l e g a l l y d e t a i n e d . T h i s C o u r t i s
of the opinion that the defendant has incorrectly
interpreted the operation of the doctrine and that he
misconstrues t h e e f f e c t of t h i s C o u r t ' s o r d e r d i s m i s s i n g t h e
amended i n f o r m a t i o n .
Although t h e q u e s t i o n is one of f i r s t impression f o r
t h i s Court, it is our o p i n i o n t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l p l e a d i n g s
would become f u n c t u s o f f i c i o o n l y i f t h e amended i n f o r m a t i o n
were v a l i d . This Court held i n t h e f i r s t Cardwell opinion
that the amended pleading was not valid under the
Constitution. As a result, t h e i n v a l i d amendment c o u l d n o t
render the original information f u n c t - o -i c -.
u s -f f -i o This
r u l i n g a d o p t s t h e p o s i t i o n e n u n c i a t e d i n S t a t e v. Thompson
(Mo. 1 9 6 5 ) , 392 S.W.2d 617, t h a t where a n u n a u t h o r i z e d o r
otherwise improper amended information is quashed or
dismissed, f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s may be had o n t h e o r i g i n a l
information.
T h i s C o u r t ' s o r d e r d i s m i s s i n g t h e amended i n f o r m a t i o n
s i m p l y wiped the s l a t e clean i n D i s t r i c t C o u r t from t h a t
point in time at which we determined that the State's
amended i n f o r m a t i o n had n o t b e e n p r o p e r l y f i l e d . The o r d e r
had no e f f e c t on t h e p r o c e e d i n g s t h a t o c c u r r e d p r i o r t o t h a t
time, including the f i l i n g of the o r i g i n a l information. As
a result, this Court properly ordered that defendant be
bound o v e r t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o p r o c e e d from t h a t p o i n t .
Speedy T r i a l
Cardwell cites our decision in S t a t e v. Harvey
(19791, Mont. , 603 P.2d 661, 36 St.Rep. 2035,
a r g u i n g t h a t when t h i s C o u r t c o n s i d e r s t h e f a c t o r s r e l a t i n g
t o speedy t r i a l g u a r a n t e e s w e should r e v e r s e h i s c o n v i c t i o n .
The defendant alleges that unnecessary delay has
deprived him of his right to a speedy trial, and
s p e c i f i c a l l y names t h i s C o u r t a s t h e p r i m a r y m a l i n g e r e r in
t h e r e s o l u t i o n of h i s f i r s t appeal. Cardwell claims t h a t
t h e 174 d a y s we u s e d t o d e c i d e t h e c a s e was u n r e a s o n a b l e and
t h a t h i s c o n v i c t i o n s h o u l d be r e v e r s e d . W cannot agree.
e
Once again defendant's assignment of error hinges
upon a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e r e was no new t r i a l g r a n t e d by u s i n
t h e previous Cardwell opinion. For the reasons discussed
a b o v e , w e f i n d t h a t w e g r a n t e d a new t r i a l by t h e l a n g u a g e
o f t h e o p i n i o n , i f n o t by t h e r e m i t t i t u r o r d e r . This being
the case, Cardwell is in error when he argues that the
c r u c i a l t i m e f r a m e b e g a n upon h i s a r r e s t . W e adopted t h e
p o s i t i o n i n S t a t e v . S a n d e r s ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 3 Mont. 209, 516 P.2d
372, that, in cases of retrial, it is the time of the
r e m i t t i t u r which is c o n t r o l l i n g i n d e t e r m i n i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s
r e l a t i v e speedy t r i a l r i g h t s .
In t h i s case, t h e t i m e e l a p s e d between t h i s C o u r t ' s
remittitur and defendant's second trial was thirty-three
days. W e do n o t find t h i s period offensive t o Cardwell's
constitutional guarantees or prejudicial t o h i s cause.
Compare S t a t e v. H a r v e y , s u p r a .
W affirm.
e
W concur:
e