Benders v. Stratton

No. 82-276
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1982
BERTA V. BENDERS, LINDA BENDERS,
and JOHN BENDERS,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
WILLIAM G. STRATTON, JOYCE M. ST-RATTON,
and DOES I through X I inclusive,
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from: ~istrictCourt of the Thirteenth ~udicial~istrict,
In and for the County of Carbon
Honorable Charles Luedke, Judqe presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants:
Barry David Ziskind, Billings, Montana
For Respondents:
Kinnard & Woodward, Billings, Montana
Submitted on briefs: September 3 0 , 1982
Decided: I?ecem?ber S , 1982
Filed:
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B . D a l y d e l i v e r i n g t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .
Plaintiffs, John and Linda Benders, appeal from an order
i s s u e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Carbon County, dismissing t h e i r claims a g a i n s t t h e defendants.
On October 24, 1979, Berta Benders, the mother of John
Benders and mother-in-law of Linda Benders, entered into a
c o n t r a c t f o r d e e d w i t h t h e S t r a t t o n s , t h e d e f e n d a n t s , to buy cer-
t a i n r e a l p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d i n C a r b o n C o u n t y , Montana. According
t o the briefs filed i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court, John Benders helped
h i s mother i n t h e c o n t r a c t n e g o t i a t i o n s .
On A p r i l 6 , 1 9 8 2 , J o h n B e n d e r s i n d i v i d u a l l y and as a n a g e n t
f o r h i s mother, and L i n d a B e n d e r s f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t t h e
Strattons alleging, among other things, breach of contract,
m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , and t r e s p a s s .
The S t r a t t o n s moved to dismiss the action for failure to
s t a t e a claim upon w h i c h r e l i e f c a n be g r a n t e d . R u l e 1 2 ( b )( 6 )
M.R.Civ.P. The S t r a t t o n s b a s e d t h e i r m o t i o n on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t
n e i t h e r J o h n n o r L i n d a B e n d e r s had a n y l e g a l i n t e r e s t i n e i t h e r
t h e c o n t r a c t or t h e l a n d .
The B e n d e r s f i l e d a n amended c o m p l a i n t a d d i n g B e r t a B e n d e r s
a s a p a r t y p l a i n t i f f , and a l l e g i n g t h a t Berta B e n d e r s had g r a n t e d
t o J o h n and L i n d a B e n d e r s a n u n d i v i d e d p a r t i a l i n t e r e s t in the
real property.
The S t r a t t o n s renewed t h e i r m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s t h e claims of
J o h n and L i n d a B e n d e r s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d t h e m o t i o n .
B e r t a B e n d e r s r e m a i n s t h e sole p a r t y p l a i n t i f f , p u r s u i n g t h e same
claims o r i g i n a l l y a l l e g e d b y h e r s o n and d a u g h t e r - i n - l a w .
A p p e l l a n t s claim t h a t t h e i r d i s m i s s a l i s p r e s e n t l y a p p e a l a b l e
because it is b a s e d on a 1 2 ( b )( 6 ) m o t i o n . W do n o t
e agree.
B e c a u s e a p p e l l a n t s f a i l e d t o o b t a i n a n e n t r y o f f i n a l j u d g m e n t as
provided in rule 54(b), M.R.Civ.P., their appeal must be
dismissed.
Appellants cite Tobacco River Lumber Co., Inc. v. Yoppe
( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 6 Mont. 2 6 7 , 577 P.2d 8 5 5 , and P r e n t i c e Lumber Company,
Inc. v. Hukill (1972)r 1 6 1 Mont. 8, 5 0 4 P.2d 277, to support
their argument that 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) motions are appealable. In
P r e n--- i c -- - -Lumber w e h e l d t h a t a n o r d e r d i s m i s s i n g a c o m p l a i n t w a s
- -- t e - - . --
appealable because t h e o r d e r had the e f f e c t of denying a p a r t y
relief "just as completely as if judgment had been entered
against it." 504 P.2d a t 279.
-- e n t- c e- ----. - i n v o l v e d t h e d i s m i s s a l o f c l a i m s by t h e s o l e
Pr - i Lumber
.-
plaintiff. We have, however, applied the P r e n -i c e
-t - Lumber
--- -
r a t i o n a l e t o c a s e s i n v o l v i n g m u l t i p l e claims or m u l t i p l e p a r t i e s .
S e e -- c o R i v e r - -
Tobac
- -- Lumber,
-- supra; and H a s b r o u c k v . K r s u l ( 1 9 7 5 ),
1 6 8 Mont. 270, 5 4 1 P.2d 1197. W e did not address the question
of c e r t i f i c a t i o n u n d e r r u l e 5 4 ( b ) i n e i t h e r - o b a c c o --- - - -
T
- -- R i v e r Lumber
-
o r ---.- o u c k .
Hasbr W e merely stated that a dismissal of either a
c l a i m or a party under a rule 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) motion was appealable
because the practical effect of the d i s m i s s a l was to l e a v e t h e
appellant without further judicial relief. See Hasbrouck where
w e allowed t h e appeal of the d i s m i s s a l of a third-party plain-
tiff.
Here, t h e r a t i o n a l e u n d e r l y i n g P r e n t i c e -. -- ---- -- b a c c o --v e r
- Lumber, T o - R i -- --
- -
Lumber, and H ---- c-
- a s b r o u .k is n o t applicable. Although appellants,
John and Linda Benders, are prevented from presently seeking
relief, same r e l i e f
t h e -- is s t i l l b e i n g p u r s u e d by B e r t a B e n d e r s .
Relief f r o m t h e a l l e g e d w r o n g s o f b r e a c h o f c o n t r a c t and t r e s p a s s
h a s n o t b e e n b l o c k e d by t h e d i s m i s s a l . The o r d e r d i s m i s s i n g t h e
claims o f John and Linda Benders must therefore be considered
i n t e r l o c u t o r y , and n o t f i n a l .
Under rule 54(b), M.R.Civ.P., interlocutory judgments
i n v o l v i n g m u l t i p l e c l a i m s or p a r t i e s m u s t be c e r t i f i e d a s f i n a l
judgments in order t o be appealable. Roy v . Neibauer (198O),
- Mont . -- .- , 610 P.2d 1 1 8 5 , 37 S t . R e p . 897; Krusemark v.
Hansen ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 2 Mont. 2 9 1 , 5 9 7 P.2d 48.
The o r d e r d i s m i s s i n g t h e claims o f J o h n and L i n d a B e n d e r s was
n e v e r c e r t i f i e d a s a f i n a l judgment u n d e r r u l e 5 4 ( b ) . The a p p e a l
is t h e r e f o r e dismissed.
ChieP Justice \