State v. Spinks

September 3 2013
DA 12-0423
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2013 MT 248N
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
BRIAN JOSEPH SPINKS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Toole, Cause No. DC 11-027
Honorable Laurie McKinnon, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Wade Zolynski, Chief Appellate Defender; Nicholas Domitrovich, Assistant
Appellate Defender; Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General; C. Mark Fowler, Assistant
Attorney General; Helena, Montana
Merle Raph, Toole County Attorney, Shelby, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 7, 2013
Decided: September 3, 2013
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Brian Morris delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve
as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s
quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Appellant Brian Joseph Spinks (Spinks) appeals his felony conviction for violation of
an order of protection in the Ninth Judicial District Court, Toole County. We affirm.
¶3 The State of Montana (State) charged Spinks with one felony count of violation of
order of protection pursuant to § 45-5-626, MCA, on January 11, 2011, in Gallatin County.
Spinks’ ex-wife, Stephanie Archuleta (Archuleta), contacted the Gallatin County Victim
Services regarding letters that she had received from two inmates at the Crossroads
Correctional Center (CCC) in Shelby. Spinks was housed as an inmate at CCC at that time.
The State dismissed the charges in Gallatin County and refiled them in Toole County. The
State timely filed a notice of intent to seek persistent felony offender status, pursuant to § 46-
18-501, MCA.
¶4 Spinks filed a motion to suppress evidence of prior bad acts based on his belief that
police investigative materials that the State had disclosed contained extensive references to
Spinks’ prior bad acts or unfavorable character evidence. The State clarified that it did not
intend to “elicit testimony of specific incidents of any physical abuse or mental cruelty” on
the part of Spinks. The State informed the jury during opening statements that Spinks passed
around Archuleta’s home address to other inmates and told them to write to her as a means to
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“threaten[] her or harass[] her” to “[r]each[] out the one way he could still hold some power
over her, over this gal that was his ex-wife, and . . . get at her one more time.”
¶5 Archuleta testified at trial about her state of mind as a result of receiving these letters
from the inmates. Archuleta pointed to the fact that Spinks had threatened her during their
marriage that he would have others rape or murder her to explain the basis for her fear of
Spinks. The District Court overruled Spinks’ objection to the testimony. The District Court
explained that Archuleta’s brief statement of a ten-year history between her and Spinks
proved more probative than prejudicial as a reflection of the nature of Archuleta’s fear of
Spinks. The District Court further rejected Spinks’ request for a limiting instruction. The
jury convicted Spinks and the District Court sentenced him as a persistent felony offender to
an 18-year commitment to the Department of Corrections. The court also ordered Spinks to
pay fees and surcharges in the amount of $1,998.83. Spinks appeals.
¶6 Spinks argues on appeal that the District Court improperly admitted Archuleta’s
testimony as the State intended it to infer Spinks’ propensity to commit the charged offense.
Spinks argues, in the alternative, that the potential prejudice of Archuleta’s testimony
outweighed any probative value under M. R. Evid. 403. Spinks further contends that the
District Court failed to inquire as to Spinks’ ability to pay fees and surcharges that the
District Court imposed.
¶7 We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to admit evidence. State
v. Guill, 2010 MT 69, ¶ 21, 355 Mont. 490, 228 P.3d 1152. We have determined to decide
this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), of our 1996 Internal Operating Rules, as
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amended in 2006, that provides for memorandum opinions. The District Court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting Archuleta’s testimony as probative of whether Spinks violated the
order of protection by contacting Archuleta indirectly through the other two inmates. Spinks
failed to object to the District Court’s imposition of the fines and surcharges.
¶8 Affirmed.
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
We Concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ JIM RICE
/S/ BETH BAKER
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