Phillips v. State

No. 02-552
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2002 MT 324N
THOMAS PHILLIPS,
Defendant and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and for the County of Lewis and Clark,
The Honorable Dorothy McCarter, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Thomas Phillips, Shelby, Montana (pro se)
For Respondent:
Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General, Micheal S. Wellenstein, Assistant
Montana Attorney General, Helena, Montana; Leo J. Gallagher, Lewis and
Clark County Attorney, Carolyn A. Clemens, Deputy Lewis and Clark County
Attorney, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: December 5, 2002
Decided: December 19, 2002
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent but shall be filed as a
public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case title,
Supreme Court cause number and result to the State Reporter Publishing Company and to
West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases issued by this Court.
¶2 Thomas Phillips pled guilty in the District Court for the First Judicial District, Lewis
and Clark County, to felony theft. He was then sentenced to ten years in Montana State
Prison with five years suspended and ordered to pay restitution. Phillips appeals the District
Court's order regarding restitution. We affirm.
¶3 We address the following issues on appeal:
¶4 1. Whether Phillips' claims regarding restitution are time barred by § 46-21-102,
MCA.
¶5 2. Whether Phillips' claims regarding restitution are procedurally barred by § 46-21-
105(2), MCA, because they could have been raised on direct appeal.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶6 On October 31, 1996, the State charged Phillips by Information with felony theft in
violation of § 45-6-301(1)(c), MCA, for stealing money and cigarettes from a Mini Mart in
Helena. He was also charged with making false reports to law enforcement officers, a
misdemeanor, in violation of § 45-7-205(1)(a), MCA, for knowingly giving false information
to law enforcement personnel in an attempt to implicate someone else in the theft.
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¶7 Phillips subsequently entered into a plea agreement with the State in which he agreed
to plead guilty to the felony theft charge and, in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the
charge of making false reports to law enforcement officers. Phillips also agreed to pay
$4,000 in restitution to the victim of the theft.
¶8 On February 12, 1997, Phillips appeared in court with his counsel and pled guilty to
felony theft. The District Court accepted Phillips' guilty plea and granted the State's motion
to dismiss the other charge. The court then sentenced Phillips to ten years in Montana State
Prison with five years suspended based upon a number of conditions including that he pay
restitution. The court entered its written Judgment and Commitment on February 18, 1997.
¶9 Phillips did not appeal his conviction or sentence. On June 12, 2002, Phillips filed a
petition for postconviction relief. In his petition, he claimed that he was denied due process
of law when the District Court failed to follow the procedures set forth in § 46-18-242, MCA,
to determine whether he had the financial resources to pay restitution. He also claimed that
the District Court lacked the statutory authority to order him to pay $4,000 in restitution. The
State opposed Phillips' postconviction petition arguing that the petition was barred by the
one-year time limit set forth in § 46-21-102, MCA, and by § 46-21-105(2), MCA, because
Phillips could have raised his claims regarding his restitution obligation on direct appeal.
¶10 On July 23, 2002, the District Court denied Phillips' petition for postconviction relief
on the grounds that Phillips' claims were procedurally barred because he failed to raise them
on direct appeal and that Phillips' claims were time barred by the five-year time limit set forth
in § 46-21-102, MCA. The District Court also noted that "the claim in the petition makes no
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sense in light of the fact that the restitution order and amount was agreed to by Phillips in the
plea agreement." Phillips appeals.
Standard of Review
¶11 We review a district court's denial of a petition for postconviction relief to determine
whether the court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether the court's conclusions
of law are correct. State v. Hanson, 1999 MT 226, ¶ 9, 296 Mont. 82, ¶ 9, 988 P.2d 299, ¶ 9
(citation omitted).
Issue 1.
¶12 Whether Phillips' claims regarding restitution are time barred by § 46-21-102, MCA.
¶13 The District Court concluded that Phillips' petition for postconviction relief was time
barred by the five-year time limit set forth in § 46-21-102, MCA. We agree that the District
Court reached the right result in concluding that Phillips' petition is time barred, however, we
conclude that the court reached that result using the wrong statutory authority.
¶14 In 1997, the Montana Legislature amended § 46-21-102, MCA, to provide that a
petition for postconviction relief must be filed within one year from the time the conviction
becomes final rather than the five years previously allowed by the statute. See Sec. 4, ch. 378,
L. 1997. Section 46-21-102, MCA, now provides in pertinent part as follows:
When petition may be filed. (1) Except as provided in subsection (2),
a petition for the relief referred to in 46-21-101 may be filed at any time within
1 year of the date that the conviction becomes final. A conviction becomes
final for purposes of this chapter when:
(a) the time for appeal to the Montana supreme court expires;
(b) if an appeal is taken to the Montana supreme court, the time for
petitioning the United States supreme court for review expires; or
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(c) if review is sought in the United States supreme court, on the date
that that court issues its final order in the case. [Emphasis added.]
The one-year time bar applies to those convictions which became final after April 24, 1997,
the effective date of the 1997 amendment to § 46-21-102, MCA, or within one year prior to
April 24, 1997. Morrison v. Mahoney, 2002 MT 21, ¶ 11, 308 Mont. 196, ¶ 11, 41 P.3d 320,
¶ 11. For those postconviction petitioners whose convictions became final within one year
prior to April 24, 1997, § 46-21-102, MCA, allows a one-year grace period for the filing of a
petition running from the April 24, 1997 effective date, or until April 24, 1998. Morrison, ¶
11.
¶15 In Phillips' case, the District Court entered its written Judgment and Commitment on
February 18, 1997. Phillips did not file a direct appeal and his time for filing an appeal
expired on April 21, 1997. Rule 5(b), M.R.App.P. Under, § 46-21-102(1), MCA, Phillips
had until April 24, 1998, to file his petition for postconviction relief. Phillips, however, did
not file his petition until June 12, 2002.
¶16 We have previously stated that the time period for filing a claim for postconviction
relief under § 46-21-102(1), MCA, is a jurisdictional limit on litigation and waiver is justified
only by a clear miscarriage of justice. State v. Abe, 2001 MT 260, ¶ 15, 307 Mont. 233, ¶ 15,
37 P.3d 77, ¶ 15 (citations omitted). The miscarriage of justice exception does not apply
unless the defendant provides newly-discovered evidence that shows that the defendant is
actually innocent. State v. Rosales, 2000 MT 89, ¶ 7, 299 Mont. 226, ¶ 7, 999 P.2d 313, ¶ 7
(citations omitted).
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¶17 Here, Phillips has not claimed that he is actually innocent of felony theft. In fact, he
pled guilty to the offense of felony theft and he is not now challenging his conviction. In his
petition, Phillips merely challenges the imposition of restitution by the District Court.
¶18 Accordingly, we hold that Phillips' petition for postconviction relief is time barred by
the one-year time limit set forth in § 46-21-102(1), MCA.
Issue 2.
¶19 Whether Phillips' claims regarding restitution are procedurally barred by § 46-21-
105(2), MCA, because they could have been raised on direct appeal.
¶20 The District Court concluded that Phillips' claims regarding restitution are
procedurally barred by § 46-21-105(2), MCA, because he failed to raise those claims on
direct appeal. We agree.
¶21 Section 46-21-105(2), MCA, provides in pertinent part as follows:
When a petitioner has been afforded the opportunity for a direct appeal
of the petitioner's conviction, grounds for relief that were or could reasonably
have been raised on direct appeal may not be raised, considered, or decided in
a proceeding brought under this chapter. Ineffectiveness or incompetence of
counsel in proceedings on an original or an amended original petition under
this part may not be raised in a second or subsequent petition under this part.
Postconviction relief is not intended as a substitute for a direct appeal. In re Manula (1993),
263 Mont. 166, 169, 866 P.2d 1127, 1129 (citations omitted). The purpose of this
requirement is to preserve postconviction relief as an opportunity to explore only those issues
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which are not properly considered on direct appeal. See Manula, 263 Mont. at 169, 866 P.2d
at 1129.
¶22 In this case, Phillips never filed a direct appeal challenging his restitution obligation
even though he could reasonably have raised his claims regarding restitution in a direct
appeal. Moreover, as the State points out in its brief, the two cases that Phillips cites in
support of his claims regarding restitution, State v. Hilgers, 1999 MT 284, 297 Mont. 23, 989
P.2d 866, and State v. Brown (1994), 263 Mont. 223, 867 P.2d 1098, were direct appeal
cases.
¶23 Accordingly, we hold that Phillips' claims regarding restitution are procedurally
barred by § 46-21-105(2), MCA, because they could have been raised on direct appeal.
¶24 Affirmed.
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
We Concur:
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ JIM RICE
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