Calaway v. Jones

No. 80-241
I N THE SUPREME COURT O T E STATE O MONTANA
F H F
1981
TIMOTHY J. C L W Y
AA A ,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
VS.
SID JONES,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e E i g h t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f Cascade.
Honorable H. W i l l i a m Coder, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel o f Record:
For A p p e l l a n t :
Randono & Donovan, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
F o r Respondent:
Marra, Wenz, Johnson & Hopkins, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s : December 11, 1980
Decided: MAR 4 - 1981
Filed:
I/
v
4
Y
Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .
T h i s i s an a p p e a l by t h e d e f e n d a n t from t h e D i s t r i c t
Court's refusal to set aside a judgment in favor of the
p l a i n t i f f and a d i s m i s s a l o f d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n t e r c l a i m i n t h e
E i g h t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Cascade County.
On December 5, 1972, Timothy J. Calaway filed a
c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t S i d J o n e s s e e k i n g damages f o r t h e l o s s o f
a p o t a t o c r o p a l l e g e d l y c a u s e d by J o n e s ' s f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e
an i r r i g a t i o n system. J o n e s d e n i e d any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for
the loss and filed a counterclaim alleging sums due and
owing from Calaway. Jones also filed a third party
complaint seeking both affirmative relief and
indemnification against Parker I r r i g a t i o n Supply, Inc.,
S i n p s o n Timber Company and B. F. G o o d r i c h Company.
On May 12, 1977, Simpson Timber Company moved to
d i s m i s s t h e t h i r d p a r t y c o m p l a i n t f o r want o f prosecution.
The remaining third party defendants later joined in the
motion. Following a h e a r i n g , t h e m o t i o n was g r a n t e d by t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t on J u n e 7 , 1 9 7 7 .
J o n e s a p p e a l e d t h e o r d e r of d i s m i s s a l t o t h i s C o u r t .
We affirmed the District Court's order on J u n e 28, 1978,
f i n d i n g t h a t J o n e s had f a i l e d t o t a k e a n y s i g n i f i c a n t a c t i o n
towards a f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the case as characterized
by his failure to timely respond to interrogatories and
appear at a scheduled deposition. S e e Calaway v. Jones
( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7 Mont. 516, 582 P.2d 756.
Following t h i s Court's a f f irmation of the dismissal
of J o n e s ' s t h i r d p a r t y complaint, George N. McCabe f i l e d a
motion t o withdraw a s a t t o r n e y of record for Jones. This
motion was granted by the District Court on November 2,
After waiting eight months for Jones to secure
substitute counsel, Calaway, on August 1, 1979, filed a
"Notice to Appoint Counsel or Appear in Person" and a
"Notice of Readiness for Trial." Both notices had been
s e r v e d on J o n e s by t h e C a s c a d e C o u n t y s h e r i f f on J u l y 2 1 ,
1979.
On A u g u s t 6 , 1 9 7 9 , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s s u e d a n o r d e r
f o r p r e t r i a l c o n f e r e n c e and d i r e c t e d t h a t c o p i e s o f t h e same
be s e n t t o t h e r e s p e c t i v e c o u n s e l f o r t h e p a r t i e s . Included
i n t h e o r d e r was t h e f o l l o w i n g p r o v i s i o n :
" T h a t i n e v e n t of a f a i l u r e o f a p a r t y o r
p a r t i e s t o a p p e a r , p u r s u a n t t o t h i s O r d e r , an
ex p a r t e h e a r i n g s h a l l be h e l d and a n
a p p r o p r i a t e Judgment r e n d e r e d o r d i s m i s s a l
ordered, unless continued, pursuant to
r e q u e s t made a t l e a s t 48 h o u r s i n a d v a n c e ,
f o r good c a u s e shown."
Jones's copy of t h e o r d e r was s e n t t o h i s p r e v i o u s
counsel of record, G e o r g e McCabe, even though McCabe had
withdrawn with court approval some nine months earlier.
McCabe, upon r e c e i v i n g t h e o r d e r , s t a t e s h e f o r w a r d e d i t t o
J o n e s by o r d i n a r y m a i l , together with a carbon copy o f a
l e t t e r s e n t t o t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e who s i g n e d t h e o r d e r and a
n o t e s u g g e s t i n g t h a t J o n e s c o n t a c t an a t t o r n e y . The l e t t e r
McCabe s e n t t o t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e was d a t e d A u g u s t 2 0 , 1 9 7 9 .
I t s t a t e d t h a t McCabe had withdrawn a s J o n e s ' s a t t o r n e y of
record and that he was sending a copy of the order for
pretrial conference directly to Jones. McCabe further
t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e o r d e r and accompanying l e t t e r would h a v e
b e e n m a i l e d by h i s s e c r e t a r y a s a m a t t e r o f r o u t i n e .
J o n e s d e n i e s h a v i n g r e c e i v e d any c o r r e s p o n d e n c e from
McCabe o r a copy o f t h e o r d e r f o r p r e t r i a l c o n f e r e n c e .
Jones failed to appear at the September 27, 1979,
pretrial conference. As a result of this failure, the
District Court, on October 1, 1979, issued an order of
judgment i n f a v o r of Calaway and a n o r d e r o f d i s m i s s a l o f
Jones's counterclaim. The judgment was for $10,379.23,
t o g e t h e r w i t h c o s t s and i n t e r e s t a t a r a t e o f 6 p e r c e n t p e r
annum from S e p t e m b e r 1, 1 9 7 1 .
On November 1 5 , 1 9 7 9 , J o n e s moved t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
f o r a n o r d e r s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e judgment and d i s m i s s a l o f h i s
counterclaim. Following a hearing, the District Court
d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n on May 1 6 , 1 9 8 0 . J o n e s now a p p e a l s .
The issue presented for review is whether the
D i s t r i c t Court abused its d i s c r e t i o n i n denying t h e motion
t o s e t a s i d e t h e judgment and o r d e r o f d i s m i s s a l .
The s o l e f a c t p r e s e n t e d t o move t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e
trial court was a contention by Jones that he failed to
r e c e i v e any n o t i c e o f t h e s c h e d u l e d p r e t r i a l c o n f e r e n c e .
Entering a default judgment or dismissal with
prejudice i s a d r a s t i c s a n c t i o n t o impose a s a remedy f o r
f a i l i n g t o attend a p r e t r i a l conference. Consequently, the
t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d o n l y r e s o r t t o s u c h a remedy i n e x t r e m e
s i t u a t i o n s where t h e r e is a c l e a r r e c o r d o f c o n t i n u a l d e l a y ,
a b u s e and d i s r e g a r d o f the court's a u t h o r i t y by t h e e r r a n t
party. S e e S i l a s v. S e a r s , Roebuck & Co., Inc. (5th Cir.
1 9 7 8 ) , 586 F.2d 382; L i n k v. Wabash R a i l r o a d Company ( 1 9 6 2 ) ,
370 U.S. 626, 82 S . C t . 1 3 8 6 , 8 L. Ed. 2d 734, r e h . d e n i e d 371
U.S. 8 7 3 , 83 S . C t . 1 1 5 , 9 L. Ed. 2d 112.
Throughout this action Jones has displayed an
a t t i t u d e of unresponsiveness. Such a t t i t u d e i s e v i d e n c e d by
Jones's failure to timely respond to interrogatories; to
a p p e a r a t d e p o s i t i o n s ; and i n h i s f a i l u r e t o s e e k s u b s t i t u t e
c o u n s e l f o r more t h a n e i g h t m o n t h s a f t e r h i s f i r s t a t t o r n e y
had withdrawn. Based upon t h i s d i s r e g a r d of the judicial
process and an apparent inclination to delay the timely
resolution of this action, the District Court would have
been w i t h i n t h e p e r m i s s i b l e r a n g e of d i s c r e t i o n i n imposing
s a n c t i o n s o f d e f a u l t and d i s m i s s a l f o r f a i l i n g t o a t t e n d t h e
pretrial conference if Jones received notice of the
c o n f e r e n c e and h i s r e q u i r e d a t t e n d a n c e .
The e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g t h e n o t i c e was c o n f l i c t i n g .
I n r e v i e w i n g t h e s u b m i t t e d r e c o r d , however, i n a l i g h t most
f a v o r a b l e t o Calaway a s t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y and i n r e l a t i o n
to Jones's continual unresponsive attitude, we conclude
t h e r e is s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s
finding t h a t Jones received information concerning t h e t i m e
and p l a c e o f the p r e t r i a l conference. W e f i n d no a b u s e of
discretion.
The judgment i n f a v o r o f Calaway and t h e d i s m i s s a l o f
Jones's counterclaim a s e n t e r e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a r e
hereby affirmed.
W concur:
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