Bd. of County Comm Rs v. Fourth Jud

No. 82-285
I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E S T A T E O F MONTANA
1983
THE BOARD O F COUNTY C O M M I S S I O N E R S
O F R A V A L L I C O U N T Y , MONTANA,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE D I S T R I C T COURT OF THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, e t al.,
Respondents.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING:
C o u n s e l of Record:
F o r P e t i t i o n e r :
R o b e r t Brown, County Attorney, Hamilton, Montana
For R e s p o n d e n t s :
John W . R o b i n s o n , Hamilton, Montana
Koch, McKenna & Goheen, Hamilton, Montana
F i l e d :
r t tj 2 4 '983
Mr. Justice John Conway H a r r i s o n delivered t h e O p i n i o n of the
Court.
T h i s a c t i o n i s b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t on a w r i t of r e v i e w by t h e
Ravalli County commissioners. The commissioners were held in
c o n t e m p t by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f the Fourth J u d i c i a l District
f o r v i o l a t i n g an o r d e r i s s u e d i n a c i v i l a c t i o n e n t i t l e d D e l b e r t
Carter, et al. v. A r t h u r J. Hoiland, et al., number DV-79-430,
f i l e d i n R a v a l l i County.
The s o u r c e o f t h e s e p r o c e e d i n g s is a d e d i c a t e d r o a d r i g h t - o f -
way i n M o u n t a i n V i e w O r c h a r d s d e s c r i b e d as a f i f t y - f o o t s t r i p of
l a n d r u n n i n g e a s t and w e s t b e t w e e n B l o c k s 7 and 1 0 , M o u n t a i n V i e w
Orchards, S e c t i o n 1 4 , Township 7 N o r t h , Range 20 West. On J u l y
30, 1979, fifteen landowners filed a petition to vacate the
r i g h t - o f -way w i t h t h e R a v a l l i County c o m m i s s i o n e r s . The p e t i t i o n
a s k e d t h a t t h e d e d i c a t e d , b u t n o t y e t opened r o a d , be a b a n d o n e d .
On A u g u s t 7, 1 9 7 9 , t h i r t e e n l a n d o w n e r s f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r remo-
val of road obstructions. The petition asked the dedicated
right-of-way be o p e n e d and t h a t a r o a d be c o n s t r u c t e d i n a c c o r -
dance with the o r i g i n a l p l a t .
On A u g u s t 9 , 1 9 7 9 , t h e m i n u t e s o f t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r s ' m e e t i n g
reflect the two p e t i t i o n s were d i s c u s s e d and t h e commissioners
decided not t o t a k e a c t i o n on e i t h e r p e t i t i o n , concluding they
were i n d i r e c t c o n t r a s t w i t h e a c h o t h e r . On S e p t e m b e r 1 0 , 1 9 7 9 ,
t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r s i s s u e d a memorandum a g a i n s t a t i n g t h e y were n o t
g o i n g t o act on e i t h e r p e t i t i o n .
On November 7, 1979, the Carters filed a complaint in
District C o u r t s e e k i n g t o e n j o i n a n y o b s t r u c t i o n of t h e u s e of
the above-mentioned dedicated r i g h t - o f -way. Defendants in the
a c t i o n a p p e a r t o be i n d i v i d u a l s who own l a n d n e a r o r a d j a c e n t to
t h e right-of-way. A l l p a r t i e s moved f o r summary j u d g m e n t and o n
June 12, 1981, the D i s t r i c t Court granted d e f e n d a n t s t motion f o r
summary judgment. Defendants then filed a motion in aid of
judgment s e e k i n g c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h e District C o u r t ' s o r d e r . On
August 13, 1981, the District Court issued a second order
granting the commissioners authority to d o o n e o f two things:
r e t a i n the s u b j e c t land i n t r u s t f o r the public, o r return the
land to t h e g r a n t o r s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t f u r t h e r o r d e r e d that
the commissioners did not have discretion to "do any other
t h i n g s , i n c l u d i n g opening t h e land ."
On O c t o b e r 3 0 , 1 9 8 1 , t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r s i s s u e d an o r d e r pur-
suant to the o r d e r of t h e District Court granting defendants'
motion for summary judgment entered June 12, 1981. The
commissioners ' order stated : the dedicated roadway had been
inspected by Commissioners Frank Williams and County Surveyor
L a r r y H i g g i n b o t h a m and t h e r e p o r t o f t h e i n s p e c t i o n was f i l e d o n
J u n e 29, 1 9 8 1 ; n o t i c e was g i v e n t o t h e a d j o i n i n g l a n d o w n e r s by
c e r t i f i e d mail and to t h e p u b l i c by p u b l i c a t i o n ; and, a public
h e a r i n g on t h e p e t i t i o n s was h e l d o n A u g u s t 4 , 1981. The com-
m i s s i o n e r s e n t e r e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w and
ordered: t h e p e t i t i o n f o r v a c a t i o n of t h e roadway is d e n i e d ; a n y
encroachments that i n t e r f e r e with the unencumbered use of the
l a n d s b y t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c be removed; a n y u s e o f the premises
s h a l l be n o n e x l u s i v e and s h a l l n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e u s e by a n y
o t h e r person; and t h e p r o p e r t y s h a l l be h e l d in t r u s t for the
p u b l i c by t h e Board o f County C o m m i s s i o n e r s f o r f u t u r e d e v e l o p -
m e n t f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c .
On November 1 9 , 1 9 8 1 , d e f e n d a n t s moved t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r
a contempt o r d e r a g a i n s t t h e commissioners. On J u n e 2 5 , 1982,
t h e District Court i s s u e d an o r d e r holding t h e commissioners i n
civil contempt for failure to abide by the District Court's
o r d e r s o f J u n e 1 2 and A u g u s t 1 3 , 1 9 8 1 . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t f i n e d
t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r s $300 and o r d e r e d them t o p a y a t t o r n e y f e e s f o r
t h e contempt proceeding. The o r d e r g a v e t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r s o p p o r -
t u n i t y to p u r g e t h e m s e l v e s o f t h e c o n t e m p t c i t a t i o n by r e v o k i n g
t h e October 30, 1981, o r d e r w i t h i n t h i r t y days. On A u g u s t 3 ,
1982, t h e commissioners f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r w r i t of review i n
t h i s Court.
The p e t i t i o n r a i s e s f i v e i s s u e s f o r r e v i e w :
1. Whether the District Court had jurisdiction over the
petitioners;
2. W h e t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t had j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e s u b -
ject matter of the p e t i t i o n e r s ' jurisdictional powers and title
t o t h e roadway;
3. W h e t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c a n l i m i t s t a t u t o r y powers o f
e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s w i t h o u t g i v i n g t h e e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s t h e oppor-
t u n i t y to a p p e a r and o f f e r t e s t i m o n y ;
4. W h e t h e r t h e p e t i t i o n e r s c a n be h e l d i n contempt without
an evidentiary hearing;
5. W h e t h e r a t t o r n e y f e e s c a n be g r a n t e d i n a contempt pro-
c e e d i n g i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e p e n a l t y imposed.
We find issue number two to be dispositive. The com-
m i s s i o n e r s contend t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t have s u b j e c t matter
jurisdiction to enter an order which in effect abandoned the
roadway. Here, t h e d e d i c a t e d roadway was i n c l u d e d i n t h e o r i g i -
n a l p l a t of Mountain V i e w Orchards f i l e d i n 1908. The r e l e v a n t
statute in effect at the t i m e of d e d i c a t i o n was s e c t i o n 1 3 3 7 ,
R e v i s e d C o d e s o f Montana 1 9 0 7 . The s e c t i o n s t a t e s i n p e r t i n e n t
part:
" A l l highways, r o a d s , streets, a l l e y s ,
laid out ... by the public . . ., ...
or i f l a i d
o u t o r e r e c t e d b y o t h e r s , d e d i c a t e d o r aban-
doned to t h e p u b l i c , . . . are public
highways. "
I n B a i l e y v . R a v a l l i County ( 1 9 8 2 ) f Mont . - , 6 5 3 P.2d
1 3 9 , 39 S t . R e p . 2010, t h i s Court h e l d a s i m i l a r d e d i c a t e d roadway
c r e a t e d a p u b l i c r o a d w a y o r highway a t t h e t i m e of d e d i c a t i o n .
S e c t i o n 7-14-2615 MCA, s t a t e s :
" ( 1 ) A l l county r o a d s once e s t a b l i s h e d must
c o n t i n u e t o be c o u n t y r o a d s u n t i l abandoned or
v a c a t e d by :
"(a) o p e r a t i o n of l a w ;
"(b) judgment of a court of competent
j u r i s d i c t i o n ; or
"(c) t h e o r d e r of t h e board.
" ( 2 ) No o r d e r t o a b a n d o n a n y c o u n t y r o a d
s h a l l be v a l i d u n l e s s p r e c e d e d b y n o t i c e and
public hearing. "
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t a r g u e s it had j u r i s d i c t i o n t o a b a n d o n t h e
r o a d v i a s e c t i o n 7 - 1 4 - 2 6 1 5 ( 1 ) ( b ) , MCA, b e c a u s e it is a c o u r t of
competent jurisdiction. However, section 7-14-2601, et seq.,
MCA, e s t a b l i s h e s t h e p r o c e d u r e t o abandon a r o a d . The s t a t u t o r y
procedure requires the f i l i n g of a p e t i t i o n by t e n freeholders
with the Board of County Commissioners; investigation by the
B o a r d ; d e c i s i o n ; and n o t i c e t o t h e a d j o i n i n g l a n d o w n e r s .
Here , t h e r e were t w o p e t i t i o n s f i l e d . One to o p e n t h e r o a d
and one to abandon t h e road. At the commissioners I meeting t h e
m i n u t e s r e f l e c t t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r s was to n o t a c t
on e i t h e r p e t i t i o n . At t h i s point the Carters filed a civil
action i n District Court seeking t o e n j o i n o b s t r u c t i o n of the
road. However, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t s 1 m o t i o n f o r
summary j u d g m e n t and o r d e r e d t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r s to d o o n e of two
things: "1. Retain the subject land i n t r u s t f o r the public;
2. Return the land to t h e g r a n t o r s . The C o m m i s s i o n e r s d o n o t
have discretion to do any o t h e r t h i n g s , including opening the
land. "
The e f f e c t o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s o r d e r was t o a b a n d o n t h e
road whereas the initial cause of a c t i o n was injunction. As
e x p l a i n e d a b o v e , t h e p r o c e d u r e f o r abandoning a road is t o p e t i -
tion the Board o f Commissioners. The D i s t r i c t Court does not
have o r i g i n a l jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Should
petitioners o r r e s p o n d e n t s be unsatisfied w i t h t h e d e c i s i o n of
the commissioners , they could then p e t i t ion the District Court
f o r a w r i t o f r e v i e w p u r s u a n t to s e c t i o n 27-25-102, MCA:
"A w r i t o f r e v i e w may be g r a n t e d b y : (2) the
s u p r e m e c o u r t or t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t o r a n y
j u d g e t h e r e o f , when a n ... board
e x c e e d e d t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of s u c h . .. . .
has
.
board
. . . and t h e r e i s no a p p e a l o r , i n t h e
j u d g m e n t o f t h e c o u r t , a n y p l a i n s p e e d y , and
a d e q u a t e remedy. "
Upon a w r i t o f r e v i e w t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t would become a c o u r t of
competent j u r i s d i c t i o n .
W e f i n d t h i s t o be t h e o n l y method f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t to
o b t a i n j u r i s d i c t i o n to abandon a r o a d . Here, t h i s p r o c e d u r e was
not followed. As the proper procedure was not followed, the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o o r d e r a b a n d o n m e n t of
t h e road. The c o m m i s s i o n e r s c l a i m t h e y c a n n o t be h e l d i n con-
t e m p t f o r v i o l a t i n g a n o r d e r which e x c e e d e d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s
jurisdiction. W e agree. A p a r t y c a n n o t be h e l d i n contempt f o r
d i s o b e y i n g an o r d e r which the c o u r t had n o a u t h o r i t y to make.
P h i l l i p s v. Loberg ( 1 9 8 0 ) , -- - Mont . - r 6 0 7 P.2d 561, 564, 37
Because the ~ i s t r i c tCourt exceeded its jurisdiction by
o r d e r i n g t h e r o a d a b a n d o n e d , i t had no a u t h o r i t y to h o l d t h e com-
missioners i n contempt f o r v i o l a t i n g t h e o r d e r . Therefore, the
o r d e r h o l d i n g t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r s i n c o n t e m p t is v a c a t e d .
Justices
M r . J u s t i c e J o h n C . S h e e h y d i s s e n t s and w i l l f i l e a
written dissent later.
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting:
I dissent. The Board of County Commissioners of Ravalli
County are in contempt of the presiding judge and of the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State
of Montana for the County of Ravalli, and this Court should
uphold the right of that District Court to protect its
process and proceedings from obstruction and disruption by
the contemnors.
In the underlying suit to determine whether a roadway
existed, the District Court had concluded that a roadway had
indeed been dedicated to the public use; that since the time
of its dedication, no use as a roadway had occurred; that by
its lack of use for more than 70 years, the public had
abandoned any right to have the dedicated stip used as a
roadway; and because of the absolute waiver that had so
occurred the county commissioners could either (1) continue
to hold the land in public trust, or (2) vacate the roadway.
The board of county commissioners violated, obstructed
and disrupted the proceedings and decision of the District
Court in the underlying cause by adopting a resolution contra
to the order of the court, and in effect countermanding the
decree of the court that the landowners had no right to a
roadway.
It is true that the Board of County Commissioners were
not parties to the action in which the court made its
decision. What the majority forgets, however, is that an
action for contempt is a separate cause of action. Contempt
proceedings are entirely independent of the civil action for
which they arise. McPartlin v. Fransen (1978), 178 Mont.
178, 582 P.2d 1255. The power of the District Court reaches
to any person or officer who is in contempt of the authority
of the court by misbehavior in office or by any other
unla.wfu1 interference with the process or proceedings of a
court. Section 3-1-501, MCA.
Here the District Court, after hearing, determined that
the commissioners were in fact in contempt of the court's
authority and levied a punishment of $300 on each and
attorney's fees, which punishment they could purge by
vacating the contemptuous order which they had made. The
majority fails to note in is statement of facts that one of
the commissioners who signed the contemptuous order was Hugh
G. Cumming, a nearby landowner who would benefit from the
County Commissioners' order that the roadway be maintained.
I can think of no more contemptuous situation than to have a.
public officer for his personal benefit use the power of his
office to flaunt a lawful decision of the District Court.
This Court's decision leaves the respondents in a legal
no-man's land. They have a judgment from the Fourth Judicial
District Court that there has been a waiver by the public of
any right to use the strip of land as a roadway. They have a
Board of County Commissioners' subsequent order which has the
effect of establishing the roadway. It is small wonder tha.t
taxpayers and litigants are perplexed by decisions of the
courts that in the guise of reasoned approaches can sanctify
two exactly divergent results.
\ Justice