Matter of S.C.

May 28 2013
DA 12-0468
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2013 MT 140IN THE MATTER OF:
S.C.,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DI 06-111B
Honorable Robert B Allison, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Wade Zolynski, Chief Appellate Defender, Kristen L. Larson, Assistant
Appellate Defender; Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Tammy K Plubell, Assistant
Attorney General; Helena, Montana
Ed Corrigan, Flathead County Attorney; Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 6, 2013
Decided: May 28, 2013
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Brian Morris delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Appellant S.C. appeals from a determination in the Eleventh Judicial District Court,
Flathead County to grant the State of Montana’s (State) petition to extend S.C.’s involuntary
outpatient mental health treatment plan. S.C. alleges that the State failed to comply with the
timeliness requirements necessary to extend the plan as provided in § 53-21-198, MCA. We
reverse.
¶2 We address the following issue on appeal:
¶3 Whether the District Court properly granted the State’s third request to extend S.C.’s
involuntary treatment plan?
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶4 Local police officers brought S.C. to the Kalispell Regional Medical Center’s
emergency room on September 20, 2011. S.C. appeared to be suffering from significant
depression and disorganization of thought activity. Katie Henley (Henley), a psychiatric
nurse practitioner for the Western Montana Mental Health Center, met with S.C. to observe
S.C.’s behavior. Henley observed that S.C.’s mental condition had deteriorated from a point
that Henley had determined to be S.C.’s “baseline.” The Kalispell Regional Medical Center
transferred S.C. to the Pathways Treatment Center.
¶5 Dr. James Rougle (Dr. Rougle), a psychiatrist at the Pathways Treatment Center,
evaluated S.C. Among other things, Dr. Rougle interviewed S.C.’s father (Father). Father
reported that S.C. had become increasingly paranoid. Father reported that S.C. heard voices.
Father increasingly feared S.C. Father felt unsafe with S.C. living at home. Dr. Rougle
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diagnosed S.C. as bipolar. Dr. Rougle also determined that S.C was suffering from an
episode of depression. Dr. Rougle concluded that S.C.’s depression was making it extremely
difficult for S.C. to maintain his baseline mental state.
¶6 The District Court conducted a hearing on October 6, 2011. Dr. Rougle testified that
S.C. was incapable of meeting his own needs. Dr. Rougle recommended that S.C. be
committed to the Montana State Hospital (MSH) so that S.C. could receive proper medical
care to allow him to return to his baseline. Dr. Rougle further testified that MSH provided
the least restrictive environment where someone could look after S.C.’s daily needs. Father
testified that he locked his bedroom door at night because he feared what S.C. might do.
Father reiterated that he was unwilling to allow S.C. to return home until S.C.’s mental state
improved.
¶7 The District Court determined that S.C. should be committed involuntarily to MSH.
The court ordered that S.C.’s period of commitment was “not to exceed ninety days, unless
extended as provided by law.” S.C.’s commitment was to expire on January 6, 2012.
¶8 The State conditionally released S.C. from MSH on December 9, 2011. The
conditions of S.C.’s release included that he attend sessions three days a week at the Western
Montana Mental Health Center in Kalispell. The State further required that S.C. continue to
take his prescribed medication.
¶9 The State filed the first petition to extend S.C.’s conditional release on January 11,
2012. S.C.’s commitment period had expired five days earlier on January 6, 2012. S.C. did
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not request a hearing or challenge the State’s petition. The District Court granted the petition
to extend S.C.’s release conditions for a period of 90 days through April 6, 2012.
¶10 The State filed a second untimely petition to extend S.C.’s conditional release on
March 29, 2012. Section 53-21-198(2), MCA, requires that any petition to extend must be
filed “[n]ot less than 2 calendar weeks” before the expiration of a person’s detention or
extension period. The State’s petition should have been filed no later than March 23, 2012.
S.C. again did not request a hearing or challenge the State’s petition. The District Court
granted the State’s petition to extend S.C.’s release conditions for 90 additional days through
July 6, 2012.
¶11 The State filed a third untimely petition to extend S.C.’s conditional release on June
27, 2012. Section 53-21-198(2), MCA, required that the State file its motion to extend no
later than June 22, 2012. This time S.C. requested a hearing to challenge the State’s petition.
The Office of Public Defender represented S.C. at the July 6, 2012, hearing. S.C. argued
that the State’s third petition to extend S.C.’s commitment period failed to comply with the
timeliness requirements set forth in § 53-21-198, MCA. The District Court granted the
State’s petition after the hearing. The court extended S.C.’s release conditions through
October 6, 2012. S.C. appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶12 Whether the District Court properly granted the State’s third request to extend S.C.’s
involuntary treatment plan?
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¶13 The State concedes that it failed to comply with the time requirements provided in
§ 53-21-198, MCA. The State argues, however, that S.C. should be required to show that the
State’s failure to comply with the time requirements caused prejudice to S.C. S.C. contends
that the State’s failure to comply with the time requirements set forth in § 53-21-198, MCA,
represents the lesser of the State’s omissions. S.C. argues that the State’s failure to file its
first motion to extend S.C.’s conditional release until after the expiration of S.C.’s
commitment period deprived the District Court of the authority to extend the conditions of
S.C’s release.
¶14 Section 53-21-198(2), MCA, clearly sets forth that any petition to extend must be
filed “[n]ot less than 2 calendar weeks” before the expiration of a person’s detention or
extension period. We evaluated the mandates of the statute in In re Morlock, 261 Mont. 499,
862 P.2d 415 (1993). Morlock had been committed to the Montana Development Center
(MDC). The district court granted an untimely petition to extend Morlock’s commitment
after the expiration of Morlock’s original commitment period. Morlock filed a motion to
dismiss the petition as untimely under § 53-20-128, MCA (1993). Neither party disputed
that the recommitment petition had been filed untimely. Morlock, 261 Mont. at 500, 862
P.2d at 416.
¶15 The Court determined that Montana’s civil commitment laws are to be “strictly
followed.” Morlock, 261 Mont. at 501, 862 P.2d at 416. The legislature provided that a
petition for recommitment could be granted “only if renewal of the commitment order is
requested at least 15 days before the expiration of the commitment order.” Morlock, 261
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Mont. at 501, 862 P.2d at 416 [internal citations omitted]. The Court interpreted the time
period attached to the filing requirement as “mandatory.” Morlock, 261 Mont. at 501, 862
P.2d at 416. The Court further provided that the State’s failure to comply with the time
requirements left the District Court “without authority to recommit Morlock.” Morlock, 261
Mont. at 501, 862 P.2d at 416.
¶16 The State likens the “[n]ot less than 2 calendar weeks” requirement of § 53-21-198(2),
MCA, to the numerous filing or notice deadlines of the type addressed in BNSF Ry. v.
Cringle, 2010 MT 290, ¶ 13, 359 Mont. 20, 247 P.3d 706. We determined that “none of the
judicially or statutorily created procedural deadlines deprive a district court of subject matter
jurisdiction.” BNSF Ry., ¶ 17. This argument fails to address, however, the State’s failure to
file its first petition to extend S.C. conditions of release until after S.C.’s period of
commitment had expired.
¶17 The period for S.C.’s commitment expired on January 6, 2012. The State waited until
January 11, 2012, to file its first petition to extend S.C.’s conditional release. The State
argues that S.C. waived this defect due to his failure to object to the State’s first untimely
petition. The expiration of S.C.’s commitment period ended the case. Nothing remained for
S.C. to waive. The State remained free at that point to file a new petition for involuntary
commitment. The expiration of S.C.’s commitment period, however, left the District Court
with no proceeding over which it could exercise continuing jurisdiction.
¶18 Consequently, the District Court was “without authority” to extend the period of
S.C.’s conditions of release when the State filed the second and third petitions. Morlock, 261
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Mont. at 501, 862 P.2d at 416. The “[n]ot less than two calendar weeks” filing deadline
could be construed in the nature of a categorical time bar that would be subject to forfeiture
and waiver. The 90-day statutory commitment period could not. The expiration of the 90-
day statutory commitment period leaves a court without power to take further action. See
State v. Tison, 2003 MT 342, ¶ 15, 318 Mont. 465, 81 P.3d 471 (determining that expiration
of the 90-day commitment period prescribed by § 46-14-221, MCA, left the district court
without authority to take further action).
¶19 The District Court’s lack of authority to extend the period of S.C.’s conditions of
release applies, in turn, to the State’s second petition of March 29, 2012, and the State’s third
petition of June 27, 2012. As a result, we must vacate the District Court’s orders of April 4,
2012, and July 6, 2012, that granted the State’s second and third petitions. We emphasize
that the State remains free to file a new petition to seek S.C.’s involuntary commitment. Any
attempts by the State to extend or modify a future voluntary commitment must be filed
within the time periods set forth in § 53-21-198, MCA.
¶20 Reversed.
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
We concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
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