Marriage of Hamilton

No. 94-495
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1995
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
WILLIAM R. HAMILTON,
Petitioner and Respondent,
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and for the County of Flathead,
The Honorable Ted 0. Lympus, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Paula Johnson-Martin, Attorney at Law,
Whitefish, Montana
For Respondent:
Bruce McEvoy; Warden Christiansen, Johnson & Berg,
Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 12, 1995
Decided: February 14, 1995
Filed:
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Kathleen D. Hamilton (Kathleen) appeals from the findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and decree entered in the Eleventh
Judicial District Court, Flathead County, dissolving her marriage
to William R. Hamilton (William). We affirm.
The issue Kathleen presents is essentially: whether the
District Court erred in its distribution of property.
On January 29, 1984, just prior to their marriage, Kathleen
and William signed an antenuptial agreement. The agreement was
prepared by William. Neither party was represented by an attorney
in the preparation or signing of the document. The agreement
stated that William's trust fund (worth between $400,000 and
$500,000) , pickup truck, and boat would all remain his separate
property. The agreement stated that Kathleen's car would remain
her separate property. It also contained a mutual waiver of
spousal support, and an agreement to split marital debts equally
between the parties.
William's trust fund was established after William's father
died in 1972. William's mother was the primary beneficiary and
William was the secondary beneficiary. After his mother's death,
in 1991, William became the sole trust beneficiary. Kathleen and
William were married on February 14, 1984 in Monterey County,
California.
Shortly after their marriage, the parties moved to Whitefish,
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Montana. When the parties first moved to Whitefish, William seldom
worked, but as years passed he worked an increasing amount.
Kathleen worked full time as a licensed practical nurse after
arriving in Whitefish, and attempted to work full time throughout
the marriage.
William's mother lived with the parties for a few years before
they became concerned that they could not give her the care she
required. While his mother was alive, William had liberal powers
to draw on the trust. He did so to provide for his mother's care,
and for the benefit of both himself and Kathleen. The parties
lived off their incomes and money generated by the trust fund.
On June 26, 1992, William filed a petition for dissolution.
In the petition, William alleged that the antenuptial agreement
equitably divided the parties' property mentioned in the agreement,
and requested an equitable division of property accumulated during
the marriage. On September 17, 1992, Kathleen filed her response
in which she denied that the antenuptial agreement was valid and
binding. She requested an equitable division of all marital
property. On February 16, 1993, Kathleen filed an amended response
to William's petition. She included a request for spousal support
which was not included in her original response.
William moved for partial summary judgment on December 21,
1992. He asked the court to determine that the property mentioned
in the antenuptial agreement be distributed in accordance with the
agreement. On May 12, 1993, the court denied William's motion on
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the basis that the antenuptial agreement was signed in I984 and
Montana did not adopt the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act until
1987. Instead, the court held that the antenuptial agreement, if
conscionable, was only one factor to consider in the distribution
of marital property.
The court held a hearing on the dissolution on September 13,
1993. On July 11, 1994, the court entered its findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and decree. The court found that it was
equitable to return to William his remaining pre-marital
properties, inherited properties, and properties traceable to the
trust. After the parties separated but prior to the entry of
dissolution, Kathleen had received $18,000 from a joint bank
account and an account containing the proceeds from the sale of the
Whitefish home. The court allowed her to retain this money. In
addition, the court awarded Kathleen a car paid for by trust monies
as a replacement for her car that was mentioned in the antenuptial
agreement. The court made William and Kathleen responsible for
credit card debt of $7,000 and $4,600 respectively. It also denied
Kathleen's claim for spousal support as she was able to support
herself through appropriate employment. Kathleen appeals.
The sole issue we consider on appeal is whether the District
Court erred in distributing the marital estate.
We review divisions of marital property to determine whether
the district court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. In re
Marriage of Nordberg (1994), 265 Mont. 352, 358, 877 P.2d 987, 991
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(citations omitted). Absent an abuse of discretion, this Court
will uphold the district court's decision if substantial credible
evidence supports the court's findings and judgment. Marriaqe of
Nordberq, 877 P.2d at 991.
Kathleen specifically contends that the District Court erred
by only allowing her to retain $10,000 of the proceeds from the
sale of their Whitefish home, and $8,000 she received from a joint
account. We disagree.
Section 40-4-202(l), MCA, states in relevant part:
In dividing property acquired prior to the marriage;
property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
property acquired in exchange for property acquired
before the marriage or in exchange for property acquired
by gift, bequest, devise, or descent; the increased value
of property acquired prior to marriage; and property
acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation,
the court shall consider those contributions of the other
spouse to the marriage, including:
(a) the nonmonetary contribution of a homemaker;
(b) the extent to which such contributions have
facilitated the maintenance of this property; and
(c) whether or not the property division serves as
an alternative to maintenance arrangements.
We have stated that " It1 hose assets belonging to a spouse prior to
a marriage, or acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent during
the marriage are not part of the marital estate unless the [other]
spouse made contributions in the preservation or interest in that
property." Marriage of Nordberq, 877 P.2d at 992; citing In re
Marriage of Smith (1994), 264 Mont. 306, 871 P.2d 884
The Whitefish home was purchased with monies traceable to the
trust. The Whitefish home sold for about $269,000; about $70,000
of which was gain. Kathleen testified that her father helped out
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where he could in the construction of the house and that she and
her mother cleaned up after the construction crew on weekends and
did other odds and ends. The District Court found that Kathleen
had contributed somewhat to the construction and maintenance of the
home. It found that the $10,000 she received from the proceeds
from the sale of the home was sufficient compensation for her
efforts toward the home. We hold that substantial credible
evidence exists to support the District Court's finding and award.
The joint account contained stock originally owned by the
trust. William liquidated some of the stock to pay marital debts
and other expenses. At the time of dissolution, the account
contained cash and stocks worth approximately $35,500. The
District Court found that Kathleen had not contributed to the
account. Kathleen received $8,000 from the account prior to the
dissolution. The court allowed Kathleen to retain the $8,000. The
court also found that the assets remaining in the account were
premarital and inherited property which would be returned to
William.
There is sufficient evidence in the record to support findings
that Kathleen did not contribute to the joint account, and that any
actions she took which helped maintain the account were
sufficiently compensated when she received $8,000 from the account.
We hold that the District Court sufficiently considered the
factors listed in § 40-4-202(l), MCA, and did not abuse its
discretion in distributing the marital estate. Affirmed.
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Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court
1988 Internal Operating Rules, this decision shall not be cited as
precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public document
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its result
to Montana Law Week, State Reporter and West Publishing Company.
&#&& Justice/
We concur:
February 14, 1995
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following certified order was sent by United States mail, prepaid,
to the following named:
Paula Johnson-Martin
Attorney at Law
6336 Highway 93 So.
Whitefish, MT 59937
Bruce McEvoy, Esq.
Warden, Christiansen, Johnson & Berg
P.O. Box 3038
Kalispell, MT 59903-3038
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MONTANA