Matter of S.G.-H.M. Jr., A Youth.

07/13/2021
DA 19-0199
Case Number: DA 19-0199
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2021 MT 176IN THE MATTER OF
S.G.-H.M., JR.,
A Youth.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause No. DJ 06-07
Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Kristen L. Peterson, Assistant Appellate
Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Andrew J. Cziok, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
William E. Fulbright, Ravalli County Attorney, Hamilton, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 5, 2021
Decided: July 13, 2021
Filed:
Vir-641.-if
__________________________________________
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 S.G.-H.M. challenges an October 10, 2018 order denying his motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction. We reverse.
¶2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows:
Whether a court retains jurisdiction over a youth court proceeding after the youth
reaches the age of 25 if the court does not transfer jurisdiction pursuant to
§ 41-5-1605(3), MCA.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 S.G.-H.M. was born in June 1990. In 2006, When S.G.-H.M. was 16 years old, his
mother found a gallon container of acetone, a small container labeled as sodium nitrate, a
bottle labeled “napalm,” and binders containing handwritten instructions for making
various explosives in S.G.-H.M.’s room. The State filed a petition in youth court to proceed
under the Extended Jurisdiction Prosecution Act (EJPA), charging S.G.-H.M. with
possession of explosives, in violation of § 45-8-335(1)(a), MCA, and criminal
endangerment, in violation of § 45-5-207, MCA. S.G.-H.M. admitted to these charges. A
presentence investigation (PSI) concluded that S.G.-H.M. was a “potentially volatile young
man” but was believed to have “excellent potential if a treatment package can be put
together to meet his multiple and pressing needs” to allow him to “grow up healthy and
happy and not be a threat to the community.” On November 22, 2006, the Judge held a
dispositional hearing and subsequently found S.G.-H.M. to be a serious juvenile offender
and delinquent youth under § 41-5-103, MCA. Pursuant to statute, S.G.-H.M. received a
juvenile disposition consisting of both a juvenile sentence and an adult sentence. The
juvenile sentence consisted of formal probation until he reached the age of 23 (a period
2
consisting of approximately six and a half years), subject to 28 conditions. The adult
sentence consisted of a six-year deferred imposition of sentence on each charge, to run
concurrently, subject to 29 conditions. The court also ordered, pursuant to § 41-5-1604,
MCA, that the execution of the adult sentence was stayed on the condition that S.G.-H.M.
not violate the provisions of his juvenile disposition and not commit a new offense.
¶4 Less than three months before S.G.-H.M.’s juvenile probation was set to expire in
2013, the State filed a petition to revoke, alleging various violations of the conditions of
S.G.-H.M.’s sentence. On July 10, 2013, S.G.-H.M., now age 23, admitted to having been
cited for possession of alcohol and vagrancy in 2010 and to failing to provide
documentation of completion of a chemical dependency assessment and a substance abuse
program. The Judge “implemented the adult sentence in a modified form,” imposing two
three-year deferred sentences to run concurrently, subject to the same conditions as those
imposed upon the original stayed adult sentences in 2006. At a hearing, the Judge inquired
whether “this will be under the supervision of Adult Probation and Parole,” to which the
parties agreed. The record does not show any court order transferring the matter from
Youth Court to District Court or any discussion regarding jurisdiction over S.G.-H.M.
¶5 A few months later, the State filed a second petition to revoke. S.G.-H.M. admitted
to violations of conditions of his sentence—that he had tested positive for
methamphetamine, had been in possession of alcohol, had attempted to purchase illegal
drugs, and had given false identification to law enforcement. On January 29, 2014, the
Judge revoked S.G.-H.M.’s deferred adult sentences, and sentenced S.G.-H.M. to five
years Department of Corrections (DOC) custody with two years suspended, upon the
3
previous conditions. The court denied any “probation time credit.” The judgment set forth
that “supervisory responsibility for [S.G-H.M.] remains transferred from Juvenile
Probation Services to the Montana Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole
Bureau.”
¶6 S.G.-H.M. turned 25 in 2015, while serving the custodial portion of the 2014
sentence. In October 2017, while S.G-H.M. was serving the probationary portion of the
2014 sentence, the State filed a third petition to revoke, alleging that S.G.-H.M. had missed
an appointment with his parole officer, failed to respond to a contact letter, failed to keep
his home address updated, and left his place of employment without returning. S.G.-H.M.
was 27 years old. S.G.-H.M. filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that
the Youth Court’s jurisdiction over him ended when he reached the age of 25 and that,
since the Judge had not “transfer[red] the case to the district court” under § 41-5-1605(3),
MCA, there was no longer a tribunal with jurisdiction over his case. The Judge denied the
motion, reasoning that jurisdiction had transferred from Youth Court to District Court
automatically at the execution of S.G.-H.M.’s adult sentence in 2013. The case proceeded
to a revocation hearing and the court entered a judgment revoking the suspended portion
of S.G.-H.M.’s sentence. The judgment did not grant credit for street time. S.G.-H.M.
appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7 This Court reviews a decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction for correctness. Comm’r of Political Practices for Mont. v. Bannan,
2015 MT 220, ¶ 7, 380 Mont. 194, 354 P.3d 601. We review criminal sentences for
4
legality, a question of law subject to de novo review. State v. Heath, 2004 MT 126, ¶ 13,
321 Mont. 280, 90 P.3d 426; State v. McCaslin, 2011 MT 221, ¶ 6, 362 Mont. 47, 260 P.3d
403. This Court reviews matters of statutory interpretation for correctness. State v. Felde,
2021 MT 1, ¶ 8, 402 Mont. 391, 478 P.3d 825.
DISCUSSION
¶8 Issue: Whether a court retains jurisdiction over a youth court proceeding after the
youth reaches the age of 25 if the court does not transfer jurisdiction pursuant to
§ 41-5-1605(3), MCA.
¶9 On appeal, S.G.-H.M. renews his argument that no court had the necessary
jurisdiction to sentence him for matters stemming from his 2006 Youth Court proceeding
after he reached the age of 25 in 2015, contending that the Judge failed to transfer the case
to District Court. The EJPA constitutes Part 16 of the Montana Youth Court Act (Youth
Court Act) and allows youth courts to address cases involving youths “alleged to have
committed an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult.” Section 41-5-1602,
MCA. The EJPA provides for a youth court disposition in such cases consisting of a
juvenile disposition and an adult sentence that is “stayed on the condition that the youth
not violate the provisions of the disposition order and not commit a new offense.” Section
41-5-1604(1)(a), MCA.
¶10 Pursuant to the EJPA, a youth court’s jurisdiction terminates when an individual
reaches the age of 25. Section 41-5-205(3), MCA. However, jurisdiction may be
transferred from a youth court to a district court upon revocation of the stay of the adult
sentence. Section 41-5-1605(3), MCA, provides: “Upon revocation and disposition under
subsection (2)(b)(iii), the youth court shall transfer the case to the district court.” Thus, if
5
S.G.-H.M.’s proceeding was “transfer[red] . . . to the district court” at the 2013 revocation,
court jurisdiction over his case could continue beyond the statutory 25-year age limit.
¶11 Section 41-5-1605, MCA, does not define “transfer.” There is nothing in the record
demonstrating that the Judge ordered the case be transferred from Youth Court to District
Court. The State argues that jurisdiction transferred automatically in 2013 when the Judge
lifted the stay on S.G.-H.M.’s 2006 adult sentence. The State notes that the same judge
presided over both the Youth Court and the District Court and argues that the failure to
transfer jurisdiction from himself, as a youth court judge, to himself, as a district court
judge, represents a mere “formal defec[t]” that this court should “loo[k] past.”
¶12 We are not tasked with commenting upon the wisdom of this provision of the EJPA.
In statutory interpretation, “the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what
is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit
what has been inserted.” Section 1-2-101, MCA. The statutory text clearly provides that
the transfer of jurisdiction must be accomplished by the revoking court, stating that, upon
revocation, “the youth court shall transfer the case to the district court.” Section
41-5-1605(3), MCA (emphasis added). The EJPA could have, but does not, provide that,
upon revocation “the case is transferred to the district court.” The statutory text does not
provide for a self-executing transfer but, instead, unambiguously requires a youth court
judge to affirmatively act to move the case to a district court. Whatever act is entailed by
the statutory use of the term “transfer,” it must be something more than nothing.
¶13 The State contends that the Judge implicitly transferred jurisdiction under
§ 41-5-1605(3), MCA, by specifying at the revocation hearing that supervision would be
6
with “Adult Probation and Parole” rather than juvenile probation services.
Section 41-5-1605, MCA, provides that: “Upon transfer, . . . youth court jurisdiction is
terminated. Ongoing supervision of the offender is with the department, rather than the
youth court’s juvenile probation services.” (Emphasis added.) The statute does not suggest
that the act of designating supervision can substitute for the required “transfer”; it simply
describes the consequences of that transfer. Even assuming a court could transfer
jurisdiction without a formal order, jurisdiction is “the court’s fundamental authority to
hear and adjudicate cases or proceedings,” In re A.D.B., 2013 MT 167, ¶ 54, 370 Mont.
422, 305 P.3d 739, and we will not find jurisdiction on the basis of such meager
implications.
¶14 Relatedly, the State argues that the Judge “manifestly presided over S.G.-H.M.’s
case as the district court” by imposing an un-stayed adult sentence in January of 2014—an
action beyond the purview of a youth court under § 41-5-1604(1)(a), MCA. Much like
designating department supervision, this simply demonstrates that the Judge acted like a
district court to whom jurisdiction had been transferred. Behaving as if jurisdiction exists
does not establish that a proper jurisdictional transfer occurred any more than driving a
vehicle establishes that the one has acquired a driver’s license. The State points to no
evidence that the Judge issued any order, made any pronouncement, or took any action that
could be interpreted as fulfilling the statutory requirement that he “transfer the case to the
district court.” Section 41-5-1605(3), MCA.
¶15 Because a youth court’s jurisdiction under the EJPA terminates when the youth
reaches the age of 25 and the Judge did not transfer jurisdiction to a district court, there
7
was no tribunal with jurisdiction over S.G.-H.M.’s case after he turned 25 in 2015. The
Judge had no authority to hear the 2017 revocation proceedings brought against
27-year-old S.G.-H.M. and erred in declining to dismiss the case. The subsequent sentence
is therefore illegal.
¶16 This conclusion is bolstered by our understanding of the purposes of the Youth
Court Act. The Youth Court Act embodies “Montana[’s] recogni[tion] that youths are to
be given special treatment by the courts.” In re Cascade Cty. Dist. Court, 2009 MT 355,
¶ 14, 353 Mont. 194, 219 P.3d 1255. In this way, Montana aligns itself with the “collective
thrust of [United States] Supreme Court jurisprudence . . . recogni[zing] that juveniles are
‘constitutionally different from adults’” for purposes of sentencing. State v. Keefe, 2021
MT 8, ¶ 13, 403 Mont. 1, 478 P.3d 830 (quoting Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __,
136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016)).
¶17 More specifically, the Youth Court Act “promote[s] individual rehabilitation and
allow[s] young people to learn positive lessons from their transgressions.” In re Cascade
Cty. Dist. Court, ¶ 14. The express legislative purposes of the Youth Court Act include
providing for the “mental and physical development” of youths, efforts to “reduce youth
delinquency through a system that does not seek retribution,” providing services “for youth
before they become adult offenders,” and “separating the youth from the parents only when
necessary for the welfare of the youth or for the safety and protection of the community.”
Section 41-5-102, MCA (emphasis added).
¶18 These stated purposes reflect several key underpinnings. First is the moral judgment
that troublesome youths have “diminished culpability,” undercutting the justification for
8
retributive responses and instead demanding care for their welfare. See Montgomery, 577
U.S. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 733 (quotation omitted); § 41-5-102, MCA (creating a “system
that does not seek retribution” and allowing for the separation of a youth from parents “only
when necessary for the welfare of the youth” or community safety). Second is the empirical
assessment that youths have “greater prospects for reform” than their adult counterparts, a
prognosis that buoys hope of avoiding unnecessary entanglement with the criminal justice
system in adulthood. See Montgomery, 577 U.S. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 733 (quotation
omitted); § 41-5-102, MCA (providing for the “mental and physical development” of
youths and services “for youth before they become adult offenders” (emphasis added)).
¶19 Finally, the Youth Court Act vindicates society’s heightened interest in enabling
members of the younger generation “to reach their full potential,” as described by 1972
Constitutional Convention Delegate Monroe while sponsoring Article II, Section 15, of the
Montana Constitution, which specifically protects the rights of persons under 18 years of
age. See Keefe, ¶ 47 (McGrath, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, March 8, 1972, Vol. V,
p. 1750). For instance, the Youth Court Act requires that the relevant records be sealed
upon the youth’s eighteenth birthday, allowing the young person to enter adult society with
a clean slate rather than forever branded by the contact with the justice system and dogged
by the debilitative effects of a record. Section 41-5-216, MCA; see also § 41-5-221, MCA
(providing criminal sanctions for any person who improperly discloses confidential youth
court records).
9
¶20 Essentially, the Youth Court Act provides appropriate responses to youthful
misdeeds more reflective of “transient immaturity” than “irreparable corruption,” without
unnecessary embroilment with a punitive system that will tarnish the youth’s lifetime
potential. See Montgomery, 577 U.S. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (describing as “rare” the
juvenile offender whose misdeed reflects “permanent incorrigibility” or “irreparable
corruption” rather than an “unfortunate yet transient immaturity” (citations omitted)).
¶21 By all appearances, S.G.-H.M. was exactly the sort of youth envisioned by the
Youth Court Act. The nature of his offense is indicative of “transient immaturity” and the
State points to nothing in the record suggesting that S.G.-H.M.’s youthful interest in
explosives has accompanied him into adulthood. The 2006 PSI determined that S.G.-H.M.
had “excellent potential” and could, if given the proper tools, be expected to “grow up
healthy and happy and not be a threat to his community.” We therefore find it difficult to
reconcile our understanding of the purpose of the Youth Court Act with the fact that
S.G.-H.M., at the age of 27, was still under supervision and facing criminal proceedings
stemming from this event.
¶22 S.G.-H.M. appears to have become entrapped in an endless cycle of supervision and
conditions imposed as penalties for violations of prior conditions. Since 2006, S.G.-H.M.
has been subject to dozens of various conditions ranging from keeping “his parent(s)
informed of his whereabouts and activities at all times” and “abid[ing] by the rules of his
home” to forfeiting his privacy rights, paying a myriad of fees and costs, observing curfews
and restrictions on residence and travel, abstaining from alcohol and drugs, completing
various counseling programs, reporting to his probation officer, seeking and maintaining
10
employment, obtaining permission “before financing or purchasing a vehicle, property, or
engaging in business,” and complying with all “city, county, state, federal laws,
ordinances,” while “conduct[ing] himself as a good citizen.” Though the State apparently
did not view any of S.G.-H.M.’s alleged missteps in the intervening years as rising to a
level warranting criminal prosecution, the predictable result of this approach has been
multiple DOC commitments and a treadmill of State supervision with no foreseeable
endpoint. See Maddox v. State, 246 A.3d 604, 615-16 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2021) (“By
imposing additional conditions on a probationer, creating numerous opportunities for a
probationer to violate probation, the probationer could be trapped in a permanent probation
period and facing a minefield of conditions.”); Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc.,
155 F. Supp. 3d 758, 764 (M.D. Tenn. 2015) (enjoining probation practices that had
“trap[ped] probationers in a pernicious cycle for years on end”); Cecelia Klingele, Criminal
Law: Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1015,
1035 (2013) (“While often reasonable when considered individually, in the aggregate, the
sheer number of requirements imposes a nearly impossible burden on many offenders.”);
Lara Montecalvo et al., Article: No Exit, No End: Probation in Rhode Island, 21 Roger
Williams U. L. Rev. 316, 350 n. 130 (describing a “vicious cycle” of technical probation
violations leading to incarceration resulting in a loss of employment or housing, leading to
more violations).
¶23 The Youth Court Act envisions that one day, the youth will no longer be a youth,
the court’s involvement will come to an end, and the individual will independently embark
11
upon adult life, seeking his or her full potential. See § 41-5-205(1), (3), MCA (terminating
youth court jurisdiction at ages 21 or 25).1
CONCLUSION
¶24 We conclude that the Youth Court lost jurisdiction over S.G.-H.M. when he reached
his 25th birthday and the case was not transferred to a district court. As such, after
S.G.-H.M. reached the age of 25, no court had jurisdiction over proceedings stemming
from his involvement with the Youth Court commencing in 2006. The lower court
therefore erred in declining to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and subsequently
imposed an illegal sentence.
¶25 The lower court’s order is reversed, and the sentence is vacated.
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
1
Because we agree with S.G.-H.M. that the lower court did not have jurisdiction over him after
he reached the age of 25 pursuant to § 41-5-1605(3), MCA, we need not address his remaining
arguments regarding credit for time served and street time credit.
12