DocketNumber: No. WC 79-79-S-P
Citation Numbers: 487 F. Supp. 352
Judges: Smith
Filed Date: 2/29/1980
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/26/2022
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This action is before the court upon the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. After considering briefs in support of and in opposition to the motion, and after receiving oral argument from counsel for both sides, the court directed counsel for defendant to supplement the defendant’s motion by filing additional affidavits. These affidavits having been filed, the matter is now ready for decision.
The plaintiff’s complaint alleges a violation of certain provisions of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. The facts of this case, as revealed by plaintiff’s complaint and by the arguments of counsel, indicate that on December 26, 1978, the plaintiff entered into a loan agreement with the defendant, by executing a promissory note and security agreement. The amount financed, as evidenced by the disclosure statement given to the plaintiff, was $791.87. This amount was to be repaid in 25 consecutive monthly installments, at a purported annual percentage rate of 35.66%. The finance charge, therefore, was calculated to be $358.13, and the total amount to be repaid was $1150.00. Plaintiff alleges that the defendant violated the Truth in Lending Act during this transaction, in that it: (1) failed to disclose the
The Truth in Lending Act was designed “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit. . . . ” 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). To achieve that purpose, Congress established a broad statutory scheme of disclosure requirements with which creditors must comply before lending money. In general, a creditor must disclose “clearly and conspicuously, in accordance with the regulations of the [Federal Reserve] Board, to each person to whom consumer credit is extended and upon whom a finance charge is or may be imposed,” certain required information. 15 U.S.C. § 1631(a).
The plaintiff alleges that, in the transaction involved here, the defendant violated § 1631 by failing to disclose certain infor
The court finds that the material facts involved in this action are not in dispute. The issue to be resolved is whether the defendant “is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. This naturally involves the proper interpretation of those statutes and regulations previously cited, and a decision as to whether or not the defendant has complied with the requirements of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z.
Plaintiff would ask this court to interpret the language of § 226.6(a) of Regulation Z, calling for disclosure in a “meaningful sequence”, to require that the terms of the loan agreement be set out in a particular order or progression. The defendant correctly points out, however, that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in interpreting this regulation, does not require such a hard and fast rule. The statute and regulations “with respect to meaningful séquence do not require any particular order for the disclosure of the security interest retained by the lender so long as that description is clear and conspicuous.” Lamar v. American Finance System, 577 F.2d 953, 954 (5th Cir. 1978), citing with approval Federal Reserve Board Public Position Letter No. 780 (April 10, 1974).
The plaintiff has also raised the issue of whether or not the net amount of the loan proceeds paid to or for the plaintiff was properly disclosed. Section 1639(a)(1) requires the disclosure of the “amount of credit of which obligor will have the actual
Plaintiff next contends that the defendant “failed to properly state the annual percentage rate of the finance charges.” This allegation is based upon the requirement of 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(b)(1), and Supplement I to Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.40. Plaintiff contends that the annual percentage rate, determined through the mathematical equation found in Supplement I, is actually in excess of the percentage rate listed on the disclosure statement.
By way of affidavit, the defendant has shown that the annual percentage rate was calculated from certain tables prepared and supplied by Carleton Financial Services, Inc. Defendant states that the tables “were utilized by Tower in reliance on Carleton Financial Services’ assurance that they were prepared in accordance with the rules of § 226.5, et seq.” That section provides that any chart or table other than that published by the Federal Reserve Board may be utilized to determine the annual percentage rate, provided it meets certain requirements.
For the foregoing reasons, the court is of the opinion that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The court will enter an order granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint. Since this opinion disposes of the defendant’s motion only, it does not address the issues in this case raised by the defendant’s counterclaim. Any such issues will be resolved either upon the proper motion or at the trial of the case.
. The terms “credit” and “creditor” are defined at 15 U.S.C. § 1602(e) & (f), and 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(q) & (s). “Consumer credit” is defined as
credit offered or extended to a natural person in which the money, property, or service which is the subject of the transaction is primarily for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes. “Consumer loan” is one type of “consumer credit.”
12 C.F.R. § 226.2(p).
. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a), provides, in pertinent part:
Any creditor making a consumer loan or otherwise extending consumer credit . . . shall disclose each of the following items, to the extent applicable:
(1) The amount of credit of which the obligor will have the actual use, or which is or will be paid to him or for his áccount or to another person on his behalf.
(2) All charges, individually itemized, which are included in the amount of credit extended but which are not part of the finance charge.
(3) The total amount to be financed (the sum of the amounts referred to in paragraph (1) plus the amounts referred to in paragraph (2) ).
(4) Except in the case of a loan secured by a first lien on a dwelling and made to finance the purchase of that dwelling, the amount of the finance charge.
(5) The finance charge expressed as an annual percentage rate except in the case of a finance charge
(A) Which does not exceed $5 and is applicable to an extension of consumer credit not exceeding $75, or
(B) Which does not exceed $7.50 and is applicable to an extension of consumer credit exceeding $75.
(6) The number, amount, and the due dates or periods of payments scheduled to repay the indebtedness.
(7) The default, delinquency, or similar charges payable in the event of late payments.
(8) A description of any security interest held or to be retained or acquired by the creditor in connection with the extension of credit, and a clear identification of the property to which the security interest relates.
. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8 governs the disclosures required to be made in consumer transactions of the type involved in the action sub judice.
. The Position Letter cited above states that the words “meaningful sequence”
relate to a presentation of required disclosures in a logical order with respect to those items which have an arithmetical relationship to each other. For example, many of the items called for in § 226.8(b) are arithmetical and follow each other in logical progression. ... A meaningful sequence would call for those Items which are arithmetically related to appear within a reasonable proximity to each other, not mixed with items which are irrelevant to a progression of arithmetical computations or thought.
The construction which the Board places upon its own regulation, while not binding upon this court, is certainly persuasive and entitled to great deference. Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 499 F.2d 971 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 502 F.2d 1167 (1974).
. 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(c)(2) requires that the chart or table may be used if:
(i) It is prepared in accordance with the general rule set forth in paragraph (b)(1) or (2) of this section;
(ii) It bears the name and address of the person responsible for its production and ... an identification of the method of computation;
(iii) . . [I]t permits determination of the annual percentage rate to the nearest one-quarter of 1 percent for the range of rates covered by the table; and
(iv) . . [I]t discloses the amount of the finance charge and the annual percentage rate on the median balance within each range or bracket of balances .
. As to the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant failed “to give specifically dated and separately signed written affirmative indication of a desire to . obtain credit life or health and accident insurance,” the mere absence of a date inside the insurance agreement portion of the disclosure statement does not violate Regulation Z. See Hayslip v. Dunlap Chevrolet Co., 560 F.2d 192 (5th Cir. 1977).