Manolo Mauriz v. Department of Homeland Security

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
MANOLO MAURIZ, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, DA-0752-16-0260-I-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND DATE: March 6, 2023
SECURITY,
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Lorenzo W. Tijerina, Esquire, San Antonio, Texas, for the appellant.
Kelleen O’Fallon, Esquire, and Keyur Shah, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Member
Tristan L. Leavitt, Member 2
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
Member Leavitt’s name is included in decisions on which the three -member Board
completed the voting process prior to his March 1, 2023 departure.
2
FINAL ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
affirmed the agency’s removal action. Generally, we grant petitions such as this
one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous
findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner
has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for
review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly
MODIFIED by our analysis of the appellant’s discrimination claim, in which we
VACATE the portion of the initial decision that made findings regarding that
claim, we AFFIRM the initial decision.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Prior to his removal, the appellant was a Federal Air Marshal, SV -1801,
with the agency’s Transportation Security Administration (TSA), in Houston,
Texas. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1, Tab 8 at 27. Federal Air Marshals
are required to maintain a Top Secret security clearance. IAF, Tab 8 at 127. The
agency suspended and then revoked the appellant’s clearance, effective
December 18, 2015, after he failed to file an appeal of its revocation. Id. at 52,
55.
¶3 Based on the sole charge of inability to maintain a Top Secret security
clearance, the agency proposed the appellant’s removal. Id. at 51. The proposal
3
notice provided the appellant 7 days from the date of receipt, January 12, 2016, in
which to submit written and oral responses. Id. at 50, 52. On January 15, 2016,
the appellant sought a 15-day extension of the period in which to reply, and the
deciding official granted an extension until January 29, 2016. Id. at 44-49. On
January 27, 2016, the appellant requested an additional extension of time in
which to reply. Id. at 37-43. The deciding official denied his request. Id. at 36.
The appellant failed to submit a written or an oral response before the extended
reply period ended, and the agency issued its final decision upholding the
proposed removal. Id. at 28-32.
¶4 The appellant filed this appeal and requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. After
holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge found that the agency
proved the charge by preponderant evidence. IAF, Tab 19, Initial Decision (ID)
at 3-5. He found that the appellant did not establish that the agency violated his
right to due process or committed a harmful procedural error when it denied his
second request for an extension of time to reply to the notice of proposed
removal. ID at 5-8. The administrative judge further found that the appellant’s
affirmative defense alleging discrimination based on national origin was not
properly before the Board because the agency’s action was premised on the
revocation of a security clearance, but he made alternative findings that the
appellant failed to prove the merits of the defense. ID at 8-11. Finally, he found
that the penalty was reasonable and promoted the efficiency of the service. ID
at 11. He thus affirmed the removal action. Id.ANALYSIS
¶5 Because the appellant was a TSA employee, this appeal is governed by the
provisions of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. Winlock v.
Department of Homeland Security, 110 M.S.P.R. 521, ¶ 5 (2009) (citing
Connolly v. Department of Homeland Security, 99 M.S.P.R. 422, ¶ 9 (2005)
(finding that TSA employees are covered by the personnel management system
that is applicable to employees of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
4
under 49 U.S.C. § 40122)), aff’d, 370 F. App’x 119 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The TSA
Administrator, however, has modified the FAA personnel system as it ap plies to
TSA employees, and those modifications are controlling. Id., ¶¶ 5-6. TSA
Management Directive (MD) 1100.75-3 sets forth policies and procedures for the
agency’s use of “non-disciplinary, corrective, disciplinary, and adverse actions to
address unacceptable employee performance and conduct.” IAF, Tab 8 at 90.
MD 1100.75-3 mirrors 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 in some of its provisions, in that it
requires the agency to give an appellant written notice of its proposed action, an
opportunity to respond, and notice of the decision. 3 Compare id. at 93, 107-16,
with 5 U.S.C. § 7513. Additionally, any removal, suspension, or demotion must
promote the efficiency of the service. IAF, Tab 8 at 93.
The administrative judge properly found that the agency’s action was supported
by preponderant evidence.
¶6 The agency’s sole charge in this appeal was that the appellant was unable to
maintain his Top Secret security clearance. Id. at 51-54. The agency asserted
that, pursuant to MD 1100.88-1 ¶ 7.G, Law Enforcement Position Standards and
Hiring Requirements, the appellant was required to maintain a Top Secret security
clearance and his inability to do so disqualifies him from his position. 4 Id. at 52.
¶7 The Board lacks the authority to review the merits of an agency decision to
suspend or revoke a security clearance. Department of the Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518, 530-31 (1988). Instead, in an appeal of an adverse action based on
an agency’s decision to deny, revoke, or suspend a security clea rance, the Board
generally will only review whether the employee’s position required a security
clearance; the clearance was denied, revoked, or suspended; and the employee
3
MD 1100.75-3 also incorporates the harmful error standard in that it states that failure
to follow the provisions of the directive are grounds for reversal of an agency action, if
such failure caused the agency to reach a conclusion different from the one it would
have reached in the absence of the failure. Compare IAF, Tab 8 at 95, with 5 C.F.R.
§§ 1201.56(c)(1), 1201.4(r).
4
MD 1100.88-1 is included in the agency file. IAF, Tab 8 at 74-87.
5
was provided with the procedural protections set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 7513.
Rogers v. Department of Defense, 122 M.S.P.R. 671, ¶ 5 (2015) (citing Hesse v.
Department of State, 217 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Egan, 484 U.S.
at 530-31)). In appeals of TSA adverse actions, the agency follows the
procedural protections in its internal directive, MD 1100.75-3, rather than those
in 5 U.S.C. § 7513. Buelna v. Department of Homeland Security, 121 M.S.P.R.
262, ¶ 14 (2014). The Board also will review whether the agency afforded the
appellant due process. Id., ¶ 15.
¶8 The record supports, and the appellant did not dispute, that he was required
to maintain a Top Secret security clearance as a Federal Air Marshal and that his
clearance was revoked. IAF, Tab 8 at 55-66, 81, 127. The administrative judge
thus properly found that the agency met these two elements of proof. ID at 3-5.
The agency did not violate the appellant’s right to due process by declining to
grant an additional extension of time in which to submit written and oral
responses.
¶9 The appellant argues on review that the agency denied his right to due
process by intentionally denying him the opportunity to present an oral or written
reply to the notice of proposed removal after he proposed dates upon which to
schedule an oral reply. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4, 8-11, 14-15;
IAF, Tab 8 at 34-39. In adverse actions based upon security clearance
determinations, due process requires an employee being deprived of his property
interest to be given “the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.’” Buelna, 121 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶ 16 (quoting Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). The Board analyzes the due process issue
under the balancing test set forth in Mathews, which weighs: (1) the private
interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government’s interest. Id. (citing
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). Under the second Mathews factor, the employee must
6
be afforded the opportunity to invoke the deciding official’s discretion to
consider any existing viable alternatives to the adverse action. Id., ¶ 22.
¶10 Under the first factor, we find that the appellant’s private property interest
was significantly affected by the agency’s decision. As for the third factor, the
agency had a compelling interest to withhold national security information from
unauthorized persons. Egan, 484 U.S. at 527. As for the risk of erroneous
deprivation of the appellant’s property interest, we agree with the administrative
judge’s conclusion that the agency did not deprive him of a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. ID at 5-7. The agency gave him written notice of the
proposed removal, the reasons for the proposed action, and a 7-day period in
which to respond. IAF, Tab 8 at 51-54. The agency also notified him of his right
to be represented. Id. at 53. At his request, the agency extended the original
reply period by 10 days. Id. at 44-49. When the appellant requested a second
extension, the agency informed him—prior to the extended reply period
expiring—that no additional extension would be granted. Id. at 36-43. The
agency issued the written decision after the extended reply period ended, and no
response had been received. Id. at 28-43.
¶11 The Board has held that an agency commits a due process violation when it
fails to consider a response that is timely by the agency’s own terms. Alford v.
Department of Defense, 118 M.S.P.R. 556, ¶ 7 (2012). Here, however, the
appellant submitted nothing that we would deem to be a timely response under the
agency’s terms. In his notice extending the original reply period, the deciding
official stated, “The response period (to complete both written and oral
responses) is therefore extended to the close of business on January 29, 2016.”
IAF, Tab 8 at 46 (emphasis added). Further, the agency’s instructions for the
initial 7-day reply period state that the appellant had the right “ to reply to this
proposal orally and/or in writing and furnish any evidence in support of [his]
reply within 7 calendar days” after the date he received the proposal. Id. at 52.
We find that the unambiguous terms of the initial and extended reply periods
7
required the appellant to present his oral and written responses—and not just to
attempt to schedule an oral response—by a date certain.
¶12 The appellant asserts that his January 15 and January 27, 2016 letters were
requests for a date, time, and location certain for giving an oral response. PFR
File, Tab 1 at 9. The subject-matter line on the January 15, 2016 letter referenced
a date certain to reply orally, but the body of the letter did not elaborate upon that
request. IAF, Tab 8 at 48. In the January 27, 2016 letter, the appellant offered
the week of February 23 through February 27, 2016, in which to schedule an oral
response. Id. at 39. That week, however, was well beyond the January 29, 2016
deadline by which both written and oral responses were to have been completed.
Compare IAF, Tab 8 at 46 (stating that the response period to complete both
written and oral responses ended on January 29, 2016), with Massey v.
Department of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 226, ¶¶ 7-10 (2013) (finding that the
agency violated the appellant’s due process rights when the proposal notice
afforded her the opportunity to schedule her oral response during the reply
period). For these reasons, we find that the appellant failed to submit either an
oral or a written response within the agency’s designated timeframe.
¶13 The appellant argues that the agency’s proffered reply period was nothing
more than “an empty formality.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 11. We disagree.
Predecisional due process requires that the agency provide an appellant with an
opportunity in which to respond to the agency’s proposal, which the appellant
received from January 12 through January 29, 2016. See Kinsey v. Department of
the Navy, 59 M.S.P.R. 226, 229 (1993) (citing Darnell v. Department of
Transportation, 807 F.2d 943, 945 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“An opportunity to present is
quite different from a presentation in fact.”) (emphasis in original)). The
appellant clearly would have preferred a longer period in which to respond for the
reasons set forth in his letters asking the deciding official for extensions. IAF,
Tab 8 at 39, 48. Nevertheless, if a tenured public employee is entitled to a full
post-decisional hearing, such as the appellant’s Board hearing , a predecisional
8
trial-type hearing is not required, and fundamental due process requirements are
satisfied if the employee has a predecisional opportunity to present, either in
person or in writing, reasons why the proposed action should not be taken.
Pumphrey v. Department of Defense, 122 M.S.P.R. 186, ¶ 8 (2015) (citing
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985); Ray v.
Department of the Army, 97 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶ 22 (2004), aff’d, 176 F. App’x 110(Fed. Cir. 2006)).
¶14 The removal action here is based on a single charge of failure to maintain a
required security clearance, and we find no indication that the matters to be
addressed in a reply were particularly numerous or complex. We have considered
the appellant’s reasons for requesting an extension, including his attorney’s
asserted scheduling issues, but, under the circumstances, we find that the 17 -day
predecisional reply period afforded to the appellant was of sufficient length to
satisfy the requirements of minimum due process under the Constitu tion. See
Henderson v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 536, ¶¶ 3, 13 (2016)
(holding that 7 days was a reasonable, and constitutionally adequate, period of
time for a predecisional reply to a notice of proposed suspension based on a
criminal indictment), aff’d, 878 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Pumphrey,
122 M.S.P.R. 186, ¶ 8 (holding that a 14-day predecisional reply period allowed
the appellant a meaningful opportunity and reasonable time to respond to a notice
of proposed furlough and was constitutionally sufficient); cf. Ray, 97 M.S.P.R.
101, ¶¶ 6, 14, 22 (finding that a 29-day predecisional reply period satisfied
minimum due process requirements regarding a removal action based on nine
specifications of conduct unbecoming a Federal employee, even considering
circumstances that included the number and complexity of the charges, the
volume of supporting evidence, the difficulties imposed by distance, a nd
scheduling constraints concerning an oral reply).
¶15 Intertwined with the appellant’s due process arguments is his assertion that
he was denied a hearing before a “neutral” or unbiased deciding official. PFR
9
File, Tab 1 at 4, 8, 14-15. The appellant’s arguments regarding the deciding
official’s alleged bias that he made before the administrative judge pertain to his
belief that the deciding official discriminated against him based on national
origin. IAF, Tab 10 at 6. As we explain infra ¶ 23, the Board cannot adjudicate
the appellant’s discrimination claim because doing so would require the Board to
consider the validity of the security clearance determination, which it cannot do.
See Putnam v. Department of Homeland Security, 121 M.S.P.R. 532, ¶¶ 18-19
(2014). For all of these reasons, we conclude that the administrative judge
properly found that the appellant failed to establish that the agency violated his
right to due process when it did not grant him an additional extension of time in
which to submit written and oral responses to the notice of proposed removal.
The agency did not commit harmful error by not granting an additional extension
of time in which to submit written and oral responses.
¶16 The appellant also argues on review that the agency’s alleged denial of his
right to offer a written or an oral response was harmful error. PFR File, Tab 1
at 4, 8-11, 15. The appellant asserts that, if he had been given such a response,
the deciding official might have exercised his discretion to consider transferring
him to a Transportation Security Officer (Airport Screener) position, which does
not require a security clearance. Id. at 4, 10. The appellant included with his
petition for review an internet vacancy announcement seeking to hire
Transportation Security Officers in the San Angelo, Texas area. Id. at 17-23.
¶17 The vacancy announcement is not in the record from the proceeding before
the administrative judge. Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d), the Board generally will
not consider evidence submitted for the first time with the petition for review
absent a showing that it was unavailable before the record was closed despite the
party’s due diligence. Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214
(1980). Although this particular announcement would not have been available
before the record closed, IAF, Tab 11 at 6, there were likely similar
announcements available at the time. To the extent the appellant relies on this
10
vacancy announcement to establish that positions existed to which he could have
been assigned without a security clearance, we find that he has not established
that such information was unavailable to him before the record closed despite his
due diligence. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d) (“To constitute new evidence, the
information contained in the documents, not just the documents themselves, must
have been unavailable despite due diligence when the record closed.”).
¶18 Moreover, an appellant who seeks to introduce new evidence must show
that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the
initial decision. Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980).
The appellant’s submission here would not warrant a different outcome because
the administrative judge properly concluded that the agency did not commit
harmful procedural error by denying him an additional extension of the period for
submitting written and oral responses. ID at 7-8. To prove harmful procedural
error, an appellant must establish that an agency committed a procedural error
that was likely to have caused it to reach a conclusion different from the one it
would have otherwise reached in the absence or cure of the error. 5 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.4(r). The appellant bears the burden of proof on this affirmative defense.
5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(C). As explained above, the agency followed the
procedures set forth in MD 1100.75-3 by giving the appellant written notice
stating the charge and a description of the evidence supporting the charge, 6 as
well as an opportunity to respond orally and in writing. IAF, Tab 8 at 51-54. The
appellant failed to avail himself of the opportunity to respond.
5
Similarly, MD 1100.75-3 ¶ 6.L states:
A failure to comply with the provisions of this directive, the
accompanying Handbook, or Appendices may be grounds for reversing an
action only if it caused TSA to reach a conclusion different from the one it
would have reached in the absence of the failure.
IAF, Tab 8 at 95.
6
The agency supplied copies of the materials supporting the charge. IAF, Tab 8 at 53,
55-89.
11
¶19 Additionally, the appellant failed to show that any statute or regulation
required the agency to consider assigning him to an alternative position. See
Flores v. Department of Defense, 121 M.S.P.R. 287, ¶ 12 (2014). The deciding
official testified that he was unaware of any right of reassignment under such
circumstances, and, in any event, a candidate for any position at TSA must be
eligible for a security clearance. Hearing Compact Disc (HCD) (testimony of the
deciding official). On review, the appellant asserts that there are positions at
TSA that do not require a security clearance. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, 10. We find,
however, that the existence of any such position is immaterial to th e outcome of
this appeal. In the absence of a statute or regulation requiring the agency to seek
out alternative employment, the Board lacks the authority to review whether the
lesser sanction of reassignment to a nonsensitive position would have been
feasible. Flores, 121 M.S.P.R. 287, ¶ 12 (citing Griffin v. Defense Mapping
Agency, 864 F.2d 1579, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). Thus, we will not disturb the
administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to establish that any
harmful procedural error occurred. ID at 7-8.
The administrative judge did not abuse his discretion when he declined to admit
the transcript of the deciding official’s deposition.
¶20 On review, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge summarily
sealed the record and closed the hearing, preventing him from introducing
portions of the deciding official’s deposition transcript. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-13.
The appellant submitted these portions of the transcript with his petition for
review. Id. at 24-46. The record shows that the appellant sought to introduce the
entire transcript on May 19, 2016, after the prehearing conference had taken place
and the May 6, 2016 Order and Summary of Telephonic Prehearing Conference
had been issued. IAF, Tabs 11, 16. The agency objected because the deciding
official was set to testify in person. IAF, Tab 17 at 4. The agency also asked the
administrative judge to remove the appellant’s filing from the Board’s e-Appeal
Online Repository because the deposition had been marked as containing
12
Sensitive Security Information (SSI). Id. at 9. The agency explained that the
record would have to be sealed if the transcript were admitted into evidence. Id.
at 9-10.
¶21 The administrative judge did not seal the record. Instead, he ruled that
portions of the deposition could be used to impeach the deciding official’s
testimony, but the deposition in its entirety would not be admitted. HCD. Before
testimony began, the administrative judge asked the agency to identify the
portions of the transcript containing SSI. HCD. The agency stated that the SSI in
the transcript was general background information and not relevant to the issues
on appeal. HCD. At the end of the hearing, when the appellant had not cited to
any portion of the transcript for impeachment purposes, the administrative judge
declined to admit the transcript. 7 HCD.
¶22 We find no abuse of discretion in the administrative judge’s rulings, which
were within his sound discretion. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b)(3), (6), (8). In any
event, the transcript also fails to meet the Board’s definition of new evidence, and
the appellant had the opportunity to use it for impeachment purposes during the
hearing. IAF, Tab 16; see Alvarado v. Department of the Air Force,
103 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶¶ 25-26 (2006) (finding that the administrative judge did not err
or abuse his discretion by not considering testimony proffered at a prior hearing
when, among other things, neither party was precluded at a later hearing from
using the record from the prior hearing to refresh a witness’s recollection or
impeach his credibility), aff’d, 626 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (D.N.M. 2009), aff’d,
490 F. App’x 932 (10th Cir. 2012); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d).
7
The appellant’s submissions that include portions of the transcript nevertheless remain
in the physical record, which is appropriately marked as containing SSI, but are not
available through the Board’s electronic case repository. IAF, Tab 16; PFR File, Tab 1.
13
To the extent that the administrative judge made findings on the issue of
discrimination, we vacate those findings.
¶23 Finally, as the administrative judge properly noted, the Board cannot
adjudicate whether an agency’s adverse action, which is premised on the
suspension or revocation of a security clearance, constitutes impermissible
discrimination or retaliation. ID at 9-10; see Putnam, 121 M.S.P.R. 532, ¶ 18;
Pangarova v. Department of the Army, 42 M.S.P.R. 319, 322-24 (1989).
Accordingly, the Board lacks the authority to adjudicate the appellant’s
discrimination claim. To the extent that the administrative judge made findings
concerning the discrimination claim in the initial decision, ID at 10-12, we vacate
those findings.
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation an d
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
8
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
14
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
15
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
16
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in s ection
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 9 The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
9
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisd iction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
17
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.