Rob Bryant v. Department of Homeland Security

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
ROB BRYANT, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, SF-4324-16-0267-I-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND DATE: September 22, 2016
SECURITY,
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Brian J. Lawler, San Diego, California, for the appellant.
Janet W. Muller, Chula Vista, California, for the agency.
BEFORE
Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
Mark A. Robbins, Member
FINAL ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
dismissed his appeal as barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision
contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of
the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either
the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required
procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the
outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available
that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record
closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that
the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting
the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as
expressly MODIFIED by this Final Order, to dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, we AFFIRM the initial decision.
BACKGROUND
¶2 The appellant, an officer in the U.S. Air Force Reserve, was formerly
employed by the agency as an Air Interdiction Agent with the Office of Air and
Marine, Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Bryant v. Department of
Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. SF-4324-16-0267-I-1, Initial Appeal File
(0267 IAF), Tab 1 at 3. On March 7, 2013, he filed a Board appeal under the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA),
alleging that the agency had unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of
his military service. Bryant v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket
No. SF-4324-13-0298-I-1, Initial Appeal File (0298 IAF), Tab 1. The
administrative judge found jurisdiction and consolidated the appellant’s appeal
with two similar appeals, Ferguson v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB
Docket No. SF-4324-13-0299-I-1, and Hau v. Department of Homeland Security,
MSPB Docket No. SF-4324-13-0300-I-1, for processing and hearing. 0298 IAF,
Tab 18.
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¶3 On July 31, 2014, the administrative judge held a prehearing conference in
the consolidated appeal. 0298 IAF, Tab 26. In his summary of the conference, he
identified the appellants’ allegations as follows:
The appellants here allege that the agency failed to grant them
waivers as to certain training classes which conflicted with the dates
and times of their military service requirements, resulting in their
being “de-designated” from performing law enforcement duties;
created a hostile work environment by pressuring them to attend
training and/or cancel periods of military leave, exerting similar
pressure on the relevant military commands, requesting written
documentation related to military leave of less than 30 days, and
[ratifying] negative comments related to their military status and/or
use of military leave from co-workers and/or management officials;
forced them to surrender their badges and weapons when performing
military service in excess of 30 days; delayed receipt of within-grade
pay increases; and required the use of annual, sick or other leave in
lieu of military leave.
Id. at 1-2.
¶4 Before the first witness was called at the hearing, the administrative judge
asked if the parties wished to make any additions or corrections to the summary
of the prehearing conference. Hearing Compact Disc (HCD). The parties
declined the offer at that time. Id. However, in the course of the hearing, all
three appellants testified that they had resigned from their positions, or were
about to do so, as a result of the same hostile working conditions they previously
had alleged. Id. At the close of the hearing, the appellants’ attorney argued that
the appellants had been constructively discharged. Id. The administrative judge
granted leave for the appellants to address that issue in their posthearing brief.
Id.¶5 The appellants submitted their joint closing statement and posthearing brief.
0298 IAF, Tab 27. At the opening of the brief, the appellants stated that they
“were constructively discharged from their positions with CBP’s Office of Air
and Marine (OAM) due to the harassment, discrimination and hostile work
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environments they endured based solely on their military affiliations and military
service obligations.” Id. at 4-5. They further explained:
Appellants each testified that the discriminatory and harassing
conduct was severe and pervasive enough to materially alter the
conditions of their work environment such that they were forced to
quit the Agency because the workplace was poisoned. Due to the
Agency’s discriminatory and harassing conduct, through co-workers
and, more importantly, supervisors, the relationship between the
Appellants and the Agency became so antagonistic that Appellants
were left with no other choice but to resign from their positions with
the Agency and seek employment elsewhere. Appellants joined the
Agency with every intention to retire as OAM agents but were
constructively discharged due to the hostile work environment.
Id. at 9.
¶6 Effective September 20, 2014, the appellant resigned from the agency.
0267 IAF, Tab 7 at 10. Subsequently, the administrative judge issued an initial
decision denying the appellants’ request for corrective action. 0298 IAF, Tab 31,
Initial Decision (0298 ID). In denying the request, the administrative judge
found, inter alia, that the appellants failed to establish that they were subjected to
a hostile work environment in violation of USERRA. 0298 ID at 5-10. The
administrative judge declined to adjudicate the appellants’ constructive discharge
claims and advised them that they could pursue those claims by filing separate
appeals under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. 0298 ID at 12 n.6. None of the parties filed a
petition for review, and the initial decision became final. See 0298 ID at 13.
¶7 The appellant then filed the instant appeal, in which he again alleged that
the agency constructively discharged him by creating a hostile work environment
such that he was forced to resign. 0267 IAF, Tab 1. The appellant specified that
his appeal was brought under USERRA, and he requested a hearing. Id. The
administrative judge assigned to the new appeal issued an order directing the
appellant to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed as barred by res
judicata or collateral estoppel. 0267 IAF, Tab 3. In response, the appellant
argued that his appeal was not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel
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because the administrative judge in the earlier appeal did not rule on his
constructive discharge claim. 0267 IAF, Tab 5. He again clarified that his appeal
was brought under USERRA and was not intended as an adverse action appeal
under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. Id.¶8 The administrative judge dismissed the appeal as barred by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, without conducting a hearing. 0267 IAF, Tab 15, Initial
Decision (0267 ID). This petition for review followed. Petition for Review
(PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has responded. PFR File, Tab 3.
ANALYSIS
¶9 The administrative judge did not make an explicit finding as to whether the
Board has jurisdiction over this appeal, and the parties have not addressed the
issue on petition for review. 0267 ID; PFR File, Tabs 1, 3. However, the Board
must satisfy itself that it has authority to adjudicate the matter before it and may
raise the issue of its own jurisdiction sua sponte at any time. Metzenbaum v.
General Services Administration, 96 M.S.P.R. 104, ¶ 15 (2004). For the reasons
set forth below, we find that the Board lacks jurisdiction over this appeal.
¶10 This appeal arises under the antidiscrimination provision of USERRA,
38 U.S.C. § 4311(a), which provides that:
A person who is a member of, applies to be a member of, performs,
has performed, applies to perform, or has an obligation to perform
service in a uniformed service shall not be denied initial
employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or
any benefit of employment by an employer on the basis of that
membership, application for membership, performance of service,
application for service, or obligation.
To establish Board jurisdiction over a claim arising under 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a), an
appellant must make nonfrivolous allegations that: (1) he performed duty or has
an obligation to perform duty in a uniformed service of the United States; (2) the
agency denied him initial employment, reemployment, retention, promotion, or
any benefit of employment; and (3) the denial was due to the performance of duty
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or obligation to perform duty in the uniformed service. Kitlinski v. Department of
Justice, 123 M.S.P.R. 41, ¶ 7 (2015); see 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.57(b), 1208.2(a). A
claim under USERRA should be broadly and liberally construed in determining
whether it is nonfrivolous. Lubert v. U.S. Postal Service, 110 M.S.P.R. 430, ¶ 11
(2009).
¶11 It is undisputed that the appellant is an officer in the U.S. Air Force
Reserve. As to elements (2) and (3), the appellant alleges that the agency denied
him retention in employment by forcing him to resign due to a hostile work
environment, which was in turn the result of harassment based on his military
service. 0267 IAF, Tab 1 at 6-7; see Wallace v. City of San Diego, 479 F.3d 616,
625-30 (9th Cir. 2010) (considering plaintiff’s claim that he was forced to resign
due to intolerable working conditions as a constructive discharge claim under
USERRA). Thus, his allegation that the agency denied him retention in
employment is predicated on his previously adjudicated claim that the agency
subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his military service. See
Bryant v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No.
SF-4324-13-0298-I-1; Hau v. Department of Homeland Security, 2016 MSPB 33,
¶ 12.
¶12 However, the appellant is collaterally estopped from relitigating that
underlying claim. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is appropriate when:
(1) the issue is identical to that involved in the prior action; (2) the issue was
actually litigated in the prior action; (3) the determination of the issue in the prior
action was necessary to the resulting judgment; and (4) the party against whom
issue preclusion is sought had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in
the prior action, either as a party to the earlier action or as one whose interests
were otherwise fully represented in that action. McNeil v. Department of
Defense, 100 M.S.P.R. 146, ¶ 15 (2005). The issue of whether the agency
subjected the appellant to a hostile work environment based on his military
service was actually litigated in his own prior USERRA appeal, and the
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administrative judge’s finding on that issue was necessary to the resulting
judgment. Moreover, while the appellant resigned after the August 7, 2014 close
of the record in his prior USERRA appeal, he specifically denies that the agency
took actions after August 7, 2014, that caused him to resign, and he has not
alleged any other acts of harassment that differ from those he relied upon in that
appeal. 0267 IAF, Tab 11 at 4; see Mintzmeyer v. Department of the Interior,
84 F.3d 419, 424 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The appellant is thus barred from arguing that
the agency subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his military
service, which is the sole basis of his constructive discharge claim. See Hau,
2016 MSPB 33, ¶ 13.
¶13 Under these circumstances, we find that the appellant cannot make even a
nonfrivolous allegation that the agency denied him retention in employment based
on his military service. Hau, 2016 MSPB 33, ¶¶ 14-16. 2 We therefore conclude
that, even under the liberal standard applicable to USERRA appeals, the appellant
has not made allegations sufficient to establish the Board’s jurisdiction over his
appeal.
2
In Hau, the Board overruled Boechler v. Department of the Interior, 109 M.S.P.R.
619, ¶ 17 (2008), aff’d, 328 F. App’x 660 (Fed. Cir. 2009), in which we held that,
notwithstanding our previous finding on the merits that the appellant’s alleged
whistleblowing disclosure was not protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), the appellant
was not precluded from making a nonfrivolous allegation that the disclosure was
protected for purposes of establishing jurisdiction over a subsequent individual right of
action appeal. The Board also overruled Wadhwa v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
111 M.S.P.R. 26, ¶ 6, aff’d, 353 F. App’x 434 (Fed. Cir. 2009), and Parikh v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 110 M.S.P.R. 295, ¶¶ 13-17 (2008), which relied on the
holding in Boechler. In Hau, the Board found that these decisions were contrary to
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1988), which held that collateral estoppel is meant
to “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial
resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on
adjudication.”
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NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS
The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You have the right to
request review of this final decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. You must submit your request to the court at the following address:
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, DC 20439
The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar days
after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff.
Dec. 27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court
has held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory
deadline and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed.
See Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to
court, you should refer to the Federal law that gives you this right. It is found in
title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff.
Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United
States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.
Additional information is available at the court’s website,
www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se
Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained within the court’s Rules of
Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit.
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The Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by
any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given
case.
FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.