Kimberly Walker v. United States Postal Service

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
KIMBERLY WALKER, DOCKET NUMBERS
Appellant, CH-0752-20-0262-I-1
CH-0752-20-0402-I-1
v.
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
Agency. DATE: July 27, 2023
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Albert Lum, Brooklyn, New York, for the appellant.
Glenn L. Smith, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for the appellant.
Deborah W. Carlson, Chicago, Illinois, for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Member
FINAL ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed two petitions for review of two initial decisions,
both cases addressing demotion actions. First, the appellant has filed a petition
for review in Walker v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. CH-0752-20-
0262-I-1 (Walker 1), challenging the initial decision which, in part, found that the
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
agency did not have to return the appellant to her former position or an equivalent
managerial position after it rescinded its first demotion action . The appellant has
also filed a petition for review in Walker v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket
No. CH-0752-20-0402-I-1 (Walker 2), challenging the initial decision which
sustained the agency’s reissued demotion action. For the reasons discussed
below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review in Walker 2, REVERSE the
Walker 2 initial decision, and order the agency to cancel the second demotion
action. We DENY the appellant’s petition for review of Walker 1 because the
appeal is MOOT. We RE-JOIN the two appeals for adjudication. 2
BACKGROUND
¶2 The appellant held the EAS-22 position of Customer Service Manager at
Graceland Station in Chicago, Illinois. Walker v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB
Docket No. CH-0752-20-0402-I-1, Initial Appeal File (0402 IAF), Tab 6 at 39.
On February 14, 2020, the agency issued a decision demoting th e appellant,
effective February 29, 2020, to an EAS-17 Supervisor of Distribution Operations
position based on a charge of negligent performance of duties. Walker v. U.S.
Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. CH-0752-20-0262-I-1, Initial Appeal File
(0262 IAF), Tab 1 at 12-17. The appellant then filed a Board appeal, which will
be referred to as Walker 1, challenging the demotion. 0262 IAF, Tab 1. While
Walker 1 was pending before the administrative judge, the agency issued an
April 9, 2020 letter rescinding the demotion action. 0262 IAF, Tab 20 at 11. In
that letter, the agency stated that it was not rescinding the proposed demotion,
and that it would issue another decision at a later date. Id. However, the parties
continued to argue in Walker 1 regarding whether the agency had fully rescinded
2
Although the appeals were joined while they were pending in front of the
administrative judge, the administrative judge issued separate initial decisions, which
necessitated that the appeals were severed. Because joining the appeals will promote
judicial efficiency and expedite the processing of the cases, and will not adversely
affect the interests of the parties, we hereby re-join the appeals for adjudication.
5 C.F.R. § 1201.36.
3
the demotion by returning the appellant to the status quo ante. 0262 IAF,
Tabs 20-21, 26-27, 29-30.
¶3 While Walker 1 was still pending in front of the administrative judge, the
agency issued a second decision on May 21, 2020, demoting the appellant to an
EAS-17 position. 0402 IAF, Tab 4 at 32-36, 45-49; Hearing Recording (HR)
(testimony of the appellant). The record contains two decision letters for the
reissued demotion, both with an issuance date of May 21, 2020, but the first letter
was signed by the deciding official on May 6, 2020 (First Decision Letter), and
the second letter was signed by the deciding official on May 21, 2020 (Second
Decision Letter). 0402 IAF, Tab 4 at 32-36, 45-49. Both decision letters were
sent to the appellant. HR (parties’ discussion prior to closing arguments).
Subsequently, the appellant filed a Board appeal, which will be referred to as
Walker 2, challenging the agency’s reissued demotion action. 0402 IAF, Tab 1.
The administrative judge joined Walker 1 and Walker 2 and proceeded to
adjudicate the cases together. 0402 IAF, Tab 10. However, as noted, she issued
two separate initial decisions.
¶4 In Walker 1, the administrative judge found that the agency had not fully
rescinded the February 14, 2020 decision and ordered that the agency take
additional actions in order to fully rescind the demotion, includ ing paying the
appellant additional monies and removing the Postal Service form 50 (PS-50)
memorializing the demotion from the appellant’s personnel file. 0262 IAF,
Tab 52, Initial Decision (0262 ID) at 8-9. She also found that, while the agency
did not return the appellant to her former EAS-22 position or an equivalent
position, it was not required to do so because it had presented a compelling or
overriding interest. 0262 ID at 5-6. The appellant has filed a petition for review
in Walker 1 challenging the administrative judge’s finding that the agency was
not required to return her to her former EAS-22 position or an equivalent
position. Walker v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. CH-0752-20-0262-
I-1, Petition for Review (0262 PFR) File, Tab 3 at 5. The agency has responded
4
in opposition to the appellant’s petition for review in Walker 1. 0262 PFR File,
Tab 5.
¶5 In Walker 2, the administrative judge sustained the reissued demotion on
the merits and found that the appellant did not establish a violation of her due
process rights. 0402 IAF, Tab 58, Initial Decision (0402 ID). On review in
Walker 2, the appellant argues: (1) the administrative judge erred in not finding
that the agency was prohibited from proceeding with the reissued demotion before
fully rescinding the first demotion action; (2) the administrative judge erred in
finding that the First Decision Letter was the agency decision letter, and that the
agency violated the appellant’s due process rights because the decision letters cite
to aggravating factors not contained within the proposal notice; and (3) the
penalty exceeded the bounds of reasonableness. Walker v. U.S. Postal Service,
MSPB Docket No. CH-0752-20-0402-I-1, Petition for Review (0402 PFR) File,
Tab 3. The agency did not respond to the petition for review in Walker 2.
DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶6 As discussed below, we first find that the agency’s reissued demotion action
in Walker 2 cannot stand in light of the agency’s harmful error of issuing two
different written decisions with conflicting information, both signed by the
deciding official and provided to the appellant as the agency decision, and it is
impossible to discern which letter was intended as the agency decision.
Regarding Walker 1, we deny the appellant’s petition for review as moot because
there is no further relief that can be granted to the appellant.
The issuance of two decision letters constitutes a violation of 5 U.S.C. § 7513.
¶7 When an agency takes an adverse action against an employee pursuant to
chapter 75, the employee against whom the action is proposed is entitled to,
among other things, “a written decision and the specific reasons” for the decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7513(b)(4). Here, there are two signed written decisions in the record.
0402 IAF, Tab 4 at 32-36, 45-49. During the proceedings below in Walker 2, the
5
agency claimed that the agency’s decision was the First Decision Letter, signed
on May 6, 2020, and that the Second Decision Letter, signed on May 21, 2020,
was a draft that was mistakenly included in the agency file. HR (parties’
discussion prior to closing arguments); 0402 IAF, Tab 54 at 4 -5. The
administrative judge, in the initial decision, accepted the agency’s explanation,
and found that this First Decision Letter was the agency’s decision, noting that
the appellant had attached a copy of the First Decision Letter to her initial appeal .
0402 ID at 3 n.3. The appellant, on review, asserts that the administrative judge’s
finding was incorrect, arguing instead that the Second Decision Letter was the
agency’s decision, and had been issued by the agency “to correct the due process
violations in the first letter.” 0402 PFR File, Tab 1 at 9. As explained below,
because the record contains conflicting evidence, we cannot discern what
document is the agency decision required by 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b), and therefore
conclude that the agency effectively failed to issue a final written decision in
violation of 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b).
¶8 Looking first at the letters themselves, we find no definitive evidence that
identifies which letter is the actual agency decision. The two decision letters
have the same issuance date, i.e., May 21, 2020, and both letters were signed by
the deciding official—the First Decision Letter signed on May 6, 2020, and the
Second Decision Letter signed on May 21, 2020. 3 0402 IAF, Tab 4 at 32, 36, 45,
48. The agency sent both letters to the appellant, and the appellant received both
letters. Id. at 43-44, 49; 0402 IAF, Tab 1 at 10-14; HR (parties’ discussion prior
to closing arguments). The First Decision Letter states that the appellant will be
demoted to the position of EAS-17 Supervisor of Customer Services, effective
May 23, 2020. 0402 IAF, Tab 4 at 34. The Second Decision Letter states that the
appellant will be demoted to the position of EAS-17 Supervisor of Distribution
3
Although the signature date on the First Decision Letter is blurry, the deciding official
in her testimony confirmed that it appeared she signed the letter on May 6, 2020.
HR (testimony of the deciding official).
6
Operations, effective February 15, 2020. 4 Id. at 47. Additionally, as we discuss
in more detail below, the First Decision Letter and the Second Decision Letter
contain differing narratives. Id. at 32-36, 45-49.
¶9 The testimony of the witnesses at the hearing is not any clearer than the
written record. During the deciding official’s testimony, the appellant’s attorney
first referred her to the Second Decision Letter, which the deciding official
reviewed, and proceeded to testify as if the Second Decision Letter was the
agency’s decision. HR (testimony of the deciding official). In fact, the deciding
official testified that everything she considered was contained in the Second
Decision Letter, thus demonstrating that she believed the Second Decision Letter
was the agency’s decision. Id. It was only when the appellant’s attorney directed
her to the First Decision Letter and proceeded to ask questions about that
document that it dawned on the deciding official and the agency attorney that
there was an issue. Id. Then, the deciding official could not clearly identify
which decision letter was the actual decision until after conferring with the
agency’s attorney, at which point she claimed that the First Decision Letter
constituted the agency’s decision. Id. The appellant, during her testimony, also
indicated that she was confused as to which letter constituted the agency’s
decision. HR (testimony of the appellant).
¶10 In an effort to explain the two decision letters, the agency asserts that the
Second Decision Letter was merely a draft and that the First Decision letter is the
4
We acknowledge that the effective date set forth in the Second Decision Letter
predates the date of the letter by over 3 months. As discussed below, this further adds
to the confusion regarding the agency’s decision. As set forth previously, the decision
in Walker 1 was issued on February 14, 2020, and that action was effective
February 29, 2020. 0262 IAF, Tab 1 at 14. Thus, it does not appear that the Second
Decision Letter was somehow confused with the agency decision in Walker 1.
7
agency’s decision regarding the appellant’s demotion. 5 There are several pieces
of evidence that undermine this assertion.
¶11 First, the Second Decision Letter was signed by the deciding official nearly
two weeks after the First Decision Letter, and was sent to the appellant via
priority mail. 0402 IAF, Tab 4 at 48-49. In addition, the deciding official
initially testified about the Second Decision Letter as if it was the agency
decision, and only claimed it was a draft after conferring with the agency’s
attorney. HR (testimony of the deciding official). Furthermore, the First
Decision Letter and the Second Decision Letter contain statements that conflict
with each other and with the personnel action the agency actually took. The First
Decision Letter, i.e., the effective decision according to the agency, state s that
appellant would be demoted to the position of EAS-17 Supervisor of Customer
Services effective May 23, 2020. 0402 IAF, Tab 4 at 34. However, the appellant
was never placed in that position. HR (testimony of the appellant, testimony of
the deciding official). Meanwhile, the Second Decision Letter states that the
appellant would be demoted to the position of EAS-17 Supervisor of Distribution
Operations effective February 15, 2020, which was 3 months prior to the issuance
of the decision. 0402 IAF, Tab 4 at 47. In actuality, the agency demoted the
appellant to the position of Supervisor of Distribution Operations, as stated in the
Second Decision Letter, but there is no indication that her demotion was
retroactive. 6 HR (testimony of the appellant, testimony of the deciding official).
¶12 Finally, despite the agency’s assertion that the First Decision Letter was the
agency decision, in Walker 1, when the agency attorney responded to the
administrative judge’s order regarding the rescission of the Febr uary 14, 2020
demotion decision, she relayed to the administrative judge that the agency had
reissued the demotion, and attached a copy of the Second Decision Letter, despite
5
The agency has offered no explanation as to how the errors set forth in this appeal
occurred.
6
A copy of the PS-50 reflecting the reissued demotion is not in the record.
8
the fact that she asserted in Walker 2 that the First Decision Letter was the agency
decision. 0262 IAF, Tab 20 at 6, 16-20; 0402 IAF, Tab 54 at 4-5; HR (parties’
discussion prior to closing arguments, agency’s closing argument, testimony of
the deciding official).
¶13 Thus, contrary to the administrative judge’s holding, we do not find the
agency’s claim that the Second Decision Letter was a mere draft to be persuasive
in light of the evidence undermining such an assertion. 0402 ID at 3 n.3. In sum,
we cannot discern whether the First Decision Letter or the Second Decision Letter
is the agency’s controlling decision, and it does not appear the parties can discern
this fact either. Therefore, in effect, by issuing two decisions with differing
information, the agency failed to issue a written decision regarding the
appellant’s demotion. We conclude that the agency’s failure constitutes a
violation of 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b).
The agency’s issuance of two decisions constitutes harmful error and therefore
the demotion must be reversed.
¶14 Having determined that the agency violated 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b), we must
now consider whether the appellant was harmed by the agency’s error. As
discussed below, we find that she was harmed.
¶15 Under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A), the Board cannot sustain an agency’s
decision if the employee “shows harmful error in the application of the agency’s
procedures in arriving at such decision.” Stephen v. Department of the Air Force,
47 M.S.P.R. 672, 681 (1991). The Board has concluded that the “harmful error”
standard is applicable to our review of an agency’s failure to comply with a
statutory procedure under 5 U.S.C. § 7513. 7 Baracco v. Department of
Transportation 15 M.S.P.R. 112, 119 (1983); see Robinson v. Department of the
7
The appellant received notice of the charges, the materials relied upon, and an
opportunity to respond. 0402 IAF, Tab 4 at 71-75. Thus, the circumstances of this
appeal do not implicate the requirements for constitutional due process . Cleveland
Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).
9
Treasury, 96 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶¶ 9-13 (2004), aff’d, 135 F. App’x 423 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (applying the harmful error analysis to the agency’s failure to comply with
5 U.S.C. § 7513(b)); Rawls v. U.S. Postal Service, 94 M.S.P.R. 614, ¶¶ 22-24
(2003) (same), aff’d, 129 F. App’x 628 (Fed. Cir 2005); Williams v. U.S. Postal
Service, 68 M.S.P.R. 150, 153-54 (1995) (same). To prove harmful error, an
appellant must “prove that any procedural errors substantiall y prejudiced his
rights by possibly affecting” the outcome. Stephen, 47 M.S.P.R. at 681 (quoting
Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648, 661 (1985)).
¶16 Therefore, the overarching question of a harmful error analysis is whether a
procedural violation by the agency caused actual harm to the appellant and
prejudiced her in some manner. See Stephen, 47 M.S.P.R. 672, 682-83; see also
Torres v. U.S. Postal Service, 35 M.S.P.R. 655, 660 (1987) (“In considering the
effects of agency procedural errors under 5 U.S.C. § 7513, the Board focuses on
whether the employee’s ability to defend against the adverse action was impaired
by the error, or whether the error otherwise had a likely effe ct on the agency’s
action so as to constitute harmful error under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A).”). Or,
whether the agency’s error, “casts sufficient doubt on the reliability of the
agency’s factfinding or decision.” Smith v. U.S. Postal Service, 789 F.2d 1540,
1545 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing Cornelius, 472 U.S. at 663). Nothing in the Board’s
harmful error analysis limits the question as to whether the harm occurred before
the agency or the Board.
¶17 In this case, the outcome in both agency decision letters is the same —the
appellant was demoted in both letters—but there is a question regarding whether
the appellant was harmed in her ability to appeal the agency action because of the
two decision letters. As explained above, the two agency decisions include
different effective dates, demote the appellant to different positions, and were
signed on different dates. 0402 IAF, Tab 4 at 32-36, 45-49. However, the
decisions also differ in the narrative explaining why the deciding official
sustained the demotion. For instance, the First Decision Letter states that the
10
deciding official considered the fact that the appellant was aware of the intense
scrutiny the station was under by a member of Congress, the Postmaster General,
and the local media regarding service issues and specifically the problem of
delayed mail. Id. at 33. The Second Decision Letter, on the other hand, has no
reference to this scrutiny. Id. at 45-49. The First Decision Letter also includes a
more detailed summary of the appellant’s arguments in her written responses,
including a specific reference to her April 20, 2020 supplemental written
response. Id. at 32-33. The Second Decision Letter, on the other hand, contains a
single generic statement summarizing the appellant’s reply, and does not contain
any reference to the appellant’s April 20, 2020 supplemental writ ten response.
Id. at 45. Thus, the two decisions contain different information about not only
the practical aspects of the demotion, but what exactly the deciding official
reviewed and considered in coming to her decision.
¶18 These differences are not trivial. There are substantive differences as to
what the deciding official considered and reviewed in coming to her conclusion.
0402 IAF, Tab 4 at 32-36, 45-49. Thus, we do not see how the appellant can
litigate her case before the Board when she cannot be sure of which decision she
is being held to. Further, the Board cannot carry out its statutory duty to review
the agency’s decision when we cannot discern what decision to review. Thus, we
find that the appellant suffered actual harm as a result of the agency’s error
because it de facto foreclosed her from seeking the Board’s review of the
agency’s decision. We also find that the issuance of two differing written
decisions casts “sufficient doubt” on the reliability of the agency’s decision,
because it is impossible to determine which information contained in the
decisions is the correct information. Thus, based upon the unique facts of this
case, we find that the agency committed harmful error and reversal of the
demotion action is warranted. Accordingly, the agency must restore the appellant
to her EAS-22 Station Manager position. Hess v. U.S. Postal Service,
123 M.S.P.R. 183, ¶ 5 (2016).
11
The Walker 1 appeal is moot.
¶19 Although an action may be within the Board’s jurisdiction, subsequent
events may render an appeal moot and foreclose the Board’s review. Rodriguez v.
Department of Homeland Security, 112 M.S.P.R. 446, ¶ 12 (2009). A case is
moot when the issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome of the case. Hess v. U.S. Postal Service,
124 M.S.P.R. 40, ¶ 8 (2016). Mootness can arise at any stage of litigation, and an
appeal will be dismissed as moot if, by virtue of an intervening event, the Board
cannot grant any effectual relief in favor of the appellant. As discussed below,
because we cannot grant any effectual relief to the appellant on the issue
presented on review in Walker 1, the appeal is moot and accordingly we deny the
petition for review.
¶20 As discussed above, the agency issued a decision on February 14, 2020,
demoting the appellant effective February 29, 2020. 0262 IAF, Tab 4 at 32 -34.
On April 9, 2020, the agency notified the appellant that it was rescinding the
February 14, 2020 decision letter. 0262 IAF, Tab 20 at 11. On May 21, 2020, the
agency reissued the decision letter demoting the appellant, which went into effect
on May 23, 2020. 8 0402 IAF, Tab 4 at 32-36, 45-49.
¶21 In Walker 1, the administrative judge ordered the agency to fully rescind the
February 2020 demotion action, ordering the agency to tak e specific additional
actions to make the appellant whole, i.e., ordering the agency to rescind the PS-50
memorializing the demotion, and pay the appellant additional monies owed. 9
8
The record does not have a copy of the PS-50 memorializing the reissued demotion.
However, the agency, in its prehearing submissions, has asserted t hat the reissued
demotion went into effect on May 23, 2020. 0402 IAF, Tab 21 at 12. The appellant
does not contest this date, and there is no evidence in the record to contradict this date.
Therefore, we accept that the effective date of the reissued de motion was May 23, 2020.
9
In her petition for review, the appellant does not allege that the agency failed to
comply with the administrative judge’s orders. To the ex tent that the appellant
contends that the agency has failed to comply with the administrative judge’s order, the
12
0262 ID at 8-9. On review in Walker 1, the appellant only contests the
administrative judge’s finding that the agency did not have to restore her to her
former EAS-22 position or the nearest equivalent position after it rescinded the
February 2020 demotion. 0262 PFR File, Tab 3 at 5. In Walker 2, the appellant
further argues that the reissued demotion could not be sustained because she was
not fully restored to the status quo ante following the rescission of the decision in
Walker 1. 0402 PFR File, Tab 3 at 6-9. Thus, the only issue raised in Walker 1 is
whether the appellant should have been physically returned to her former EAS-22
position or an equivalent position between the rescission of the first demotion
action, i.e., April 9, 2020, and the effective date of the reissued demotion, i.e. ,
May 23, 2020.
¶22 Even if we were to agree with the appellant’s arguments, we can discern no
tangible remedy we could grant the appellant that would correct the agency’s
failure to physically return her to her former EAS-22 position or an equivalent
position for a period of 6 weeks in 2020. The appellant has already received
relief from the administrative judge such that, on paper, it appears that she was
returned to the EAS-22 position. Id. Additionally, because the agency committed
harmful error in Walker 2, we are reversing the second demotion action and,
among other things, ordering the appellant’s return to her EAS -22 Station
Manager position. Thus, to the extent that the appellant was relying on the status
quo ante argument to reverse the second demotion, we have granted her request ed
relief, albeit on different grounds. As the Board does not have the power to
reverse time, we discern no further effectual relief that we could grant in favor of
the appellant for the issue presented in Walker 1 other than what has already been
ordered. 0262 PFR File, Tab 3. As there is no further effectual relief to grant in
Walker 1, the appeal is moot and accordingly we deny her petition for review.
appellant should file a petition for enforcement with the regional office. 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.182(a).
13
ORDER
¶23 We ORDER the agency to cancel the demotion action and restore the
appellant to her EAS-22 Station Manager position effective May 23, 2020. The
agency must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this
decision.
¶24 We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back
pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Back Pay Act and/or Postal
Service regulations, as appropriate, no later than 60 calendar days after the date
of this decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the
agency’s efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, inte rest, and benefits due,
and to provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out
the Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest
due, and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the
undisputed amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision.
¶25 We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing
when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has
taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask
the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶26 No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant
believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency ha s not
fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of
any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
¶27 For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance
Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and
Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation
necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board deci sion
14
are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all
documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the
Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be
made within the 60-day period set forth above.
NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at Title 5 of
the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
the initial decision on your appeal.
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 10
You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
10
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
15
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
16
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
17
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir cuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 11 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
11
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
18
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
Civilian Pay Operations
DFAS BACK PAY CHECKLIST
The following documentation is required by DFAS Civilian Pay to compute and pay back pay
pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805. Human resources/local payroll offices should use the following
checklist to ensure a request for payment of back pay is complete. Missing documentation may
substantially delay the processing of a back pay award. More information may be found at:
https://wss.apan.org/public/DFASPayroll/Back%20Pay%20Process/Forms/AllItems.aspx.
NOTE: Attorneys’ fees or other non-wage payments (such as damages) are paid by
vendor pay, not DFAS Civilian Pay.
☐ 1) Submit a “SETTLEMENT INQUIRY - Submission” Remedy Ticket. Please identify the
specific dates of the back pay period within the ticket comments.
Attach the following documentation to the Remedy Ticket, or provide a statement in the ticket
comments as to why the documentation is not applicable:
☐ 2) Settlement agreement, administrative determination, arbitrator award, or order.
☐ 3) Signed and completed “Employee Statement Relative to Back Pay”.
☐ 4) All required SF50s (new, corrected, or canceled). ***Do not process online SF50s
until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***
☐ 5) Certified timecards/corrected timecards. ***Do not process online timecards until
notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***
☐ 6) All relevant benefit election forms (e.g. TSP, FEHB, etc.).
☐ 7) Outside earnings documentation. Include record of all amounts earned by the employee
in a job undertaken during the back pay period to replace federal employment.
Documentation includes W-2 or 1099 statements, payroll documents/records, etc. Also,
include record of any unemployment earning statements, workers’ compensation,
CSRS/FERS retirement annuity payments, refunds of CSRS/FERS employee premiums,
or severance pay received by the employee upon separation.
Lump Sum Leave Payment Debts: When a separation is later reversed, there is no authority
under 5 U.S.C. § 5551 for the reinstated employee to keep the lump sum annual leave payment
they may have received. The payroll office must collect the debt from the back pay award. The
annual leave will be restored to the employee. Annual leave that exceeds the annual leave
ceiling will be restored to a separate leave account pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805(g).
NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES
Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process
payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as ordered by the Merit
Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts.
1. Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise information describing
what to do in accordance with decision.
2. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration:
a. Employee name and social security number.
b. Detailed explanation of request.
c. Valid agency accounting.
d. Authorized signature (Table 63).
e. If interest is to be included.
f. Check mailing address.
g. Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached.
h. Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to be collected
(if applicable).
Attachments to AD-343
1. Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday Premium,
etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement (if applicable).
2. Copies of SF-50s (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and amounts.
3. Outside earnings documentation statement from agency.
4. If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address to
return monies.
5. Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable)
6. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of the type of
leave to be charged and number of hours.
7. If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual Leave to
be paid.
NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay Period and required
data in 1-7 above.
The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump Sum Payment,
Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.)
a. Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above.
b. Prior to conversion computation must be provided.
c. Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable.
If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s Payroll/Personnel
Operations at 504-255-4630.