Pugh v. Baker.

MoNTg-omeky, J.

TMs case is before ns upon tbe following facts agreed: On January 1, 1898, Wiley Carter, now deceased, hired Augustus Pugh to cultivate his home tract of land, do general menial service and work thereon, for the year 1898, at $10 per month. This action was commenced on December 5, 1898, and there was due to Pugh ixp to November 1, 1898, $100. Wiley Carter died on April 5, 1898, and no administration was taken out on Wiley Carter’s estate until May, 1899. Pugh filed a lien with W. T. Harrell, the nearest Justice of the Peace to the tract of land. No actual notice of the filing of the lien was given to the defendant Baker, until the commencement of this action. Baker knew that Pugh was a laborer on the Carter farm. Baker, in September, 1899, seized and converted to his own use all the crops raised on the farm and cultivated by Pugh’s labor, of the value of $219. The seizure was made in an action for the recovery of personal property against the widow and son of Wiley Carter. No action has been commenced to enforce said lien, the notice whereof was filed November 10, 1898, unless this proceeding be such an action. His Honor, upon the record and the agreed facts, adjudged that the plaintiff could not recover, and dismissed the action. The defendant contended here that this action could not be maintained against him for the reasons — First, that the paper-writing filed before the Justice of the Peace was not sufficient in law to constitute a lien; and, second, that, if such, paper did constitute a lien, yet it can not be enforced against the defendant, because the debt was not proved and reduced to a judgment against the administrator of Wiley Carter; and, third, because the plaintiff worked on the farm and crops after the death of Carter without a contract with the administrator, and therefore was entitled to recover nothing for his services.

We have examined the lien with care, and we are of the opinion that it constitutes a good and valid lien against the crops mentioned therein. The fault which the defendant finds with it is that it was entitled in the Justice’s Court, "Augustus Pugh v. Wiley Carter," when the fact was that Carter was dead at the time of the filing of the lien. But that is not a valid objection. The object of the law, in requiring it to be filed with so much particularity, is to give public notice of the plaintiff’s claim, and especially to give notice with certainty as to details to those who may be interested in the property upon which the lien is filed. Every reasonable requirement was met by the plaintiff, and the use of the name of the deceased c mploj er in the capti- n of tie pro_ cecding did not affect the force and virtue of the lien. If the caption had been stricken out, or never used, the body of the lien set forth every necessary requirement, and gave a reasonable notice to every person as to the object of the plaintiff, including the contract with the deceased employer, a proper location and description of the land upon which the plaintiff performed his services, and a particular description of the crops cultivated by him thereon. The filing of a lien, then, for work and labor done upon crops or buildings, is a proceeding in rem, and, if sufficient in form and substance under the statutes, would be good and valid, even though it appeared that the person who owned the buildings or crops at the time of making the contract had died before the filing of the lien.

It is true that if there bad been an attempt on tbe-part of tbe plaintiff to enforce bis lien against tbe estate of Carter, or against tbe crops in tbe bands of tbe administrator or tbe beirs at law of Carter, then it would have been necessary for tbe plaintiff to liave brought tbe personal representative into Court for the purpose of reducing tbe claim to judgment, as required by section 1190 of Tbe Code. But tbe crops bad been taken.into possession of tbe defendant under a claim of ownership and under process of law, and tbe contention was shifted as to tbe plaintiff’s debt and his superior lien from a contention against tbe personal representative to one with tbe defendant, a wrong-doer.

But tbe defendant contends that tbe relation of debtor and creditor must be shown to have existed between tbe estate of Carter and the plaintiff, and that tbe plaintiff could not show indebtedness of tbe estate of Carter to himself, because, as matter of law, upon the death of Carter early in tbe Spring, tbe plaintiff bad no contract with tbe administrator of Carter to continue tbe work, and therefore was entitled to no compensation. In our investigation in our own Reports, we find no decision directly on this point, but we are of tbe opinion that tbe contract made by Carter, the employer, with tbe plaintiff did not end with tbe death of Carter. Tbe plaintiff was employed by -Carter, not at tbe will of Carter, but by tbe year, payments to be made monthly for bis work, and the' appointment of an administrator, and bis ratification of tbe contract of bis decedent, during tbe year 1898, could not have affected, one way or tbe other, tbe original contract between tbe plaintiff and Carter. Tbe plaintiff did exactly what be contracted to do with Carter, and that contract was binding on Carter during bis life, and on bis personal representative after bis death. But we find elsewhere numerous authorities for this position. “Under a contract for employment for a specified time, tbe employe may recover from tbe personal representative as sncb for tbe whole term, though part of tbe services were rendered after tbe employer’s death.” 8 Am. and Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.), p. 1008, and cases there cited. Especially do we bold that that principle of law is a sound one when applied to tbe hiring of persons by tbe owners of land by tbe year to make crops. Tbe plaintiff, upon tbe facts agreed, should have bad judgment against tbe defendant for tbe amount due him. There was error in tbe judgment of tbe Court below, and tbe same is reversed.

Reversed.