Citation Numbers： 135 S.E. 50, 192 N.C. 348, 49 A.L.R. 755, 1926 N.C. LEXIS 293
Judges： Clakkson, Stacy
Filed Date： 10/20/1926
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 10/19/2024
The sole question presented: Are the ordinances valid or void? We are of the opinion they are void.
. In S. v. Deposit Co., 191 N. C., 645, it was said: “The police power of a state is broad and comprehensive. It is elastic so that the governmental control may be adequate to meet changing social, economic and political conditions. Under the United States Constitution the police power has been left to the states — in fact it is inherent in the states. Each state has the power to regulate the relative rights and duties of all persons, individuals and corporations within its jurisdiction for the public convenience, welfare and good — for public health, public morals and public safety. The only limit is that no law shall be enacted repugnant to the Constitution of the United States (14th Amendment) or the State. Durham v. Cotton Mills, 141 N. C., 615; Shelby v. Power Co., 155 N. C., p. 196; Shields v. Harris, 190 N. C., 527; Moore v. Greensboro, ante, p. 592; 6 R. C. L., sec. 188-190.”
In Weaver, Chief of the Bureau of Inspection, etc., of Penn. v. Palmer Bros. Co., Supreme Court of U. S. Advance Opinions, p. 366 (70 Law Ed.), the facts succinctly were: Palmer Bros. Co., a Connecticut corporation, had a large factory in Connecticut, in which for more than a half century it had manufactured comfortables in that state and had sold them there and elsewhere, and in the State of Pennsylvania. In Pennsylvania a law was passed regulating the manufacture, sterilization and sale of bedding. In the act the definition of “shoddy” was, “any material which has been spun into yarn, knit or woven into fabric, and subsequently cut up, torn up, broken up or ground up.” It was made a violation of law, punishable by fine or imprisonment to make comfortables with “shoddy” or to sell comfortables made with “shoddy.” The evidence disclosed by eminent public health scientists is that in the absence of sterilization or disinfection, there would be little if any danger to the health of the users of comfortables filled with “shoddy.” There was no evidence that any sickness or disease was ever caused by the use of “shoddy.” Mr. Justice Butler, writing the majority opinion, says: “The constitutional guaranties may not be made to yield to mere convenience, Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, decided 1
In S. v. Yopp, 97 N. C., p. 481, Merrimon, J., said: “Such statutes are valid unless the purpose or necessary effect is not to regulate the use of property but destroy it.” S. v. Whitlock, 149 N. C., 542; Standard Oil Co. v. City of Kearney, 106 Neb., p. 558.
C. S., chap. 56, Municipal Corporations, Art. 11, provides for “Regulation of Buildings” for protection against fire, etc., in municipalities. In this chapter the Legislature has laid down stringent rules in regard to the regulation of buildings within and without the fire limits of the municipalities. It is compulsory on municipalities to establish fire limits. It provides for the building inspector to grant building permits. It provides in certain localities the material, etc., to be used. A comprehensive safety regulation of buildings is provided by law for municipalities.
Under Art. 15, General Powers of Municipal Corporations are enumerated. C. S., 2787, subsec. 6, is as follows: “To supervise, regulate, or suppress, in the interest of public morals, public recreations, amusements and entertainments, and to define, prohibit, abate or suppress all things detrimental to the health, morals, comfort, safety, convenience, and welfare of the people, and all nuisances and causes thereof.” C. S., 2787, subsec. 16, is as follows: “To regulate, control, and prohibit the keeping and management of bouses or any building for the storage of gunpowder and other combustible, explosive, or dangerous materials within the city, and to regulate the keeping and conveying of the same, and to authorize and regulate the laying of pipes and the location and construction of houses, tanks, reservoirs, and pumping stations for the storage of oil and gas.”
The board of aldermen of the city of Goldsboro passed an ordinance, the material one that concerns us here, prohibiting gasoline filling or gasoline storage stations to be located, conducted or operated in the city of Goldsboro without first obtaining consent from the board of aider-men at some regular meeting thereof.
The plaintiff contends that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void, that it vests arbitrary discretion with respect to an ordinary law
In S. v. Tenant, 110 N. C., p. 609, "Mission Hospital case’’ tbe ordinance was as follows: “That no person, firm or corporation shall build or erect within the limits of the city any house or building of any kind or character, or otherwise add to, build upon or generally improve or change any house or building, without having -first applied to the aldermen and obtained a permission for such purpose.” The Court said: “If an ordinance is passed by a municipal corporation, which, upon its face, restricts the right of dominion which the individual might otherwise exercise without question, not according to any general or uniform rule, but so as to make the absolute enjoyment' of his own depend upon the arbitrary will of the governing authorities of the town or city, it is unconstitutional and void, because it fails to furnish a uniform rule of action and leaves the right of property subject to the despotic will of aldermen who may exercise it so as to give exclusive profits or privileges to particular persons, Newton v. Belger, 143 Mass., 598; City of Richmond v. Dudley, Northern Reporter, vol. 28, No. 13, p. 312; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 356; May v. People, 27 Pac. Rep., 1010; Baltimore v. Rodeck, 49 Md., 217; Anderson v. City of Wellington, 40 Ka., 173; In re Frazee, 63 Mich., 396; Tugman v. Chicago, 78 Ill., 405; Village of Braceville v. Doherty, 30 Ill. Ap., 645; Barthel v. City of New Orleans, 564; Bolls v. City of Goshen, 117 Ill., 221; Lake View v. Lutz, 44 Ill., 81; Horr & Bemis on Mun. Police Ordinances, sec. 13; Evansville v. Martin, 41 Ind., 145.” The City of Plymouth v. Schultheis, 135 Ind., p. 339; City of St. Louis v. Russell, 20 L. R. A., p. 721 (Mo.), (the latter case citing S. v. Tenant, supra).
In S. v. Bass, 171 N. C., p. 781, it was said: “Stables are not per se nuisances at common law, to be abated regardless of the manner in which they are kept. Dargan v. Waddill, 31 N. C., p. 244.” In the Bass case, the Tenant case, supra, was approved. The ordinance declared void was to the effect that no person or persons, firm or corporation, shall build or cause to be erected stables or stalls nearer to a neighbor’s residence than it is to the owner’s. The court further said (pp. 781-782) : “Its purpose is presumed to be to improve the health of the inhabitants of the town, as well as to minister to their comfort. It fails conspicuously to accomplish such purpose, as under it stables may be kept with impunity obnoxiously near any number of dwellings if they are equally as near the dwelling of the owner of the stables. Thus it is put within the power of the owner to annoy his neighbor at will if he is willing to endure the same annoyance himself. An ordinance to be valid must be uniform in its application to all citizens
The construction of a filling station dealing with property rights, cannot be placed in a class with one applying for a license to operate a poolroom or dance hall, etc., which is a privilege as distinguished from a legitimate business in which one is authorized to engage as a matter of right. We think this distinction has been clearly recognized in this State. Brunswick-Balke Co. v. Mecklenburg, 181 N. C., 386; S. v. Vanhook, 182 N. C., 831.
In Brunswick-Balke Co. v. Mecklenburg, supra, p. 388, Hoke, I., speaking to the question, says: “In S. v. Tenant, 110 N. C., 609, the case in this State chiefly relied upon by appellant, involved the validity of an ordinance of the city of Asheville, which prohibited any and all owners of property within the city from building or erecting anywhere in the city limits any house or building of any kind or character or adding to or altering any house or building already constructed without first obtaining permission from the board of aldermen. The court held the ordinance void, as ah unwarranted interference with the ordinary incidents of ownership, at the arbitrary will of the board of aldermen without valid reason had or assigned for their action, and as having no reasonable relation to the exercise of the police powers vested in the board for the well ordering of the town.”
In Hanes v. Carolina Cadillac Co., 176 N. C., p. 351, it is held: “Automobiles are of such general use that 'they have become a part of the daily life of our people in business as well as for pleasure. Public garages and supply stations are essential and cannot well be dispensed with. The establishment of such public conveniences even in residential sections of cities and towns have been held not to be a nuisance per se. (Italics ours). Sheman v. Lexington, 128 N. Y., 681. It has been further held that the storage of gasoline in suitable tanks set well down in the earth does not constitute a nuisance per se. Harper v. Standard Oil Co., 78 Mo., 338; Cleveland v. Gaslight Co., 20 N. J. Eq., 201.”
In Refining Co. v. McKernan, 179 N. C., p. 314, applicable to gasoline, etc., the ordinance applied to all classes alike, no discrimination, no discretionary power given as in the present case.
It is to be seen that this Court has held that the business of dealing in gasoline and oil is legitimate business in municipalities and not a
In Small v. Edenton, 146 N. C., 530, it is said: “The reasonableness of an ordinance is for the court, the jury being called in to find the facts when in dispute.”
In Barger v. Smith, 156 N. C., p. 323, a town ordinance prohibited the erection of any saw mill or other steam mill within certain boundar ries. It is said, at p. 324: “ 'An ordinance must not be oppressive or discriminating, but must be reasonable and lawful.’ 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. (5 ed.), see. 589; 2 Abb. Mun. Corp., sec. 545. When an ordinance is 'within the grant of power to the municipality, the presumption is that it is reasonable, unless its unreasonable character appears upon its face. But the courts will declare an ordinance to be void because unreasonable upon a state of facts being shown which makes it unreasonable.’ Ibid., sec. 591, and cases there cited. It is further said that 'art ordinance must be impartial, fair and general. It would be unreasonable and unjust to make under the same circumstances an act done by one person penal and done by another not so. Ordinances which have this effect cannot be sustained. Special and unwarranted discrimination or unjust or oppressive interference in particular cases is not to be allowed.’ Ibid., 593.”
In S. v. Rice, 158 N. C., p. 655, in the interest of health an ordinance was sustained forbidding keeping of hogs and pigs (a nuisance per se) within one-fourth mile of the city limits of Greensboro. The Legislature giving police power for sanitary purposes to the territory one mile beyond the city limits. A like ordinance in S. v. Hord, 122 N. C., p. 1092, was sustained forbidding keeping a hog 100 yards from another’s dwelling, etc. There is no discrimination in either of these cases for it forbids all citizens alike.
In Lawrence v. Nissen, 173 N. C., p. 363, it is said: “The discriminations which are open to objection are those where persons engaged in the same business are subjected to different restrictions or are held entitled to different privileges under the same conditions. It is only then that the discrimination can be said to impair that equal right which all can claim in the enforcement of the laws. This is the rule laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S., 709. It is those restrictions imposed upon one class of persons engaged in a 'particular business, which are not imposed upon others engaged in the same business and under like conditions, that impair the equal right which all can claim in the enforcement of the laws.” S. v. Denson, 189 N. C., p. 173.
S. v. Weddington, 188 N. C., 643, was a Sunday ordinance held valid, as follows: “That it shall be unlawful for any person or persons, merchants, tradesmen, or company to sell or offer for sale on Sunday any goods, wares, drinks or merchandise of any kind or character, except in case of sickness or absolute necessity, in the town of Faith.” This is a different class of ordinance from the one under consideration. The Sunday ordinances are predicated on the idea that there should be a rest day for man. It is a police regulation necessary to the health and welfare of a people. The forbidding keeping open stores gives the rest and applies to all in the town alike. To the same effect is S. v. Medlin, 170 N. C., 682; S. v. Davis, 171 N. C., 809; S. v. Burbage, 172 N. C., 876; S. v. Lumber Co., 186 N. C., 122.
“General Assembly or a municipal corporation has the power to classify the different occupations, provided the classification is not unreasonable and oppressive, and that usually the extent to which the power will be exercised is for the General Assembly or the governing body of the municipality.” S. v. Davis, supra.
The principle is well stated in 19 R. C. L., p. 813, part sec. 118: “It is clear that an ordinance is passed by a municipal corporation which upon its face restricts the right of dominion which the individual might otherwise exercise without question, not according to any general or uniform rule, but so as to make the absolute enjoyment of his own depend upon the arbitrary will of the governing authorities of the town or city, it is unconstitutional and void, because it fails to furnish a uniform rule of action and leaves the right of property subject to the despotic will of the municipal officers, who may exercise it in accordance with some principle which it would not be within the constitutional power of the State to sanction or even so as to give exclusive profits and privileges to particular persons. There is, however, no valid objection to an ordinance which vests in a municipal board, or vests in a single officer, authority to grant permits or licenses to engage in an
We are not unmindful of the case of S. v. Shannonhouse, 166 N. C., 241, and cases therein referred to. In these cases, in pursuance of authority (or inherent power), the town specifically prescribed fire limits applicable to all alike. This case, cited with approval S. v. Johnson, 114 N. C., p. 848, which was written by Mr. Justice Avery, who wrote the Tenant case. In S. v. Kirkpatrick, 179 N. C., p. 747, the ordinances applied to all alike. There are exceptional cases where it is difficult or impracticable to lay down a definite comprehensive rule or the discretion relates to an administration of a police regulation and is necessary to protect the public morals, health, safety and general welfare, but in cases of this kind the exercise of discretion must not be unreasonable or arbitrary.
Interesting' opinions, holding defendant’s contention correct, are: The State of Washington v. C. A. Fleming, 129 Wash. Rep., p. 646; Herring v. Stannus, 169 Ark., p. 244, 275 S. W., p. 321.
There is no question as to the good faith of the mayor or board of aldermen of Goldsboro — men of character. The ordinances are far-reaching, and the law does not permit the enjoyment of one’s property to depend upon the arbitrary or despotic will of officials, however well-meaning, or to restrict the individual’s right of property or lawful business without a general or uniform rule applicable to all alike.
In this State, dealing in gasoline and oils is a legitimate business and so declared. Any valid ordinance must come under the time-honored rule of equal rights and not be dependent on arbitrary or despotic will. No ordinance is enforceable in matters of this kind, a lawful business, that does not make a general or uniform rule of equal rights to all and applicable to all alike — then there can be no special privilege or favoritism. .The ordinance gives the power to the board of aldermen at their pleasure to grant one person a license and refuse another under the same circumstances. The cleavage and question is less troublesome when the distinction is observed between those things that are not harmful and unsafe and those that are. The right of individuals to engage in any lawful calling and use their property for lawful purposes is guaranteed to them, and any unreasonable restraint or oppressive exaction upon the use of property and utmost liberty of business growth and advancement is contrary to the fundamental law of the land.
In the case at bar we are dealing with property rights and a lawful business — -not unsafe, according to the decisions of this Court. There
We do not think tbat tbe reference in tbe pleadings to tbe acts of tbe city planning commission of tbe city of Goldsboro enters into tbis controversy, although it may be noted tbat by a vote of.two to one tbe commission recommended tbat tbe permit be granted.
Tbe decisions are conflicting in other states, but tbe principle applicable in tbe present .case, we think, is borne out by tbe decisions of tbe United States Supreme Court, in tbis State and a large majority in tbe other states of tbe Union, and founded on reason and justice.
For tbe reason given, tbe judgment of tbe court below is
Affirmed.