State v. Cox

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 57PA12-2
FILED 8 NOVEMBER 2013
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
RONALD PRINCEGERALD COX
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous
decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 731 S.E.2d 438 (2012), reversing
in part and finding no error in part in a judgment entered on 15 September 2010 by
Judge Charles H. Henry in Superior Court, Wayne County, and remanding for
resentencing. Heard in the Supreme Court on 3 September 2013.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant Attorney General,
for the State-appellant.
Irving Joyner for defendant-appellee.
MARTIN, Justice.
Defendant, a convicted felon, confessed to possession of a firearm recovered
by Goldsboro police officers ten to twelve feet from a car in which he was a
passenger. Because defendant’s confession is supported by substantial independent
evidence tending to establish its trustworthiness, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied.
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
STATE V. COX
Opinion of the Court
The Goldsboro Police Department conducted a DWI checkpoint from 11:00
p.m. on 30 October until 3:00 a.m. on 31 October 2009 at the intersection of Central
Heights Road and Highway 13 North. The Department posted notice signs and
illuminated the area with mobile lighting units. Officer William VanLenten was
assigned to watch for vehicles attempting to avoid the checkpoint. At
approximately 1:35 a.m., Officer VanLenten observed a Chevrolet Impala sedan
traveling north toward the checkpoint. The Impala abruptly slowed down and
appeared to Officer VanLenten “like it was going to turn west” onto another road.
Instead, the Impala continued its path north and turned into the driveway of a
residence. Officer VanLenten was familiar with this residence and had never seen
the Impala there. As he followed in his patrol vehicle to investigate, he observed
the driver jump from the Impala and flee to the back of the property. Three other
men remained in the car: defendant in the front passenger seat, James Darden in
the rear seat behind defendant, and Deangelo Cox in the rear seat behind the
driver’s seat. The driver’s door was open and all the windows were down. Officer
VanLenten ordered the passengers to show their hands. The backseat passengers,
Darden and Deangelo Cox, complied, but defendant ignored the command, rolling a
marijuana cigarette instead.
As Officer Tyler McNeill arrived to provide backup, the driver of the Impala,
Brian White, returned to the scene with his hands up. Officer McNeill removed
James Darden from the car and found a firearm on the car’s floor at the foot of his
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Opinion of the Court
seat. Deangelo Cox and defendant were then removed from the car. In White’s
flight path through the yard, the officers found a firearm loaded with five rounds of
ammunition and a clear plastic bag containing several smaller plastic bags of
marijuana. The firearm was located within ten to twelve feet of the driver’s side of
the car. The night was cool and the grass was wet with condensation, but the
firearm was dry and warm. Within three feet of the firearm the officers also found
a small bag of individually wrapped marijuana. Darden claimed ownership of the
firearm found at the foot of his seat, and Officer NcNeill took him into custody. No
one claimed ownership of the firearm and marijuana that were found outside the
car. Officer VanLenten checked the serial number of the unclaimed firearm and
learned it had been reported stolen from Sumter, Georgia. He arrested White,
Deangelo Cox, and defendant.
After the Impala’s four occupants had been transported to the Wayne County
Magistrate’s Office, they discussed among themselves their desire that Deangelo
Cox, who was defendant’s younger brother, not be charged. Officer VanLenten
reiterated that if none of them took ownership of the marijuana and stolen firearm,
then all of them would be charged. The group asked Officer VanLenten whether
Deangelo Cox would be released “if they said who the items belonged to.” After
Officer VanLenten gave them their Miranda warnings, White stated the marijuana
belonged to him and defendant stated the firearm belonged to him. The men
refused to make written statements. Deangelo Cox was released from police
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Opinion of the Court
custody and was not charged. Defendant was indicted for possession of a stolen
firearm, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of a firearm by a felon.
Before defendant’s case was called for trial, the State dismissed the charge of
possession of a stolen firearm. At trial, Officers VanLenten and McNeill testified
for the State. The trial court admitted a certified copy of defendant’s prior felony
conviction. At the conclusion of the State’s case in chief, defense counsel moved to
dismiss the two remaining charges. The trial court denied these motions. Brian
White, the Impala’s driver, was the sole witness for the defense. He testified that
he was present with defendant the entire time they were held at the magistrate’s
office and never heard defendant admit the stolen firearm belonged to him. He also
denied claiming ownership of the marijuana found in the grass. At the close of the
evidence, the trial court again denied the defense’s motions to dismiss the charges.
The jury found defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance and
possession of a firearm by a felon. The trial court consolidated the offenses for
judgment and sentenced defendant to a term of twelve to fifteen months of
imprisonment.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held the trial court erred by denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon. State
v. Cox, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 721 S.E.2d 346, 348 (2012). The court stated: “[T]he
entirety of the confession, as conveyed by Officer VanLenten, was that defendant
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Opinion of the Court
owned the gun. Thus, any corroborative evidence under either [the traditional or
Parker articulation of the corpus delicti] test would have to tend to establish that
defendant owned or possessed the gun.” Id. at ___, 721 S.E.2d at 350. Concluding
that “[t]he State did not present such evidence” and “the only evidence that
defendant possessed the gun was the extrajudicial confession,” the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss that charge. Id. at
___, 721 S.E.2d at 350. As for the second issue raised on appeal, the court found no
error in defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana. Id. at ___, 721 S.E.2d at
350.
On 13 June 2012, we allowed the State’s petition for discretionary review for
the limited purpose of remanding to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in
light of our decision in State v. Sweat, 366 N.C. 79, 727 S.E.2d 691 (2012). State v.
Cox, 366 N.C. 211, 742 S.E.2d 189 (2012). Upon reconsideration, the Court of
Appeals upheld its original decision. State v. Cox, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 731
S.E.2d 438, 443 (2012). The State again petitioned this Court for discretionary
review. We allowed the State’s petition on 24 January 2013.
The sole issue before us is whether the Court of Appeals erred by reversing
the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a
firearm by a felon. “Upon a defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence,
the question for the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each
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essential element of the offense charged . . . and (2) of defendant’s being the
perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.” Sweat, 366 N.C.
at 84, 727 S.E.2d at 695 (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Miller, 363 N.C. 96, 99,
678 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “The
evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is
entitled to . . . every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom.” Sweat, 366 N.C.
at 84, 727 S.E.2d at 695 (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). “Whether the State presented substantial evidence of each
essential element is a question of law.” State v. Phillips, 365 N.C. 103, 133-34, 711
S.E.2d 122, 144 (2011) (citation omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1541(2012). “We review questions of law de novo.” State v. Khan, ___ N.C. ___, ___, 738
S.E.2d 167, 171 (2013) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we conduct a de novo review
to determine whether there was substantial evidence that defendant was previously
convicted of a felony and subsequently possessed a firearm. State v. Bradshaw, 366
N.C. 90, 93, 728 S.E.2d 345, 347-48 (2012) (citing N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1(a) (2011)).
A confession can be powerful evidence against the accused. See, e.g., Premo v.
Moore, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 733, 744 (2011). But we have long held that “an
extrajudicial confession, standing alone, is not sufficient to sustain a conviction of a
crime.” State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 229, 337 S.E.2d 487, 491 (1985). When the
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Opinion of the Court
State relies upon a defendant’s extrajudicial confession, we apply the corpus delicti
rule “to guard against the possibility that a defendant will be convicted of a crime
that has not been committed.” Id. at 235, 337 S.E.2d at 494. This inquiry is
preliminary to consideration of whether the State presented sufficient evidence to
survive the motion to dismiss.
The corpus delicti rule is historically grounded in three policy justifications:
(1) to “protect[ ] against those shocking situations in which alleged murder victims
turn up alive after their accused killer has been convicted and perhaps executed”;
(2) to “ensure[ ] that confessions that are erroneously reported or construed,
involuntarily made, mistaken as to law or fact, or falsely volunteered by an insane
or mentally disturbed individual cannot be used to falsely convict a defendant”; and
(3) “to promote good law enforcement practices [by] requir[ing] thorough
investigations of alleged crimes to ensure that justice is achieved and the innocent
are vindicated.” State v. Smith, 362 N.C. 583, 591-92, 669 S.E.2d 299, 305 (2008)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Traditionally, our corpus delicti rule has required the State to present
corroborative evidence, independent of the defendant’s confession, tending to show
that “(a) the injury or harm constituting the crime occurred [and] (b) this injury or
harm was done in a criminal manner.” Id. at 589, 669 S.E.2d at 304 (citation
omitted); see also Parker, 315 N.C. at 231, 337 S.E.2d at 492. This traditional
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Opinion of the Court
approach requires that the independent evidence “ ‘touch[ ] or concern[ ] the corpus
delicti’ ”—literally, the body of the crime, such as the dead body in a murder case.
Parker, 315 N.C. at 229, 337 S.E.2d at 491 (citation omitted).
When applying the corpus delicti rule, it is fundamental that the
corroborative evidence “need not . . . in any manner tend to show that the defendant
was the guilty party.” 1 Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence § 146, at
810 (7th ed. 2013) [hereinafter 1 McCormick on Evidence]. Instead, the rule
requires the State to present evidence tending to show that the crime in question
occurred. The rule does not require the State to logically exclude every possibility
that the defendant did not commit the crime. Thus, if the State presents evidence
tending to establish that the injury or harm constituting the crime occurred and
was caused by criminal activity, then the corpus delicti rule is satisfied and the
State may use the defendant’s confession to prove his identity as the perpetrator.
See, e.g., State v. Trexler, 316 N.C. 528, 533, 342 S.E.2d 878, 881 (1986).
In State v. Parker, acknowledging shortcomings and criticisms of the
traditional corpus delicti rule, 315 N.C. at 231-35, 337 S.E.2d at 492-95, we adopted
a rule for non-capital cases “expand[ing] the type of corroboration which may be
sufficient to establish the trustworthiness of the confession,” Trexler, 316 N.C. at
532, 342 S.E.2d at 880.
[W]hen the State relies upon the defendant’s confession to
obtain a conviction, it is no longer necessary that there be
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Opinion of the Court
independent proof tending to establish the corpus delicti
of the crime charged if the accused’s confession is
supported by substantial independent evidence tending to
establish its trustworthiness, including facts that tend to
show the defendant had the opportunity to commit the
crime.
We wish to emphasize, however, that when
independent proof of loss or injury is lacking, there must
be strong corroboration of essential facts and
circumstances embraced in the defendant’s confession.
Corroboration of insignificant facts or those unrelated to
the commission of the crime will not suffice. We
emphasize this point because although we have relaxed
our corroboration rule somewhat, we remain advertent to
the reason for its existence, that is, to protect against
convictions for crimes that have not in fact occurred.
Parker, 315 N.C. at 236, 337 S.E.2d at 495; see also Sweat, 366 N.C. at 82, 727
S.E.2d at 694; Trexler, 316 N.C. at 532, 342 S.E.2d at 880. This rule, known as the
Parker rule, applies when independent proof of the commission of the crime—that
is, the corpus delicti—is lacking but there is substantial independent evidence
tending to establish the trustworthiness of the defendant’s extrajudicial confession.
Trexler, 316 N.C. at 532, 342 S.E.2d at 880. As we later clarified, we did not
abandon the traditional rule when we adopted the rule in Parker. Id. Rather, the
State may now satisfy the corpus delicti rule under the traditional formulation or
under the Parker formulation. Id.; see also State v. Sloan, 316 N.C. 714, 725, 343
S.E.2d 527, 534 (1986).
The Court in Parker noted that application of the traditional corpus delicti
rule “is nearly impossible in those instances where the defendant has been charged
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Opinion of the Court
with a crime that does not involve a tangible corpus delicti such as is present in
homicide (the dead body), arson (the burned building) and robbery (missing
property).” 315 N.C. at 232, 337 S.E.2d at 493. For many statutory offenses,
“[s]imply identifying the elements of the corpus delicti . . . provides fertile ground
for dispute.” 1 McCormick on Evidence § 147, at 815. These difficulties provided, in
part, the Court’s motivation for adopting the more flexible Parker rule. Although
the gun recovered by the officers may have provided independent evidence of the
tangible corpus delicti under the traditional rule, in light of the above
considerations, we apply the Parker rule. Accordingly, we must determine whether
defendant’s “confession is supported by substantial independent evidence tending to
establish its trustworthiness, including facts that tend to show [he] had the
opportunity to commit the crime.” Parker, 315 N.C. at 236, 337 S.E.2d at 495.
The State’s evidence tended to show that the Chevrolet Impala attempted to
avoid a DWI checkpoint by pulling into a residential driveway. The driver fled on
foot as Officer VanLenten’s patrol car approached. Officer VanLenten observed that
defendant was one of three remaining passengers in the car. Officers thereafter
found the firearm in question within ten to twelve feet of the driver’s open door.
Even though the night was cool and the grass was wet with condensation, the
firearm was dry and warm, indicating that it came from inside the car. Near the
firearm officers found marijuana packaged in a manner consistent with packaging
for sale. The officers also found a firearm at the feet of one of the other passengers.
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Opinion of the Court
These are not “insignificant facts” or facts “unrelated to the commission of the
crime.” Id. Rather, these facts strongly corroborate “essential facts and
circumstances embraced in [ ] defendant’s confession.” Id. They link defendant
temporally and spatially to the firearm. Thus, the circumstances preceding
defendant’s confession—circumstances that were observed by law enforcement
officers—establish the trustworthiness of the confession.
Furthermore, defendant makes no claim that his confession was obtained by
deception or coercion, or was a result of physical or mental infirmity. In fact, before
confessing, defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and signed a Waiver of
Rights form that stated:
I have read the statement of my [Miranda] rights above.
I understand what my rights are. I am willing to answer
questions and make a statement. I do not want a lawyer
present during questioning. I understand and know what
I am doing. No promises or threats have been made
against me and no pressure of any kind has been used
against me by any officer or any other person.
The evidence presented at trial is consistent with these statements. As Officer
McNeill testified, while the officers were completing their paperwork, the four men
discussed among themselves how they might prevent defendant’s younger brother
from being charged. Officer VanLenten also testified that he observed the four
men’s conversation and noted their concern that defendant’s younger brother might
be charged. Defendant confessed only after Officer VanLenten informed him of his
Miranda rights. The trustworthiness of defendant’s confession is thus further
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Opinion of the Court
bolstered by the evidence that defendant made a voluntary decision to confess. For
the foregoing reasons, defendant’s confession is “supported by substantial
independent evidence tending to establish its trustworthiness.” Id. The State has
therefore met its burden under the Parker articulation of the corpus delicti rule.
The Court of Appeals erred when it reasoned: “[T]he entirety of the
confession, as conveyed by Officer VanLenten, was that defendant owned the gun.
Thus, any corroborative evidence under either [corpus delicti] test would have to
tend to establish that defendant owned or possessed the gun.” Cox, ___ N.C. App. at
___, 731 S.E.2d at 443. Even though defendant admitted the gun belonged to him,
the Court of Appeals conducted a sufficiency analysis that effectively disregarded
his confession—evaluating whether the State’s other evidence excluded the
possibility that the gun belonged to any of the other three occupants of the Impala.
This analysis is inconsistent with the corpus delicti doctrine, which does not require
that the corroborative evidence “in any manner tend to show that the defendant
was the guilty party.” 1 McCormick on Evidence § 146, at 810. Rather, defendant’s
confession provides the proof that he committed the crime.
We apply the corpus delicti rule in light of the standard of review for motions
to dismiss for insufficient evidence, which requires the reviewing court to construe
the evidence “in the light most favorable to the State.” State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95,
99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980). Under that standard, evidentiary “contradictions
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Opinion of the Court
and discrepancies are for the jury to resolve and do not warrant dismissal.” Id. If a
reasonable inference of the defendant’s guilt may be drawn from the evidence,
dismissal is improper, “even if the evidence likewise permits a reasonable inference
of the defendant’s innocence.” State v. Butler, 356 N.C. 141, 567 S.E.2d 137 (2002).
Our opinion in State v. Butler is illustrative of these axiomatic principles. In that
case, controlled substances were discovered in a taxicab in which the defendant had
been a passenger. Id. at 144, 567 S.E.2d at 139. Unlike defendant in the present
case, the defendant in Butler made no confession. Applying the “light most
favorable to the State” standard of review, we held there was sufficient evidence
that the defendant constructively possessed the controlled substances even though
two other individuals had the opportunity to place the drugs there. See id. at 144-
45, 567 S.E.2d at 139. We did not require the State to exclude the possibility that
the controlled substances belonged to the two other individuals. In that case, the
defendant did not confess. In the case before us, however, defendant did confess to
possession of the firearm, presenting the jury with evidence of his guilt. Armed
with defendant’s confession, the State was not required to submit alternative
evidence proving defendant’s identity as the perpetrator.
Because the corpus delicti rule is satisfied, defendant’s confession provides
substantial evidence that he possessed the firearm. Taken with the undisputed
evidence of defendant’s prior felony conviction, the evidence was sufficient for the
State to survive defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a firearm
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Opinion of the Court
by a felon. See Bradshaw, 366 N.C. at 93, 728 S.E.2d at 347-48 (citing N.C.G.S.
§ 14-415.1(a) (2011)). Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
REVERSED.
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