State v. Hester

Justice MITCHELL

dissenting.

The majority concludes that the trial court committed reversible error by sustaining the State’s objections to certain questions the defendant asked of Lieutenant R. T. Robinson concerning the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the defendant’s confession. Some of the questions had already been answered or were answered at subsequent points in the examination of Robinson by the defendant. Assuming the trial court erred in sustaining the objections to other questions, such errors were harmless.

The majority concludes error was committed when, after Robinson had testified that it was department policy “most of the time” not to have defendants sign statements, the trial court sustained an objection to the defendant’s question as to what cases did not “fall into ‘most of the time.’ ” The transcript of the trial reveals, however, that at several points the defendant had already made full inquiry and received full answers from Robinson concerning this matter. Robinson had fully testified that it was not a procedure or policy of his department to have defendants who made statements give written statements and sign them, but that it was departmental policy to have at least two people present when a defendant made a statement. That policy was followed in this case. Robinson testified further that: “When we do require a statement to be signed is when there is a co-defendant. When the defendant is going to testify against another person in court, we do require him to sign a statement.” The question as to which the trial court sustained the objection had already been asked and answered, and the trial court did not err by sustaining the objection to the repetitious question.

I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in sustaining objections to the defendant’s questions concerning departmental policy with regard to the making of sound-recordings or videotapes of interrogations of suspects. However, Robinson was permitted to testify that his department “very seldom” made sound-recordings of such interrogations. In my view, the trial court’s action in sustaining objections to questions concerning departmental policy with regard to the making of sound-recordings and videotapes of interrogations was harmless. The testimony of Lieutenant Robinson before the jury clearly indicated that no such steps were taken in this case, and the defendant had full advantage of any inferences adverse to the State which could be drawn from that fact. Therefore, there is no reasonable possibility that the trial court’s rulings in this one narrow area of inquiry affected the result at trial, and any error in this regard was harmless. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) (1988).

Finally, the majority errs to the extent it rests its holding in this case upon the authority of State v. Sanchez, 328 N.C. 247, 400 S.E.2d 421 (1991). As the majority’s own analysis of Sanchez clearly demonstrates, that case is only remotely similar to the present case and certainly is not controlling here.

I dissent from the decision of the majority which awards this defendant a new trial.

Justice WEBB joins in this dissenting opinion.