State v. Watkins-Price

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling
legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-946
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 17 February 2015
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Pender County
Nos. 12 CRS 51464
13 CRS 1531-32
DANIELLE M. WATKINS-PRICE
Review of judgments entered 28 April 2014 by Judge Phyllis
Gorham in Pender County Superior Court upon grant of Defendant’s
petition for writ of certiorari. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12
January 2015.
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney
General Cathy Hinton Pope, for the State.
Winifred H. Dillon for Defendant-appellant.
DILLON, Judge.
Danielle M. Watkins-Price (“Defendant”) appeals from three
judgments revoking her probation and sentencing her to consecutive
sentences of 8 to 19 and 6 to 17 months imprisonment and an
additional concurrent sentence of 6 to 17 months imprisonment for
convictions of possession of stolen goods, two counts of forgery,
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and two counts of uttering. Because the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in sentencing Defendant to consecutive terms of
imprisonment, we affirm.
We note that Defendant’s written notice of appeal did not
satisfy Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon this Court. She has filed
a petition for writ of certiorari, to which the State does not
oppose. Accordingly, in the interest of justice and in our
discretion, we allow Defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari
and address the merits of her argument on appeal.
Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
abused its discretion when it imposed two consecutive sentences.
We disagree.
It is well established that a trial court may, within its
discretion, “impose a consecutive sentence when a suspended
sentence is activated upon revocation of a probationary judgment
without regard to whether the sentence previously imposed ran
concurrently or consecutively.” State v. Hanner, 188 N.C. App.
137, 140, 654 S.E.2d 820, 822 (2008) (quoting State v. Paige, 90
N.C. App. 142, 143, 369 S.E.2d 606, 606 (1988)); see also N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(d) (2013). An abuse of discretion generally
occurs only “where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by
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reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result
of a reasoned decision.” State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 673,
617 S.E.2d 1, 19 (2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted),
cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1073, 164 L. Ed. 2d 523 (2006). However, an
abuse of discretion also occurs where the trial court erroneously
believed that it lacked the discretion to impose concurrent
sentences. See State v. Nunez, 204 N.C. App. 164, 169-70, 693
S.E.2d 223, 227 (2010); see also State v. Crain, 73 N.C. App. 269,
271, 326 S.E.2d 120, 122 (1985).
Here, Defendant argues that the trial court’s inquiry into
her original sentences shows that the court erroneously believed
that it lacked discretion to run her sentences concurrently after
the revocation of her probation. However, we read the trial
court’s questioning as no more than a simple inquiry into the
number of sentences Defendant faced and how the sentences were
originally structured. It is clear from the trial court’s overall
questions to the State and Defendant’s trial counsel that the court
intentionally, and within its full discretion, set two of
Defendant’s sentences to run consecutively in an attempt to give
Defendant an opportunity to participate in extended substance
abuse treatment programs available to her while in prison.
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Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
sentencing of Defendant, and affirm the court’s judgments.
AFFIRMED.
Judges ELMORE and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).