State v. Matthews

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-109
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 19 August 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Mecklenburg County
11 CRS 219314
MEGAEL JERMAINE MATTHEWS
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 22 April 2013 by
Judge C. Thomas Edwards in Mecklenburg County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 June 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Alexandra M. Hightower, for the State.
Tin Fulton Walker & Owen PLLC, by Matthew G. Pruden, for
Defendant-Appellant.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Megael Jermaine Matthews (“Defendant”) appeals from
judgments entered upon his convictions for attempted first
degree murder, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill
inflicting serious bodily injury, and discharging a firearm into
occupied property inflicting serious bodily injury. For the
following reasons we find no error.
I. Background
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On the evening of 24 April 2011, Charlotte-Mecklenburg
police responded to a report of a single vehicle accident at the
intersection of West Sugar Creek Road and Hubbard Road in
Charlotte. Officer Derrick Bowlin responded to the call, and
when he arrived at the scene he found a single vehicle parked in
the grass off of the road with several bullet holes in the side.
When Officer Bowlin approached the car, the passenger in the
driver’s seat told him that he had been shot. Later, Officer
Bowlin joined other police officers at an address in the 4500
block of Christenbury Hills Lane, about a mile and a half from
the scene of the car accident, after reports had come in earlier
that day that shots had been fired in that vicinity.
Earlier that same afternoon, upon hearing gun shots,
Tiffany Amaya looked through her living room window on
Christenbury Hills Lane and observed two men walking toward the
back of a house. She later described these men as black and
approximately 5’9” in height. She described one of the men as
in his early 20’s with short dreads and wearing a bright blue
shirt.
Based on information from neighbors, Detective Ritter and
other officers were posted outside of 4542 Christenbury Hills
Lane at approximately 10:00 p.m. when two men were seen exiting
from that residence, one of whom was later identified as
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Defendant. As soon as Defendant exited the building, Detective
Ritter placed him in handcuffs and frisked him for weapons.
Immediately after, while still in handcuffs, Defendant was
placed in the back seat of a patrol car on the scene. During
the approximately forty-five minutes that Defendant was detained
in the back of the patrol car an officer was present outside of
the car. Defendant has testified that at this time he did not
feel free to leave, but that he was told several times that he
was not under arrest.
After forty-five minutes in the police cruiser, Defendant
was uncuffed and asked to exit so that a show-up identification
could be performed. It was at this time that Ms. Amaya was
asked to perform the show-up identification of a suspect. Ms.
Amaya observed that the suspect, Defendant, was approximately
5’9”, had dreads, and was wearing a navy blue shirt, which she
identified as a different color from the shirt worn by the
person she had observed walking behind the house. She was
unsure whether the suspect was the person that she had observed
previously in the afternoon.
At the scene, Detective Manassah questioned Defendant about
what he had done that day, and then requested that he accompany
the officers to the Law Enforcement Center (“LEC”) for
questioning. With Detective Manassah’s permission, Defendant
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called his father, who drove to the scene and accompanied
Defendant to the police station. During the ride, Defendant was
unrestrained, sat in the front seat, and used his cell phone.
At the LEC, Defendant was placed in an interview room and
the questioning began at 12:09 a.m. During the questioning,
Defendant gave several different accounts of his story.
Eventually, Defendant confessed to shooting the victim after
discovering that the $100 bill the victim had paid Defendant in
a marijuana transaction was counterfeit. At this time, 4:31
a.m., Defendant was placed under arrest and read his Miranda
rights.
During the interview, Defendant was left alone several
times, and was told that there was a bathroom down the hall if
he needed to use it. Defendant was also able to privately speak
with his father in the interview room shortly after 3:00 a.m.
Defendant was later indicted by a Mecklenburg County Grand
Jury on one count of attempted first degree murder, one count of
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting
serious injury, one count of discharging a firearm into occupied
property inflicting serious bodily injury, and six counts of
discharging a firearm into a vehicle in operation. Prior to
trial, Defendant moved to suppress the statements he made to
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police. A hearing on the motion to suppress was held on 11-12
April 2013. This motion was denied on 15 April 2013.
On 15 April 2013, Defendant’s case was called for trial in
Mecklenburg County Superior Court, the Honorable C. Thomas
Edwards, Judge presiding. After the State presented its
evidence, Defendant moved for a dismissal, which was denied.
Defendant presented no evidence, and the jury returned verdicts
finding Defendant guilty of all charges on 22 April 2013. That
same day, the trial judge sentenced Defendant to a term of 125
to 161 months in prison for the charge of attempted first degree
murder, under which the judge consolidated the charge of assault
with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious
bodily injury. The Judge also sentenced Defendant to a
consecutive term of 72 to 96 months for the charge of
discharging a firearm into occupied property inflicting serious
bodily injury, and consolidated the remaining charges under this
sentence. That day, 22 April 2013, trial counsel for Defendant
allegedly entered an oral notice of appeal in open court. The
notice, however, was not recorded by the court reporter and does
not appear in the transcript of the trial.
II. Discussion
Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1)
whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to
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suppress statements made to the police during a period of
questioning that occurred before Defendant was read his Miranda
rights; (2) whether Defendant received ineffective assistance of
counsel where his attorney did not raise a Fourth Amendment
argument in his motion to suppress Defendant’s statements to
police; and (3) whether the trial court erred in denying
Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of discharging a
firearm into an occupied vehicle in operation where there was no
direct evidence that the vehicle was in operation at the time
the shots were fired.
A. Notice of Appeal
Defendant appeals to this Court as of right under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7A-27(b) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(a). Now on
appeal, Defendant contends trial counsel orally entered notice
of appeal per Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate
Procedure at trial. However, Defendant’s oral notice of appeal
does not appear in the transcript. In an attempt to remedy this
situation, Defendant’s trial counsel has filed an affidavit in
the record that certifies he entered such oral notice of appeal
at trial on 22 April 2013.
Furthermore, Defendant points to State v. Williams, in
which this Court held that it had jurisdiction to address the
merits of a defendant’s appeal where
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the record reflect[ed] that the State, the
trial court, and Defendant’s counsel all
proceeded as if proper notice of appeal had
been properly noted. Upon Defendant’s
request, the trial court appointed the
Appellate Defender’s Office to represent
her, and stayed the execution of judgment
pending resolution of the matter in the
Court of Appeals. The trial court stated in
its Appellate Entries form that “[D]efendant
has given Notice of Appeal to the N.C. Court
of Appeals,” and “ordered that [Defendant]
is allowed to appeal as an indigent.”
State v. Williams, 215 N.C. App. 1, 4, 714 S.E.2d 835, 837
(2011) (alterations in original), affirmed, 366 N.C. 110, 726
S.E.2d 161 (2012).
In the case before us, all parties have proceeded as if
notice of appeal had been properly noted: the trial court
appointed the Appellate Defender’s Office to represent
Defendant, the trial court noted in its appellate entries that
“[t]he defendant has given Notice of Appeal to the N.C. Court of
Appeals,” and “ordered that the defendant is allowed to appeal
as indigent.”
Under these circumstances, in comporting with our holding
in Williams, we hold that Defendant’s right to appeal is
preserved and this court has the appropriate jurisdiction to
resolve this case on the merits.1
1
Out of precaution, Defendant has also petitioned this court for
writ of certiorari. Having determined Defendant’s right to
appeal is preserved, we dismiss defendant’s petition as moot.
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B. Motion to Suppress Confession
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress. The North Carolina Supreme
Court has previously held that:
On review of a motion to suppress evidence,
an appellate court determines whether the
trial court’s findings of fact are supported
by the evidence and whether the findings of
fact support the conclusions of law. The
trial court’s findings of fact are
conclusive on appeal if supported by
competent evidence, even if the evidence is
conflicting. The conclusions of law,
however, are reviewed de novo.
State v. Haislip, 362 N.C. 499, 499-500, 666 S.E.2d 757, 758
(2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Furthermore, “[w]here a defendant fails to challenge any of the
trial court’s findings of fact relating to the motion, our
review is limited to whether the trial court’s findings of fact
support its conclusions of law.” State v. Allen, 200 N.C. App.
709, 712–13, 684 S.E.2d 526, 529 (2009) (citations omitted).
Here, the Defendant has not contested any of the findings
of fact on appeal, merely the application of the law to the
facts. Therefore, our review of the motion to suppress is on an
entirely de novo basis.
As the State notes in its brief, the law differentiates
between the “free to leave” test under the Fourth Amendment for
the purposes of the seizure of a person and the “restraint of
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movement” test found under the Fifth Amendment for the purposes
of a detainment that rises to the level of a formal, custodial
arrest. State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 340, 543 S.E.2d 823,
828 (2001). In Miranda v. Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that “custodial interrogation” involves “questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L.
Ed. 2d 694, 706 (1966) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court later elaborated that
a noncustodial situation is not converted to
one in which Miranda applies simply because
a reviewing court concludes that, even in
the absence of any formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement, the
questioning took place in a “coercive
environment.” Any interview of one
suspected of a crime by a police officer
will have coercive aspects to it, simply by
virtue of the fact that the police officer
is part of a law enforcement system which
may ultimately cause the suspect to be
charged with a crime. But police officers
are not required to administer Miranda
warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor
is the requirement of warnings to be imposed
simply because the questioning takes place
in the station house, or because the
questioned person is one whom the police
suspect. Miranda warnings are required only
where there has been such a restriction on a
person’s freedom as to render him “in
custody.”
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Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714, 719
(1977).
In Mathiason, the Supreme Court held that even though a
suspect was being voluntarily questioned at the police station
behind closed doors, and where the police lied to the suspect
and warned him about his truthfulness, the questioning was not
custodial, and did not require Miranda warnings. Id. at 493, 50
L. Ed. 2d at 718.
Finally, in California v. Beheler, the Supreme Court held
that “[a]lthough the circumstances of each case must certainly
influence a determination of whether a suspect is ‘in custody’
for purposes of receiving Miranda protection, the ultimate
inquiry is simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint
on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal
arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 77 L. Ed.
2d 1275, 1279 (1983) (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 50 L.
Ed. 2d at 719).
In the present case, the actions of the police do not
appear tantamount to placing Defendant under custodial arrest.
Defendant was initially placed in handcuffs for the safety of
the officers. At that time he was in “investigatory detention,”
which was warranted because the police had reasonable suspicion
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that a crime had been committed and that he had been involved.
In North Carolina,
[o]nly unreasonable investigatory stops are
unconstitutional. An investigatory stop
must be justified by a reasonable suspicion,
based on objective facts, that the
individual is involved in criminal activity.
A court must consider the totality of the
circumstances——the whole picture in
determining whether a reasonable suspicion
to make an investigatory stop exists. The
stop must be based on specific and
articulable facts, as well as the rational
inferences from those facts, as viewed
through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious
officer, guided by his experience and
training. The only requirement is a minimal
level of objective justification, something
more than an unparticularized suspicion or
hunch.
State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441-42, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
Here, the police had specific articulable facts, including
the fact that the house where Defendant left from was close to
the shooting and there was a witness that saw two men walk into
the home shortly after hearing gun shots. The investigatory
detention, though forty-five minutes long, was not improper
because during this time the police were checking Defendant’s
record and attempting to set up a show-up identification.
Defendant was taken out of handcuffs for this show-up and
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remained out of handcuffs until his eventual arrest early the
next morning.
After the police uncuffed Defendant, he was told he was not
under arrest; he was asked to come to the station for voluntary
questioning; he was allowed to call his father and have his
father accompany him to the police station; he rode in the front
seat of the police vehicle; the door to the questioning room
remained open until Defendant closed it himself; he was allowed
to use the bathroom unaccompanied while at the station; and he
was allowed to use his cell phone during breaks. In light of
these circumstances, it does not appear that Defendant was
restrained in his freedom of movement to a degree comparable to
a lawful, custodial arrest. Although the questioning may have
had coercive aspects, and the officers may have appeared tough
on Defendant in questioning, this alone is not sufficient to
require Miranda warnings.
Therefore, Defendant was not under a custodial
interrogation when he made his confession to the police, and
Miranda warnings were not required. Further, the voluntariness
of the questioning, and thereby the confession, were not tainted
by the initial investigatory detention of Defendant because the
police had reasonable suspicion to detain him at that time.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
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Defendant next claims that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel when his trial counsel did not argue a
violation of the Fourth Amendment in support of Defendant’s
motion to suppress his confession. The law on claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel is well settled and several
precedential decisions dictate our scope of review.
As to whether an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim can be dealt with on appeal,
[the Supreme] Court has stated,
[i]neffective assistance of counsel claims
brought on direct review will be decided on
the merits when the cold record reveals that
no further investigation is required, i.e.,
claims that may be developed and argued
without such ancillary procedures as the
appointment of investigators or an
evidentiary hearing. Therefore, on direct
appeal we must determine if these
ineffective assistance of counsel claims
have been prematurely brought. If so, we
must dismiss those claims without prejudice
to the defendant’s right to reassert them
during a subsequent motion for appropriate
relief proceeding.
State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 691, 617 S.E.2d 1, 30 (2005)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
Further, when claims are ripe for review,
this Court must be highly deferential and
“indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance[....]”
Defendant may rebut this presumption by
specifically identifying those acts or
omissions that are not “the result of
reasonable professional judgment” and the
court determining, “in light of all the
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circumstances, the identified acts [or
omissions] were outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance.”
State v. Banks, 210 N.C. App. 30, 49, 706 S.E.2d 807, 821 (2011)
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-90, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 674, 694-95 (1984)) (alterations added). “[T]he court
should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions
in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695.
“When a defendant attacks his conviction on the basis that
counsel was ineffective, he must show that his counsel’s conduct
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” State v.
Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 561-62, 324 S.E.2d 241, 248 (1985).
North Carolina has adopted and followed the two-part test laid
out in Strickland for determining whether counsel’s conduct fell
below such an objective standard:
In order to meet this burden, a defendant
must satisfy a two-part test: “First, the
defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires
showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the
“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires
showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a
fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable.”
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Campbell, 359 N.C. at 690, 617 S.E.2d at 29 (2005) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693).
In further defining these terms, the North Carolina Supreme
Court followed Strickland in defining that “[p]rejudice is
established by showing ‘that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.’” Id. at 690, 617 S.E.2d at 29-30 (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698). Furthermore, “[b]oth
prongs of this test must be met to prevail on an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.” Id. at 690, 617 S.E.2d at 30.
“This Court has held that ‘[c]ounsel is given wide latitude
in matters of strategy, and the burden to show that counsel’s
performance fell short of the required standard is a heavy one
for defendant to bear.’” Id. (quoting State v. Fletcher, 354
N.C. 455, 482, 555 S.E.2d 534, 551 (2001), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 846, 154 L. Ed. 2d 73 (2002)). “Moreover, this Court
indulges the presumption that trial counsel’s representation is
within the boundaries of acceptable professional conduct.” Id.(citing State v. Fisher, 318 N.C. 512, 532, 350 S.E.2d 334, 346
(1986)).
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In the case before us, it does not appear that Defendant
has met the “heavy burden” of proving that trial counsel was
ineffective. The absence of a Fourth Amendment argument as to
the admissibility of Defendant’s statement does not, by itself,
render counsel’s assistance “below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” Defendant would have to prove (1) that the
performance of his trial counsel was deficient, and (2) that
this deficiency worked a prejudice against his defense.
The defense’s argument that trial counsel’s performance was
deficient is based on the assumption that suppression of the
confession was warranted due to the “unlawful detention” of
Defendant during the time of the show-up identification. As we
discussed above, we do not find that this investigatory
detention was unlawful, and therefore it would have been
unnecessary, and indeed unfruitful, if trial counsel had pursued
it.
As Defendant has failed under the first prong of the
Strickland test, we need not discuss the second. However, it
would seem clear that Defendant cannot be prejudiced by the
absence of an unfruitful argument, and this Court’s confidence
in the outcome of the case is in no way undermined as a result
of the absence of said argument.
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Because this Court is required to “indulge in a strong
presumption [that] counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance,” we do not find that
Defendant has met the burden of proving this case. Furthermore,
it is appropriate to decide this issue at this time because the
cold record reflects all of the relevant facts and there does
not appear to be any reason for instigating an investigation
into trial counsel’s conduct.
Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of
counsel. Trial counsel is given a wide latitude in trial
strategy, and Defendant has not proven that the absence of a
Fourth Amendment argument to accompany a Fifth Amendment
argument was a decision that rendered counsel’s performance
below an objective standard of reasonableness or that the
absence of such an argument worked a prejudicial effect into the
outcome of the trial.
D. Motion to Dismiss
In Defendant’s final argument on appeal, Defendant contends
that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the
charges of discharging a firearm into a vehicle in operation.
The standard of review for an appellate court’s review of a
motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence is well settled.
Evidence is sufficient to sustain a
conviction when, viewed in the light most
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favorable to the State and giving the State
every reasonable inference therefrom, there
is substantial evidence to support a jury
finding of each essential element of the
offense charged, and of defendant’s being
the perpetrator of such offense.
Evidence is substantial if it is relevant
and adequate to convince a reasonable mind
to accept a conclusion. In considering a
motion to dismiss, the trial court does not
weigh the evidence, consider evidence
unfavorable to the State, or determine any
witness' credibility. Evidence is not
substantial if it is sufficient only to
raise a suspicion or conjecture as to either
the commission of the offense or the
identity of the defendant as the perpetrator
of it, and the motion to dismiss should be
allowed even though the suspicion so aroused
by the evidence is strong. This Court
reviews the denial of a motion to dismiss
for insufficient evidence de novo.
If substantial evidence, whether direct,
circumstantial, or both, supports a finding
that the offense charged has been committed
and that the defendant committed it, the
motion to dismiss should be denied and the
case goes to the jury.
State v. Bettis, 206 N.C. App. 721, 728-29, 698 S.E.2d 507, 512
(2010) (quoting State v. Wilkerson, 196 N.C. App. 706, 708-09,
675 S.E.2d 678, 680 (2009)) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
Our Supreme Court has held that:
When determining the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a charged offense, we
must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, giving the State the
benefit of all reasonable inferences. A
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defendant’s motion to dismiss must be denied
if the evidence considered in the light most
favorable to the State permits a rational
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt the
existence of each element of the charged
crime and that defendant was the
perpetrator.
Whether the evidence presented is direct or
circumstantial or both, the test for
sufficiency is the same. Circumstantial
evidence may withstand a motion to dismiss
and support a conviction even when the
evidence does not rule out every hypothesis
of innocence. If the evidence supports a
reasonable inference of defendant’s guilt
based on the circumstances, then it is for
the [jurors] to decide whether the facts,
taken singly or in combination, satisfy them
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is actually guilty.
State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 447, 509 S.E.2d 178, 191 (1998)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
Here, taking all inferences in the light most favorable to
the State, the denial of the motion to dismiss was appropriate.
Although there is no direct evidence that the vehicle was in
operation at the time of the shooting, it is a reasonable
inference that arises from the other undisputed facts, such as
the fact that the victim’s car was found crashed on the side of
the road with tire tracks being found behind it, spent shell
casings were found at the intersection of Emma Lynn Court and
Christenbury Hills Lane, and a bullet was found in the road, as
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well as several other bullets found in the victim’s driver’s
side door.
With the evidence standing as such, “it is for the [jurors]
to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in combination,
satisfy them beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
actually guilty.” The denial of the motion to dismiss for lack
of evidence of an essential element of a charged crime was
appropriate here because the circumstantial evidence was
sufficient to provide the jury with a reasonable inference of
Defendant’s guilt.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, this Court finds no error in
the findings or holdings of the Superior Court of Mecklenburg
County.
No error.
Judges STEPHENS and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).