In re C.W.F.

NO. COA13-444
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 4 February 2014
IN THE MATTER OF C.W.F.
Moore County
No. 12 SPC 364J
Appeal by juvenile respondent from order entered 22 August
2012 by Judge Don W. Creed, Jr. in Moore County District Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 September 2013.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Charlene Richardson and Special Deputy Attorney General Lisa
Corbett, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate
Defender David W. Andrews, for juvenile respondent-appellant.
Miranda R. McCoy, for petitioner-appellee Jackson Springs
Treatment Center.
CALABRIA, Judge.
C.W.F. appeals an order concurring with the voluntary
admission of a minor and authorizing a continued admission for
inpatient psychiatric treatment for a period of 90 days. We vacate
the order and remand to the trial court for findings.
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On 7 August 2012, C.W.F’s mother consented to C.W.F.’s
evaluation for treatment, services and support provided by Jackson
Springs Treatment Center (“Jackson Springs”). Freida Green
(“Green”), a member of Jackson Springs’ staff, completed C.W.F.’s
Evaluation for Admission/Continued Stay (“Green’s evaluation”).
Green described her findings, included C.W.F.’s medications and
recommended his admission for treatment or rehabilitation.
On 8 August 2012, Green filed a Request for Hearing to
determine whether the court concurred with the voluntary
admission/continued stay. Green attached her evaluation as well
as a psychological evaluation prepared by licensed psychological
associate Daniel Huang, M.A., dated 15 January 2012 (“Huang’s
evaluation”).
Dr. Leah McCallum, Ph.D. (“Dr. McCallum”), performed a
Comprehensive Clinical Assessment (“McCallum’s assessment”) dated
10 August 2012, which included, inter alia, C.W.F.’s general health
and behavioral health history, described his removal from home for
sexually abusing his younger sister, physical abuse by his father,
and the precipitating events that caused his problems. McCallum’s
assessment also included recommendations for C.W.F.’s treatment
within a structural 24-hour therapeutic environment. Dr. McCallum
justified treatment at Jackson Springs because less intense levels
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of care where C.W.F. remained in the home and received community
based treatment had been attempted but were unsuccessful. In the
less structured treatment environments, C.W.F. continued to
exhibit emotional and behavioral problems both in the home and
community settings.
At the hearing in Moore County District Court on 22 August
2012 to determine whether C.W.F. should be treated at Jackson
Springs or whether a less restrictive environment would be
sufficient, the trial court reviewed Green’s and Huang’s
evaluations that had been attached to the Request for Hearing.
C.W.F. was represented by appointed counsel. Jackson Springs
presented the testimony of clinical director Teresa McGuire
(“McGuire”) as well as McCallum’s assessment. McGuire, a social
worker and clinical director at Jackson Springs, testified that
she was providing C.W.F. with individual and group therapy.
McGuire stated the reason C.W.F. was transferred to Jackson Springs
from his prior treatment facility in South Carolina. Specifically,
during C.W.F’s prior placement, he displayed physical and verbal
aggression and violated sexual boundaries with peers. McGuire
believed that in C.W.F.’s prior treatment facility, he had possibly
learned the skills he needed to reduce his physical and verbal
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aggression but had been unable to carry out those skills. C.W.F.
objected to McGuire’s testimony.
When McGuire was questioned regarding the purpose of
reviewing a patient’s medical records, she answered that it is
part of the process of familiarizing the staff with a new patient’s
history, and that to prepare for the hearing she had reviewed
Green’s and Huang’s evaluations as well as McCallum’s assessment
(collectively, “the reports”). C.W.F. objected to the
introduction of the reports. The trial court overruled C.W.F.’s
objections to McGuire’s testimony and also admitted the reports.
The trial court found as fact all matters that had been set
out in Green’s evaluation, which included Green’s opinion that
C.W.F. was mentally ill, and incorporated it by reference as
findings. Based on the findings, the trial court concluded that
C.W.F. was mentally ill and in need of continued treatment at
Jackson Springs because less restrictive measures would not be
sufficient. In addition, the court concurred with C.W.F.’s
voluntary admission and authorized C.W.F.’s continued admission at
Jackson Springs for 90 days. C.W.F. appeals.
C.W.F. argues that the court erred by admitting and relying
on three reports prepared by non-testifying witnesses because the
reports violated his right to confrontation. We agree.
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N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-224.3(f) (2011) provides the criteria
for the trial court to determine whether a minor should remain in
a voluntary admission:
For an admission to be authorized beyond the
hearing, the minor must be (1) mentally ill or
a substance abuser and (2) in need of further
treatment at the 24-hour facility to which he
has been admitted. Further treatment at the
admitting facility should be undertaken only
when lesser measures will be insufficient. It
is not necessary that the judge make a finding
of dangerousness in order to support a
concurrence in the admission.
On appeal from an order of involuntary commitment, the questions
for determination are (1) whether the court’s findings of fact
“are indeed supported by the ‘facts’ which the court recorded in
its order as supporting its findings, and (2) whether in any event
there was competent evidence to support the court’s findings.” In
re Hogan, 32 N.C. App. 429, 433, 232 S.E.2d 492, 494 (1977). These
same issues must be addressed in an appeal from the voluntary
commitment of a minor.
C.W.F. disputes the trial court’s findings of mental illness
and that further treatment at Jackson Springs was based upon
competent evidence. Specifically, C.W.F. argues that the
admission of all three reports deprived him of his right to
confrontation.
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N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-224.3, which addresses hearings for
review of voluntary admissions of minors, provides that
“[c]ertified copies of reports and findings of physicians,
psychologists and other responsible professionals as well as
previous and current medical records are admissible in evidence,
but the minor’s right, through his attorney, to confront and cross-
examine witnesses may not be denied.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-
224.3(c) (2011). Thus, the plain language of this statute not
only permits admission of relevant medical records into evidence,
but also ensures the minor’s right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses. Id. The juxtaposition of these two points in a single
sentence indicates the legislature sought to protect the minor’s
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses regarding those
admissible records.
In the instant case, McGuire was Jackson Springs’ sole witness
at the hearing. C.W.F.’s counsel specifically objected to
McGuire’s reliance on the reports “on the grounds of hearsay, lack
of confrontation, and foundation” and later objected to the
admission of the reports themselves on the same grounds. The court
overruled the objections and admitted Green’s report as well as
Huang’s evaluation and McCallum’s assessment. McGuire indicated
that the purpose of all three reports was for the professionals at
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Jackson Springs to acquaint themselves with C.W.F.’s specific
needs and individual conditions as a new patient.
The trial court found as fact all matters in Green’s
evaluation, and incorporated it by reference as findings. The
court made no additional findings of fact. While Green’s
evaluation was certified as a true and exact copy of the Evaluation
for Admission/Continued Stay, and therefore admissible under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 122C-224.3(c) as a certified copy of a report by a
“psychologist [or] other responsible professional,” Green was not
available to testify at the hearing. In addition, Green was not
subject to cross-examination regarding her evaluation and opinions
regarding C.W.F.’s mental health. Therefore, the trial court erred
in relying solely on Green’s evaluation, since C.W.F. had no
opportunity to cross-examine her.
The court’s conclusions of law that C.W.F. was mentally ill,
in need of continued treatment, and that less restrictive measures
than a voluntary commitment would not be sufficient, are based
solely upon Green’s report. However, Green did not testify at the
hearing, and C.W.F. was unable to confront or cross-examine Green
regarding the findings and opinions she recorded in her evaluation.
Since N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-224.3(c) protects a minor’s right to
cross-examine witnesses regarding relevant medical records, we
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vacate the trial court’s order, remand for further findings, and
need not address C.W.F.’s remaining arguments.
Vacated and remanded.
Judges ELMORE and STEPHENS concur.