Hayman v. Ramada Inn, Inc.

Judge COZORT

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “plaintiff has failed to forecast sufficient evidence of circumstances supporting an apparent agency or agency by es-toppel to withstand summary judgment.” I simply believe that summary judgment was granted too soon; the facts on the issue of apparent agency have not been developed at this point in the case.

The plaintiffs affidavit raises the issue of apparent agency:

16. That during the entire program of several weeks training while your affiant stayed at Ramada Inn, Akron Drive, she never saw any sign, poster, advertisement, or other indication of responsibility by anyone for or about the premises of Ramada Inn except Ramada Inn itself. References to that institution were always made as to Ramada Inn.

The plaintiff also submitted the affidavit of Juanita Robinson, a Piedmont employee. Robinson’s affidavit supports plaintiffs assertion that defendant did not require Turnpike to identify itself as the owner and operator of the facility:

16. The entire time that I am aware of Piedmont employees using Ramada Inn, Akron Drive, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for housing for their temporarily [sic] stopovers or during the training period, this facility has been known as Ramada Inn. I have never heard the term Turnpike Properties, Inc. and know absolutely nothing about any interest that Turnpike Properties, Inc. may or may not have in Ramada Inn or any of its connections with Ramada Inn. No other name was ever used in connection with Ramada Inn with me in referring to Ramada Inn, Akron Drive, Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

The majority’s reliance on the license agreement as factual disposition of this issue is, in my opinion, misplaced. There is no evidence that the requirement of the agreement that Turnpike identify itself as owner/operator was ever followed. The affidavits of both Dean Davis, the Director of Operations for Turnpike, and John G. -Drumm, the Secretary of defendant, are silent on this issue.

I further believe the majority erred in finding no factual issue as to whether the plaintiff relied on her belief that she was staying in a facility owned and operated by Ramada Inn. Plaintiffs affidavit raises the inference that she relied on the name “Ramada Inn.” The majority’s statement that plaintiff failed to allege reliance in her complaint is true. I do not believe, however, that plaintiffs failure to allege reliance should be construed as an admission that she did not rely on the “Ramada Inn” name. It is an issue of material fact not yet resolved.

I vote to reverse.