State v. Patterson

GREENE, Judge,

concurring in the result.

I believe (I) the killing and robbery of the victim did not form one continuous transaction, and it was therefore error to submit a felony murder instruction to the jury; (II) the testimony of Respess regarding the victim’s statements to her was inadmissible hearsay; and (III) neither of these errors require a new trial. As I otherwise fully concur with the majority, I join the majority in affirming Defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder.

I

Our statutes specifically provide that a murder “committed in the perpetration . . . of. . . robbery . . . shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree.” N.C.G.S. § 14-17 (1999). This is commonly known as the felony murder doctrine and traditionally required the homicide occur subsequent to or during the commission of the underlying felony. See 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide § 67 (1999) (death must “be caused by an act in [the] course of or in furtherance of the [underlying] felony”); State v. Squire, 292 N.C. 494, 511, 234 S.E.2d 563, 573 (there must be no break in the chain of events leading from the initial felony to the act causing death), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 998, 54 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1977). Although the original rationale for the felony murder doctrine remains intact, State v. Richardson, 341 N.C. 658, 666, 462 S.E.2d 492, 498 (1995) (“to deter . . . killings from occurring during the commission of ... a dangerous felony”), our courts have more recently held “the temporal order of the killing and the felony is immaterial” and neither does it matter that the intent to commit the felony may have been formed after the killing, provided the killing and the commission of the felony constitute one continuous transaction, State v. Roseborough, 344 N.C. 121, 127, 472 S.E.2d 763, 767 (1996). The two events are not considered continuous if there is any “break in the chain of events.” State v. Handy, 331 N.C. 515, 529, 419 S.E.2d 545, 552 (1992).

In this case, the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the State, reveals defendant, some thirty minutes after he killed the victim and attempted to clean his fingerprints from the premises, picked up the box of marijuana and smoking pipe as he was leaving the house. There is no evidence defendant formed his intent to take the items before the murder. The intent was formed just as he was leaving the premises some thirty minutes after the killing and after defendant sought to remove his fingerprints from the premises and, thus, does not constitute a taking occurring as part of a single transaction beginning with the killing of the victim. See State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 102, 261 S.E.2d 114, 119 (1980) (taking of property was an “afterthought” and did not constitute a “continuous chain of events”). To hold otherwise in this case would be an abuse of the felony murder doctrine and this type of abuse, if sanctioned by the courts, could lead to its abrogation. See 2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 149, at 306 (15th ed. 1994) (felony murder doctrine eliminated in England and limited in some United States jurisdictions). The trial court thus erred in submitting a jury instruction on felony murder.

II

“Evidence tending to show the victim’s state of mind is admissible [as an exception to the hearsay rule] so long as the victim’s state of mind is relevant to the case at hand.” State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 314, 406 S.E.2d 876, 897 (1991). Evidence of the victim’s state of mind includes evidence indicating “the victim’s mental condition by showing the victim’s fears, feelings, impressions or experiences.” State v. Walker, 332 N.C. 520, 535, 422 S.E.2d 716, 725 (1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 919, 124 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1993). However, statements relating only factual events and “made in isolation, unaccompanied by a description of [the victim’s] emotionfs],” generally fall outside the scope of Rule 803(3). State v. Lathan, 138 N.C. App. 234, 240, 530 S.E.2d 615, 621, disc. review denied, 352 N.C. 680, 545 S.E.2d 723 (2000).

In this case, the testimony of Respess was unaccompanied by descriptions of the victim’s emotions or mental state and instead reflected only defendant’s mental state. Thus, it was error for the trial court to admit these statements into evidence.

III

The error in submitting the felony murder instruction does not require a new trial because I agree with the majority there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s alternative determination defendant was guilty of first-degree murder on the basis of premeditation and deliberation. See State v. Green, 321 N.C. 594, 606, 365 S.E.2d 587, 594, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 900, 102 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1988).

The error in allowing Respess to offer her testimony about the comments of Andrews does not entitle defendant to a new trial as he was not prejudiced by their admission. Defendant argues he is entitled to a new trial because without the testimony of Respess there is no showing Defendant had a motive for the killing. The State, however, was not required to develop a motive as there was undisputed evidence defendant killed the victim. See State v. Heavener, 298 N.C. 541, 548, 259 S.E.2d 227, 231 (1979) (the State is not required to establish motive to prove guilt of first-degree murder).