State v. TurnerÂ

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA16-656
Filed: 6 December 2016
Caldwell County, No. 12 CRS 52634
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
CHRISTOPHER GLENN TURNER
Appeal by the State from order entered 15 January 2016 by Judge Michael D.
Duncan in Caldwell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18
October 2016.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Christopher W.
Brooks, for the State.
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Daniel L.
Spiegel, for defendant-appellee.
CALABRIA, Judge.
The express language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-1 required the State to prosecute
defendant’s misdemeanor charge within two years. Because the State failed to take
any action in that time, prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations, and the
trial court did not err in dismissing the charge.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On 7 August 2012, Christopher Glenn Turner (“defendant”) received a citation
for driving while impaired. Defendant was arrested and brought before a magistrate,
STATE V. TURNER
Opinion of the Court
who issued a magistrate’s order. Defendant was never charged via indictment,
presentment, or warrant.
On 26 November 2014, defendant moved to dismiss the charge, pursuant to
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15-1, 15A-953, and 15A-954, alleging the expiration of the statute
of limitations. On 3 December 2014, defendant moved that he be charged in a new
pleading, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-922(c). Judge Amy. S. Walker (“Judge
Walker”), a District Court Judge in Caldwell County, held a hearing in response to
defendant’s motions. On 22 April 2015, Judge Walker entered a preliminary
indication, holding that the statute of limitations barred prosecution of defendant.
The State appealed to superior court.
On 1 October 2015, the superior court affirmed Judge Walker’s preliminary
indication, citing the explicit language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-1, and our Supreme
Court’s decision in State v. Underwood, 244 N.C. 68, 92 S.E.2d 461 (1956).
Thereafter, Judge Walker issued a final order of dismissal. The State appealed this
dismissal, and on 15 January 2016, the Superior Court of Caldwell County entered
an order affirming the dismissal.
The State appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“ ‘Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of
law, which are reviewed de novo by an appellate court. In
conducting this review, we are guided by the following
principles of statutory construction.’ ” State v. Largent, 197
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N.C. App. 614, 617, 677 S.E.2d 514, 517 (2009) (quoting In
Re Proposed Assessments v. Jefferson-Pilot, 161 N.C. App.
558, 559-60, 589 S.E.2d 179, 180-81 (2003)). “Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no
room for judicial construction and the courts must give it
its plain and definite meaning, and the courts are without
power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and
limitations not contained therein.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
State v. Williams, 218 N.C. App. 450, 451, 725 S.E.2d 7, 8-9 (2012).
“When reviewing the trial court's grant of a criminal defendant's motion to
dismiss . . . [w]e review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo.” State v. Price,
233 N.C. App. 386, 389, 757 S.E.2d 309, 312 (citations omitted), writ denied, review
denied, appeal dismissed, 367 N.C. 508, 759 S.E.2d 90 (2014).
III. Statute of Limitations
In its sole argument on appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in
dismissing defendant’s driving while impaired charge because the citation tolled the
statute of limitations. We disagree.
The General Statutes provide a statute of limitations with respect to
misdemeanors such as the one at issue:
The crimes of deceit and malicious mischief, and the crime
of petit larceny where the value of the property does not
exceed five dollars ($5.00), and all misdemeanors except
malicious misdemeanors, shall be presented or found by the
grand jury within two years after the commission of the
same, and not afterwards: Provided, that if any indictment
found within that time shall be defective, so that no
judgment can be given thereon, another prosecution may
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Opinion of the Court
be instituted for the same offense, within one year after the
first shall have been abandoned by the State.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-1 (2015) (emphasis added). By its explicit language, this statute
establishes a two-year statute of limitations on the misdemeanors listed.
On appeal, however, the State contends that, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§
15A-921 and 15A-922, a citation constitutes a criminal pleading. Specifically, a
“citation, . . . or magistrate's order serves as the pleading of the State for a
misdemeanor prosecuted in the district court[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-922(a) (2015).
The State contends that this tolled the statute of limitations.
The State cites several cases in support of its position. Primarily, the State
relies upon our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Underwood, 244 N.C. 68, 92
S.E.2d 461 (1956). The State contends that Underwood stands for the principle that,
upon the issuance of a criminal pleading, the statute of limitations is tolled. However,
we hold that the State’s reliance is misplaced.
Underwood is a successor case to State v. Hedden, 187 N.C. 803, 123 S.E. 65
(1924). In Hedden, the defendant was arrested and charged with abandonment on
11 September 1921; a magistrate’s warrant issued 25 October 1922, and an
indictment issued on 1 November 1923, more than two years after the defendant’s
arrest. The defendant was subsequently tried, and his motion to dismiss was denied.
On appeal, our Supreme Court held:
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There is no saving clause in this statute1 as to the effect of
preliminary warrants before a justice of the peace or other
committing magistrate, and in our opinion on the facts of
this record the law must be construed and applied as
written. There must be a presentment or indictment
within two years from the time of the offense committed
and not afterwards.
Id. at 805, 123 S.E. at 65. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in
denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and reversed.
More than thirty years later, Underwood revisited Hedden. In Underwood, the
defendant was tried upon a warrant, which was issued on 29 June 1953. He appealed
the matter to superior court, and raised the issue of the statute of limitations, moving
to dismiss. This motion was denied, and the defendant appealed. Underwood, 244
N.C. at 69, 92 S.E.2d at 461-62. Our Supreme Court distinguished Underwood from
Hedden, noting that Hedden “involved an entirely different factual situation from
that involved in the present appeal.” Id. at 70, 92 S.E.2d at 463. The Court then
went on to hold that, “[i]n criminal cases where an indictment or presentment is
required, the date on which the indictment or presentment has been brought or found
by the grand jury marks the beginning of the criminal proceeding and arrests the
statute of limitations.” Id. As a result, the Court found no error with the trial court’s
denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
1 The statute in question was C.S. § 4512, a predecessor to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-1, which had
substantially similar language.
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Opinion of the Court
In the roughly sixty years since Underwood was decided, that case has only
been held to apply to indictments, presentments, and warrants; never once has it
been applied to citations or other forms of criminal pleading. See State v. Hundley,
272 N.C. 491, 493, 158 S.E.2d 582, 583-84 (1968) (a warrant tolls the statute of
limitations); State v. Gamez, 228 N.C. App. 329, 332, 745 S.E.2d 876, 878 (2013) (an
indictment or presentment tolls the statute of limitations); State v. Taylor, 212 N.C.
App. 238, 249-50, 713 S.E.2d 82, 90 (2011) (an indictment, presentment, or warrant
tolls the statute of limitations); State v. Whittle, 118 N.C. App. 130, 134, 454 S.E.2d
688, 690 (1995) (an indictment or presentment tolls the statute of limitations).
The State’s arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, the language of N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15-1 is explicit: misdemeanors, such as the matter in the instant case,
“shall be presented or found by the grand jury within two years after the commission
of the same, and not afterwards[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-1. “Where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous there is no room for judicial construction and the
courts must give it its plain and definite meaning, and the courts are without power
to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.”
Williams, 218 N.C. App. at 451, 725 S.E.2d at 8-9 (citations and quotations omitted).
Further, Hedden explicitly held that “[t]here is no saving clause in this statute as to
the effect of preliminary warrants before a justice of the peace or other committing
magistrate, and in our opinion on the facts of this record the law must be construed
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and applied as written.” Hedden, 187 N.C. at 805, 123 S.E. at 65. And despite the
holding in Underwood, we note that that case was specifically limited to “those
misdemeanor cases in which the defendant may be tried in the Superior Court on a
warrant issued by an inferior court and without an indictment.” Underwood, 244
N.C. at 69, 92 S.E.2d at 462.
We hold that Underwood, in which our Supreme Court considered whether a
superior court could try a defendant based on a warrant issued by an inferior court,
is distinguishable from the instant case. We further hold that the explicit language
of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-1, as interpreted in Hedden, is binding upon this Court. The
issuance of a citation did not toll the statute of limitations pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15-1; the State had two years to either commence the prosecution of its case, or to
issue a warrant, indictment, or presentment which would toll the statute of
limitations. Because the State failed to do so, the statute of limitations expired, and
the State was barred from prosecuting this action. The trial court did not err in
dismissing the charge.
AFFIRMED.
Judges BRYANT and STEPHENS concur.
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