Inman v. City of Whiteville

NO. COA14-94
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 16 September 2014
KAYLA J. INMAN
v. Columbus County
No. 12 CVS 561
CITY OF WHITEVILLE, a
municipality incorporated
under the laws of the State
of North Carolina
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 2 August 2013 by
Judge D. Jack Hooks, Jr. in Columbus County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 June 2014.
Lee & Lee, Attorneys, by Junius B. Lee, III, for plaintiff-
appellant.
Crossley McIntosh Collier Hanley & Edes, PLLC, by Clay
Allen Collier, and Williamson Walton & Scott, LLP, by
Carlton F. Williamson, for defendant-appellee.
DAVIS, Judge.
Kayla J. Inman (“Plaintiff”) appeals from the trial court’s
order dismissing her complaint against the City of Whiteville
(“the City”) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure. On appeal, she contends that the
trial court erred in dismissing her complaint based on the
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public duty doctrine. After careful review, we affirm the trial
court’s order.
Factual Background
We have summarized the pertinent facts below using the
statements contained in Plaintiff’s complaint, which we treat as
true when reviewing an order dismissing a complaint pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6). See Stein v. Asheville City Bd. of Educ., 360
N.C. 321, 325, 626 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2006) (“When reviewing a
complaint dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), we treat a plaintiff’s
factual allegations as true.”).
On 12 September 2011, Plaintiff was involved in a motor
vehicle accident near the intersection of South Madison Street
and East Hayes Street in Whiteville, North Carolina. Plaintiff
was “run off the road” by another motorist, and Plaintiff and
her passenger suffered significant injuries arising from the
accident. Officer Donnie Hedwin (“Officer Hedwin”) of the
Whiteville Police Department was called to the scene to
investigate the accident. Officer Hedwin spoke with the other
motorist but did not ascertain his identity or include his name
in the accident report. When questioned about this omission,
Officer Hedwin and his supervisor, Sergeant Mark McGee, both
stated that the accident had not been investigated further
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because there had been no physical contact between the two
vehicles.
On 30 April 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the
City in Columbus County Superior Court alleging that Officer
Hedwin and Sergeant McGee, who were agents of the City acting in
the course and scope of their employment, were negligent in
their investigation of the accident, primarily because they
failed to ascertain the identity of the other motorist.
Plaintiff asserted that “[b]ased upon the failure of the
officers to properly and completely investigate, the identity of
the party responsible for this accident has not been determined”
and that “[b]ut for the negligent acts of [the City], by and
through its employees, the plaintiff could have and would have
maintained an action against the unknown driver of the second
vehicle for her damages.”
On 7 August 2012, the City filed an answer and motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. The City’s motion to dismiss
came on for hearing on 15 July 2013, and the trial court entered
an order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint on 2 August 2013.
Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.
Analysis
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When a party files a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the question for
the court is whether the allegations of the
complaint, treated as true, are sufficient
to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted under some legal theory, whether
properly labeled or not. A complaint may be
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) where
(1) the complaint on its face reveals that
no law supports a plaintiff’s claim, (2) the
complaint on its face reveals the absence of
facts sufficient to make a good claim, or
(3) the complaint discloses some fact that
necessarily defeats a plaintiff’s claim. An
appellate court reviews de novo a trial
court’s dismissal of an action under Rule
12(b)(6).
Horne v. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc., ___ N.C. App. ___,
___, 746 S.E.2d 13, 16 (2013) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
In order to successfully assert a claim for negligence, a
plaintiff must allege that the defendant owed a legal duty to
her. See Derwort v. Polk Cty., 129 N.C. App. 789, 791, 501
S.E.2d 379, 381 (1998) (“It is fundamental that actionable
negligence is predicated on the existence of a legal duty owed
by the defendant to the plaintiff.” (citation and quotation
marks omitted)). “[I]n the absence of any such duty owed [to]
the injured party by the defendant, there can be no liability
[and] when the public duty doctrine applies, the government
entity, as the defendant, owes no legal duty to the plaintiff.”
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Scott v. City of Charlotte, 203 N.C. App. 460, 464, 691 S.E.2d
747, 750-51 (citations, quotation marks, brackets, and emphasis
omitted), disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 435, 702 S.E.2d 305
(2010).
The public duty doctrine, adopted by our Supreme Court in
Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 410 S.E.2d 897 (1991),
provides that “when a governmental entity owes a duty to the
general public . . . individual plaintiffs may not enforce the
duty in tort.” Strickland v. Univ. of N.C. at Wilmington, 213
N.C. App. 506, 508, 712 S.E.2d 888, 890 (2011) (citation and
quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, ___ N.C. ___, 720
S.E.2d 677 (2012). Application of this doctrine has
traditionally arisen in cases in which a plaintiff asserts a
negligence claim alleging that a law enforcement officer
breached his duty to protect a victim from a third party’s
criminal act and that this failure caused the victim’s injury or
death. Id. at 508-09, 712 S.E.2d at 890.
In such scenarios, the municipality is generally insulated
from liability because in providing police protection, “[the]
municipality and its agents act for the benefit of the public,
and therefore, there is no liability for the failure to furnish
police protection to specific individuals.” Braswell, 330 N.C.
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at 370, 410 S.E.2d at 901. Accordingly, “while the law
enforcement agency owes a ‘duty to protect’ the public at large,
individual members of the public as plaintiffs generally may not
enforce that duty in tort.” Strickland, 213 N.C. App. at 509,
712 S.E.2d at 890.
The Supreme Court has, however, recognized two specific
exceptions to the public duty doctrine:
(1) where there is a special
relationship between the injured party
and the police, for example a state’s
witness or informant who has aided law
enforcement officers; and
(2) when a municipality, through its
police officers, creates a special duty
by promising protection to an
individual, the protection is not
forthcoming, and the individual’s
reliance on the promise of protection
is causally related to the injury
suffered.
Braswell, 330 N.C. at 371, 410 S.E.2d at 902 (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
Our Supreme Court has made clear that with regard to local
governments, the public duty doctrine only extends to actions
taken in the exercise of their general duty to protect the
public. Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 351 N.C. 458, 461, 526
S.E.2d 652, 654 (2000) (“While this Court has extended the
public duty doctrine to state agencies required by statute to
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conduct inspections for the public’s general protection, we have
never expanded the public duty doctrine to any local government
agencies other than law enforcement departments when they are
exercising their general duty to protect the public.” (internal
citations omitted)); see also Wood v. Guilford Cty., 355 N.C.
161, 169, 558 S.E.2d 490, 496 (2002) (explaining that public
duty doctrine “retains limited vitality, as applied to local
government, within the context of government’s duty to protect
the public generally, which is necessarily limited by the
resources of the local community” (internal citations, quotation
marks, and brackets omitted)). The public duty doctrine
“acknowledges the limited resources of law enforcement and works
against judicial imposition of an overwhelming burden of
liability.” Little v. Atkinson, 136 N.C. App. 430, 432, 524
S.E.2d 378, 380, disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 474, 543 S.E.2d
492 (2000).
This Court has applied the public duty doctrine to limit
the liability of municipalities and their law enforcement
agencies in circumstances beyond the “classic example of . . . a
negligence claim alleging a law enforcement agency’s failure to
protect a person from a third party’s criminal act.”
Strickland, 213 N.C. App. at 508, 712 S.E.2d at 890. Indeed, we
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have applied the doctrine where — as here — the allegations of
negligence stem from a law enforcement officer’s handling of a
motor vehicle accident. For example, in Lassiter v. Cohn, 168
N.C. App. 310, 607 S.E.2d 688, disc. review denied, 359 N.C.
633, 613 S.E.2d 686 (2005), we concluded that the public duty
doctrine shielded the City of Durham and one of its police
officers from liability in an action arising out of the
officer’s allegedly negligent management and control of a multi-
vehicle accident scene. We reasoned that imposing liability
upon the city and its officer, who was “fulfilling her general
duties owed when responding to the many and synergistic elements
of a traffic accident. . . . is exactly that which the public
duty doctrine seeks to alleviate.” Id. at 318, 607 S.E.2d at
693.
In Scott, we held that the public duty doctrine barred the
plaintiff’s negligence claim against the City of Charlotte where
officers of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department had
pulled over an individual, David Scott (“Mr. Scott”), on
suspicion of impaired driving, determined that he was
“physically impaired in some respect,” been informed that Mr.
Scott had suffered a stroke during the past year, and failed to
call for medical assistance. Scott, 203 N.C. App. at 464, 691
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S.E.2d at 750. Mr. Scott later collapsed in the parking lot as
he was waiting for the plaintiff, his wife, to pick him up and
died the following day. Id. at 462-63, 691 S.E.2d at 749-50.
The plaintiff filed a complaint against the City of
Charlotte alleging that the officers were negligent in failing
to summon medical assistance for Mr. Scott. Id. at 463, 691
S.E.2d at 750. We concluded that the City of Charlotte was
entitled to summary judgment in its favor based on the public
duty doctrine because the officers “were engaged in their
general law enforcement duty to protect the public from an
erratic driver who they believed could be intoxicated” when they
made the discretionary decision not to call for medical
assistance, thereby indirectly harming Mr. Scott. Id. at 468,
691 S.E.2d at 752.
In both Lassiter and Scott, this Court recognized that the
plaintiffs’ claims arose from circumstances in which the local
governments at issue, through their law enforcement officers,
were engaged in their general duty of protecting the public and
that, consequently, they were shielded from liability by the
public duty doctrine. See id. at 467, 691 S.E.2d at 752
(“Braswell and its progeny have not wavered from the general
principle that when a police officer, acting to protect the
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general public, indirectly causes harm to an individual, the
municipality that employs him or her is protected from
liability.”).
Here, Plaintiff’s negligence claim is premised on the
manner in which a motor vehicle accident was investigated by law
enforcement officers. Specifically, Plaintiff has alleged that
Officer Hedwin and his supervisor “failed in their obligation
and duty to perform competent law enforcement services in that
they failed to determine both the responsible party [for] this
[accident] and the facts indicating his responsibility.” The
duty to investigate motor vehicle accidents and to prepare
accident reports is a general law enforcement duty owed to the
public as a whole. See Lassiter, 168 N.C. App. at 320, 607
S.E.2d at 694 (describing officer’s interview with parties
involved in car accident as “general investigatory dut[y]”); see
also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166.1 (2013) (requiring police
department of city or town to investigate “a reportable
accident” and “make a written report of the accident within 24
hours of the accident”). As such, the circumstances at issue in
this case fall within the scope of the public duty doctrine.
In attempting to avoid the application of the public duty
doctrine, Plaintiff relies heavily on our decision in
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Strickland. However, Strickland is clearly distinguishable from
the present case.
In Strickland, the plaintiff’s son (“the decedent”) was
mistakenly shot and killed by a member of the New Hanover County
Emergency Response Team (the “ERT”) during an attempt to serve a
warrant for the decedent’s arrest. The University of North
Carolina at Wilmington Police Department (“UNC-W Police
Department”) was investigating the decedent for an assault and
theft on the university’s campus and had requested the ERT’s
assistance in serving the arrest warrant on him. Strickland,
213 N.C. App. at 506-07, 712 S.E.2d at 889. The shooting
occurred when an ERT member mistook for a gunshot the sound of a
battering ram striking the door of the decedent’s residence and
fired his weapon into the residence. Id. The plaintiff filed a
wrongful death suit against the University of North Carolina at
Wilmington (“UNC-W”) and the UNC-W Police Department, alleging
that officers of the UNC-W Police Department “negligently
provided false, misleading, and irrelevant information to . . .
ERT members” in order to secure their assistance in executing
the warrant. Id. at 507, 712 S.E.2d at 889. The plaintiff
further alleged that this false information, which included
statements that the decedent was involved in gang activity and
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known to be armed and dangerous, “proximately caused [the
decedent’s] death by leading ERT members to believe that they
were entering into . . . a severely dangerous environment
including heavily armed suspects with histories of intentional
physical violence causing injuries to persons.” Id.
In concluding that the public duty doctrine did not
insulate UNC-W and its police department from liability, we
explained that the duty of a law enforcement officer “not to
negligently provide false and misleading information . . .
during a criminal investigation” did not “resemble the types of
duties to the general public for which the public duty doctrine
normally precludes liability.” Id. at 511-12, 712 S.E.2d at
892. In particular, we emphasized that
[i]n all cases where the public duty
doctrine has been held applicable, the
breach of the alleged duty has involved the
governmental entity’s negligent control of
an external injurious force or of the
effects of such a force. See, e.g., Myers,
360 N.C. 460, 628 S.E.2d 761 (negligent
control of a forest fire not started by fire
fighting agency); Wood v. Guilford Cty., 355
N.C. 161, 558 S.E.2d 490 (2002) (failure to
prevent third party’s criminal act on county
property); Stone, 347 N.C. 473, 495 S.E.2d
711 (failure to ensure plant worker’s
ability to escape plant fire not started by
inspection agency); Hunt, 348 N.C. 192, 499
S.E.2d 747 (negligent inspection of
amusement ride prior to ride’s malfunction,
which was not caused by the inspection);
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Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 410 S.E.2d 897
(failure to prevent a third party’s criminal
act). In this case, however, the alleged
breach is not a negligent action with
respect to some external injurious force.
Rather, the UNC-W police department’s act of
negligently providing misleading and
inaccurate information was itself the
injurious force.
Id. at 512, 712 S.E.2d at 892 (emphasis added and footnote
omitted).
Here, unlike in Strickland in which “UNC-W police officers’
negligent provision of inaccurate information brought about the
ERT member’s decision to fire his weapon through [the
decedent’s] front door,” id. at 514, 712 S.E.2d at 893, Officer
Hedwin’s alleged negligence in failing to ascertain the other
motorist’s identity did not bring about the physical injuries,
medical bills, lost wages, and pain and suffering alleged in
Plaintiff’s complaint. Instead, Plaintiff is alleging that
Officer Hedwin negligently failed to properly investigate an
accident caused by “an external injurious force” — namely, the
third-party motorist who ran her vehicle off the road.
Accordingly, as in Lassiter, the public duty doctrine shields
the City from liability arising from Officer Hedwin’s
investigation of the accident. See Lassiter, 168 N.C. App. at
321, 607 S.E.2d at 695 (concluding that officer’s management of
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accident scene “fell completely within Durham’s immunization of
performing a public duty”).
Finally, because Plaintiff has not alleged the
applicability of either the special relationship exception or
the special duty exception to the public duty doctrine, we
decline to address the potential applicability of these
exceptions. See Myers v. McGrady, 360 N.C. 460, 468-69, 628
S.E.2d 761, 767 (2006) (declining to address exceptions to
public duty doctrine where plaintiffs did not raise them); Rev
O, Inc. v. Woo, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 725 S.E.2d 45, 52 (2012)
(“It is not the duty of this Court to supplement an appellant’s
brief with legal authority or arguments not contained therein.”
(citation and quotation marks omitted)). As such, Plaintiff’s
negligence claim against the City is barred by the public duty
doctrine, and the trial court therefore properly granted the
City’s motion to dismiss.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s 2 August
2013 order is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Judges HUNTER, JR. and ERVIN concur.
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Judge HUNTER, JR. concurred in this opinion prior to 6
September 2014.