State v. Graham

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-1459
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 19 August 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
Durham County
v.
Nos. 11 CRS 55324, 55331
DEANDRE GRAHAM
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 24 July 2013 by
Judge Carl Fox in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the
Court of Appeals 4 August 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Aimee Escueta Margolis, for the State.
Reece & Reece, by Michael J. Reece for defendant-appellant.
ERVIN, Judge.
Defendant Deandre Graham appeals from judgments imposing
active sentences of imprisonment upon him based upon his
convictions for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious
injury, robbery with a dangerous weapon, conspiracy to commit
robbery with a dangerous weapon, and possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial
court committed plain error by allowing the admission of
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evidence that the victim had heard “on the street” that
Defendant was one of the individuals who had assaulted and
robbed him and that he is entitled to relief from his
convictions on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds in
light of the failure of his trial counsel to object to the
admission of the victim’s testimony to the effect that he had
heard “on the street” that Defendant was the individual who had
robbed him, to request the trial court to deliver an appropriate
limiting instruction applicable to that testimony, and asking
the alleged victim additional questions about this subject on
cross-examination. After careful consideration of Defendant’s
challenges to the trial court’s judgments in light of the record
and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court’s
judgments should remain undisturbed.
I. Factual Background
A. Substantive Facts
After working all day on 14 May 2011, Terence Clay stopped
by his girlfriend’s apartment before meeting some friends at a
bar at 1:00 a.m. After leaving the bar at approximately 2:30
a.m., Mr. Clay drove to a McDonald’s restaurant to get something
to eat before returning to his girlfriend’s apartment. As he
left the restaurant, he noticed a Jeep Cherokee with tinted
windows following him. The Jeep Cherokee was still behind him
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when he reached the parking lot associated with his girlfriend’s
apartment complex.
As Mr. Clay backed his car into a parking space, the Jeep
Cherokee “rode in front of [him] and went out [of] the parking
lot and made a right onto the main road.” Two men, both of whom
brandished handguns, emerged from the Jeep Cherokee and ran
toward him. One of the men, whom Mr. Clay later identified as
Defendant, confronted Mr. Clay at his open car door while the
second man waited by the trunk. As he stood “[d]irectly in
front of” Mr. Clay at a distance of about an arm’s length,
Defendant “kept saying, ‘we want this car, give us this car, we
want this car.’” In light of this set of circumstances, Mr.
Clay surrendered his car keys, wallet, and phone.
After obtaining control of Mr. Clay’s car keys, wallet, and
phone, Defendant struck Mr. Clay twice in the head with the gun
before shooting him as he lay on the ground. As a result of the
fact that his assailant was having difficulty starting the car,
Mr. Clay had to tell him how to do that. At about the time that
his assailant managed to get the car started, Mr. Clay saw the
second armed man “r[u]n back up the sidewalk and g[e]t in the
truck[,]” which drove away from the apartment complex along with
Mr. Clay’s vehicle.
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Mr. Clay remained on the ground until the armed men left.
After their departure, Mr. Clay walked to his girlfriend’s
apartment and told her to call the police. At the time that he
talked with investigating officers, Mr. Clay did not appear to
be impaired. Paramedics transported Mr. Clay to the hospital,
where he remained for two weeks. At the hospital, attending
physicians removed portions of Mr. Clay’s large and small
intestines and liver that had been damaged as the result of the
gunshot wound that had been inflicted upon him.
Mr. Clay, who is six feet tall, told investigating officers
that the individual who shot him was “[s]horter than me” and had
“dark skin with a close cut” and that he would be able to
identify the person if he saw him again. Mr. Clay described the
second armed individual as “tall, slender[ly] buil[t], and
[having] single plaits.” Although Mr. Clay believed he would
also be able to identify the second armed individual if he saw
him again, he acknowledged that he “got a better look at” the
individual who shot him given that he had been closer to that
person.1
After “asking around[,]” Mr. Clay viewed Defendant’s
photograph on Facebook and “immediately” recognized him as
“[t]he guy that shot me.” On 15 June 2011, Mr. Clay identified
1
Mr. Clay later identified Marcus Wilder as the second
assailant.
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Defendant as the individual who had shot him after viewing a
photographic array prepared by investigating officers. In
addition, Mr. Clay positively identified Defendant in open court
as the man who had stolen his car and shot him on 15 May 2011.
B. Procedural History
On 16 June 2011, a warrant for arrest charging Defendant
with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, assault with
a deadly weapon, and conspiring with Mr. Wilder to rob Mr. Clay
using a dangerous weapon was issued. On 18 July 2011, the
Durham County grand jury returned bills of indictment charging
Defendant with robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault with a
deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury,
conspiring with Mr. Wilder to commit robbery with a dangerous
weapon, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
The charges against Defendant came on for trial before the
trial court and a jury at the 22 July 2013 criminal session of
the Durham County Superior Court. On 22 July 2013, the trial
court allowed the State’s motions to amend the conspiracy to
commit robbery with a dangerous weapon and possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon indictments to correct certain
errors. On 24 July 2013, the jury returned verdicts convicting
Defendant of robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault with a
deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, conspiracy to commit
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robbery with a dangerous weapon, and possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon. At the conclusion of the ensuing sentencing
hearing, the trial court entered judgments sentencing Defendant
to a term of 97 to 126 months imprisonment based upon his
consolidated convictions for robbery with a dangerous weapon and
conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon and to a
consecutive term of 38 to 55 months imprisonment based upon his
consolidated convictions for assault with a deadly weapon
inflicting serious injury and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from
the trial court’s judgments.
II. Substantive Legal Analysis
A. “Word on the Street” Evidence
In his first challenge to the trial court’s judgment,
Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error by
allowing Mr. Clay to testify that the “word on the street”
indicated that one of his assailants was named “D-Block” or
“Deandre Graham.” More specifically, Defendant contends that
the admission of evidence to the effect that “the ‘word on the
street’” indicated that Defendant had been one of Mr. Clay’s
assailants “was clearly hearsay.” We do not find Defendant’s
argument persuasive.
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As Defendant candidly concedes, he did not object at trial
to the introduction of the evidence that he has challenged in
this portion of his brief before this Court. As a result, we
are limited to reviewing Defendant’s challenge to the admission
of the challenged evidence for “plain error.” N.C.R. App. P.
10(a)(4) (stating that, “[i]n criminal cases, an issue that was
not preserved by objection noted at trial and that is not deemed
preserved by rule or law without any such action nevertheless
may be made the basis of an issue presented on appeal when the
judicial action in question is specifically and distinctly
contended to amount to plain error”).
For error to constitute plain error, a
defendant must demonstrate that a
fundamental error occurred at trial. To
show that an error was fundamental, a
defendant must establish prejudice — that,
after examination of the entire record, the
error had a probable impact on the jury’s
finding that the defendant was guilty. . .
. In other words, the inquiry is whether
the defendant has shown that, absent the
error, the jury probably would have returned
a different verdict.
State v. Carter, 366 N.C. 496, 500, 739 S.E.2d 548, 551 (2013)
(quotations omitted). We do not believe that the admission of
the challenged evidence constituted error, much less plain
error.
The North Carolina Rules of Evidence define
hearsay as “a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the
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trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
However, out-of-court statements offered for
purposes other than to prove the truth of
the matter asserted are not considered
hearsay. This Court has held that
statements of one person to another to
explain subsequent actions taken by the
person to whom the statement was made are
admissible as nonhearsay evidence.
State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 409, 508 S.E.2d 496, 513 (1998)
(quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (1988)). According
to Mr. Clay, “[o]nce I got a name, I tried to put a name with
the face. . . . I got, I guess, [the shooter’s] government
name, and I went on [F]acebook and tried to look him up.” As
soon as he saw Defendant’s picture on Facebook, Mr. Clay
“immediately” recognized him as “[t]he guy that shot me” and
communicated that information to investigating officers. Thus,
when considered in context, Mr. Clay’s testimony to the effect
that the “word on the street” indicated that Defendant had been
one of his assailants was admissible, not for the purpose of
showing the truth of the matter asserted, but to explain his
decision to look at Defendant’s photograph on Facebook. As a
result, the trial court did not err by allowing the admission of
Mr. Clay’s testimony to the effect that “word on the street”
indicated that Defendant had been one of his assailants.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
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Secondly, Defendant contends that he received
constitutionally deficient representation from his trial
counsel. More specifically, Defendant contends that the failure
of his trial counsel to object to the admission of Mr. Clay’s
testimony that the “word on the street” indicated that Defendant
was one of his assailants, to request an appropriate limiting
instruction applicable to that testimony, and to ask Mr. Clay
additional questions concerning this subject deprived him of his
right to the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant is not
entitled to relief on the basis of these contentions.
In reviewing allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel, this Court employs the two-part test enunciated in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and adopted for state constitutional purposes
in State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 562-63, 324 S.E.2d 241, 248
(1985). As a result, in order to assert a successful
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Defendant must show
that (1) his counsel’s performance fell “‘below an objective
standard of reasonableness[,]’” and (2) “there is ‘a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.’” State v.
Waring, 364 N.C. 443, 502, 701 S.E.2d 615, 652 (2010) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 2068, 80
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L. Ed. 2d at 693, 698), cert denied, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 132,
181 L. Ed. 2d 53 (2011). We “need not determine whether counsel
made errors if the record does not show a reasonable probability
that a different verdict would have been reached in the absence
of counsel’s deficient performance.” State v. Banks, 163 N.C.
App. 31, 36, 591 S.E.2d 917, 921 (citing Braswell, 312 N.C. at
563, 324 S.E.2d at 248-49), disc. review denied, 358 N.C. 377,
597 S.E.2d 767 (2004).
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim asserted on
direct appeal, such as the claim at issue here, may “be decided
on the merits when the cold record reveals that no further
investigation is required, i.e., claims that may be developed
and argued without such ancillary procedures as the appointment
of investigators or an evidentiary hearing.” State v. Fair, 354
N.C. 131, 166, 557 S.E.2d 500, 524 (2001), cert. denied, 535
U.S. 1114, 122 S. Ct. 2332, 153 L. Ed. 2d 162 (2002). As a
result of our inability to see how further evidentiary
development would in any way affect our evaluation of the
validity of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim that
Defendant has advanced in this case, we will proceed to address
Defendant’s ineffectiveness claim on the merits.
As noted above, the challenged testimony was admissible to
explain Mr. Clay’s decision to look at Defendant’s picture on
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Facebook and did not, for that reason, constitute inadmissible
hearsay. Call, 349 N.C. at 409, 508 S.E.2d at 513. As a result
of the fact that the failure to raise a futile objection does
not reflect the provision of deficient representation and could
not have prejudiced Defendant, Defendant cannot show that the
failure of his trial counsel to object to the admission of Mr.
Clay’s testimony to the effect that the “word on the street”
indicated that Defendant had been one of his assailants
satisfies either prong of the Strickland test.
Assuming, without in any way deciding, that Defendant’s
trial counsel should have requested that the trial court deliver
a limiting instruction directing the jury to refrain from
considering Mr. Clay’s testimony that “the word on the street”
indicated that Defendant had been involved in robbing and
assaulting him for the truth of the matter asserted, we do not
believe that there is any reasonable probability that the
delivery of such an instruction would have had any impact on the
jury’s decision to return guilty verdicts in this case. As we
have already noted, Mr. Clay positively identified Defendant as
one of his assailants when he looked at his photograph on
Defendant’s Facebook page, when he examined a photographic array
presented to him by investigating officers, and in open court at
trial. Although the record establishes that Mr. Clay had worked
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for eleven hours during the day before the assault and robbery
occurred, that he had consumed marijuana and alcoholic beverages
earlier in the evening, that there were inconsistences in Mr.
Clay’s descriptions of the vehicle driven by his assailants in
his pretrial statements to investigating officers and his trial
testimony, and that Mr. Clay’s description of his assailant’s
height differed from Defendant’s actual height by several
inches, we do not believe that the existence of these latent
questions about the credibility of Mr. Clay’s testimony suffices
to substantially undercut the strength of the State’s case
against Defendant given the consistency and clarity of his
identification testimony. As a result, we do not believe that
there is any reasonable probability that the outcome at
Defendant’s trial would have been more favorable to Defendant
had his trial counsel requested the delivery of an instruction
precluding the jury from considering Defendant’s testimony
concerning what he heard “on the street” for substantive
purposes.
Finally, we are not persuaded that the decision made by
Defendant’s trial counsel to question Mr. Clay about what he
heard “on the street” about Defendant’s involvement in the
assault and robbery prejudiced Defendant. On cross-examination,
Mr. Clay testified that he talked to a lot of people as part of
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his effort to ascertain the identity of his assailants, that the
information that Defendant was one of his assailants came from
people that he trusted, and that he was not satisfied that
Defendant was one of his assailants until he saw Defendant’s
photograph on Facebook. The apparent purpose of the cross-
examination questions of which Defendant now complains was to
suggest that, instead of having identified Defendant as one of
the perpetrators of the robbery and assault, Mr. Clay was merely
reciting what he heard “on the street.” We are at something of
a loss to determine how the decision of Defendant’s trial
counsel to ask this line of questions materially harmed
Defendant’s chances for a more favorable outcome at trial. At a
minimum, given that the jury properly heard Mr. Clay testify
concerning what he heard about Defendant’s involvement in the
robbery and assault “on the street” and given the fact that Mr.
Clay identified Defendant as one of the individuals who
assaulted and robbed him at the time that he looked at
Defendant’s Facebook page, when he examined the photographic
array presented to him by investigating officers, and in open
court, we cannot conclude that there is any reasonable
probability that the jury would have returned verdicts that were
more favorable to Defendant had his trial counsel refrained from
asking Mr. Clay additional questions about what he had heard “on
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the street.” As a result, Defendant is not entitled to any
relief from the trial court’s judgments on the basis of any
aspect of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim that he
has asserted in this case.
III. Conclusion
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that
none of Defendant’s challenges to the trial court’s judgments
have any merit. As a result, the trial court’s judgments
should, and hereby are, allowed to remain undisturbed.
NO ERROR.
Judges Robert C. HUNTER and STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).