State v. Lott

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-719
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 5 August 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Wake County
Nos. 11 CRS 218625—28, 218636—
39, 218666, 218672
KIDADA SHIDEEAH LOTT and JOSE
ROBERTO VALENTINE
Appeal by defendants from judgments entered 21 September
2012 by Judge Paul C. Ridgeway in Wake County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 January 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General M. A. Kelly Chambers, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate
Defender Kathleen M. Joyce, for defendant-appellant Jose
Roberto Valentine.
Kimberly P. Hoppin for defendant-appellant Kidada Shideeah
Lott.
BRYANT, Judge.
Where there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to
support a jury instruction on the theory of aiding and abetting,
the trial court did not err in its instruction. Where defendant
Valentine’s trial counsel conceded to the jury, with Valentine’s
-2-
consent, that Valentine was guilty of misdemeanor breaking and
entering, the concession was not Harbison error. Where the
trial court instructed the jury that a gunshot wound from a
bullet passing through the victim’s buttock and out the front of
his thigh was a serious injury, we find no error.
The evidence presented tended to show that on the evening
of 9 August 2011, Robert Wright, Camille Perry, Britney
Montgomery, Belinda Montgomery, and Crystal Daniel were in a
house located at 11 Maywood Avenue in Raleigh. In addition to
the above-named adults, there were seven children present, all
under the age of nine years. Over the course of the evening,
Crystal and Britney went to bed, as did all seven children.
Belinda, Camille, and Robert stayed up playing cards. Two times
that night, Robert stepped outside to smoke. The first time at
2:00 a.m., he noticed that an SUV drove by twice. The second
time at 3:00 a.m., Robert observed the same vehicle drive down
Maywood Avenue, then park diagonally across from the house. He
noted the vehicle lights were turned off but the engine was
still running. No one exited the vehicle at that time. Fifteen
to twenty minutes later, the vehicle was still sitting there.
Between 3:30 and 4:00 a.m., Robert called for a ride to take him
home. When Robert saw his ride drive by, he flicked the lights
-3-
to identify the house. As he stepped out of a side door, he was
shot. Robert then ran to the car waiting to give him a ride
home and told the driver to take him to the hospital. In route
to the hospital, Robert reported the shooting to the Raleigh
Police Department, which dispatched law enforcement officers to
meet him at WakeMed Hospital. Robert described the SUV he
observed sitting across from 11 Maywood Avenue as a grey Dodge
Durango.
Crystal testified that she was in her bed when Belinda and
Camille ran into her room screaming. She heard a man’s voice
tell Britney to get out and go into the room with Crystal,
Britney, and Camille. When Britney walked into Crystal’s
bedroom, Crystal recognized the man with Britney and noted that
he held a handgun. Crystal later identified the man as
defendant Jose Roberto Valentine. Valentine asked for each
woman’s name and then grabbed Crystal, saying “Yeah, you the one
I want.” A gunshot was fired in the hallway and Valentine
pulled Crystal out of her bedroom, where she observed two more
men. “One of them was just big and tall, the one that was
standing at the door. The other guy, he was just a regular size
person [less than six feet tall].” All of the intruders wore
dark clothes and other than Valentine, wore masks covering their
-4-
faces. Valentine threatened Crystal and warned her not to call
the police. Then he and the two other men left the house taking
a Playstation III video game system.
Officer Michael Keon, a patrolman with the Raleigh Police
Department, was patrolling the southeast district of Raleigh on
the evening of 9 August 2011. After hearing reports of a
shooting at 11 Maywood Avenue, he proceeded in the direction of
that residence. The dispatcher provided the description of a
suspect vehicle, a grey SUV – Dodge Durango. Within two
minutes, Officer Keon observed what he described as a silver
Dodge Durango at the intersection of Raleigh Boulevard and
Martin Luther King Blvd. The Durango was the only other car on
the road. Officer Keon followed the SUV until additional law
enforcement officers could provide assistance, then conducted a
stop. The driver was a female later identified as defendant
Kidada Shideeah Lott. There were three male passengers in the
SUV, including defendant Valentine. One passenger fled the
scene upon the vehicle stop but was apprehended shortly
thereafter. Inside the vehicle, law enforcement officers found
a ski mask, latex gloves, and two firearms.
Defendant Kidada Shideeah Lott was indicted on charges of
robbery with a dangerous weapon, first-degree burglary, assault
-5-
with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious
injury, and discharging a weapon into an occupied dwelling.
Defendant Jose Roberto Valentine was indicted on charges of
discharging a weapon into an occupied dwelling, first-degree
burglary, robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, two counts
of assault with a deadly weapon, two counts of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a stolen
firearm. The State thereafter dismissed both counts of assault
with a deadly weapon against Valentine but subsequently issued a
superseding indictment against Valentine for possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon.
The cases against Lott and Valentine were joined for trial.1
Trial commenced in Wake County Superior Court during the 11
September 2012 session with the Honorable Paul C. Ridgeway,
Judge presiding.
At the close of the State’s evidence, the trial court
allowed Valentine’s motion to dismiss the charge of possession
of a stolen firearm. During closing arguments, Valentine’s
1
Initially, co-defendants Jimmie Cornelius and Hakim Lamar
Jacobs were joined for trial with Lott and Valentine. However,
while the record is not clear as to the disposition of the cases
involving Cornelius and Jacobs, only the joined cases involving
Lott and Valentine were tried before a jury.
-6-
attorney conceded to the jury that Valentine was guilty of
possession of a firearm by a felon, was present during the home
invasion, and was guilty of misdemeanor breaking and entering.
The jury returned the following verdicts. Lott was found
guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon, first-degree
burglary, and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious
injury; Valentine was found guilty of first-degree burglary,
robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault with a deadly weapon
inflicting serious injury, and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. Both Lott and Valentine were found not guilty
of discharging a weapon into occupied property.
In accordance with the jury verdict against Lott, the trial
court entered a consolidated judgment on the charges of robbery
with a dangerous weapon and first-degree burglary, imposing a
sentence of 73 to 100 months, and as to the charge of assault
with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, a consecutive
term of 29 to 44 months. In accordance with the jury verdict
against Valentine, the trial court sentenced him to a term of 78
to 103 months on the charge of first-degree burglary, 30 to 45
months on the charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon, and 30
to 45 months on the consolidated charges of assault with a
-7-
deadly weapon inflicting serious injury and possession of a
firearm by a felon, all to be served consecutively.
Lott and Valentine appeal.
___________________________________
Lott’s appeal
Lott argues that the trial court erred by instructing the
jury on the theory of aiding and abetting, contending there was
insufficient evidence to support such an instruction.
Specifically, Lott contends the State’s evidence was sufficient
to show only her presence in the SUV sometime after three
perpetrators invaded a home but was insufficient to establish
that she intended to aid in the commission of any crime. We
disagree.
The trial court instructed the jury on all of the
substantive offenses including robbery with a dangerous weapon,
first-degree burglary, and assault with a deadly weapon
inflicting serious injury. The jury was also instructed that
“[a] person who aids and abets another to commit a crime is
guilty of that crime” and further instructed on the requirements
for finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on a theory of
aiding and abetting.
-8-
We note that during the charge conference, Lott accepted
the trial court’s proposal to instruct the jury on the theory of
aiding and abetting with regard to the charges against Lott:
[The Court]: The State has indicated that it
is asking to not include instructions on
acting in concert with respect to Defendant
Lott and only give the instructions on
aiding and abetting. I do agree that it
certainly is less confusing to have only
that instruction.
Do either of you wish to be heard on that?
[Defense counsel for Lott]: No, Your Honor.
I'll accept that.
The trial court thereafter gave the above mentioned instructions
on the substantive offenses as well as instructions on aiding
and abetting. Following the trial court’s instructions to the
jury, Lott raised no objection to the instructions as given.
In a criminal case, an issue not preserved by objection
noted at trial may be made the basis of an issue presented on
appeal when the judicial action in question is specifically and
distinctly contended to amount to plain error. N.C. R. App. P.
10(a)(4) (2014). “[P]lain error analysis is limited to
reviewing jury instructions and evidentiary matters.” State v.
Ross, 207 N.C. App. 379, 386—87, 700 S.E.2d 412, 418 (2010)
(quoting State v. Wiley, 355 N.C. 592, 615, 565 S.E.2d 22, 39—40
(2002)) (quotations omitted); see also State v. Jaynes, 342 N.C.
-9-
249, 276, 464 S.E.2d 448, 465 (1995) (reviewing the trial
court’s jury instruction for plain error).
For error to constitute plain error, a
defendant must demonstrate that a
fundamental error occurred at trial. To show
that an error was fundamental, a defendant
must establish prejudice—that, after
examination of the entire record, the error
had a probable impact on the jury's finding
that the defendant was guilty. Moreover,
because plain error is to be applied
cautiously and only in the exceptional case,
the error will often be one that seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.
State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012)
(citations and quotations omitted).
Our Supreme Court has previously approved a jury charge
setting forth the three criteria for finding a defendant guilty
of a crime on the theory of aiding and abetting: “(1) that the
crime was committed by another; (2) that the defendant knowingly
advised, instigated, encouraged, procured, or aided the other
person; and (3) that the defendant's actions or statements
caused or contributed to the commission of the crime by the
other person.” State v. Francis, 341 N.C. 156, 161, 459 S.E.2d
269, 272 (1995) (citation omitted); see also State v. Lyles, 19
N.C. App. 632, 636, 199 S.E.2d 699, 702 (1973) (“The driver of a
getaway car is present at the scene of the crime, and he is a
-10-
principal rather than an accessory before the fact. Therefore,
there is no error in . . . the court's instructing the jury on
aiding and abetting.”).
The State’s evidence was sufficient to support the trial
court’s instruction on aiding and abetting. On the evening in
question, Robert Wright observed a grey Dodge Durango drive by
11 Maywood Avenue at least two times between 2:00 and 3:30 a.m.
Then, between 3:30 and 4:00 a.m., Wright observed this vehicle
park across the street, and turn its lights off, while the
engine kept running. As Wright stepped outside of his friends’
home to wait for his ride, he was shot by someone in the SUV.
Thereafter, three men wearing dark clothes, two of whom wore
masks, entered 11 Maywood Avenue with at least two firearms.
One of the firearms discharged while defendant Valentine was
holding another firearm in a bedroom containing the three women.
The men fled after taking a video game system and warning the
occupants not to call the police.
Officer Keon was patrolling Raleigh’s southeast district
when he learned of the reported shooting at 11 Maywood Avenue
and received the description of a suspect vehicle, a grey SUV
Dodge Durango. Officer Keon began to head toward 11 Maywood
Avenue when he encountered what he described as a silver Dodge
-11-
Durango. Approximately two minutes elapsed between the time
Officer Keon received the report of a shooting at 11 Maywood
Avenue along with a description of the suspect vehicle and when
he spotted the vehicle. He saw no other vehicles on the road in
the interim. Officer Keon stopped the SUV. Lott was the
driver. In response to Officer Keon’s question as to how many
people were in the vehicle, “she told me just her two
brothers[,]” when in fact there were three passengers in the
vehicle. “And then I also asked her if there were any weapons
in the vehicle, and she said no.” Suddenly, the front seat
passenger opened the door and ran. Lott started the vehicle as
if to drive away; however, on Officer Keon’s command, Lott
immediately turned the vehicle off and threw the keys outside.
In the SUV, police officers found a black ski mask, latex
gloves, and two firearms.
Considering the temporal proximity between the shooting at
11 Maywood Avenue and Officer Keon’s observation of the suspect
vehicle in the vicinity of the shooting, along with the fact
that no other vehicles were on the road in those early morning
hours, coupled with the fact that four individuals were in the
car – three of whom were men – and three men were reported to be
involved in the home invasion, and that Lott participated as the
-12-
driver of what appeared to be the getaway car and gave
misleading responses to inquiries as to the number of people in
the SUV and the presence of weapons, this evidence was more than
sufficient to support the trial court’s instruction on the
theory of aiding and abetting. See id. Accordingly, we
overrule Lott’s argument.
Valentine’s appeal
Valentine first argues that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. Specifically, Valentine contends he is
entitled to a new trial because defense counsel committed a
Harbison error during closing arguments by admitting Valentine
was guilty of misdemeanor breaking and entering. We disagree.
Appellate assessments of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims involve mixed questions of law and fact. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 700 (1984). We
review the questions of law de novo. State v. Williams, 362 N.C.
628, 632, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008). "Under a de novo review,
the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its
own judgment for that of the lower tribunal." Id. at 632—33, 669
S.E.2d at 294. We review questions of fact to determine if the
finding is supported by competent evidence. Pineda-Lopez v. N.C.
Growers Ass'n, 151 N.C. App. 587, 589, 566 S.E.2d 162, 164
-13-
(2002).
Pursuant to the United States Constitution, “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . .
. have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. Pursuant to our North Carolina Constitution, “[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, every person charged with crime has
the right to . . . have counsel for defense . . . .” N.C. CONST.
art. I, § 23. Our Supreme Court has “conclude[d] that
ineffective assistance of counsel, per se in violation of the
Sixth Amendment, has been established in every criminal case in
which the defendant's counsel admits the defendant's guilt to
the jury without the defendant's consent.” State v. Harbison,
315 N.C. 175, 180, 337 S.E.2d 504, 507—08 (1985). “The
practical effect is the same as if counsel had entered a plea of
guilty without the client’s consent. Counsel in such situations
denies the client’s right to have the issue of guilt or
innocence decided by a jury.” Id. at 180, 337 S.E.2d at 507(citation omitted). This is true even when defense counsel
concedes the defendant’s guilt to either the charged offense or
a lesser-included offense. State v. Matthews, 358 N.C. 102,
109, 591 S.E.2d 535, 540 (2004) (Our Supreme Court granted the
defendant a new trial on the charge of first-degree murder where
-14-
defense counsel conceded the defendant’s guilt to the charge of
second-degree murder and the jury returned a verdict of guilty
to the charge of first-degree murder. “Harbison requires that
the decision to concede guilt to a lesser included crime ‘be
made exclusively by the defendant.’” (citation omitted)); see
also State v. Maready, 205 N.C. App. 1, 695 S.E.2d 771 (2010)
(reviewing whether defense counsel’s argument admitting the
defendant’s guilt to a lesser-included offense amounted to
Harbison error).
However, where defendant allows counsel to concede guilt to
a crime, no Harbison violation occurs. See State v. Johnson,
161 N.C. App. 68, 77—78, 587 S.E.2d 445, 451 (2003) (“Although
the better practice would be for defense counsel to make a
record of a defendant's consent to concessions or admissions of
guilt prior to making those concessions . . . we conclude that
the trial court's inquiry [following defense counsel’s
concession of guilt] was adequate to establish that defendant
had previously consented to his counsel's concession that he was
present and had fired the shots that killed three people and
wounded a fourth.”).
Here, following the jury voir dire but prior to the
presentation of evidence, Valentine’s defense counsel brought to
-15-
the court’s attention that Harbison issues would likely arise
during trial. The trial court engaged in the following inquiry
of Valentine:
[Valentine’s defense counsel]: Yes, sir, and
I apologize not to bring this up before the
jury came in. There are some Harbison issues
in this case. I anticipate admitting to the
jury and arguing to the jury that they
should be free to find certain elements, and
included among those basically I think I'm
going to admit that he was in that house,
that identity is not an issue in this
particular case. While I'm not prepared at
this point to say that they've met any of
the charges that are actually against him,
potentially lesser included charges would
include misdemeanor breaking and entering,
second degree trespassing, communicating
threats, among other things that are not
necessarily lesser includeds, but that I'm
going to be admitting to the jury that they
would probably be able to find beyond a
reasonable doubt and I would ask the Court
to inquire from my client whether -- whether
the Court's comfortable with him and whether
I have his consent to do that.
THE COURT: Mr. Valentine, if you could stand
for me for a moment I need to discuss this
matter with you.
. . .
Your attorney has indicated to me that as a
matter of strategy he is going to be
admitting to this jury that perhaps certain
elements of the offenses have been met and
that they can assume those to be true. Do
you understand that?
DEFENDANT VALENTINE: Yes, I do.
-16-
THE COURT: And as I understand it, in
particular, he is intending to inform the
jury that you were present at the house
located at [11 Maywood Avenue] on the night
in question.
DEFENDANT VALENTINE: Yes.
. . .
THE COURT: And he is also going to
acknowledge that your identity as a person
who was at the scene of these alleged crimes
is also not an issue. Do you understand
that?
DEFENDANT VALENTINE: Yes.
. . .
THE COURT: And that by your attorney's
acknowledging or informing the jury that
these issues are not in dispute, he's in
effect removing the state's obligation to
prove these matters beyond a reasonable
doubt. Do you understand that?
DEFENDANT VALENTINE: Yes, I do.
. . .
THE COURT: Now, have you had an opportunity
to fully discuss the strategic choice that
your attorney is making with him?
DEFENDANT VALENTINE: Yes.
THE COURT: And do you consent to the
strategic choice that your attorney is
making?
DEFENDANT VALENTINE: Yes, I do.
-17-
(Emphasis added).
Before the jury during closing argument, Valentine’s
defense counsel made the following concession:
The good news for your conscience is you're
going to get to find him guilty of some
stuff. . . .
If you are not convinced, fully convinced
and entirely satisfied, that the intention
when they broke into that house was to shoot
her or was to steal from them, then you get
to find him guilty of misdemeanor breaking
and entering. If you are intellectually
honest with yourself, with each other, if
you do your job the way you promised that
you would, [that is the charge] you find him
guilty of.
(Emphasis added).
In accordance with Valentine’s acknowledgment, as presented
to the trial court prior to the presentation of evidence,
defense counsel admitted Valentine’s guilt after the close of
the evidence to misdemeanor breaking and entering, a lesser-
included offense of first-degree burglary, the offense for which
defendant was indicted. See State v. Patton, 80 N.C. App. 302,
305, 341 S.E.2d 744, 746 (1986) (misdemeanor breaking and
entering is a lesser-included offense of first-degree burglary).
Therefore, where the trial court made a Harbison inquiry of
Valentine and Valentine indicated his understanding of and
consent to the defense strategy of admitting to misdemeanor
-18-
breaking and entering, this does not constitute error. This was
not Harbison error and is not ineffective assistance of counsel
per se. For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Valentine’s
argument. See Johnson, 161 N.C. App. at 77—78, 587 S.E.2d at
451.
Serious injury
Valentine next argues that the trial court erred by
instructing the jury over Valentine’s objection that Robert
Wrights’ injury, a single gunshot wound to the buttocks and
upper thigh, was a serious injury. We disagree.
We review challenges to jury instructions de novo. State
v. Osorio, 196 N.C. App. 458, 466, 675 S.E.2d 144, 149 (2009)
(citations omitted).
[Our Supreme Court] has not defined
“serious injury” for purposes of assault
prosecutions, other than stating that the
injury must be serious but it must fall
short of causing death and that further
definition seems neither wise nor desirable.
Whether “serious injury” has been inflicted
must be decided on the facts of each case.
State v. Ramseur, 338 N.C. 502, 507, 450 S.E.2d 467, 471 (1994)
(citations and quotations omitted).
Valentine was indicted on assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to kill inflicting serious injury in violation of General
Statutes, section 14-32(a). “The essential elements of assault
-19-
with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious
injury are: (1) an assault, (2) with a deadly weapon, (3) with
intent to kill, (4) inflicting serious injury, (5) not resulting
in death.” State v. McLean, 211 N.C. App. 321, 324, 712 S.E.2d
271, 275 (2011) (citation and quotations omitted).
After the close of the evidence, the trial court instructed
the jury as follows:
The defendant Jose Roberto Valentine has
been charged with assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill inflicting
serious injury. For you to find the
defendant guilty of this offense, the State
must prove four things beyond a reasonable
doubt.
First, that the defendant assaulted the
victim, Robert Lamont Wright, by
intentionally shooting him.
Second, that the defendant used a deadly
weapon. A handgun is a deadly weapon.
Third, the State must prove that the
defendant
had the specific intent to kill the victim.
. . .
And, fourth, that the defendant inflicted
serious injury. A gunshot wound to the
buttock and upper thigh is a serious injury.
. . .
If you find from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that on or about the
alleged date the defendant, acting either by
himself or acting together with other
-20-
persons, intentionally shot the victim,
Robert Lamont
Wright, with a handgun and that the
defendant or a person with whom the
defendant was in concert with intended to
kill the victim and did seriously injure
him, it would be your duty to return a
verdict of guilty. If you do not so find or
have a reasonable doubt as to one or more of
these things, you will not return a verdict
of guilty of assault with a deadly weapon
with intent to kill inflicting serious
injury but would consider whether the
defendant is guilty of assault with a deadly
weapon inflicting serious injury.
(Emphasis added).
The serious injury element of N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14–32 [(“Felonious assault with
deadly weapon with intent to kill or
inflicting serious injury; punishments”)]
means a physical or bodily injury. . . .
Among the factors that have been deemed
relevant in determining whether serious
injury has been inflicted are: (1) pain and
suffering; (2) loss of blood; (3)
hospitalization; and (4) time lost from
work. . . . The cases that have addressed
the issue of the sufficiency of evidence of
serious injury appear to stand for the
proposition that as long as the State
presents evidence that the victim sustained
a physical injury as a result of an assault
by the defendant, it is for the jury to
determine the question of whether the injury
was serious.
State v. Walker, 204 N.C. App. 431, 446—47, 694 S.E.2d 484, 494—
95 (2010) (citations and quotations omitted). In State v.
Hedgepeth, 330 N.C. 38, 409 S.E.2d 309 (1991), our Supreme Court
-21-
found merit in the reasoning of this Court in State v.
Pettiford, 60 N.C. App. 92, 298 S.E.2d 389 (1982), considering
whether a trial court could peremptorily instruct a jury on the
serious injury element of an assault charge under N.C.G.S. § 14–
32. Hedgepeth, 330 N.C. at 54, 409 S.E.2d at 318. Our Supreme
Court held that “[i]n the absence of conflicting evidence, a
trial judge may instruct the jury that injuries to a victim are
serious as a matter of law if reasonable minds could not differ
as to their serious nature.” Id. at 54, 409 S.E.2d at 318—19.
Here, the evidence is undisputed that Robert suffered a
gunshot wound that extended from his buttock through the front
of his thigh. Robert testified that he jumped from the pain and
ran to the car to carry him to the hospital. “I showed him all
the blood and stuff everywhere. That's when he knew it was
serious. He got on the gas a little more, you know?”
Q. What kind of treatment did you get
while you were at the hospital?
A. Um, it was just in and out. Hit no
bones or nothing so they just flushed
it, packed it, a little gauze stuff,
ran water through it.
Q. Did it hurt?
A. Yeah. I just left on my own.
Q. Pardon me?
-22-
A. I just left. Stayed about eight hours.
Q. Did your injury cause you any lasting
effects?
A. Slightly in the walk . . . .
We hold that under these facts and our case law reasonable
minds cannot differ as to the seriousness of Wright’s injuries.
See id. at 55, 409 S.E.2d at 319 (“We think that reasonable
minds could not differ as to the seriousness of Mrs. Hedgepeth's
physical injuries. A bullet ripped through her ear mere inches
from her skull. She required emergency room treatment for a
gunshot wound, powder burns and lacerations on her hand and
head. Her testimony indicates that her physical injuries may
have some permanency since she was still suffering from daily
ringing in her ear at the time of trial.”). Compare with State
v. Bagley, 183 N.C. App. 514, 527, 644 S.E.2d 615, 623—24 (2007)
(holding reasonable minds could differ as to whether an injury
was serious where after suffering from a gunshot that passed
through his leg, the victim refused help from a passerby, went
home, waited thirty minutes, returned to the scene of the
shooting, was interviewed by a police officer, asked a paramedic
to look at his leg, was then transported to a hospital where
medical staff “squirted water on it, gave him pain pills, and
released him after about two hours,” and the victim has no on-
-23-
going difficulties from the wound). Accordingly, Valentine’s
argument is overruled.
No error.
Judges CALABRIA and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).