In re K.L.C.

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-1365
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 6 May 2014
IN THE MATTER OF:
K.L.C. Davidson County
No. 12 JT 98
Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 30 August
2013 by Judge Jimmy L. Myers in Davidson County District Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 April 2014.
Assistant Davidson County Attorney Christopher M. Watford
for petitioner-appellee Davidson County Department of
Social Services.
Attorney Advocate Laura Bodenheimer for Guardian ad Litem.
Hunt Law Group, P.C., by James A. Hunt, for respondent-
appellant mother.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Respondent-mother appeals from an order terminating her
parental rights to her daughter K.L.C. (“Kate”)1. We affirm.
I. Background
On 25 May 2012, the Davidson County Department of Social
Services (“DSS”) filed a juvenile petition alleging that Kate,
1
The pseudonym “Kate” is used throughout this opinion to protect
the identity of the child and for ease of reading.
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born October 2011, was a neglected and dependent juvenile. DSS
took non-secure custody of Kate. By order filed 17 July 2012,
the trial court adjudicated Kate neglected based upon the
stipulations of the parties. In a separate disposition order
filed 15 August 2012, the trial court continued custody of Kate
with DSS and ordered respondent-mother, among other things, to
pay child support pursuant to North Carolina Child Support
Guidelines.
On 4 April 2013, DSS filed a petition to terminate the
parental rights of respondent-mother under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a)(3) for failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost
of care for the child. The trial court held termination
hearings in June and August 2013. By order filed 30 August
2013, the trial court concluded that grounds for termination of
respondent-mother’s parental rights existed under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3). The trial court concluded that it was in
Kate’s best interest to terminate respondent-mother’s parental
rights.2 Respondent-mother appeals.
II. Discussion
2
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Kate’s
father. He did not appeal.
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Respondent-mother contends the trial court erred in
concluding that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3). We disagree.
In reviewing a trial court’s order terminating parental
rights, this Court must determine whether the trial court’s
findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence and whether those findings support the trial court’s
conclusions of law. In re S.N., 194 N.C. App. 142, 146, 669
S.E.2d 55, 58-59 (2008), aff'd per curiam, 363 N.C. 368, 677
S.E.2d 455 (2009). “The trial court’s conclusions of law are
fully reviewable de novo by the appellate court.” Id. at 146,
669 S.E.2d at 59 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A court may terminate parental rights upon finding that
[t]he juvenile has been placed in the
custody of a county department of social
services, a licensed child-placing agency, a
child-caring institution, or a foster home,
and the parent, for a continuous period of
six months next preceding the filing of the
petition or motion, has willfully failed for
such period to pay a reasonable portion of
the cost of care for the juvenile although
physically and financially able to do so.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3) (2013). “A finding that a
parent has ability to pay support is essential to termination
for nonsupport” pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3). In
re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 716-17, 319 S.E.2d 227, 233 (1984). A
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parent’s “nonpayment will be deemed a failure to pay a
reasonable portion if and only if the [parent] could pay some
amount greater than zero.” In re McDonald, 72 N.C. App. 234,
243, 324 S.E.2d 847, 853, disc. review denied, 314 N.C. 115, 332
S.E.2d 490 (1985).
To support its conclusion that respondent-mother willfully
failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for Kate,
the trial court made the following findings of fact:
22. [Respondent-mother] was first ordered by
the Court to pay child support for the
benefit of [Kate] in the disposition
order entered following a hearing on
August 1, 2012.
23. [Respondent-mother] is able-bodied and
has [sic] the Court is unaware of any
disability that prevents her from gainful
employment. [Respondent-mother] has
indicated that she has been employed for
the past eighteen months although no
verification has been received. Based on
her assertion, the Court finds that
[respondent-mother] has the ability to
pay child support.
24. Mrs. Angie Curry is the custodian of
Davidson County DSS records which pertain
to accounts of children placed in the
custody of the Davidson County Department
of Social Services foster care placements
and the monies expended for their support
while in foster care.
25. For the six months prior to the filing of
the petition in this matter, the
Department of Social Services paid
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$2,850.00 for room and board and $120.00
in clothing allowance for the benefit of
the minor child. In that same time, the
Department has received no payments from
the respondent parents, and has not
received any payment as of the date of
the affidavit filed in this matter which
was received into evidence as
Petitioner’s Exhibit 9. The Department
has advanced a total of $5,682.26 for the
actual cost of care of the minor child as
of the date of this affidavit.
26. On or about September 11, 2012,
[respondent-mother] entered into a
voluntary support agreement which was
ratified by the Court that established
that [respondent-mother] was to pay
$50.00 per month as current support and
$5.00 toward arrears. The total monthly
obligation of $55.00 is a reasonable and
just amount for the cost of care for the
minor child, especially in light of the
actual costs of care for the child. A
certified copy of the order was received
into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 10.
27. Ms. Mitzi Troxell is the custodian of
records for the Davidson County Child
Support Enforcement Agency and is an
establishment agent. For the six months
prior to filing the petition in this
matter, [respondent-mother] paid no
voluntary payments. [Respondent-mother]
has failed to pay a reasonable portion of
the cost of care of the child.
28. On February 7, 2013, [respondent-mother]
was held in willful civil contempt for
failure to pay the obligations under the
existing child support order and the
court subsequently issued an order for
[respondent-mother’s] arrest.
[Respondent-mother] was arrested but was
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released on May 1, 2013 after making a
purge payment of $300.00. [Respondent-
mother] has made no payments since. A
certified copy of the order was received
into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 11.
29. The [respondent-mother] has, for a period
of six months next preceding the filing
of the petition to terminate her parental
rights, willfully failed to pay a
reasonable portion of the cost of care
for the children [sic] although
physically and financially able to do so.
Respondent-mother first asserts the trial court erred in
finding that she had the “ability to pay child support” when
there “was no evidence that the mother had any income or ability
to pay child support.” However, respondent-mother entered into
a voluntary support agreement to pay $50.00 per month and,
therefore, DSS did not need to provide detailed evidence of her
ability to pay support during the relevant time period. See In
re Roberson, 97 N.C. App. 277, 281, 387 S.E.2d 668, 670 (1990)
(“[b]ecause a proper decree for child support will be based on
the supporting parent’s ability to pay as well as the child’s
needs . . . there is no requirement that petitioner
independently prove or that the termination order find as fact
respondent’s ability to pay support during the relevant
statutory time period.”)
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Respondent-mother also asserts the trial court erred in
finding that she failed to make any payments during the relevant
time period when “the evidence is uncontroverted that the mother
paid $510 between October 2012 and April 2013.” Child Support
Enforcement Worker Ms. Troxell testified that the only payment
the agency received between October 2012 and April 2013 was a
payment on March 13th of $150, which “was intercepted.”
Contrary to respondent-mother’s assertion, she did not make any
voluntary payments during the relevant period. Rather, the $150
payment was “intercepted” by the agency and applied towards
respondent-mother’s child support obligation. Although
respondent-mother made a purge payment of $360 in May 2013, any
payments made after 4 April 2013 “are irrelevant, since the
termination statute specifically limits consideration to the
amount of support paid for the six months next preceding the
filing of the petition in termination.” In re Phifer, 67 N.C.
App. 16, 27, 312 S.E.2d 684, 690 (1984). Accordingly, the trial
court properly found that respondent-mother failed to
voluntarily pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care of Kate
for the six months prior to the filing of the termination
petition.
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Finally, respondent-mother objects to the court’s ultimate
finding and conclusion that her failure to pay a reasonable
portion of the juvenile’s cost of care during the relevant six-
month period was “willful.” We hold that the court’s findings
are sufficient to establish respondent-mother’s willful failure
to pay a reasonable portion of Kate’s cost of care. For the six-
month period that preceded DSS’s filing of the petition on 4
April 2013, respondent-mother paid no child support despite
having the ability to do so. Accordingly, we conclude the trial
court properly found grounds existed to terminate respondent-
mother’s parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3).
Affirmed.
Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).