Mount Ulla Historical Preservation Society, Inc. v. Rowan County

NO. COA13-447
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 18 February 2014
MOUNT ULLA HISTORICAL
PRESERVATION SOCIETY, INC.,
et al.,
Petitioners
v. Rowan County
No. 11 CVS 2793
ROWAN COUNTY, DAVIDSON COUNTY
BROADCASTING, INC., RICHARD and
DORCAS PARKER, and MAURICE E.
and MARY LEE PARKER,
Respondents
Appeal by respondent from order entered 27 September 2012 by
Judge W. David Lee in Rowan County Superior Court. Heard in the
Court of Appeals 23 October 2013.
Smith Moore Leatherwood LLP, by Thomas E. Terrell, Jr. and
Elizabeth Brooks Scherer; Kluttz, Reamer, Hayes, Randolph,
Adkins & Carter, L.L.P., by Richard R. Reamer; and Sherrill
and Cameron, PLLC, by Carlyle Sherrill, for petitioner-
appellees.
Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Anthony Fox and Benjamin
Sullivan, for respondent-appellant Rowan County.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Respondent Rowan County (“the County”) appeals from the trial
court’s order reversing the decision of the Rowan County Board of
Commissioners (“the Board”) to issue a conditional use permit
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(“CUP”) to respondent Davidson County Broadcasting, Inc. (“DBCI”)
on the basis that the CUP application was barred by the doctrines
of res judicata and collateral estoppel. We affirm.
I. Background
On 18 January 2005, DCBI applied to the Board for a CUP (“the
2005 CUP application”) to construct a 1,350 foot radio tower (“the
tower”) on property owned by respondents Richard and Dorcas Parker
(“the Parkers”). After conducting a public hearing regarding the
application, the Board voted to deny the CUP. The written decision
denying the application indicated that it was denied because the
proposed tower would pose an air safety hazard to Miller Airpark,
a nearby private airport.
DCBI and the Parkers then filed a petition for writ of
certiorari in Rowan County Superior Court to review the Board’s
decision. The court granted the petition and affirmed the denial
of the CUP. DCBI and the Parkers appealed to this Court, which
affirmed the decision of the superior court. Davidson Cty.
Broadcasting, Inc. v. Rowan Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 186 N.C. App. 81,
649 S.E.2d 904 (2007)(“DCBI I”).
On 26 May 2010, DCBI applied to the Board for a CUP for a
1,200 foot radio tower (“the 2010 CUP application”) in
substantially the same proposed location as the tower in the 2005
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application that had been denied. On 24 March 2011, DCBI filed a
supplemental application to include property owned by respondents
Maurice E. Parker and Mary Lee Parker as a fall zone. Petitioners1
moved to dismiss the 2010 CUP application as being barred by the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The Board
denied the motion on 5 July 2011. Beginning 1 August 2011, the
Board held a quasi-judicial hearing to consider the new
application. On 6 September 2011, the Board entered a written
decision approving the CUP. The Board found, inter alia, that the
proposed tower would not create any hazardous safety conditions.
On 3 October 2011, petitioners filed a petition for writ of
certiorari in Rowan County Superior Court, seeking review of the
Board’s CUP approval. Petitioners once again argued that the 2010
CUP application was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Petitioners also alleged that the approved CUP did not conform to
the Rowan County Zoning Ordinance.
On 27 September 2012, the superior court entered an order
reversing the Board’s approval of the 2010 CUP application. The
1 Petitioners consist of Mt. Ulla Historical Preservation Society,
Inc., Miller Air Park Owners Association, and several dozen private
individuals.
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court concluded that the 2010 CUP application was barred by res
judicata and collateral estoppel. Respondents appeal.2
II. Standard of Review
“Special and conditional use permit decisions are quasi-
judicial zoning decisions.” County of Lancaster v. Mecklenburg
County, 334 N.C. 496, 508, 434 S.E.2d 604, 613 (1993). “Our task,
in reviewing a superior court order entered after a review of a
board decision is two-fold: (1) to determine whether the trial
court exercised the proper scope of review, and (2) to review
whether the trial court correctly applied this scope of review.”
Whiteco Outdoor Adver. v. Johnston County Bd. of Adjust., 132 N.C.
App. 465, 468, 513 S.E.2d 70, 73 (1999).
The proper standard for the superior court’s
judicial review depends upon the particular
issues presented on appeal. When the
petitioner questions (1) whether the agency’s
decision was supported by the evidence or (2)
whether the decision was arbitrary or
capricious, then the reviewing court must
apply the whole record test. However, [i]f a
petitioner contends the [b]oard’s decision was
based on an error of law, de novo review is
proper. Moreover, the trial court, when
sitting as an appellate court to review a
[decision of a quasi-judicial body], must set
forth sufficient information in its order to
reveal the scope of review utilized and the
application of that review.
2 While all respondents entered notice of appeal from the superior
court’s order, only respondent Rowan County filed a brief with
this Court.
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Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cty. Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1, 13,
565 S.E.2d 9, 17 (2002) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
III. Res Judicata
The County argues that the superior court erred by reversing
the Board’s approval of the 2010 CUP application because the
application was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We
disagree.
“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the
merits in a prior action in a court of competent jurisdiction
precludes a second suit involving the same claim between the same
parties or those in privity with them.” Nicholson v. Jackson Cty.
School Bd., 170 N.C. App. 650, 654, 614 S.E.2d 319, 322 (2005)
(internal quotations and citation omitted). “The purpose of the
doctrine of res judicata is to protect litigants from the burden
of relitigating previously decided matters and to promote judicial
economy by preventing unnecessary litigation.” Holly Farm Foods
v. Kuykendall, 114 N.C. App. 412, 417, 442 S.E.2d 94, 97 (1994).
“[W]hether the doctrine of res judicata operates to bar a cause of
action is a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal.” Housecalls
Home Health Care, Inc. v. State, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 738 S.E.2d
753, 758 (2013).
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Our Supreme Court has specifically held that res judicata “is
available with respect to the proceedings and final decision of a
judicial or quasi-judicial body.” Little v. Raleigh, 195 N.C. 793,
795, 143 S.E. 827, 828 (1928). In Little, a building permit to
construct a gasoline filling station was denied by the building
inspector and the board of adjustment, and the denial was upheld
by our Supreme Court. See Harden v. Raleigh, 192 N.C. 395, 135
S.E. 151 (1926). The property owner then petitioned the building
inspector to reopen the case. Little, 195 N.C. at 793, 143 S.E.
at 827. The building inspector reversed his prior determination
and the previously-denied building permit was issued. Id. The
issuance of the permit was upheld by the board of adjustment and
the superior court. Id. at 793-94, 143 S.E. at 827-28. On appeal,
our Supreme Court reversed the issuance of the building permit on
the basis of res judicata:
There is no allegation, no proof, and no
finding by the trial court that the facts in
the case at bar are in anywise different from
the facts in the case of Harden v. Raleigh.
Indeed, the trial judge finds that Mrs. Harden
applied to the building inspector “to reopen
and rehear its former decision upon the
building of the filling station upon her said
lot.”
Upon these circumstances we are constrained to
hold that the plea of res judicata, duly filed
in apt time by the petitioners, was available,
and therefore that the owner of the lot is not
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entitled to reopen and rehear the case upon
the identical facts presented in the former
record.
Id. at 795, 143 S.E. at 828.
Little was subsequently distinguished by In re Broughton
Estate, 210 N.C. 62, 185 S.E. 434 (1936). In Broughton, a permit
was issued to construct a filling station. Id. at 62, 185 S.E. at
434. The permit issuance was challenged because, inter alia, a
similar application had been denied three years earlier. Id. The
superior court reversed the granting of the permit based upon
Little, concluding that there had been “no substantial change in
conditions” since the prior permit denial. Id. at 62-63, 185 S.E.
at 434. That decision was then appealed to our Supreme Court,
which reversed the superior court after determining that Little
was inapplicable:
The trial court held that the case was
controlled by the decision in Little v.
Raleigh, 195 N. C., 793, 143 S. E., 827. The
two cases are not alike. In the first place,
the cited case was on application “to reopen
and rehear” a former decision which had
received judicial approval sub nomine Harden
v. Raleigh, 192 N. C., 395, 135 S. E., 151.
Not so here. In the next place, Little's case,
supra, was not only identical in allegation
and fact with the original case, but was in
truth the same case. Here, the traffic
conditions as found by the board, “have
materially changed since the former
application was acted on . . . .”
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Id. at 63, 185 S.E. at 435.
The County contends that, when read together, Little and
Broughton stand for the proposition that res judicata applies to
quasi-judicial land use decisions only when the applicant is
attempting to “reopen and rehear the case upon the identical facts
presented in the former record.” Little, 195 N.C. at 795, 143
S.E. at 828. However, the County reads the Broughton Court’s
interpretation of Little too narrowly.
The Broughton Court determined that the use of res judicata by
the trial court was improper based upon two differences between
the permit approval before it and the permit approval at issue
in Little. First, the permit issued in Little was based upon an
“application ‘to reopen and rehear’ a former decision which had
received judicial approval . . . .” Broughton, 210 N.C. at 63, 185
S.E. at 435. Second, the Court noted that “the traffic conditions
as found by the board, ‘have materially changed since the former
application was acted on . . . .’” Id. (emphasis added). Thus,
the Broughton Court did not conclude that res judicata did not
apply merely because the two applications at issue in that case
were not exactly the same. The Court’s conclusion also depended
upon the board’s finding that there was a material change in
conditions between the prior permit application and the subsequent
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permit application. This requirement of a material change in order
to preclude the use of the defense of res judicata for quasi-
judicial land use decisions is consistent with the law in other
jurisdictions which have considered the question, see, e.g.,
Curless v. County of Clay, 395 So. 2d 255, 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); Whittle v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 125 A.2d 41, 46
(Md. 1956); Fisher v. City of Dover, 412 A.2d 1024, 1027 (N.H.
1980); and Cohen v. Fair Lawn, 204 A.2d 375, 377 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1964), as well as with general res judicata principles.
See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. f. (1982)(“Material
operative facts occurring after the decision of an action with
respect to the same subject matter may in themselves, or taken in
conjunction with the antecedent facts, comprise a transaction
which may be made the basis of a second action not precluded by
the first.”).
Although our Courts have not specifically defined what
constitutes a material change, the consensus among other
jurisdictions which have analyzed whether res judicata bars a
quasi-judicial land use decision appears to be that
[t]he change in conditions or circumstances
which would justify the reconsideration of an
action must be a change in the particular
circumstance or condition which induced the
prior denial. The change in circumstances must
be such that the application for the same or
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a substantially similar special exception or
variance no longer can be characterized as the
same claim.
83 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and Planning § 700 (2013)(footnotes omitted).
This definition of material change makes sense in the context of
quasi-judicial land use decisions because
[w]hen the facts and circumstances which
actuated an order or a decision are alleged
and shown to have so changed as to vitiate or
materially affect the reasons which produced
and supported it and no vested rights have
intervened, it is reasonable and appropriate
to the functions of the board that the
subject-matter be re-examined in the light of
the altered circumstances.
St. Patrick's Church Corp. v. Daniels, 154 A. 343, 345 (Conn.
1931).
We find the preceding authorities persuasive and utilize them
to formulate the following definition of “material change” in the
context of quasi-judicial land use decisions in North Carolina: a
material change which precludes the use of the defense of res
judicata occurs when the specific facts or circumstances which led
to the prior quasi-judicial land use decision have changed to the
extent that they “vitiate . . . the reasons which produced and
supported” the prior decision such that the application “can no
longer can be characterized as the same claim.” Id.; 83 Am. Jur.
2d Zoning and Planning § 700.
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In the instant case, the 2005 CUP application was denied
because the proposed tower was determined to be a safety hazard to
Miller Airpark. See DCBI I, 186 N.C. App. at 91-92, 649 S.E.2d at
912. Accordingly, in order to avoid being barred by res judicata,
DCBI’s 2010 CUP application must have materially changed the design
of the proposed tower in such a way as to vitiate the concerns
regarding air safety which led to the denial of the 2005 CUP
application.
Although the Board denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss on
the basis of res judicata, it did not include, as part of its
written decision approving the 2010 CUP application, any findings
which suggest that there was a material change from the denied
2005 CUP application. However, by denying petitioners’ motion to
dismiss, the Board necessarily found that there was a material
change between the two applications. This inference is consistent
with Rowan County Commissioner Jim Sides, Jr.’s explanation of his
motion to deny petitioners’ motion to dismiss:
[t]here has been considerable change in this
application from the previous application, and
I realize that the previous decision was made
based primarily on safety factors. We do not
know, at this point, based on a 1200 feet (sic)
tower versus a 1350 feet (sic) tower, what the
facts would be in relation to safety. Based
on that, I would move against the motion to
dismiss . . . .”
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The County makes substantially the same argument to this Court,
contending that the lowering of the tower by 150 feet in the 2010
CUP application was a material change that would preclude the use
of res judicata.
Prior to determining whether the Board’s finding of a material
change was correct, we must first determine the proper standard of
review, which our Courts have not explicitly considered
previously. The consensus from other jurisdictions is that the
determination of whether a subsequent application demonstrates a
material change from a prior application is a factual question,
with deference given to the quasi-judicial body’s finding. See
Russell v. Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of Tenafly, 155 A.2d 83,
88 (N.J. 1959)(“Whether the requirement [of a material change] has
been met is for the board, in the first instance, to determine.
This finding, as any other made by the board, will be overturned
on review only if it is shown to be unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious.” (internal citation omitted)); Freeman v. Ithaca
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 403 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (N.Y. App. Div.
1978)(“[I]t is for the board to determine whether or not changed
facts or circumstances are presented and, in so doing, it may give
weight even to slight differences not easily discernible[.]”
(internal quotations and citation omitted). This deferential
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standard is consistent with Broughton, in which our Supreme Court
overturned the superior court’s conclusion “that there had been no
substantial change in conditions” based upon the board of
adjustment’s finding that “traffic conditions . . . ‘have
materially changed since the former application was acted on . .
. .’” 210 N.C. at 63, 185 S.E. at 434-35. Accordingly, we conclude
that the deferential whole record test applies to the Board’s
finding of a material change. We note that the superior court
correctly applied this standard of review below, holding that “[a]
whole record review . . . fails to disclose competent, material or
substantial evidence that the height variance materially alters
the proposed use from that use proposed in the earlier
application.”
“When utilizing the whole record test, . . . the reviewing
court must examine all competent evidence (the “whole record”) in
order to determine whether the agency decision is supported by
substantial evidence.” Mann Media, 356 N.C. at 14, 565 S.E.2d at
17 (internal quotations and citation omitted). “The ‘whole record’
test does not allow the reviewing court to replace the Board’s
judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though
the court could justifiably have reached a different result had
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the matter been before it de novo.” Thompson v. Board of Education,
292 N.C. 406, 410, 233 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1977).
The County is correct that the lowering of the tower by 150
feet constituted a change from the denied 2005 CUP application.
However, a review of the whole record does not reveal any evidence
that this change would undermine the reasoning behind the denial
of the 2005 CUP application. The County points to general evidence
presented during the 2010 CUP application hearing that the proposed
1,200 foot tower would be safe for air travel, but fails to connect
this evidence in any way to the change in the height of the tower
from the 2005 CUP application. The safety evidence cited by the
County would be equally applicable to both a 1,350 foot tower and
a 1,200 foot tower. As this Court explicitly recognized in DCBI
I, the 2005 CUP application was supported by “evidence from which
the Board could have found that the tower would not pose an
unreasonable or unjustifiable safety hazard” to air travel, but
the Board nonetheless found that evidence to be outweighed by other
evidence that the tower would create such a hazard. 186 N.C. App.
at 92, 649 S.E.2d at 913. Since there is nothing in the whole
record which suggests that the prior evidence regarding the tower’s
potential safety hazard to air travel from the 2005 CUP application
hearing was vitiated by lowering the tower by 150 feet, the Board’s
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finding in the instant case that there was a material change in
the 2010 CUP application was not supported by the evidence. See
St. Patrick’s Church, 154 A. at 345. The whole record reflects
that the Board essentially considered the same information in both
the 2005 and 2010 CUP applications and reached different decisions.
Res judicata forbids such a result. See King v. Grindstaff, 284
N.C. 348, 355, 200 S.E.2d 799, 804 (1973)(“(W)hen a fact has been
agreed upon or decided in a court of record, neither of the parties
shall be allowed to call it in question, and have it tried over
again at any time thereafter, so long as the judgment or decree
stands unreversed.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)).
Ultimately, as there was no material change between the 2005 and
2010 CUP applications, res judicata barred the Board from
reconsidering its previous decision. Therefore, the superior
court properly concluded that res judicata required the Board to
dismiss the 2010 CUP application. This argument is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
Res judicata generally applies to quasi-judicial land use
decisions unless there is a material change in the facts or
circumstances since the prior decision was rendered. In the
instant case, a whole record review provides no evidence that the
lowering of the proposed tower by 150 feet in the 2010 CUP
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application constituted a material change. Therefore, the
superior court properly concluded that the 2010 CUP application
was barred by res judicata. The superior court’s order is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges BRYANT and HUNTER, Jr., Robert N. concur.