In re C.E.C.

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-930
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 18 February 2014
IN THE MATTER OF:
C.E.C. and C.E.C. Mecklenburg County
Nos. 11 JT 570,571
Appeal by respondent from order entered 16 May 2013 by
Judge Donald R. Cureton in Mecklenburg County District Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 January 2014.
Senior Associate Attorney Twyla Hollingsworth-Richardson
for Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services,
Division of Youth and Family Services, petitioner-appellee.
Poyner Spruill LLP, by Caroline P. Mackie and Carrie V.
McMillan for guardian ad litem.
Levine & Stewart, by James E. Tanner, III for mother,
respondent-appellant.
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.
Respondent mother appeals from the trial court’s order
terminating her parental rights to C.E.C. (“Carl”) and C.E.C.
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(“Celia”).1 For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the
trial court’s order.
Background
The Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services,
Division of Youth and Family Services (“YFS”) first became
involved with this family in January 2009 after receiving a
referral alleging that respondent and Carl tested positive for
marijuana at Carl’s birth. At that time, services were not
recommended and YFS closed the matter in February 2009.
Celia was born in September 2010. In November 2010, YFS
received another referral alleging that respondent and the
children’s father were involved in a domestic violence incident
in the children’s presence. During its investigation, YFS noted
additional concerns, including parenting and substance abuse
issues as to respondent, and unstable housing, substance abuse,
and possible mental health issues as to the father. In January
2011, the case was transferred to Family Intervention services
in order to address these concerns.
On or about 7 March 2011, respondent entered into a case
plan wherein she agreed to address issues regarding domestic
violence, substance abuse, housing, employment, and to follow
1
Pseudonyms are used for ease of reading and to protect the
privacy of the juveniles.
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the recommendations of her mental health provider. Between 30
March 2011 and 6 June 2011, respondent made efforts to meet with
her therapist and to address her issues. In May 2011,
respondent completed a substance abuse assessment with the
McLeod Center and tested positive for marijuana. The McLeod
Center recommended intensive outpatient substance abuse
treatment, but respondent failed to comply with this
recommendation. On or about 6 June 2011, respondent was
arrested for failing to appear in court for an assault charge.
Respondent placed the children with her cousin, T.W., and the
children have remained with T.W. since respondent’s arrest.
Respondent was in jail until 12 June 2011. After her release
from jail, respondent began counseling, but failed to engage in
any of the other recommended services.
On 13 October 2011, YFS filed a juvenile petition
alleging the children were neglected and dependent. On that
same date, YFS obtained nonsecure custody of the children. The
children remained in their placement with T.W.
On 8 December 2011, the trial court conducted adjudicatory
and dispositional hearings in this matter. The children were
adjudicated neglected and dependent. As part of her case plan,
respondent was ordered to have a Families in Recovery to Stay
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Together (“F.I.R.S.T.”) assessment; be assessed for domestic
violence and follow any recommendations; have a substance abuse
assessment and follow any recommendations; establish and
maintain stable housing; establish and maintain employment;
participate in parenting classes; visit with the children; and
maintain contact with YFS.
The trial court held review hearings on 31 January 2012, 12
April 2012, and 12 July 2012. Respondent had not made progress
on her case plan, and at the 12 July review hearing, the trial
court ceased reunification efforts.
The trial court held a permanency planning hearing on 31
August 2012, and the trial court ordered YFS to file a petition
to terminate parental rights. On 26 October 2012, YFS filed a
petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights. The hearing
was held on 18 April 2013, after which the trial court found
grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights. The
trial court also determined that termination of respondent’s
parental rights was in the best interests of the children and
entered an order terminating her parental rights. Respondent
appeals.
Discussion
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Respondent’s sole argument is that the trial court abused
its discretion in terminating her parental rights. Respondent
contends the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental
rights was not a reasoned decision because she will continue to
have contact with the children due to her familial relationship
with T.W.
After an adjudication that one or more
grounds for terminating a parent’s rights
exist, the court shall determine whether
terminating the parent's rights is in the
juvenile’s best interest. The court may
consider any evidence, including hearsay
evidence as defined in G.S. 8C-1, Rule 801,
that the court finds to be relevant,
reliable, and necessary to determine the
best interests of the juvenile. In each
case, the court shall consider the following
criteria and make written findings regarding
the following that are relevant:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the
juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of
parental rights will aid in the
accomplishment of the permanent plan
for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and
the parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship
between the juvenile and the proposed
adoptive parent, guardian, custodian,
or other permanent placement.
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(6) Any relevant consideration.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2013). “We review the trial
court’s decision to terminate parental rights for abuse of
discretion.” In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 98, 564 S.E.2d
599, 602 (2002). “A trial court may be reversed for abuse of
discretion only upon a showing that its actions are ‘manifestly
unsupported by reason.’” Davis v. Davis, 360 N.C. 518, 523, 631
S.E.2d 114, 118 (2006) (quoting Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123,
129, 271 S.E.2d 58, 63 (1980)).
In this case, the trial court made the following finding
with regard to disposition:
18. That the juveniles are in the same
placement, bonded with their relative
placement provider, [T.W.], and they are
thriving. The relative provider has
consistently met the needs of the juveniles
and is supportive. The juveniles are 4 and 2
years old. They have been in the custody
since October 2011. Prior to entering
custody they had been with [T.W.] and they
continue to remain in her care. [T.W.] has
provided appropriately for the care of the
juveniles ensuring their medical,
therapeutic and social needs are met. The
juveniles are enrolled in Thompson Child and
Development Center. [Celia] is functioning
and progressing for a child of her age. Her
medical and dental needs continue to be met
by [T.W.]. [Carl’s] medical and dental needs
also continue to be met by [T.W.]. However,
he has sensory issues that require him to
wear a special vest. Also, [Carl] has speech
issues and other issues that cause him to
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participate in a special inclusion program
at the Thompson Center. His needs are
significant enough where he has been given
the option to continue to receive services
at Thompson’s until he is in the 5th grade.
Thompson costs about $1,500 monthly for both
juveniles. It is in [Carl’s] best interest
to remain at this facility but there are
concerns regarding [T.W.’s] ability to pay
for this facility without continued
assistance from DSS. There is no information
regarding the income of her live-in partner
and the other 2 adult children in her home
and their ability to assist. [T.W.] and her
family have provided a loving, safe and
secure environment. The juveniles’ basic
needs have been met. The permanent plan for
the juveniles since July 2012 has been
adoption. In order to further that plan,
termination of parental rights is required
since the mother has not relinquished and
opposes her rights being terminated. [T.W.]
is willing to adopt but there are concerns
regarding her ability to pay for [Carl’s]
stay at Thompson Center. DSS is working with
her to explore options that will assist her
in being able to have [Carl] remain at
Thompson. With terminating the mother’s
rights, it is not foreseeable that it will
cut her out of the juveniles’ life. [T.W.]
is a relative; she has allowed the mother to
visit the juvenile[s] in her home during the
week and on weekends. [T.W.] has not shown
any indication that she plans to cut the
mother out of the juveniles’ lives.
Termination of parental rights is necessary
to further permanence for the juveniles.
The trial court’s finding clearly shows the court
considered the factors set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110. The
finding also shows the trial court considered that respondent
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would continue to have contact with the children due to her
relationship with T.W. Here, the trial court considered the
factors and made a reasoned determination that termination of
parental rights was necessary for the children’s further
permanence. “‘Although severing parental ties is a harsh
judicial remedy, the best interests of the children must be
considered paramount.’” In re Shepard, 162 N.C. App. 215, 221,
591 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2004) (quoting In re Adcock, 69 N.C. App. 222,
227, 316 S.E.2d 347, 350 (1984)). The trial court did not abuse
its discretion in terminating respondent’s parental rights. The
trial court’s order is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Judges BRYANT and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).