Huttig Building Products, Inc. v. McDonald

NO. COA13-1419
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 20 May 2014
HUTTIG BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC.,
Plaintiff
v. Wake County
No. 12 CVD 1235
ANGUS ALLAN MCDONALD, JR.,
Defendant
Appeal by defendant from order entered 13 August 2013 by
Judge Michael J. O’Foghludha in Wake County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 April 2014.
Smith, Debnam, Narron, Drake, Saintsing & Myers, LLP, by
Gerald H. Groon, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.
Robbins May & Rich, LLP, by P. Wayne Robbins and Neil T.
Oakley, for defendant-appellant.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Angus Allan McDonald, Jr. (“defendant”) appeals from the
trial court’s order which required Branch Banking and Trust
Company (“BB&T”) to release funds from defendant’s joint bank
accounts to Huttig Building Products, Inc. (“plaintiff”). We
dismiss the appeal.
On 10 May 2012, the Wake County District Court entered a
judgment in favor of plaintiff against defendant in the amount
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of $31,985.58 plus interest and attorney’s fees. On 5 November
2012, plaintiff filed a motion with the Wake County Clerk of
Superior Court (“the Clerk”) seeking, inter alia, an order
compelling BB&T to turn over any funds in its possession that
belonged to defendant to plaintiff’s counsel to be applied to
the judgment. On 8 January 2013, the Clerk entered an order
directing BB&T to release $9,089.69 from defendant’s various
accounts with BB&T to plaintiff, by and through its attorneys.
Defendant appealed the Clerk’s order to the Wake County
Superior Court. After a hearing, the trial court entered an
order directing BB&T to release the $9,089.60 in defendant’s
accounts to plaintiff, by and through its attorneys. Defendant
appeals.
Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred by ordering BB&T to release all of the funds from four
BB&T accounts that defendant held jointly with other family
members. Defendant contends that he “has no interest in the
BB&T accounts because [defendant]’s elderly mother and teenaged
children contributed all of the funds to the BB&T accounts.”
However, we are unable to consider defendant’s argument
because “only a ‘party aggrieved’ may appeal a trial court
order or judgment, and such a party is one whose rights have
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been directly or injuriously affected by the action of the
court.” Bailey v. State, 353 N.C. 142, 156, 540 S.E.2d 313, 322
(2000). If, as defendant has admitted, he has no interest in
the challenged funds, defendant likewise has no interest which
would allow him to appeal the trial court’s order. Defendant’s
rights were not directly or injuriously affected when the trial
court directed the BB&T funds, which defendant acknowledges he
did not own, to be turned over to plaintiff. Thus, he will
receive no benefit from a reversal of the trial court’s order.
Instead, the funds at issue would be restored to a nonparty1 and
defendant would remain liable to plaintiff for the portion of
his prior judgment that the BB&T funds were intended to satisfy.
In Langley v. Gore, 242 N.C. 302, 87 S.E.2d 519 (1955), the
appeal was “directed solely to the judgment of the court below
in respect to disposition of the fund of money in the hands of
the Clerk of Superior Court.” Id. at 303, 87 S.E.2d at 520.
The Court concluded that the defendant-appellants were not a
party aggrieved because there was
nothing in the record to show that
defendants have any interest in, or claim to
1
None of the individuals that defendant identified as the true
owners of the funds in the shared joint accounts at issue
attempted to intervene in the instant case. Additionally,
neither party made a motion to join these joint account holders
as necessary parties.
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[the funds at issue]. Indeed, defendants say
in their brief, filed on this appeal, that
they “did not claim the fund as theirs
personally.” They assert, however, reasons
why they think plaintiffs are not entitled
to the fund.
Id. Consequently, the Langley Court dismissed the appeal ex
mero motu.
In the instant case, defendant, like the defendants in
Langley, expressly disclaims any interest in the funds at issue
in this appeal and instead “assert[s] . . . reasons why [he]
think[s] plaintiff[ is] not entitled to the fund.” Id. Thus,
we are bound by Langley to conclude that defendant is not a
party aggrieved by the trial court’s order. Accordingly, we
lack jurisdiction to consider defendant’s challenges to the
court’s order and must dismiss defendant’s appeal. See Gaskins
v. Blount Fertilizer Co., 260 N.C. 191, 195, 132 S.E.2d 345, 347
(1963) (per curiam) (“Where a party is not aggrieved by the
judicial order entered . . . his appeal will be dismissed.”).
Dismissed.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge McGEE concur.