In re C.B.J.

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of App eals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of
A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e .
NO. COA13-985
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 4 February 2014
IN RE:
Wilkes County
No. 11 JT 56
C.B.J.
Appeal by respondent from order entered 3 June 2013 by
Judge Michael D. Duncan in Wilkes County District Court. Heard
in the Court of Appeals 13 January 2014.
Paul W. Freeman, Jr., for petitioner-appellee Wilkes County
Department of Social Services.
David A. Perez for respondent-appellant mother.
Louise M. Paglen for guardian ad litem.
BRYANT, Judge.
Where the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by
the evidence, and support its conclusion that grounds existed to
terminate parental rights, we will not disturb the trial court’s
ruling on appeal.
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Respondent-mother appeals from an order terminating her
parental rights to her son Chad.1 Chad was born in 2008 and, due
to the deplorable living conditions in which he was found
(“extremely cluttered, dirty, and roach infested” home), Chad
was adjudicated to be a neglected juvenile by order filed 9 June
2011. The Wilkes County Department of Social Services (“DSS”)
filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Chad’s
parents on 12 June 2012. The trial court conducted a hearing
upon the petition on 17 May 2013. Neither respondent nor Chad’s
father appeared for the hearing. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the trial court determined grounds existed to terminate
the parental rights of both parents pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (3) and (7). The trial court also
concluded that it was in Chad’s best interest for parental
rights to be terminated. The trial court terminated parental
rights and authorized DSS to complete the adoptive process.
Respondent appeals.2
__________________________
On appeal, respondent’s sole contention is that the trial
1
Chad is a pseudonym used to protect the identity of the
juvenile pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 3.1(b).
2
The order also terminated the parental rights of the juvenile’s
father, but he is not a party to this appeal.
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court erred and abused its discretion by finding it was in
Chad’s best interest to terminate her parental rights. We
disagree.
The standard of review in termination
of parental rights cases is whether the
findings of fact are supported by clear,
cogent and convincing evidence and whether
these findings, in turn, support the
conclusions of law. We then consider, based
on the grounds found for termination,
whether the trial court abused its
discretion in finding termination to be in
the best interest of the child.
In re Shepard, 162 N.C. App. 215, 221—22, 591 S.E.2d 1, 6 (2004)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). North Carolina General
Statutes, section 7B-1110(a), states that:
After an adjudication that one or more
grounds for terminating a parent’s rights
exist, the court shall determine whether
terminating the parent's rights is in the
juvenile’s best interest. The court may
consider any evidence, including hearsay
evidence as defined in G.S. 8C-1, Rule 801,
that the court finds to be relevant,
reliable, and necessary to determine the
best interests of the juvenile. In each
case, the court shall consider the following
criteria and make written findings regarding
the following that are relevant:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the
juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of
parental rights will aid in the
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accomplishment of the permanent
plan for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and
the parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship
between the juvenile and the
proposed adoptive parent,
guardian, custodian, or other
permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2013). In determining the best
interest of the child, a court may assign more weight to one or
more factors. In re C.L.C., 171 N.C. App. 438, 448, 615 S.E.2d
704, 709 (2005).
Here, the trial court made the following findings of fact
in determining whether termination of parental rights would be
in Chad’s best interest:
21. [Chad] has been in the care and custody
of the Wilkes County Department of Social
Services since he was approximately 2 years
and 11 months of age. He has been in his
current placement since he was approximately
3 years and 10 months of age. He is now 5
years old. Because of his age and the
length of separation from his parents,
[Chad] has no relationship with his
biological parents.
22. [Chad] is very bonded to his current
foster parents and their daughter. The
foster parents are also bonded to [Chad],
although as pointed out above, they do not
currently plan to adopt him.
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23. For dispositional purposes, the Court
admitted and considered the Guardian Ad
Litem’s report. From this report and the
testimony of the Social Worker, the Court
finds that [Chad] is adoptable, despite his
behavior issues; and that [Chad’s] behaviors
do not pose a barrier to the child’s
adoption.
24. Given the child’s age, the Court finds
that there is a likelihood that [Chad] will
be adopted; and that termination of parental
rights will aid in the accomplishment of
this adoption. Adoption has been approved
as part of a concurrent Plan in the
underlying juvenile proceeding.
Respondent challenges the trial court’s findings that Chad
is adoptable and is likely to be adopted despite his behavioral
issues. She argues these findings are not supported by
evidence. She also submits the trial court improperly
considered the bond between Chad and his current foster parents
because the relevant consideration under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a)(5) is the relationship between the child and a proposed
adoptive parent or permanent placement.
Findings of fact are binding “where there is some evidence
to support those findings, even though the evidence might
sustain findings to the contrary.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C.
101, 110—11, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252—53 (1984). The trial court
“may consider any evidence, including hearsay evidence . . .
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that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to
determine the best interests of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a).
The report of the guardian ad litem indicates that Chad “is
young and very adoptable”; that the parental rights of his
parents “need to be terminated in order for him to be legally
free for adoption”; and that a “potential adoptive home” should
be located for him “as soon as possible.” The social worker
testified that although Chad’s behavioral issues would make
adoption “difficult,” he is “not the first child that we’ve had
in our care that’s had behavioral or emotional issues” and that
adoptive placements have been found “[f]airly routinely” for
those children. She also testified that Chad has a great
relationship and gets along well with his current foster
parents.
We conclude the foregoing evidence supports the trial
court’s findings that it was in Chad’s best interest to
terminate the parental rights of his parents. The fact that
Chad is able to form a strong relationship with his foster
parents is a relevant consideration as it indicates he has the
ability to bond and form a relationship with a prospective
adoptive family when one is located. Accordingly, the trial
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court did not abuse its discretion in terminating respondent’s
parental rights.
Affirmed.
Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).