Azige v. Holy Trinity Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo ChurchÂ

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA15-760
Filed: 6 September 2016
Mecklenburg County, No. 14-CVS-5590
ANIMAW AZIGE, TEWODROS ABEBE, MESERET TEFERA, ZENASH ABEY,
TADESE GEBREGIORGIS, DAWIT GETAHUN, EDOM A. GERU, AZEMERAWU
GETANEH, TSIGE KIBRET, TEWODROSE G. TIRFE, HAILU AFRO,
MEQUANINT TSEGAW, ZEBENE MESELE, MEAZA JEMBERE, NIGATU KASSA,
ALMAZ MEKONEN, ASTER MLES, ADDISU FENTAHUM AYALWE, ASKALE
YESHANEW, and HAIMONOT GEDAMU, Plaintiffs,
v.
HOLY TRINITY ETHIOPIAN ORTHODOX TEWAHDO CHURCH, SOLOMON
GUGSA, LULESEGED DERIBE, TESFA GASHAREBA, SAMUEL AGONAFER,
SAMSON KASSAYE, GEDEWON KASSA, YOHANNES ASSEFA, TASSEW
KASSAHUN, and EYOEL MULUGETA, Defendants.
Appeal by defendants from order entered 5 January 2015 by Judge Robert C.
Ervin Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Court of Appeals on 17
December 2015.
Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, PC, by Joseph L. Nelson and John T. Holden, for
plaintiff-appellees.
Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., by Julian H. Wright, Jr. and Matthew F.
Tilley, for defendant-appellant Tassew Kassahun.
Essex Richards, P.A., by N. Renee Hughes, and the Lewis Firm, PLLC, by Earl
N. “Trey” Mayfield, III pro hac vice, for defendant-appellants.
STROUD, Judge.
AZIGE V. HOLY TRINITY ETHIOPIAN ORTHODOX TEWAHDO CHURCH
Opinion of the Court
Defendants appeal from the trial court’s order denying their motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, defendants argue that the trial
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims because exercising
jurisdiction would require the court to address ecclesiastical matters in contravention
of the First Amendment of the United States Constitutions and Article 1, Section 13
of the North Carolina Constitution. After review, we reverse the trial court’s order
because judicial involvement would impermissibly entangle the judicial system in
ecclesiastical matters. We remand the case to the trial court with instructions for the
court to enter an order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
I. Background
The Holy Trinity Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo Church (“Holy Trinity”) was
founded in Charlotte, North Carolina in 1999. Holy Trinity is a non-profit
organization and is governed by a parish council which is responsible for the day-to-
day operation of church affairs. In 2007, Holy Trinity amended its constitution and
bylaws. The amended bylaws provided:
10.6 The term of the members of the Parish Council will
be two years. However, in order to ensure continuity
and momentum in leadership, for the first Parish
Council elected after the adoption of these by-laws
only, the five members of the Executive Committee,
as elected by the full Parish Council will serve for
three years. Following this “bridge” term; all other
successive terms will be limited to two years.
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Opinion of the Court
10.7 A Registered Member is eligible to serve two
consecutive terms. In order to be eligible to serve
again, a full term (two years) must elapse.
Thereafter various disputes arose in Holy Trinity, including disagreements about the
termination of a priest, and at a meeting held in March of 2014 it was determined
that “the current parish council were granted at least a one year and six months
extension” to address “the turmoil situations [(sic)] created by few individuals who
support the terminated priest.”
In November of 2014, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against Holy
Trinity and defendants, the parish council members. Plaintiffs alleged that they are
all registered members of Holy Trinity and requested a declaratory judgment that
numerous violations of the bylaws had occurred including: “the 2012 election[,]”
improperly extended terms of certain parish council members, the process of adopting
“the purported March 16, 2014 amendment[,]” and improperly transferred real
property. Furthermore, defendants had excluded plaintiffs as registered members of
the church, though again, plaintiffs claim they are registered members of the church.
On 1 December 2014, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. On 5 January 2015, the trial court denied defendants’ motion.
Defendants appeal.
II. Interlocutory Appeal
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AZIGE V. HOLY TRINITY ETHIOPIAN ORTHODOX TEWAHDO CHURCH
Opinion of the Court
Defendants concede that this appeal is interlocutory; however, defendants
argue that it “affects their substantial First Amendment rights and will cause injury
if not corrected prior to final judgment.” Our Supreme Court has recognized that
[t]he United States Supreme Court has found First
Amendment rights to be substantial, and has held the First
Amendment prevents courts from becoming entangled in
internal church governance concerning ecclesiastical
matters. When First Amendment rights are asserted, this
Court has allowed appeals from interlocutory orders.
Accordingly, we reaffirm our stance that First Amendment
rights are implicated when a party asserts that a civil court
action cannot proceed without impermissibly entangling
the court in ecclesiastical matters.
....
. . . The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury.
Harris v. Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 269-70, 643 S.E.2d 566, 569 (2007) (citations and
quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we will consider defendants’ appeal.
III. Motion to Dismiss
Defendants argue that the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction in this case will
impermissibly entangle the court in ecclesiastical matters in contravention of the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the
North Carolina Constitution. “We review Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction de novo[.]” Id. at 271, 643 S.E.2d at 569.
The First Amendment of the United
States Constitution prohibits a civil court
from becoming entangled in ecclesiastical
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AZIGE V. HOLY TRINITY ETHIOPIAN ORTHODOX TEWAHDO CHURCH
Opinion of the Court
matters. However, not every dispute
involving church property implicates
ecclesiastical matters. Thus, while
circumscribing a court’s authority to resolve
internal church disputes, the First
Amendment does not provide religious
organizations absolute immunity from civil
liability.
As such, our Courts may resolve disputes through
neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property
disputes. The dispositive question is whether resolution of
the legal claim requires the court to interpret or weigh
church doctrine.
Davis v. Williams, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 774 S.E.2d 889, 892 (2015) (emphasis
added) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Harris v. Matthews, 361 N.C.
265, 271–72, 643 S.E.2d 566, 570 (2007) (“First Amendment values are plainly
jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil
courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice. Civil court intervention
into church property disputes is proper only when relationships involving church
property have been structured so as not to require the civil courts to resolve
ecclesiastical questions. When a congregational church’s internal property dispute
cannot be resolved using neutral principles of law, the courts must intrude no further
and must instead defer to the decisions by a majority of its members or by such other
local organism as it may have instituted for the purpose of ecclesiastical government.”
(citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted)).
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AZIGE V. HOLY TRINITY ETHIOPIAN ORTHODOX TEWAHDO CHURCH
Opinion of the Court
Plaintiffs contend that “[t]he only issue before this Court is whether the trial
court has subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether the Church followed its own
bylaws.” Although plaintiffs seek to present this dispute as a simple procedural
disagreement over the adoption of bylaws in accord with proper procedure, the
substance of the complaint belies this claim. The amended complaint alleges that
each plaintiff is “a registered member” of the church; defendants dispute their
membership. Although defendants moved for dismissal without filing an answer, an
affidavit filed by defendants alleges that “Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the
requirements for Church membership.” Although plaintiffs raise other claims
regarding the governance of the church, even they implicitly concede their standing
to challenge the defendants’ actions depends upon their status as registered
members.1
While we realize plaintiffs’ amended complaint supersedes the original
complaint, see Hyder v. Dergance, 76 N.C. App. 317, 319, 332 S.E.2d 713, 714 (1985)
(noting the “general principle that an amended complaint has the effect of
superseding the original complaint.”), the background of this case in the record before
us is still relevant to this jurisdictional inquiry, and in plaintiffs’ original complaint
they requested “a declaratory judgment pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1- 253, et. seq.
1 Though standing was not the basis of the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs spend approximately
two pages of their thirteen page brief to address that “as registered members, appellants [(sic)] have
standing to maintain their suit.” (Original in all caps.)
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AZIGE V. HOLY TRINITY ETHIOPIAN ORTHODOX TEWAHDO CHURCH
Opinion of the Court
stating that they are all registered members of the Church, can participate in worship
at the church, and that the purported attempt to ban them from the premises violates
the Church’s bylaws and is void.” Plaintiffs’ amended complaint omits this request
and subsumes the membership issue in the following allegation:
33. As registered members of the Church, Plaintiffs[]
have a cognizable civic, contract, and property
interest in the operation of the Church and whether
the Parish Council has acted within the scope of its
authority and followed the Church’s bylaws.
But even considering only the amended complaint, this case does not appear
to be primarily a property dispute or a dispute regarding misappropriation of funds,
as many of the cases arising out of church disputes are, see, e.g., Davis, ___ N.C. App.
at___, 774 S.E.2d at 891 (including allegations of “wrongfully converted church funds
for personal use, and embezzled from the church”); Johnson v. Antioch United Holy
Church, Inc., 214 N.C. App. 507, 508, 714 S.E.2d 806, 809 (2011) (including
allegations of “wasted . . . property and . . . transactions prohibited by the Internal
Revenue Code”), but instead plaintiffs’ allegations are focused upon the actual
governance of the church and their right as members to participate fully in the
church.2 Plaintiffs’ status as registered members and right as members in good
standing to vote are thus central to this action.
2 Plaintiffs did object to a real property transaction, but this transaction does not seem to be
the primary focus of the complaint. The main focus of this complaint is that the proper percentage of
the total registered members did not participate in the vote, but again, the correct number depends
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AZIGE V. HOLY TRINITY ETHIOPIAN ORTHODOX TEWAHDO CHURCH
Opinion of the Court
Our courts have defined an ecclesiastical matter as:
one which concerns doctrine, creed, or form of
worship of the church, or the adoption and
enforcement within a religious association of
needful laws and regulations for the
government of membership, and the power of
excluding from such associations those
deemed unworthy of membership by the
legally constituted authorities of the church;
and all such matters are within the province
of church courts and their decisions will be
respected by civil tribunals.
Membership in a church is a core ecclesiastical
matter. The power to control church membership is
ultimately the power to control the church. It is an area
where the courts of this State should not become involved.
This stricture applies regardless of whether the church is
a congregational church, incorporated or unincorporated,
or an hierarchical church.
The prohibition on judicial cognizance of
ecclesiastical disputes is founded upon both
establishment and free exercise clause
concerns. By adjudicating religious disputes,
civil courts risk affecting associational
conduct and thereby chilling the free exercise
of religious beliefs. Moreover, by entering
into a religious controversy and putting the
enforcement power of the state behind a
particular religious faction, a civil court risks
establishing a religion.
Tubiolo v. Abundant Life Church, Inc., 167 N.C. App. 324, 327–28, 605 S.E.2d 161,
163–64 (2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs rely primarily upon Johnson in arguing that this case does not
on the total number of registered members who are qualified to vote. Defendants do not count plaintiffs
as registered members.
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Opinion of the Court
require inquiry into ecclesiastical matters. But the dispute in Johnson related to “a
number of violations of the North Carolina Nonprofit Corporation Act and intentional
infliction of emotional distress[.]” 214 N.C. App. at 508, 714 S.E.2d at 808. As we
noted, Johnson arose in part, as many church cases do, out of a real property dispute.
214 N.C. App. at 508, 714 S.E.2d at 809. In Johnson, this Court specifically noted
that in that case “[w]hether Defendants’ actions were authorized by the bylaws of the
church in no way implicates an impermissible analysis by the court based on religious
doctrine or practice.” Id. at 511, 714 S.E.2d at 810. The Court in Johnson ultimately
determined that it could address “the very narrow” issues in that case based upon
Tubiolo:
In Tubiolo, we recognized that membership in a
church is a core ecclesiastical matter. However, we also
recognized that an individual’s membership in a church is
a form of a property interest. Accordingly, it was proper for
a court to address the very narrow issue of whether the
plaintiffs’ membership was terminated in accordance with
the church’s bylaws—whether bylaws had been adopted by
the church, and whether those individuals who signed a
letter revoking the plaintiffs’ membership had the
authority to do so. In the present case, the trial court is
therefore not prohibited by the First Amendment from
addressing Plaintiffs’ first claim.
Johnson, 214 N.C. App. at 512, 714 S.E.2d at 811 (citations, quotation marks, and
brackets omitted).
This case is both factually and legally different from Johnson. See id., 214 N.C.
App. 507, 714 S.E.2d 806. The issues before us would require interpretation of the
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AZIGE V. HOLY TRINITY ETHIOPIAN ORTHODOX TEWAHDO CHURCH
Opinion of the Court
bylaws which do impose doctrinal requirements. Even if a declaration of plaintiffs’
status as registered members is not specifically the issue before us, in order to
determine if plaintiffs even have standing to bring the other issues or to determine if
the correct number of members voted for the challenged amendments, the trial court
would need to address the contested membership status, which is governed by the
bylaws:
5.1 Membership
Without limitation to age, any individual member of a
household who believes that our Lord Jesus Christ is the
Savior and has been baptized into the Orthodox Tewahdo
Church will have the right to be registered as a member of
Holy Trinity. Any such member who is 18 years old or older
and meets the following criteria will be eligible to exercise
an additional right to vote on Church matters requiring a
vote:
5.1.1 Unless extenuating circumstances dictate,
frequently attends Church services and diligently
works to promote the mission of HTEOTC;
5.1.2 Contributes financially to support the services of the
Church according to his/her means;
5.1.3 Complies with these by-laws and related
directives[.]
(Emphasis added.)
The bylaws also impose additional requirements upon members, including
specific duties which include the following:
6.2.1 Unless extenuating circumstances dictate,
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AZIGE V. HOLY TRINITY ETHIOPIAN ORTHODOX TEWAHDO CHURCH
Opinion of the Court
Registered Members are expected to fulfill the
financial obligation they agreed to.
6.2.2 Although all functions and roles within the Church
are voluntary in nature, members are expected to
show their support and participation and support of
Church activities when requested.
6.2.3 Each member will have the duty to accept these by-
laws of the Church and to be bound by all provision
contained herein.
6.2.4 When on Church property, each member is strictly
prohibited from initiating on [(sic)] taking part in
any disruptive or divisive action or language that
adversely affects the unity and cohesion of the
Church’s community.
6.2.5 Although Registered Members have the right to offer
their perspective and participate in discussions
during general member meetings, they are required
to control their language and mannerisms to ensure
that it they are respectful and considerate of the
other members present. Accordingly, all listening
members should respect any perspective offered by
a member and treat them with respect and free from
any pressure or intimidation. Member discussions
will not be counter to the by-laws of the Church.
Even assuming for purposes of argument that plaintiffs are registered
members, Article 5.1 imposes additional requirements even for registered members
to have the right to vote “on Church matters requiring a vote” and these requirements
raise ecclesiastical questions. Plaintiff requested a declaratory judgment
determining that “the Parish Council did not comply with Article 17 of the Church’s
bylaws.” Article 17, regarding elections, requires those who “participate in electing
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AZIGE V. HOLY TRINITY ETHIOPIAN ORTHODOX TEWAHDO CHURCH
Opinion of the Court
or to be elected” to “meet the eligibility criteria for Registered Member[s,]” which
again requires consideration of various requirements of the bylaws, including
whether the individual “diligently works to promote the mission of HTEOTC[.]”
Plaintiffs also request the trial court to determine that defendants had not complied
with Article 18 regarding meetings and Article 20 regarding amendments; again,
both these articles include sections limiting participation to registered members.
Plaintiffs also request the trial court to find violations of Article 7 regarding
termination of membership and Article 19 regarding a transfer of property. Article 7
addresses whether a Registered Member has “engage[d] in misconduct or immoral
behavior” and Article 19 allows for the transfer of property if it “provide[s] service to
the growing membership and its needs.” The courts cannot determine the “immoral
behavior” of plaintiffs for purposes of the bylaws nor can the courts evaluate whether
a particular transaction serves the needs of the membership of this church without
involvement in ecclesiastical matters. In summary, plaintiffs’ claims cannot be
adjudicated in the judicial system as they raise questions which go far beyond the
consideration of “neutral principles of law” and would “require[] the court to interpret
or weigh church doctrine” in contravention of the First Amendment. Davis, ___ N.C.
App. at___, 774 S.E.2d at 892 (2015).
IV. Conclusion
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AZIGE V. HOLY TRINITY ETHIOPIAN ORTHODOX TEWAHDO CHURCH
Opinion of the Court
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s denial of defendants’
motion to dismiss.
REVERSED.
Judges DIETZ and TYSON concur.
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