The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. McCroryÂ

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA16-725
Filed: 20 December 2016
Wake County, No. 15 CVS 9591
THE NEWS AND OBSERVER PUBLISHING COMPANY, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
PAT McCRORY, as Governor of North Carolina, et al., Defendants.1
Appeal by Defendants from order entered 29 April 2016 by Judge John O.
Craig, III in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 November
2016.
Southern Environmental Law Center, by Kimberley Hunter and Douglas
William Hendrick; Stevens Martin Vaughn & Tadych, PLLC, by Hugh Stevens,
C. Amanda Martin, and Michael J. Tadych; and North Carolina Justice
Center, by Carlene McNulty, for Plaintiffs.
Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., by David C. Wright, III and Erik R.
Zimmerman; and Robert F. Orr, for Defendants; Office of General Counsel, by
General Counsel Robert C. Stephens, Jr., Deputy General Counsel Jonathan R.
Harris, and Deputy General Counsel Lindsey E. Wakeley, for Defendant
McCrory.
STEPHENS, Judge.
1 Per the custom of this Court, we style the caption of our opinion exactly as it appears in the order
from which the appeal is taken. In this matter, while Plaintiffs’ amended complaint and some other
pleadings in the record on appeal list all of the parties, the order from which Defendants appeal does
not.
THE NEWS & OBSERVER PUBL’G CO. V. MCCRORY
Opinion of the Court
This appeal arises from a partial grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor
of Plaintiffs. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, or, in the alternative, that Plaintiffs’ claims are either precluded
under the principles of declaratory and mandamus relief in this State, or are moot.
In light of our well-established precedent regarding interlocutory appeals, only
Defendants’ sovereign immunity contentions could provide them a path to immediate
appellate review. However, because the record in this matter reveals that Defendants
did not properly plead or argue sovereign immunity in the trial court, we dismiss this
appeal as not properly before us.
Factual and Procedural Background
Although we do not reach the merits of this interlocutory appeal, a brief review
of the origins of the case provides helpful context in understanding this matter of
significant public import. Defendants Pat McCrory, as Governor of North Carolina;
John E. Skvarla, II, as Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Commerce;
Donald R. van der Vaart, as Secretary of the North Carolina Department of
Environment and Natural Resources; Dr. Aldona Z. Wos, as Secretary of the North
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services; Frank L. Perry, as Secretary of
the North Carolina Department of Public Safety; William G. Daughtridge, Jr., as
Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Administration; Anthony J. Tata, as
Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Transportation; Susan W. Kluttz, as
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Opinion of the Court
Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources; and Lyons Gray,
as Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Revenue (collectively, “the
Administration”) are our State’s governor and his appointees, either currently or
formerly2 serving as the heads of various State agencies. Plaintiffs The News and
Observer Publishing Company (“N&O”); The Charlotte Observer Publishing
Company (“The Observer”); Capitol Broadcasting Company, Incorporated (“WRAL”);
Boney Publishers d/b/a The Alamance News; ZM INDY, Inc. d/b/a Indy Week (“Indy”);
and Media General Operations, Inc., are media entities that provide news services to
the citizens of our State via print and online newspapers, broadcast television
stations, and online news websites. Plaintiffs The Southern Environmental Law
Center (“SELC”) and The North Carolina Justice Center d/b/a NC Policy Watch are
not-for-profit corporations chartered in our State that, inter alia, seek to inform the
public about various matters of public concern and to advocate for policies that they
believe will benefit the people and environment of North Carolina.
As part of their regular activities, Plaintiffs frequently make requests for
access to and copies of government documents, records, and other information
2 Some of the named Defendants have left the Administration since the commencement of this lawsuit.
As of the date this opinion is filed, McCrory, Skvarla, van der Vaart, Perry, and Kluttz are still serving
in their positions, while Vos, Daughtridge, Tata, and Gray have been replaced. Rick Brajer is the
current Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, Kathryn Johnston is the current
Secretary of the Department of Administration, Nick Tennyson is the current Secretary of the
Department of Transportation, and Jeff Epstein is the current Secretary of the North Carolina
Department of Revenue.
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pursuant to our State’s Public Records Act (“the Act”). See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1(b)
(2015) (providing that, because “public records and public information compiled by
the agencies of [our] government . . . are the property of the people[,] . . . . it is the
policy of this State that the people may obtain copies of their public records and public
information free or at minimal cost unless otherwise specifically provided by law”).
Each Defendant, in his or her official capacity, is a public “agency” as defined in the
Act and a custodian of public records under the Act. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1(a).
The essence of Plaintiffs’ claims is that, since Defendant McCrory took office in
January 2013, the Administration has implemented policies and procedures in order
to frustrate the purpose of the Act by (1) intentionally delaying or wrongfully denying
access to public records so that Plaintiffs cannot provide timely and thorough
information to the public about the Administration’s decisions, actions, and policies,
and (2) imposing or requesting unreasonable and unjustified fees and charges in
connection with requests made under the Act.
Plaintiffs allege several examples of the Administration’s delaying tactics,
including, inter alia:
●That Indy requested copies of Defendant McCrory’s travel
records on 8 November 2013, spent the next 17 months
narrowing and refining the scope of its request, engaged an
attorney to pursue the request, and yet still received no
records until 13 March 2015, when redacted records were
turned over with no explanation then or now regarding the
redactions.
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●That WRAL requested travel records from Defendant
McCrory in February 2015, but had not received the
records as of July 2015.
●That N&O requested certain correspondence between
members of the Administration regarding the State’s sale
of the Dorothea Dix property to the City of Raleigh in July
2014, but received no records until 9 June 2015. N&O’s
subsequent request for additional records connected to the
Dix sale has resulted in no records being turned over.
WRAL requested similar records in October 2014 but also
received no records until 9 June 2015.
●That SELC requested records from the Department of
Transportation about a possible expansion of Interstate 77
to include High Occupancy Toll (“HOT”) lanes in January
2014 and did not receive records until May 2015—after a
contract to construct the HOT lanes had already been
signed.
●That WRAL requested email from Defendant McCrory’s
office related to the proposed move of the State Bureau of
Investigation from the Office of the Attorney General in
May 2014, but the request was not fulfilled until June
2015, after WRAL threatened litigation over the
Administration’s nonresponse.
●That NC Policy Watch submitted a public records request
in August 2013 to the North Carolina Department of
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) for records related to
a departmental salary freeze and certain subsequent
salary increases, but these records have never been
provided.
●That The Observer requested a database from the Office
of the State Medical Examiner (“OSME”)—part of HHS—
that included information compiled by the OSME about
every death investigated by medical examiners since 2001,
and, in response, HHS provided inaccurate and incomplete
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data, only turning over the complete database after a one-
year delay and threats of legal action.
●That The Alamance News requested records from the
Department of Commerce on 11 July 2014 related to
certain economic development projects in Alamance and
Orange counties, but no records were received as of July
2015.
On 21 July 2015, Plaintiffs commenced this action by the filing of a complaint
and issuance of summonses in Wake County Superior Court. Plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint (“the Complaint”) on 22 July 2015. The Complaint seeks entry
of orders (1) “in the nature of a writ of mandamus requiring [the Administration] to
comply” with the Act; (2) compelling the Administration to provide any public records
requested under the Act, but not yet provided; (3) declaring that certain of the
Administration’s policies and procedures violate the Act; (4) declaring that, under the
Act, the Administration may not collect fees for inspection of public records absent a
request for copies of the records; and (5) awarding reasonable attorney fees as
permitted under the Act. The Administration filed its answer on 25 September 2015,
and, on 17 February 2016, moved for partial judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c) (2015). On 26
February 2016, Plaintiffs moved for partial judgment on the pleadings and to compel
discovery. The motions came on for hearing at the 23 March 2016 session of Wake
County Superior Court, the Honorable John O. Craig, III, Judge presiding.
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Opinion of the Court
By order entered 29 April 2016 (“the order”), the trial court denied in part and
granted in part the Administration’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings,
granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery, and postponed ruling on
Plaintiffs’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. Specifically, the trial court
dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims “pertaining to any public records requests made by any
persons other than Plaintiffs . . . to Defendants named” in the complaint, but denied
the Administration’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief under
the Act, and relief in the nature of a writ of mandamus with regard to public records
requests “that have not yet been acted upon in whole or in part”—that is, where the
Administration has not yet produced requested public records. The court also denied
the Administration’s motion to dismiss “to the extent [it] attempt[ed] to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ claims on grounds that the General Assembly did not authorize Plaintiffs
to assert such claims against [the Administration], including as set forth particularly
in the sovereign immunity discussion in Nat Harrison Assocs., Inc. v. North Carolina
State Ports Authority, 280 N.C. 251, 258 (1972) and related cases.”3 In connection
with this portion of its ruling, the court noted that, while “the procedures and
remedies prescribed by [the Act] are exclusive[,] . . . . a request for declaratory relief
appears to be the best, if not the only, procedural method [by] which the provisions of
[the Act] can be interpreted and construed.” Finally, the trial court denied the
3 The meaning and effect of this portion of the order is discussed in greater detail infra.
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Opinion of the Court
motions of both parties with regard to Plaintiffs’ claims that the Act does not permit
the assessment of special service fees where only inspection of public records—rather
than copies of the records—is sought.4
On 3 May 2016, four days after the order was filed, the trial court advised
counsel for Plaintiffs and the Administration that it was considering filing a
supplemental order to clarify that any issue regarding sovereign immunity would not
be ruled upon at that time and requesting that the Administration refrain from filing
a notice of appeal until the supplemental order could be filed. On 5 May 2016, the
trial court provided Plaintiffs and the Administration with a draft of its supplemental
order which clarified that the issue of sovereign immunity had not been properly
raised in the trial court. The following morning, the Administration gave written
notice of appeal from the order. On 12 May 2016, the Administration filed in the trial
court a motion to stay proceedings pending appeal.
On the same day the Administration moved for a stay, the trial court filed its
supplemental order denying the Administration’s motion for a stay and seeking “to
clarify [the order] by modifying a specific portion of said order to reflect the [c]ourt’s
original intent, as well as to clarify the [c]ourt’s position as to a recent defense
asserted by the” Administration. Specifically, the supplemental order stated:
4 Thus, the record reflects that the trial court did not postpone ruling on all aspects of Plaintiffs’ motion
for partial judgment on the pleadings, having denied the motion in regard to the special service charge
“[a]t this juncture . . . .”
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Opinion of the Court
Paragraph One of the [o]rder denied a portion of the
[Administration’s] motion for judgment on the pleadings,
insofar as it pertained to the defense of sovereign
immunity, but stated that the question of sovereign
immunity could be revisited after completion of the limited
discovery permitted in the [o]rder. Upon further reflection,
the [c]ourt stated in an email to counsel for the parties, on
May 3, 2016, that it would have been more appropriate to
take the matter under advisement during the pendency of
discovery, rather than characterizing the matter as a
provisional denial. However, after conducting additional
research, the [c]ourt finds it would be inaccurate to
consider the matter as “under advisement” and that the
defense of sovereign immunity is not yet ripe for the
[c]ourt’s consideration [because] . . . .
. . . . while the [Administration] reserved the right “to
assert additional affirmative defenses as discovery
warrants and to the extent permitted by law” in their
Answer . . . , they have not filed a motion to amend their
Answer under Rule 15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
North Carolina case law is clear that sovereign immunity
must be raised as an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) of
the Rules. . . . The [c]ourt is aware of the line of appellate
cases which hold that the defense of sovereign immunity is
more than a mere affirmative defense, as it shields a
defendant entirely from having to answer for its conduct at
all in a civil suit. . . . But the action before this [c]ourt is
one in which the North Carolina General Assembly has
expressly waived sovereign immunity . . . . The
[Administration is] decidedly not immune from an action
brought under [Section] 132-9. If this [c]ourt ultimately
finds sovereign immunity to be applicable concerning
certain pleadings raised by [P]laintiffs (e.g., because
Chapter 132 does not waive sovereign immunity in such a
fashion), the defense would only narrowly apply to a mere
portion of the Plaintiffs’ [c]omplaint. . . . When combined
with the [Administration’s] decision not to raise the
defense of sovereign immunity via a motion to amend their
Answer up to this point, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that
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an appeal is premature and that discovery should go
forward.
(Emphasis added). Thus, in addition to denying the Administration’s motion to stay
discovery pending resolution of this appeal, the supplemental order sought to either
“clarify” or “modify” the order to explain there was no trial court ruling on sovereign
immunity because the trial court did not believe that the Administration had properly
raised that matter.
Grounds for Appellate Review
All parties agree that this appeal is interlocutory. “An interlocutory order is
one made during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but
leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire
controversy.” Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381
(citation omitted), reh’g denied, 232 N.C. 744, 59 S.E.2d 429 (1950). “Generally, there
is no right of immediate appeal from interlocutory orders and judgments.” Goldston
v. Am. Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 725, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990). “However, N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 1-277 . . . allows a party to immediately appeal an order that either (1)
affects a substantial right or (2) constitutes an adverse ruling as to personal
jurisdiction.” Can Am S., LLC v. State, 234 N.C. App. 119, 122, 759 S.E.2d 304, 307,
disc. review denied, 367 N.C. 791, 766 S.E.2d 624 (2014).
As appellant, it is the Administration’s burden to establish an exception that
will permit immediate review of the order. See Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture,
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115 N.C. App. 377, 380, 444 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1994) (“It is not the duty of this Court
to construct arguments for or find support for appellant’s right to appeal from an
interlocutory order; instead, the appellant has the burden of showing this Court that
the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be jeopardized
absent a review prior to a final determination on the merits.”) (citations omitted).
The only basis for immediate appellate review asserted by the Administration is that
the order involved a ruling on a claim of sovereign immunity. An interlocutory order
ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) based upon
“sovereign immunity affects a substantial right and warrants immediate appellate
review.” Webb v. Nicholson, 178 N.C. App. 362, 363, 634 S.E.2d 545, 546 (2006)
(citation omitted).
This aspect of our State’s jurisprudence is clear: in an appeal from an
interlocutory order denying a Rule 12 (c) motion based upon sovereign immunity, this
Court may reach the merits of arguments grounded in sovereign immunity5 where
that issue was properly pled and argued in the trial court. Our review of the record
5 “[I]n most immunity-related interlocutory appeals, we have declined requests that we consider
additional non-immunity-related issues on the merits.” Bynum v. Wilson Cty., 228 N.C. App. 1, 7, 746
S.E.2d 296, 300 (2013) (citing Green v. Kearney, 203 N.C. App. 260, 266, 690 S.E.2d 755, 764-65 (2010);
Meherrin Indian Tribe v. Lewis, 197 N.C. App. 380, 384-85, 677 S.E.2d 203, 207-08 (2009), disc. review
denied, 363 N.C. 806, 690 S.E.2d 705 (2010); Boyd v. Robeson Cty., 169 N.C. App. 460, 464-65, 621
S.E.2d 1, 4, disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 629, 615 S.E.2d 866 (2005)), rev’d in part on other grounds,
367 N.C. 355, 758 S.E.2d 643 (2014).
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here reveals that the Administration did neither in this case, and, accordingly, we
dismiss this appeal.
I. When and how sovereign immunity must be raised in the trial court
Our Supreme Court has held that sovereign immunity “is more than a mere
affirmative defense, as it shields a defendant entirely from having to answer for its
conduct at all in a civil suit . . . .” Craig v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C.
334, 337, 678 S.E.2d 351, 354 (2009) (citation omitted).
It is an established principle of jurisprudence, resting on
grounds of sound public policy, that a state may not be sued
in its own courts or elsewhere unless it has consented by
statute to be sued or has otherwise waived its immunity
from suit. By application of this principle, a subordinate
division of the state or an agency exercising statutory
governmental functions may be sued only when and as
authorized by statute.
Can Am S., LLC, 234 N.C. App. at 125, 759 S.E.2d at 309 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). As the Administration concedes, “[o]rdinarily, the failure
to plead an affirmative defense results in a waiver [of that defense] unless the parties
agree to try the issue by express or implied consent.” Burwell v. Giant Genie Corp.,
115 N.C. App. 680, 684, 446 S.E.2d 126, 129 (1994) (citation omitted); see also N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 8(c) (2015); see also Forbes v. Par Ten Group, Inc., 99 N.C.
App. 587, 598, 394 S.E.2d 643, 649 (1990) (noting that “failure to plead [an affirmative
defense] is a bar to this issue being raised on appeal”) (citation omitted), disc. review
denied, 328 N.C. 89, 402 S.E.2d 824 (1991). The Administration did not plead
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sovereign immunity in its answer6 and does not contend that Plaintiffs agreed—
either implicitly or explicitly—to try the issue of sovereign immunity by consent.
Instead, the Administration cites case law holding that, although “the better
practice [is] to require a formal amendment to the pleadings[,]” generally, “unpleaded
defenses, when raised by the evidence, should be considered in resolving a motion for
summary judgment[,]” N.C. Nat’l Bank v. Gillespie, 291 N.C. 303, 306, 230 S.E.2d
375, 377 (1976), and specifically, that an unpled defense of sovereign immunity
should be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment where “both parties
knew or should have known that an action against a governmental entity . . . raises
a question of sovereign immunity.” Mullis v. Sechrest, 126 N.C. App. 91, 96, 484
S.E.2d 423, 426 (1997) (citing Dickens v. Puryear, 45 N.C. App. 696, 698, 263 S.E.2d
856, 857-58, rev’d in part on other grounds, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981)),
6 At oral argument before this Court, the Administration observed that sovereign immunity may be
raised via Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and noted that its answer stated as an affirmative defense
that Plaintiffs “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-
1, Rule 12(b)(6) (2015). However, the Administration did not mention sovereign immunity as the basis
for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal in its answer, in its motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, or
during oral argument at the motion hearing. Accordingly, case law permitting immediate appellate
review of interlocutory Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals based upon sovereign immunity claims is inapplicable
here. See Murray v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, __ N.C. App. __, __, 782 S.E.2d 531, 536 (“[A]lthough
[the] defendant’s motion to dismiss referred to Rule 12(b)(6) as well as Rule 12(b)(1), the motion did
not mention sovereign immunity. During the oral argument, where [the] defendant raised the
sovereign immunity doctrine for the first time, [the] defendant relied only on Rules 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(2) in arguing that the complaint was barred by sovereign immunity and did not rely upon Rule
12(b)(6). . . . Further, since neither [the] defendant’s written motion nor its oral argument at the
hearing relied on Rule 12(b)(6) in connection with the sovereign immunity defense, the case law
authorizing interlocutory appeals for denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on sovereign immunity
does not apply.”), disc. review as to additional issues allowed, __ N.C. __, 787 S.E.2d 22 (2016). Review
of Murray on the basis of a dissent is currently pending in our Supreme Court.
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rev’d on other grounds, 347 N.C. 548, 495 S.E.2d 721 (1998). The Administration
asserts that the holdings in these appeals from summary judgment orders should
apply equally to a ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Assuming
arguendo that the Administration is correct on that point, the factual circumstances
and procedural posture of each cited case renders it inapplicable to this matter.
The above-quoted language from Mullis, for example, was part of this Court’s
analysis of whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the “defendants
to amend their answer to assert the defense of sovereign immunity.” 126 N.C. App.
at 94, 484 S.E.2d at 425. Here, in contrast, the Administration did not move to amend
its answer, and nothing in the record suggests that either party contemplated
sovereign immunity as a possible defense prior to or at the motion hearing. The
Administration also cites Craig for the proposition that the order here affects a
substantial right and is thus immediately appealable, but in that case unlike in the
matter at bar, the defendant explicitly asserted the defense of governmental
immunity in its answer. 363 N.C. at 335, 678 S.E.2d at 352. Accordingly, Craig, like
Mullis, is inapposite.
The Administration’s reliance on Gillespie and Dickens is similarly misplaced.
The Gillespie appeal arose from a suit by a bank against a debtor to collect on
promissory notes, and the bank’s “evidence and [and the debtor’s] admissions
establish that [the debtor] executed the five notes upon which this action rests,
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thereby establishing a prima facie case.” 291 N.C. at 306, 230 S.E.2d at 377-78.
“Nowhere in his answer did [the debtor] assert the defenses[, to wit, that he had an
oral agreement with the bank regarding repayment of the notes,] raised by his
affidavits filed in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 306, 230
S.E.2d at 377 (emphasis added). In that limited circumstance, our Supreme Court
held that,
in light of the policy favoring liberality in the amendment
of the pleadings, either the answer should be deemed
amended to conform to the proof offered by the affidavits or
a formal amendment permitted, the affidavits considered,
and the motion for summary judgment decided under the
usual rule pertaining to the adjudication of summary
judgment motions.
Id. at 306, 230 S.E.2d at 377 (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets
omitted; emphasis added).
Here, in contrast, it is undisputed that the Administration did not raise the
defense of sovereign immunity in its motion for partial judgment on the pleadings or
in any affidavit attached thereto. The Administration asserts that sovereign
immunity was raised at the motion hearing, but there is a critical difference between
raising an unpled affirmative defense that would operate as a complete bar to an
action in an affidavit attached to a motion and raising such a defense at the hearing
on the motion. In the former situation, the opposing party is made aware of, and
given an opportunity to prepare a response to, the unpled defense, by both written
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response in opposition to the motion and at the hearing. Thus, the holding in
Gillespie is explicitly aimed at preventing an overly technical exclusion of a possibly
valid affirmative defense from being considered even though the opposing party has
been made aware of it. On the other hand, where, as here, the matter of sovereign
immunity—a complete defense to the entire lawsuit—is raised at best only obliquely
in the midst of the hearing on a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, the
opposing party is denied any chance to prepare a response.
Our Supreme Court has directly addressed whether a party may raise an
unpled affirmative defense for the first time at a motion hearing. In Dickens v.
Puryear, although the defendant did not plead the statute of limitations—an
affirmative defense—in his answer and did not refer to the statute of limitations in
his motion for summary judgment, the Court noted that the
plaintiff was not surprised by the limitations defense and
had full opportunity to argue and present evidence relevant
to the limitations questions. The [p]laintiff’s complaint
[was] cast in terms of the tort of intentional infliction of
mental distress rather than assault and battery. This
demonstrates [the] plaintiff’s awareness that the statute of
limitations was going to be an issue. [The p]laintiff did
present evidence and briefs on the question before [the trial
court]. Thus, . . . [the] affirmative defense was clearly
before the trial court. . . . [The] defendants’ failure
expressly to mention this defense in their motions [was] not
held to bar the court’s granting the motions on the
limitations ground.
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302 N.C. 437, 443, 276 S.E.2d 325, 329-30 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted;
emphasis added). However, our Supreme Court cautioned that
if an affirmative defense required to be raised by a
responsive pleading is sought to be raised for the first time
in a motion for summary judgment, the motion must
ordinarily refer expressly to the affirmative defense relied
upon. Only in exceptional circumstances where the party
opposing the motion has not been surprised and has had
full opportunity to argue and present evidence will movant’s
failure expressly to refer to the affirmative defense not be
a bar to its consideration on summary judgment.
Id. at 443, 276 S.E.2d at 329 (emphasis added). Simply put, the circumstances in
Dickens indicated that the plaintiff was not prejudiced by the technical failure of the
defendant to plead and reference an affirmative defense because it was clear that the
plaintiff understood the issue was contested and not only had the opportunity to
respond, but had responded.
Here, on the other hand, rather than an elevation of substance over form—the
goal noted in both Dickens and Gillespie—the result urged by the Administration
would be to allow a technicality of form—the passing mention of an affirmative
defense at a hearing—to utterly bar the majority of Plaintiffs’ claims without
providing them the opportunity to make any substantive response. This type of
“gotcha” result is not due to a mere technical failure to comply with Rule 8. It is
precisely the type of unjust and inequitable outcome about which our Supreme Court
cautioned in Dickens. It is undisputed that the Administration’s answer did not
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assert sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense, the issue was not mentioned in
its motion for partial judgment on the pleadings or any of the Administration’s other
filings in the trial court, neither party briefed the issue of sovereign immunity, and
Plaintiffs were not prepared to and did not argue the issue at the motion hearing.
Indeed, the record on appeal makes clear that Plaintiffs did not believe that the issue
of sovereign immunity was raised at all at the hearing and were taken completely by
surprise when the resulting order included an ambiguous reference to the issue,
ultimately causing the trial court to file its supplemental order to clarify that the
question had not been properly raised or argued at the hearing.
In sum, precedent reveals that the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity
must generally be raised in a defendant’s answer or by motion, and the circumstances
here do not fall into any of the narrow exceptions to that rule permitted in the cases
cited by the Administration.7 Thus, the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity
was not before the trial court because the “failure expressly to refer to the affirmative
defense [was] a bar to its consideration on” the Administration’s motion for partial
judgment on the pleadings. See id.7 The Administration also cites cases in which trial court rulings on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss
based upon a plaintiff’s failure to allege the defendant’s waiver of sovereign immunity have been
approved. See, e.g., Paquette v. Cty. of Durham, 155 N.C. App. 415, 418, 573 S.E.2d 715, 717 (2002)
(noting that our appellate courts have “consistently disallowed claims based on tort against
governmental entities when the complaint failed to allege a waiver of immunity”) (citations omitted;
emphasis added), disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 165, 580 S.E.2d 695 (2003). However, the
Administration did not move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint on this basis and makes no argument in
this regard in its effort to establish a ground for appellate review of the order.
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Opinion of the Court
Despite having failed to plead the defense in its answer or motion or briefs in
support of its position on its motion, and notwithstanding the undisputed fact that
Plaintiffs were thus denied any opportunity to respond to the defense, the
Administration contends that it did raise and argue the issue of sovereign immunity
during the motion hearing. The transcript of the hearing belies this assertion.
At the hearing, the Administration began by making extensive arguments on
mootness and exclusivity of the Act’s remedies, after which counsel for the
Administration informed the trial court that he “want[ed] to raise one other point[:]”
So you start from the proposition that there—that we say
that these really are exclusive remedies. And, again, I told
you I would remind you of a statement in Shella vs. Moon
. . . . But if it were not apparent that these remedies were
limited, as we said, and comprehensive, the Court in Shella
says—and this is right in the wheelhouse of the court[’]s
case. It deals with the mootness issue.
So if you’re dealing with a mootness issue, you’re having to
ask a question what are the remedies? So have the
remedies been satisfied? So this is not dicta. This is not—
they’re not side stepping, they’re not commenting for the
good of the populous [sic]. They are making a decision in a
case about mootness.
In the Shella case, dealing with a 132-9 issue where the
documents have been produce[d], is this quote: “The only
recovery provided for by this statute is the opportunity to
inspect public records.”
And from our standpoint, not to be cute, but “only” means
“only.” So we know when it’s indisputable that there’s no
declaratory relief that is available under that statute.
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Opinion of the Court
Now, I told you I was going to hand up that case; the only
case I’m going to hand you.
I want to raise one other point that we did not directly raise
in our brief, but I think it’s important here.
[The trial court accepted a case handed up by counsel.]
And this case, this proposition has been cited in several
cases. As best I can tell it began with this case[,] this North
Carolina Port Authorities case in 1972. It’s this principle
which is located on Page 4 of the opinion. I’ve highlighted
it. If you’ll see that highlighted provision.
But, if court is with me, what that says is that, in this case,
it says the [S]tate is immune from suit unless and until it
is expressly consented to be sued. It is for the [G]eneral
[A]ssembly to determine when and under what
circumstances the [S]tate may be sued.
And when statutory provision—and we think this is what
the public records law is—when statutory provision has
been made for an action against the [S]tate, the procedure
described by the statute must be [followed and] the remedies
thus supported [sic] are, they underlined this word,
“exclusive.”
So if you considered the fact the way the statute has set out
the remedies, you consider then the judicial statement of
the Court of [A]ppeals in Shella that this is all that they
are; the only remedy is [to compel] inspection.8 And you
8 In Shella v. Moon, the plaintiff sought release of documents related to a condemnation proceeding
against her by filing an order to compel disclosure pursuant to section 132-9. 125 N.C. App. 607, 608-
09, 481 S.E.2d 363, 364 (1997). After all litigation connected to the condemnation was concluded, a
representative of our State’s Department of Transportation offered the records for the plaintiff’s
review. Id. at 609, 481 S.E.2d at 364. After the State defendants moved for summary judgment, the
“plaintiff moved to amend [her] complaint to add certain [additional] defendants and request
compensatory and punitive damages.” Id. The trial court granted summary judgment to the
defendants, thereby denying the plaintiff’s motions, and from that ruling, the plaintiff appealed. Id.This Court noted that “the only recovery provided for by this statute [section 132-9] is the opportunity
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Opinion of the Court
considered this line of cases where because [of] a waiver of
sovereign immunity there must be exclusivity unless you
risk a balance and create a cause of action the legislature
didn’t authorize when it waived immunity.
[For a]ll of those reasons[,] we say we would urge the
[c]ourt strongly to consider to say [sic] that declaratory
judgment in this context really isn’t a[] judicial add on that
was not authorized. That’s the first part of what we would
urge the [c]ourt to reconsider or consider further with
respect to that issue.
(Emphasis and italics added). This excerpt makes clear that trial counsel did not
assert sovereign immunity as a bar to the entire action, but rather, argued only that,
because the Act is a waiver of sovereign immunity, its remedy provisions are exclusive
and do not include declaratory judgments. This understanding of counsel’s argument
is further supported by a review of the case referred to—Nat Harrison Assocs., Inc. v.
N.C. State Ports Auth., 280 N.C. 251, 185 S.E.2d 793, reh’g denied, 281 N.C. 317(1972). The section of that case to which the Administration’s trial counsel referred
is the following:
to inspect public records” and held that, because “she has been granted the relief she sought by
initiating this action under [section] 132-9[,] . . . her case must be dismissed [as moot].” Id. at 610, 481
S.E.2d at 364-65. In citing Shella in support of the Administration’s exclusive remedy argument, its
trial counsel appears to be conflating the concepts of recovery and remedy. “Recovery” is defined as
“[t]he regaining or restoration of something lost or taken away[;] [t]he obtainment of a right to
something (esp. damages) by a judgment or decree[; or a]n amount awarded in or collected from a
judgment or decree[,]” while a “remedy” is a “means of enforcing a right or preventing or redressing a
wrong; legal or equitable relief.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1302, 1320 (Deluxe 8th ed. 2004). Plaintiffs
here, unlike the plaintiff in Shella, are not asking to recover damages from the Administration.
Rather, Plaintiffs seek the remedy of a declaratory judgment. As such, while Shella may be pertinent
regarding the Administration’s mootness argument, it is unavailing in connection with its exclusive
remedies contention.
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Opinion of the Court
An action against a commission or board created by statute
as an agency of the State where the interest or rights of the
State are directly affected is in fact an action against the
State. The State is immune from suit unless and until it
has expressly consented to be sued. It is for the General
Assembly to determine when and under what
circumstances the State may be sued. When statutory
provision has been made for an action against the State, the
procedure prescribed by statute must be followed, and the
remedies thus afforded are exclusive. The right to sue the
State is a conditional right, and the terms prescribed by the
Legislature are conditions precedent to the institution of
the action.
Id. at 258, 185 S.E.2d at 797 (quoting Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gold, 254 N.C. 168, 172,
118 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1961)) (citations, internal quotation marks, and ellipsis omitted).
No issue regarding sovereign immunity was presented to our Supreme Court in Nat
Harrison Assocs., which concerned a contractor’s suit against a State agency, seeking
to recover damages after the agency retained the contractor’s final payment as
liquidated damages for construction delays. Id. at 255, 185 S.E.2d at 795. The
question before the Court was whether “the trial judge correctly found that there was
no provision in the contracts for recovery of damages for delays or for losses by reason
of the devaluation of the German mark.” Id. at 259, 185 S.E.2d at 797. Thus, the
quotation from Great Am. Ins. Co. was cited not in regard to any issue of sovereign
immunity, but instead, as part of the analysis of whether the statute permitting suits
by contractors against the State for monies owed would allow the contractor to
recover for damages not provided for in its individual contract with the State agency.
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Opinion of the Court
See id. at 258-59, 185 S.E.2d at 797. The Court answered that the contractor could
not so recover because,
[u]nder the provisions of [section] 143-135.3, the plaintiff is
only entitled to recover ‘such settlement as he claims to be
entitled to under terms of his contract’ and since [the]
plaintiff’s claims as set out in the second and third counts
of its complaint did not arise under the terms of its
contracts, the court properly entered summary judgment
on these two counts.
Id. at 259, 185 S.E.2d at 797-98. Neither the case nor language cited by the
Administration to the trial court concerned sovereign immunity, but rather supported
its contention regarding exclusivity of remedies where sovereign immunity has been
waived, the very argument the Administration had all along advanced here in the
court below. The trial court appreciated that the Administration was making an
exclusivity argument, not a sovereign immunity argument, as reflected by its
response that it was “fully aware of the limitations that the case law imposes on the
exclusivity question.” (Emphasis added). Thus, the record on appeal and the hearing
transcript demonstrate that the Administration did not raise and argue sovereign
immunity as a basis for partial judgment on the pleadings, instead advancing only
arguments on mootness and exclusivity of remedies.
In conclusion, the Administration’s failure to properly plead, raise, or argue
the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity below was “a bar to its consideration
on” the motions being heard in the trial court, and, to the extent the order purported
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Opinion of the Court
to address that matter,9 it is of no effect. The interlocutory order appealed from
presents no issue of sovereign immunity entitling the Administration to immediate
appellate review, and, accordingly, this appeal is
DISMISSED.
Judges BRYANT and CALABRIA concur.
9While no party took appeal from the supplemental order, we note that it appears the trial court did
not intend to rule on the question of sovereign immunity for precisely the reasons discussed in this
opinion.
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