DocketNumber: No. 9125DC1275
Judges: Arnold, Cozort, Greene
Filed Date: 3/2/1993
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
Defendant first assigns error to the ten percent interest rate assigned to the note. Defendant argues that the trial court cannot set an interest rate higher than the legal rate of eight percent
6. The time of making the payment of the $100,000.00 and whether or not this is to be' by cash due at this time, or paid over a period of time (and if so upon what terms, whether or not the obligation bears interest and if so at what rate, and the amount of such payments), is to be determined by the court.
9. On the 25th day of July, 1991 . . . the court shall receive evidence and argument from the parties as to how the Plaintiff shall receive the distributive award ....
13. The parties stipulate .that their signature upon this order shall also constitute the same as a binding contract for the division of property ....
Plainly this language constituted an agreement granting the trial court the power to set whatever interest rate it found supported by the evidence. Because defendant agreed to let the trial court set the rate of interest, he cannot on appeal argue that the trial court lacked authority to set the interest rate above the legal rate.
Defendant also contends that the court’s decision was not supported by the evidence and was an abuse of discretion. After examining the transcript, we find ample evidence in the testimony of plaintiff’s witness, the manager of Clyde Savings Bank, to support the trial judge’s findings and conclusions on this issue. Defendant complains that the court erred in not considering evidence of different interest rates, but defendant did not present any evidence from which the court could find a different rate. For these reasons, we hold that the trial judge did not err or abuse his discretion in ordering the promissory note to bear interest at ten percent.
Unquestionably the court was powerless to enter an order binding people who were not parties to the action. However, that is not the situation before us. At the hearing, in response to a question by the court, defendant stated that he believed his parents would agree to subordinate their rights to plaintiff. Based on this admission, the court entered its judgment. The court did not attempt to bind the parents by its judgment. It merely ordered defendant to take the steps he believed he was capable of taking to ensure first priority for plaintiff’s deed of trust. If defendant is unable to comply with the judgment, plaintiff may seek further relief. We find no reversible error in the judgment.
Affirmed.