Scoggin v. ScogginÂ

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA16-311
Filed: 18 October 2016
Onslow County, No. 14 CVD 1911
CHRISTOPHER SCOGGIN, Plaintiff,
v.
FELICITAS B. SCOGGIN (now HAYES), Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from order entered 8 September 2015 by Judge William
B. Sutton, Jr. in Onslow County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21
September 2016.
The Armstrong Law Firm, P.A., by Eason Armstrong Keeney and L. Lamar
Armstrong, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.
The Lea/Schultz Law Firm, P.C., by James W. Lea, III, for defendant-
appellant.
ZACHARY, Judge.
Felicitas Hayes, formerly Felicitas Scoggin, (defendant), appeals from an order
that awarded Christopher Scoggin (plaintiff) primary custody of the parties’ four
children. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by entering a child
custody order that conflicted with oral statements that the court made during the
custody hearing, and that the trial court erred by finding that it was in the best
interest of the children for plaintiff to have their primary physical custody. We
conclude that the trial court had the authority to enter an order that was different
SCOGGIN V. SCOGGIN
Opinion of the Court
from the court’s oral statements during the hearing, and that the trial court did not
err by awarding primary physical custody of the children to plaintiff.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The parties were married on 12 May 2003, separated on 6 March 2013,
divorced on 17 September 2013, and are the parents of four children, born in 2002,
2003, 2009, and 2010. At the time of their divorce, plaintiff and defendant were living
in California and were both serving in the United States Marine Corps. On 10 May
2013, the parties executed a settlement agreement providing that plaintiff and
defendant would share joint legal and physical custody of the children, with the
children alternating residence with each parent every other week. In June 2013,
plaintiff received military orders to report to Jacksonville, North Carolina, and on 21
June 2013, the parties modified their agreement in order to allow plaintiff to take the
children with him to North Carolina. During the following year, the children spent
periods of time with plaintiff, defendant, and with plaintiff’s parents.
On 22 May 2014, plaintiff filed a motion for modification of child custody.
Plaintiff alleged that there had been a substantial change of circumstances in that
plaintiff and defendant had moved to North Carolina and Indiana, respectively, and
therefore could no longer adhere to the existing custody arrangement pursuant to the
terms of which the children spent alternate weeks with each parent. Plaintiff also
alleged that defendant had failed to comply with the parties’ agreement regarding
-2-
SCOGGIN V. SCOGGIN
Opinion of the Court
child custody, and sought primary physical custody of the children. On 10 July 2014,
defendant filed a response and countermotion for primary physical custody of the
children, in which defendant alleged that plaintiff had failed to abide by the
requirements of the parties’ custody agreement.
On 10 June 2015, the trial court conducted a hearing on the parties’ motions
for custody of the children. The trial court heard conflicting testimony from each
party regarding the other party’s lack of cooperation with their custody agreement.
At the close of the hearing, the trial judge spoke for several minutes about the
considerations that the court deemed important to the custody determination, and
stated that either party would be a fit and proper person to have custody of the
children. After reviewing in detail the facts that tended to support each party’s claim
for primary physical custody of the children, the trial court stated that the parties
would share joint legal custody of the children, with defendant having primary
physical custody and plaintiff having visitation rights. The court ended the hearing
by stating that “[t]his is a really hard decision” and that “I just hope and pray that
I’ve done the right thing.” The trial court did not ask counsel for either party to draft
an order reflecting the court’s decision.
On 8 September 2015, the trial court entered an order for child custody. The
court awarded primary physical custody of the children to plaintiff, with defendant
to have “liberal visitation privileges,” and made findings that supported the court’s
-3-
SCOGGIN V. SCOGGIN
Opinion of the Court
decision. The trial court’s findings also addressed the fact that its decision was
different from what the court had orally stated during the hearing:
15. That the Court immediately following the
closing arguments of counsel stated that this was a
very close call in deciding custody and then rendered
an oral pronouncement awarding the defendant
primary custody with secondary custody being
granted to the plaintiff.
16. That the Court, following the trial after further
deliberation and consideration, decided based on the
facts contained in this order that it was in the best
interests of the minor children to change and reverse
the Custody pronouncement previously stated in
Court and instead to direct custody as shown in this
written order.
17. That the Court notified counsel for both parties
that it wanted to meet with them on the Monday
following the trial and met with both counsel in
Chambers, telephonically or in person on the
following Wednesday, at which time the new and
amended Order was pronounced by the Court.
18. That no Order had been signed or rendered prior
to the final pronouncement by the Court to the
parties’ counsel in Chambers and this Order is the
only written signed Order rendered in this case.
Defendant appealed to this Court from the trial court’s order for child custody.
II. Standard of Review
The standard of review in child custody cases may be summarized as follows:
The standard of review “when the trial court sits
without a jury is whether there was competent
evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact
-4-
SCOGGIN V. SCOGGIN
Opinion of the Court
and whether its conclusions of law were proper in
light of such facts.” “In a child custody case, the trial
court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if
supported by substantial evidence, even if there is
sufficient evidence to support contrary findings. . . .
Unchallenged findings of fact are binding on
appeal.” “Whether [the trial court’s] findings of fact
support [its] conclusions of law is reviewable de
novo.” “If the trial court’s uncontested findings of
fact support its conclusions of law, we must affirm
the trial court's order.”
Burger v. Smith, __ N.C. App. __, __, 776 S.E.2d 886, 888-89 (2015) (quoting Barker
v. Barker, 228 N.C. App. 362, 364, 745 S.E.2d 910, 912 (2013), Peters v. Pennington,
210 N.C. App. 1, 12-13, 707 S.E.2d 724, 733 (2011), Hall v. Hall, 188 N.C. App. 527,
530, 655 S.E.2d 901, 904 (2008), and Respess v. Respess, 232 N.C. App. 611, 614, 754
S.E.2d 691, 695 (2014) (internal quotation omitted)).
In addition, “[i]t is a long-standing rule that the trial court is vested with broad
discretion in cases involving child custody.” Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 624, 501
S.E.2d 898, 902 (1998) (citation omitted). “A trial court may be reversed for abuse of
discretion only upon a showing that its actions are manifestly unsupported by
reason[.]” White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985) (citation
omitted). The rationale for this rule has been explained as follows:
“[The trial court] has the opportunity to see the
parties in person and to hear the witnesses, and [its]
decision ought not be upset on appeal absent a clear
showing of abuse of discretion.” “[The trial court] can
detect tenors, tones, and flavors that are lost in the
-5-
SCOGGIN V. SCOGGIN
Opinion of the Court
bare printed record read months later by appellate
judges.”
Surles v. Surles, 113 N.C. App. 32, 36-37, 437 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1993) (quoting Falls
v. Falls, 52 N.C. App. 203, 209, 278 S.E.2d 546, 551 (1981), superseded in part by
statute on other grounds as noted in Smith v. Smith, __ N.C. App. __, __, 786 S.E.2d
12, 22 (2016), and Newsome v. Newsome, 42 N.C. App. 416, 426, 256 S.E.2d 849, 855
(1979)).
III. Trial Court’s Authority to Enter an Order that Differs from the Decision
Orally Pronounced by the Court at Trial
At the end of the hearing on this matter, the trial court announced its intention
to award primary physical custody of the children to defendant. Upon further
consideration, the trial court reached a contrary conclusion and determined that it
would be in the best interest of the children if primary physical custody of the children
was granted to plaintiff. Within a week of the hearing, the trial court informed the
parties of this change and of its intention to award primary physical custody of the
children to plaintiff. Approximately three months later, the trial court entered a
written order placing the children in the primary physical custody of plaintiff. On
appeal, defendant argues that the trial court lacked the authority to enter an order
that did not correspond to its oral statements in court. Simply put, defendant asserts
that, as a matter of law, the trial court may not change its mind between the end of
a trial or hearing and entry of the order determining the issues raised in that
-6-
SCOGGIN V. SCOGGIN
Opinion of the Court
proceeding. In the alternative, defendant contends that the trial court’s power to
enter an order that differs from its statements in court depends upon the existence of
a substantial change of circumstances occurring between the date of the trial court’s
oral statements and the date that the court enters an order in a case. Defendant’s
arguments lacks merit.
In support of her position, defendant cites this Court’s opinion in Edwards v.
Taylor, 182 N.C. App. 722, 727, 643 S.E.2d 51, 54 (2007), in which this Court noted
that a trial court has the authority to enter a written judgment that “conforms
generally” with its oral pronouncement. Defendant contends that this statement
necessarily implies its opposite - that the trial court does not have authority to enter
a written judgment that does not generally conform with its statements in court.
Defendant does not cite any authority for this proposition. This issue was
recently addressed in In re O.D.S., __ N.C. App. __, 786 S.E.2d 410, disc. review
denied, __ N.C. __, __ S.E.2d __ (2016 N.C. LEXIS 691), in which this Court expressly
rejected the same argument made by defendant in the instant case. In O.D.S., a
petition was filed seeking to terminate the respondent’s parental rights on grounds
of neglect and dependency. At the end of the hearing on the petition, the trial court
stated that it found the existence of neglect as a ground for termination, and did not
discuss the issue of dependency. The trial court later entered a written order finding
the existence of both neglect and dependency as grounds for termination. On appeal,
-7-
SCOGGIN V. SCOGGIN
Opinion of the Court
the respondent argued that “the trial court erred because, at the conclusion of the
adjudication portion of the hearing, the trial court did not orally state it was finding
dependency as a ground for termination, but included that ground in the written
order entered [after the hearing.]” O.D.S., __ N.C. App. at __, 786 S.E.2d at 412.
The opinion issued by this Court in O.D.S. carefully reviewed the evolution of
our Rules of Civil Procedure regarding entry of judgment, noting that:
Because many of our appellate decisions addressing
these issues were based upon rules that have since
changed, it is important to note how entry of
judgment and notice of appeal from civil judgments
have changed in light of revisions to Rule 58 of the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, which
became effective 1 October 1994 for “all judgments
subject to entry on or after that date.” 1994 N.C.
Sess. Laws, Ch. 594[.]
O.D.S. at __, 786 S.E.2d at 413. “Entry of judgment based upon oral rendition of
judgments is no longer allowed in civil matters; currently, judgments and orders are
only ‘entered when [they are] reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and filed with
the clerk of court.’ N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 58 (2015).” Id. The Court observed
that the statement in Edwards upon which the instant defendant relies was based
upon language in Morris v. Bailey, 86 N.C. App. 378, 389, 358 S.E.2d 120, 127 (1987),
and stated that “Morris [was] discussing a situation when an order was entered orally
in open court, then subsequently reduced to writing and filed. . . . Judgments and
orders in civil cases can no longer be entered in open court and, therefore, this portion
-8-
SCOGGIN V. SCOGGIN
Opinion of the Court
of Morris is no longer relevant.” O.D.S. at __, 786 S.E.2d at 417. In O.D.S., this Court
held expressly that:
Further, the holding in Edwards that “[i]f the
written judgment conforms generally with the oral
judgment, the judgment is valid[,]” Edwards, 182
N.C. App. at 727, 643 S.E.2d at 54, does not
command the converse, i.e. that any written
judgment that does not generally conform with the
oral judgment is necessarily invalid. Though there
may be situations when this is true, we can find no
opinion in which it has been held that the written
and entered judgment must always generally
conform with a prior oral rendition of that judgment
in order to be valid. However, as noted above, there
are plenary opinions in which our appellate courts
have affirmed entered judgments and orders that do
not conform to the associated orally rendered
judgments and orders.
Id. (emphasis added). We conclude that O.D.S. is controlling on the issue of the trial
court’s authority to enter an order that conflicts with its oral statements in court, that
the court did not err by entering an order that reached a conclusion that differed from
its oral pronouncement, and that defendant’s arguments for a contrary result lack
merit.
IV. Trial Court’s Determination of the Best Interests of the Children
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by awarding primary physical
custody of the children to plaintiff. Defendant concedes that there had been a
substantial change of circumstances, but contends that there was “a mountain of
evidence” that made it “appropriate for the trial court to enter an order granting
-9-
SCOGGIN V. SCOGGIN
Opinion of the Court
primary physical custody to [defendant].” However, as discussed above, “[i]f the trial
court’s uncontested findings of fact support its conclusions of law, we must affirm the
trial court’s order.” Respess, 232 N.C. App. at 614-15, 754 S.E.2d at 694 (quoting
Mussa v. Palmer-Mussa, 366 N.C. 185, 191, 731 S.E.2d 404, 409 (2012)). In this case
defendant neither challenges the evidentiary support for the trial court’s findings of
fact nor argues that the court’s findings do not support its conclusions of law. We
conclude that defendant has failed to make a persuasive argument that the trial court
erred by determining that it was in the best interest of the children for plaintiff to be
granted their primary physical custody.
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the trial court did not err
and that its order should be
AFFIRMED
Judges ELMORE and ENOCHS concur.
- 10 -