State v. BridgesÂ

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA17-579
Filed: 6 February 2018
Swain County, No. 14CRS050726
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
STEPHANIE BRIDGES, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 12 October 2016 by Judge Robert
G. Horne in Swain County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28
November 2017.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Durwin
P. Jones, for the State.
The Epstein Law Firm PLLC, by Drew Nelson, for the Defendant.
DILLON, Judge.
Stephanie Bridges (“Defendant”) appeals the trial court’s judgment entered
upon a jury verdict finding her guilty of multiple drug-related offenses. Defendant
challenges her conviction for possession of methamphetamine, arguing that the State
failed to present evidence of the chemical nature of the substance found on her person.
Because Defendant admitted the contraband nature of the substance to the arresting
officer, we hold there was no error.
I. Background
STATE V. BRIDGES
Opinion of the Court
The evidence at trial tended to show the following:
Police investigated a parked car and discovered a “white crystalline substance”
in the passenger compartment. Police then arrested Defendant, who had been sitting
in the driver’s seat of the car, and transported her to a detention center. On the way,
Defendant admitted to a detective that she had “a baggy of meth hidden in her bra.”
Once Defendant arrived at the center, an officer found a bag of a “crystal-like”
substance in Defendant’s bra during a search.
One of the arresting officers testified at trial, without objection, to Defendant’s
statement regarding the methamphetamine in her bra: “[Defendant] told me that
she had a baggy of meth hidden in her bra.” The State admitted the crystal-like
substance found in Defendant’s bra as an exhibit. However, the State did not present
any testimony empirically describing the chemical composition of the substance.
Defendant moved to dismiss all charges based on the insufficiency of the
State’s evidence, which was denied by the trial court. The jury ultimately convicted
her of possession of methamphetamine. Defendant appeals.
II. Analysis
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motions to dismiss
the charge of possession of methamphetamine. Specifically, Defendant argues that
the State failed to satisfy its burden of proof by failing to offer any evidence
establishing the chemical identity of the substance. Although the State offered no
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Opinion of the Court
empirical evidence of the contraband nature of the substance, we must disagree with
Defendant’s contentions based on controlling jurisprudence from our Supreme Court.
“To survive a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence, the State must
present substantial evidence of all the material elements of the offense charged and
that the defendant was the perpetrator of the offense.” State v. Campbell, 368 N.C.
83, 87, 772 S.E.2d 440, 444 (2015).
Crimes for possession of a controlled substance, such as methamphetamine1,
require proof that (1) the defendant, in fact, possessed a controlled substance; and (2)
the defendant knew the substance she possessed was a controlled substance. See
State v. Galaviz-Torres, 368 N.C. 44, 48, 772 S.E.2d 434, 437 (2015). Regarding the
proof sufficient to establish the presence of the first element, our Supreme Court has
held that “some form of scientifically valid chemical analysis is required” unless “the
State establishes before the trial court that another method of identification is
sufficient to establish the identity of the controlled substance beyond a reasonable
doubt[.]” State v. Ward, 364 N.C. 133, 147, 694 S.E.2d 738, 747 (2010) (emphasis
added).
Here, Defendant argues that her alleged admission to the arresting officer may
be evidence that she believed she was possessing methamphetamine, thus satisfying
the second element, but that the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove the
1 Methamphetamine is a schedule II controlled substance. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-90(3)(c)
(2015).
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Opinion of the Court
first element, that the substance Defendant believed she possessed was, in fact,
methamphetamine. The only evidence offered by the State to prove that the
substance was, in fact, methamphetamine was (1) the testimony from the arresting
officer that Defendant stated that she had “meth” in her bra and (2) an exhibit
consisting of the actual “crystal-like” substance retrieved from the bra. Defendant
contends that, based on our Supreme Court’s 2010 holding in Ward, this evidence was
not sufficient to prove the first element, that the substance Defendant possessed was
in fact methamphetamine.
In 2011, the year following Ward, our Supreme Court established an exception
to the evidentiary rule laid down in its 2010 Ward decision. Specifically, the Court
held that “when a defense witness’s testimony characterizes a putative controlled
substance as a controlled substance, the defendant cannot on appeal escape the
consequences of the testimony in arguing that his motion to dismiss should have been
allowed.” State v. Nabors, 365 N.C. 306, 313, 718 S.E.2d 623, 627 (2011) (emphasis
added); see also State v. Williams, 367 N.C. 64, 69, 744 S.E.2d 125, 128 (2013) (holding
that the defendant’s trial testimony which admitted that the substance was cocaine
was sufficient to prove the identity of the substance). Defendant argues that Nabors
does not apply in the present case because Defendant’s identification of the substance
as methamphetamine was admitted through the testimony elicited by the State from
a witness for the State.
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Opinion of the Court
We, however, are persuaded by our Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Ortiz-
Zape, 367 N.C. 1, 743 S.E.2d 156 (2013), decided two years after Nabors, in which
that Court concluded that the arresting officer’s testimony offered without objection
during the State’s evidence concerning the defendant’s out-of-court statement that
(s)he was in possession of an illegal substance was sufficient to meet the State’s
burden of proof with respect to the first element of the crime of possession.
Specifically, the Ortiz-Zape case involved a defendant who was arrested for
possessing cocaine shortly after he purchased a white powdery substance. At trial,
the State offered (1) evidence of a chemical lab analysis which identified the
substance as cocaine; (2) the testimony of the arresting officer, who stated on direct
examination, without objection, that the defendant had admitted to him that the
substance was cocaine, and (3) the testimony of this same arresting officer, both on
direct and cross-examination, that the substance appeared to him to be cocaine. Id.
at 14, 743 S.E.2d at 164-65.
On appeal to our Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the evidence of
the chemical lab analysis was inadmissible because the testifying expert was not the
same person who had performed the chemical lab analysis, in violation of the
Confrontation Clause. Id. at 2, 743 S.E.2d at 157.
In a 4-2 decision, our Supreme Court upheld the defendant’s conviction.
Though the Court was divided, all of the justices agreed that the testimony of the
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Opinion of the Court
arresting officer during the State’s direct examination concerning the defendant’s
out-of-court admission was sufficient to meet the State’s burden as to the first
element of possession.2
For instance, the majority in Ortiz-Zape – in an opinion written by Justice (now
Chief Justice) Martin – held that the expert testimony regarding the chemical lab
analysis was properly admitted. Id. at 13, 743 S.E.2d at 164. The majority, though,
further stated that even if the admission of the expert testimony concerning the
chemical lab report was error, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
since other evidence was admitted concerning the identity of the drug in two different
forms: (1) the arresting officer’s testimony, which was not objected to, regarding
defendant’s out-of-court admission, and (2) the officer’s own opinion concerning the
drug’s identity during the defendant’s cross-examination:
Even assuming admission of [the] expert’s opinion violated
defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause, the
alleged error was harmless, providing a separate,
adequate, and independent state law ground for the
judgment of the Court. . . .
The arresting officer testified that when he found the
plastic baggy containing a white substance, he picked it up
and asked defendant, “What’s this?” The officer further
2 Neither the majority nor the dissent state whether the defendant’s out-of-court statement to
the arresting officer was competent to prove the identity of the substance. However, like in the present
case, the officer’s testimony concerning the defendant’s out-of-court statement came in without any
objection from the defendant. See Transcript of Trial at 223, Ortiz-Zape, 367 N.C. 1, 743 S.E.2d 156.
And in determining the sufficiency of the State’s evidence to get to the jury on an issue, our Supreme
Court has instructed that a trial court “must consider all evidence admitted, whether competent or
incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State[.]” State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d
211, 223 (1994).
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testified that defendant acknowledged it was his cocaine
[that he had just purchased]. . . . Defense counsel elicited
a statement from the arresting officer that the substance
“appears to be powder cocaine.” Under these facts, in which
defendant told a law enforcement officer that the substance
was cocaine and defense counsel elicited testimony that the
substance appeared to be cocaine, any possible error in
allowing the expert opinion was harmless.
Id. at 13-14, 743 S.E.2d at 164-65 (emphasis added).3 In sum, the majority suggests
that (1) a defendant’s out-of-court admission offered through the testimony of a
State’s witness (at least where there is no objection lodged) is sufficient to meet the
State’s burden, (2) an officer’s own opinion concerning the substance’s identity elicited
by the defendant on cross-examination is sufficient to meet the State’s burden, and
(3) both statements, taken together, render any error in admitting the expert
testimony concerning the chemical lab report harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Likewise, the dissenting opinion in Ortiz-Zape – authored by Justice Hudson
– suggests a view that the arresting officer’s testimony concerning the defendant’s
out-of-court admission was sufficient to prove the first element, at least where the
defense does not object to such testimony. These justices dissented, though, because
they believed that the admission of the chemical lab report testimony was error and
that the officer’s testimony, though sufficient to get to the jury, was not so
3 The Supreme Court so held even though the defendant in that case testified at trial that he
never admitted to the arresting officer that the substance was cocaine. Ortiz-Zape, 367 N.C. at 28,
743 S.E.2d at 173.
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overwhelming to deem the admission of the chemical lab report harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt:
[Without the testimony of the expert witness concerning
the chemical lab report,] all that remains is an
uncorroborated assertion by an officer on the witness stand
that defendant agreed the substance was cocaine. Yet
defendant also testified and denied that he had said the
substance was cocaine. Here the credibility of all those
statements must be weighed by the jury, by contrast to the
sufficiency analysis in Nabors [where the only issue was
whether the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury]. The
officer’s testimony cannot be considered overwhelming
under the constitutional harmless error standard we apply
here.
Id. at 27-28, 743 S.E.2d at 172-73.
One could argue that the majority’s view in Ortiz-Zape is mere dicta, and is
therefore not binding, since the majority expressly held that the chemical lab report
testimony was admissible, thus satisfying the standard set forth in Ward. However,
it could also be argued that the Supreme Court was expressing alternate bases for its
holding, one of which being its view that the officer’s testimony, alone, also met the
State’s burden. In either case, we feel it appropriate, as the Court of Appeals, to
follow the unanimous sentiment expressed by all the justices in Ortiz-Zape just five
years ago on the same issue which confronts us today.
We further conclude that Defendant’s argument that her admission to the
officer that she possessed “meth” was insufficient based on the doctrine of corpus
delicti lacks merit. The doctrine of corpus delicti as it currently stands in North
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Carolina states that, before considering whether the State has presented sufficient
evidence to survive a motion to dismiss, we must ensure that the State has presented
evidence to show that the crime in question actually occurred. State v. Cox, 367 N.C.
147, 152, 749 S.E.2d 271, 275 (2013). To that effect, “an extrajudicial confession,
standing alone, is not sufficient to sustain a conviction of a crime.” Id. 151, 749 S.E.
2d at 275.
To satisfy the corpus delicti rule in North Carolina, an extrajudicial confession
must be supported by “substantial independent evidence tending to furnish strong
corroboration of essential facts contained in defendant’s confession so as to establish
trustworthiness of the confession.” State v. Trexler, 316 N.C. 528, 531-32, 342 S.E.2d
878, 880-81 (1986). However, “[t]he [corpus delicti] rule does not require the State to
logically exclude every possibility that the defendant did not commit the crime.” Cox,
367 N.C. at 152, 749 S.E.2d at 275. The State need only present independent evidence
concerning the “body of the crime,” such as the body in a homicide case, or the
controlled substances themselves in a possession case.
Here, we conclude that the corpus delicti rule does not apply becaue
Defendant’s out-of-court statement that she possessed “meth” in her bra is
corroborated by the physical object of the crime. The police found a crystal-like
substance in Defendant’s bra and offered the substance as an exhibit at trial.
Additionally, police investigation revealed that the individual from whom Defendant
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Opinion of the Court
admitted to purchasing the substances had been under surveillance for drug-related
activity.
We note what seems to be a subtext of Defendant’s argument is that the two
elements of possession of a controlled substance are being conflated by our holding
here and prior holdings of our courts, such as in Nabors, Williams and Ortiz-Zape, all
cited above. That is, a defendant’s statement (whether in court or out of court) as to
the identity of a substance in her possession only tends to prove the second element
of the crime of possession, that the defendant believed the substance she possessed
was a controlled substance; it does not prove that the substance possessed was, in
fact, a particular controlled substance. And, so the argument goes, the State should
not be able to rely on a defendant’s statement to prove the first element, even where
its admission was not objected to or is offered by the defendant, since such evidence
would generally be admissible anyway to prove the second element, and, therefore,
any objection to its admission would properly be overruled.
However, the counterargument is that our Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is
consistent in instructing that a defendant’s admission received into evidence relieves
the State of any burden to otherwise provide scientifically reliable evidence because
such admission by the defendant or a defense witness is “sufficient to establish the
identity of the controlled substance beyond a reasonable doubt[.]” State v. Ward, 364
N.C. at 147, 694 S.E.2d at747 (emphasis added).
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Opinion of the Court
In any case, we must follow our Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. In the present
case, evidence was admitted that Defendant stated her belief that she possessed
“meth” in her bra and that a “meth”-like substance was actually found in her bra and
was admitted as an exhibit at trial. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did
not err by allowing the matter to go to the jury.
NO ERROR.
Judges BRYANT and DIETZ concur.
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