State v. JacksonÂ

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA16-1141
Filed: 20 February 2018
Lee County, No. 10 CRS 53292
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
ISAAC TYRONE JACKSON, JR.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 25 June 2015 by Judge Charles
W. Gilchrist in Lee County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1
November 2017.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Derrick
C. Mertz, for the State.
Jarvis John Edgerton, IV, for defendant.
ELMORE, Judge.
Isaac Tyrone Jackson, Jr. (defendant) appeals from a judgment sentencing him
to life imprisonment without parole after he was convicted by a jury of first-degree
premeditated murder for the shooting death of his ex-girlfriend, Shamekia Griffin.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to elicit
testimony from a supplemental rebuttal expert, Nicole Wolfe, M.D., that the State
first disclosed to the defense during trial, in alleged violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
903(a)(2)’s pre-trial expert witness disclosure requirements.
STATE V. JACKSON
Opinion of the Court
Although the State did not disclose Dr. Wolfe, her opinion, nor her expert
report before trial, we hold that defendant failed to demonstrate the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing the State to elicit her limited expert rebuttal
testimony. The State explained it sought Dr. Wolfe in direct response to its untimely
receipt, right before jury selection, of a primary defense expert’s final report, which
differed from that expert’s previously furnished report. Dr. Wolfe was a supplemental
rebuttal witness, not the State’s sole rebuttal witness, nor a primary expert
introducing new evidence. Defendant was able to fully examine Dr. Wolfe and the
basis for her opinion during a voir dire examination held eight days before her trial
testimony. The trial court set parameters limiting Dr. Wolfe’s testimony. And
defendant received the required discovery eight full days before Dr. Wolfe testified,
four days of which no court was held, providing the defense an opportunity to prepare
against her rebuttal testimony. Finally, although the defense moved to continue its
expert’s voir dire examination based on the State’s alleged untimely discovery
disclosures, it never moved for a continuance of trial or requested more time to
prepare for Dr. Wolfe’s rebuttal. On this record, we hold that defendant has failed to
demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Wolfe’s limited
rebuttal testimony and, therefore, that defendant received a fair trial, free of error.
I. Background
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Opinion of the Court
The State’s trial evidence indicated that, on 19 November 2010, defendant
premeditatedly and deliberately shot and killed Shamekia in front of one of their
fifteen-year-old sons in an act of domestic violence. Defendant and Shamekia had a
long relationship history together and started dating in 1995, when they were around
sixteen years old. About three years later, they became parents to twin boys and,
after defendant’s sister kicked him out of her apartment for selling drugs, defendant
moved into Shamekia’s apartment. In 2002, defendant was arrested on federal drug
charges, later convicted of trafficking cocaine, and served around eight years in
federal prison. A few years into his prison sentence, defendant and Shamekia’s
relationship began to deteriorate. Shamekia eventually stopped visiting defendant
in 2007 and their relationship became “distanced.” In July 2010, after discovering he
had been approved for release to a halfway house that October, defendant attempted
to reconcile his relationship with Shamekia. They discussed defendant being a better
father to their children, obtaining a legitimate job, and not returning to selling drugs.
A few weeks after defendant’s release to the halfway house in October 2010,
however, he returned to drug dealing. When Shamekia found out defendant returned
to hanging around with the friends he used to sell drugs with, she confronted him
about his promise not to deal drugs, which caused arguments. Defendant continued
hanging out with his friends, and they began making remarks about Shamekia
having seen other men. When Shamekia confronted defendant about selling drugs,
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Opinion of the Court
defendant accused her of cheating on him. These arguments continued for several
days and progressed in intensity. Shamekia eventually told defendant: “[P]lease
don’t contact me anymore.” By 18 November 2010, Shamekia stopped responding to
his accusations. That day, defendant called and texted Shamekia repeatedly until
about 3:00 a.m.
On the morning of 19 November 2010, defendant called Shamekia and
attempted to visit her at work, but Shamekia refused. Around 3:00 p.m., defendant
called Shamekia again. They continued to argue about defendant allegedly lying
about not returning to dealing drugs and Shamekia allegedly lying about having seen
other people. After the conversation ended, defendant called Shamekia multiple
times but was unable to reach her. Around 6:00 p.m., defendant asked his cousin to
give him a ride to Shamekia’s mother’s house in an attempt to locate Shamekia. After
Shamekia’s mother told defendant everything was fine and instructed him to return
to the halfway house, defendant and his cousin left. Around 8:00 p.m., defendant
asked a borrow a gun from his cousin and asked his cousin to drive him Shamekia’s
house. Shamekia’s car was not in the driveway, so defendant asked his cousin to drop
him off at a nearby McDonalds. After he ate, defendant called his cousin again, and
he picked him up. A short time later, defendant requested to borrow his cousin’s car.
Defendant then drove around, calling Shamekia and looking for her. Defendant had
called Shamekia nearly forty times that day.
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STATE V. JACKSON
Opinion of the Court
Eventually, defendant spotted Shamekia’s car driving through the McDonald’s
drive-thru with one of their sons, and he called her. Shamekia answered but
immediately gave the phone to her son. Defendant asked whether Shamekia was
with a man, and their son replied: “No.” Unbeknownst to Shamekia or their son,
defendant followed Shamekia’s car back to her house and parked nearby.
After Shamekia and their son went inside and ate, defendant called Shamekia
again. Shamekia answered, and defendant demanded to know why she had been
refusing to answer his calls. Shamekia accused him of lying about drug dealing;
defendant accused her of lying about cheating on him. After their conversation ended,
defendant walked toward Shamekia’s house and called her again. Shamekia
answered and replied “yeah” and then immediately hung up. Defendant then
proceeded to enter Shamekia’s house at around 8:41 p.m. and fatally shoot her five
times in front of their son.
On 13 December 2010, defendant was indicted for first-degree premeditated
murder. On 17 December 2010, defendant filed a “Request for Voluntary Discovery,”
seeking all information discoverable under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-903. On 6
September 2013, the State disclosed its proposed expert witness list, which did not
include Dr. Wolfe. On 18 September 2013, the defense alerted the State it might
present a diminished-capacity defense.
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Opinion of the Court
On 16 February 2015, three months before trial, the defense disclosed Dan
Chartier, Ph.D. and Moira Artigues, M.D. as its primary expert witnesses. Chartier,
a psychologist, was later tendered as an expert in administering a controversial
diagnostic tool called a qualitative electroencephalograph (qEEG). While an
electroencephalograph (EEG) measures electrical patterns on the brain that reflect
cortical activity, qEEG qualitatively measures a patient’s EEG data by comparing it
to databases of other patients’ EEG data for statistical analysis. A patient’s qEEG
results are typically processed into topographical “brain maps” reflecting the
comparative cortical activity, which the defense argued can provide diagnostic value
in identifying relative brain functioning impairment.
The defense furnished Chartier’s curriculum vitae, a first draft of Chartier’s
expert report containing his interpretative conclusions of defendant’s qEEG results,
and notice that Chartier would rely on qEEG to support his opinion that, at the time
of the shooting, defendant was incapable of forming the specific intent to kill required
for a first-degree premeditated murder conviction. According to Chartier, defendant’s
qEEG results showed significantly diminished electrical activity in his frontal and
central cortex, the brain centers responsible for governing “decision-making,
reasoning[,] and impulse control.” Based on these results, Chartier opined that
defendant suffered from “left hemisphere and frontal lobe dysfunction,” a mental
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Opinion of the Court
disorder not recognized in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM).
At a pretrial hearing on 12 March, defendant’s motion under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
15A-903(a)(2) for the State to disclose all of its experts was heard. That day, the State
disclosed Julia Messer Ph.D., a forensic psychologist who had previously examined
defendant’s capacity to stand trial, as the only expert it forecast calling to rebut a
diminished-capacity defense. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered
that “all expert opinions be disclosed . . . within a reasonable time” and that, “[t]o the
extent that there is a motion in limine, that’s reserved for the trial judge. If there is
some question about not being disclosed, that’s for the trial judge to decide whether
to allow that evidence.”
On 17 April, immediately before jury selection, the defense furnished
Chartier’s final report. In that report, Chartier’s ultimate conclusions and opinion
remained the same—that is, defendant’s qEEG results indicated he lacked the
mental capacity to form the specific intent to kill—but Chartier appeared to have
conducted further qEEG analysis, and the black-and-white brain maps included in
Chartier’s first report were now illustrated in color, enhancing their visual impact.
On 26 May, immediately after jury selection but before empanelment, the
State informed the defense and the trial court that it had been “digesting, reviewing
and consulting on” Chartier’s final report, and first alerted the defense it was filing a
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Opinion of the Court
motion in limine to contest the admissibility of Chartier’s testimony regarding the
qEEG testing on Daubert grounds.
On 28 May, the State began its case-in-chief. On 1 June, outside the presence
of the jury, the State first disclosed it intended to call Dr. Nicole Wolfe, a forensic
psychiatrist, to testify at Chartier’s voir dire examination in rebuttal. The State
furnished Dr. Wolfe’s curriculum vitae, and disclosed that it intended to elicit opinion
testimony from Dr. Wolfe aimed at discounting the diagnostic utility of qEEG. The
defense objected on timeliness grounds, arguing that the State failed to disclose Dr.
Wolfe on any pre-trial expert witness lists, had just furnished her curriculum vitae,
and had not yet furnished her report. The State explained that it only sought Dr.
Wolfe in response to Chartier’s final April report that was untimely furnished right
before jury selection, which the State argued contained “marked differences” from
Chartier’s first February report.
On Wednesday 3 June, after the State rested its case-in-chief, the trial court
requested copies of Chartier’s and Dr. Wolfe’s reports in preparation for Chartier’s
voir dire examination scheduled the next day. Defense counsel furnished Chartier’s
reports, but the State advised that, due to the short notice and scheduling issues, it
was unable to meet with Dr. Wolfe until the preceding Friday, and it had not yet
received her report. Around 4:45 p.m., immediately upon receipt, the State brought
Dr. Wolfe’s report to one of defendant’s trial counsel’s offices. Dr. Wolfe’s report was
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Opinion of the Court
a 55-page PowerPoint presentation that contained multiple peer-reviewed journal
articles purportedly discounting qEEG’s diagnostic utility.
On Thursday 4 June, over defendant’s request for a continuance based on the
State’s untimely discovery disclosures relating to Dr. Wolfe, Chartier’s scheduled voir
dire examination was held. After Chartier was examined, the trial court allowed Dr.
Wolfe to testify in rebuttal. After the hearing, the trial court denied the State’s
Daubert motion entirely, ruling that Chartier’s expert opinion testimony and the
contested qEEG evidence was admissible. In response, the State requested for the
first time that Dr. Wolfe be allowed to testify as a supplemental rebuttal expert
witness at trial.
After a lengthy discussion on the propriety of allowing the State to elicit Dr.
Wolfe’s testimony, the trial court ruled that Dr. Wolfe be allowed to testify in rebuttal
within certain parameters:
THE COURT: . . . I’m going to let Doctor Wolfe testify. I
think generally she can qualify as a forensic psychiatrist.
I think she can talk about whether she relies on QEEG,
what she knows about the general practice in her field,
about similar experts relying upon that methodology, and
she can state generally why, in her opinion, it’s not a
reliable methodology for a forensic psychiatrist to rely
upon. Now, you know, beyond that basis, she is not an
expert in the administration of QEEG. . . .
The trial court further elaborated:
THE COURT: The main point is that, as I understand it,
the [State] does not intend to elicit testimony that [Dr.
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Opinion of the Court
Wolfe] gleaned from these various articles that she testified
about during the hearing before the Court on QEEG. She
can testify about her general area of expertise in forensic
psychiatry, whether or not she relies on the test, her
knowledge about whether other forensic psychiatrists
generally rely upon the test, and why it is or is not relied
upon. In other words, if [Dr. Wolfe] doesn’t rely upon it, it’s
her understanding generally in the field forensic
psychiatrists don’t rely upon it because there are questions
about its validity. . . . That’s within her field of expertise to
say that. She is not an expert in administering QEEG. . . .
[T]estimony about the administration of [QEEG] and
interpretation of the results of the type that’s talked about
in the PowerPoint, that would not be a proper area for [Dr.
Wolfe] to testify to. . . .
Additionally, the trial court prohibited the State from introducing Dr. Wolfe’s
full report, limiting its admission to only a few slides that it required the State to
select and furnish to the defense at that time.
On Friday 5 June, the defense began its case-in-chief and called defendant to
testify before the jury. Defendant testified in relevant part that while he remembered
everything leading up to and after the shooting, his emotions were running so high
because he believed that Shamekia had just admitted to cheating on him, that he did
not remember actually shooting Shemekia. But after his memory returned, he saw
her lying dead on the floor, realized he was holding a gun, and conceded that he
believed he must have shot and killed her.
No court was held on the following Monday or Tuesday. On Wednesday 10
June, the case resumed, and the defense called Chartier to testify. According to
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Opinion of the Court
Chartier, defendant’s qEEG results revealed notable statistical deviations of
electrical activity in the frontal and central temporal cortical regions of his brain,
particularly in an area “involved in the control of emotions” and “significantly” in the
area controlling language ability, which might manifest in “misinterpret[ing] the
actions or behavior of others.” Based on these results, Chartier opined that defendant
suffered from “left hemisphere and frontal lobe dysfunction.” He further opined:
Based on these consistent, combined findings from the
multiple analyses of [defendant]’s EEG data, it is apparent
to a high degree of neuropsychological certainty that this
unfortunate gentleman suffers with significant neuro-
cognitive deficits that are consistent . . . with[ ] impaired
reasoning, judgment, decision-making and impulse control.
Chartier also opined that these neurocognitive deficiencies would be more
pronounced when someone is stressed, emotional, or upset.
On Thursday 11 June, after Chartier’s testimony, the defense called Dr.
Artigues, tendered as an expert in general and forensic psychiatry, to testify. Dr.
Artigues performed a forensic psychiatric evaluation on defendant. Based on his
interview with defendant and his review of defendant’s medical history and records,
including Chariter’s qEEG report, Dr. Artigues diagnosed defendant with
“personality disorder with borderline dependent and antisocial traits and with frontal
lobe syndrome.” Dr. Artigues conceded that frontal lobe syndrome is not recognized
as a medical diagnosis in the DSM, and that he relied on his review of Chartier’s
qEEG report for this part of his diagnosis. According to Dr. Artigues, defendant’s
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Opinion of the Court
“ability to plan was seriously impaired, if not completely wiped out” and he could not
“weigh the consequences of harming Shamekia in a rational way” at the time he shot
her. Dr. Artigues opined that he “d[id] not believe [defendant] could form the specific
intent to kill at the time of the shooting.”
On Friday 12 June, after the defense rested, the State called Dr. Wolfe, over
defendant’s objection, and Messer to testify in rebuttal. Dr. Wolfe, a forensic
psychiatrist, testified in relevant part that, after having examined peer-reviewed
journal articles while researching the diagnostic utility of qEEG, her practice of not
using qEEG as a diagnostic tool has not changed. Dr. Wolfe testified that neither she
nor any psychiatrist she had worked with at any facility used qEEG for psychiatric
diagnostic purposes. According to Dr. Wolfe, qEEG was not helpful “with assisting
in a psychiatric diagnosis.” She explained that “electrical brain wave activities” as
recorded in an EEG have no “particularly defined appearance,” and that psychiatric
diagnoses tend to consist of a combination of multiple different issues, meaning a
patient typically does not have just one diagnosis. Thus, Dr. Wolfe explained, while
having a patient’s EEG results might be useful in limited circumstances when
combined with other diagnostic tools, such as an MRI; standing alone, EEG results
are “not useful to [her] clinically at all” and, “in general, [q]EEG is not helpful for
diagnosis.”
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Opinion of the Court
Messer, a forensic psychologist, had previously performed a court-ordered
competency evaluation on defendant and had concluded that he was competent to
stand trial. Messer testified that defendant suffered from no mental disorder she
could identify that would account for his stated inability to remember the shooting.
Messer explained that based on her psychological examination, defendant
“demonstrated an ability to form intent, make rational decisions[,] and carry out
actions” and, therefore, opined that defendant was capable at the time of the shooting
to form the requisite specific intent to kill. Messer also discounted the defense
experts’ reliance on qEEG to support their opinions, testifying that neither she nor
any psychiatrists or psychologists she works with uses qEEG diagnostically.
After the presentation of evidence, the jury convicted defendant of first-degree
premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison
without parole. Defendant appeals.
II. Analysis
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
903(a)(2)’s statutory mandates when it allowed Dr. Wolfe’s expert rebuttal testimony
on the ground that the State violated that statute’s discovery requirements relating
to expert witness disclosures. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in allowing Dr. Wolfe’s limited rebuttal testimony.
A. Review Standard
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Opinion of the Court
As an initial matter, the parties dispute the proper appellate review standard.
The State argues that the typical abuse-of-discretion review standard applies to
defendant’s allegation that the trial court erred in allowing the State to call Dr. Wolfe
as an expert witness. Defendant argues that, under State v. Davis, 368 N.C. 794, 785
S.E.2d 312 (2016), de novo review is proper because N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-903(a)(2)
imposes a statutory mandate. Defendant misconstrues Davis. Abuse-of-discretion
review properly applies here.
In Davis, after “not[ing] that usually determining whether the State failed to
comply with discovery is a decision left to the sound discretion of the trial court,” 368
N.C. at 797, 785 S.E.2d at 314 (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks
omitted), our Supreme Court reviewed de novo a challenge to the application of N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-903(a)(2) when addressing “whether the trial court erred in
admitting the opinion testimony of [the State’s expert witnesses].” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Davis Court, however, applied de novo review not
because N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-903(a)(2) imposes statutory mandates, but because
determining whether the State’s experts’ testimonies constituted “expert[ ]
opinion[s]” under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-903(a)(2) was a “question . . . of statutory
interpretation[.]” Id. at 797–98, 785 S.E.2d at 315; see also id. at 798, 785 S.E.2d at
315 (“The central question here is whether the State’s expert witnesses gave opinion
testimony so as to trigger the discovery requirements under section 15A-903(a)(2).”).
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Opinion of the Court
Here, contrarily, the central question is not whether Dr. Wolfe gave
discoverable expert opinion testimony that triggered application of N.C. Gen. Stat. §
15A-903(a)(2), but whether the State violated that discovery statute by failing timely
to disclose discovery related to Dr. Wolfe. Unlike in Davis, addressing the central
issue raised here does not require that we interpret N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-903(a)(2),
and thus the “usual[ ]” abuse-of-discretion review standard applies. Davis, 368 N.C.
at 797, 785 S.E.2d at 314.
Under abuse-of-discretion review, “[t]he trial court may be reversed . . . only
upon a showing that its ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result
of a reasoned decision.” State v. Cook, 362 N.C. 285, 295, 661 S.E.2d 874, 880 (2008)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
B. Discussion
Defendant contends the State, within a reasonable time before trial, failed to
disclose its intent to call Dr. Wolfe as an expert, or the nature of Dr. Wolfe’s opinion
testimony, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-903(a)(2).
“[T]he purpose of discovery under our statutes is to protect the defendant from
unfair surprise by the introduction of evidence he cannot anticipate.” Davis, 368 N.C.
at 798, 785 S.E.2d at 315 (citation and quotation marks omitted). N.C. Gen. Stat. §
15A-903(a)(2) (2015) imposes expert witness disclosure requirements on the State
and provides in pertinent part:
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Opinion of the Court
(a) Upon motion of the defendant, the court must order:
....
(2) The prosecuting attorney to give notice to the
defendant of any expert witnesses that the State
reasonably expects to call as a witness at trial. Each
such witness shall prepare, and the State shall
furnish to the defendant, a report of the results of
any examinations or tests conducted by the expert.
The State shall also furnish to the defendant the
expert’s curriculum vitae, the expert’s opinion, and
the underlying basis for that opinion. The State shall
give the notice and furnish the materials required by
this subsection within a reasonable time prior to
trial, as specified by the court.
(Emphasis added.) Additionally, once the State has provided discovery under this
statute it maintains a continuing duty to disclose additional discovery. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-907 (2015).
Our review of the record reveals, and defendant has failed to demonstrate
otherwise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Wolfe’s limited
rebuttal testimony, even though the State first disclosed her as an expert at trial.
As early as February 2015, the defense knew it was introducing qEEG evidence
to support its diminished-capacity defense in part, and that the State intended to call
an expert witness to rebut that defense. Although the defense furnished Chartier’s
first qEEG report at that time, it did not furnish Chartier’s final qEEG report until
right before jury selection on 17 April. On 26 May, the State explained that, after it
had time to review and consult on Chartier’s final April report, it was filing a motion
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Opinion of the Court
in limine on Daubert grounds to contest the admissibility of Chartier’s expert opinion
testimony relating to the qEEG testing.
On 1 June, the State disclosed that it intended to call Dr. Wolfe to testify at
Chartier’s voir dire examination to rebut the diagnostic utility of qEEG and furnished
her curriculum vitae. After defendant objected on untimely disclosure grounds, the
State explained it only sought Dr. Wolfe “in response to [Chartier’s final] report [the
State] received on the Friday before jury selection began in this case.” According to
the State, Chartier’s final report contained two additional pages of analysis, enhanced
the brain mapping images with color, and contained “marked differences” from his
first report. Chartier later admitted that his April report was “absolutely different”
from his February report and that “further analysis had been done at that point.”
The trial court was in the best position to determine the extent to which those reports
differed, such that the State might not have reasonably forecast calling Dr. Wolfe in
rebuttal until after it had time to review and consult on Chartier’s final report.
On the morning of 4 June, the defense was able to review Dr. Wolfe’s report,
and after Chartier’s voir dire examination, it was afforded the opportunity to fully
examine Dr. Wolfe, her credentials, and the basis for her opinion. After the trial court
ruled to allow Dr. Wolfe’s rebuttal testimony, it set parameters limiting her testimony
and restricting the use of her report to only a few slides that it required the State to
identify and furnish to the defense that day. Although the State did not disclose its
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intent to call Dr. Wolfe in rebuttal at trial until after Chartier’s voir dire examination
and its Daubert motion was denied, Dr. Wolfe did not actually testify until 12 June.
Defendant received all required discovery eight days before Dr. Wolfe testified
in rebuttal at trial, and no court was held on four of those days. The State’s
disclosures were thus made in time for effective use at trial. Cf. State v. Jackson, 340
N.C. 301, 317, 457 S.E.2d 862, 872 (1995) (concluding that the trial court granting a
four-day continuance “afforded the defense opportunity to meet [previously
undisclosed lay opinion testimonial] evidence”). Further, the State did not call Dr.
Wolfe to introduce entirely new evidence, but to rebut the qEEG evidence defendant
had intended months earlier to introduce. Defendant thus cannot complain that he
was “unfair[ly] surprise[d] by the introduction of evidence he [could ]not anticipate.”
Davis, 368 N.C. at 798, 785 S.E.2d at 315 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, although the defense attempted to move for a continuance before
Chartier’s voir dire examination on untimely discovery disclosure grounds, the
defense never moved for a continuance after the trial court ruled to allow Dr. Wolfe
to testify in rebuttal at trial. Cf. State v. Herrera, 195 N.C. App. 181, 199, 672 S.E.2d
71, 83 (2009) (“[A]ssuming, arguendo, that the State did violate the discovery statute
provisions, . . . we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this
testimony especially when defendant did not request a recess or continuance to
address this newly disclosed evidence.” (emphasis added)). Nor did the defense
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indicate that it had inadequate time to prepare effectively to develop meaningful
impeachment or rebuttal evidence for Dr. Wolfe’s cross-examination. Cf. State v.
McCail, 150 N.C. App. 643, 652, 565 S.E.2d 96, 102 (2002) (“There is no indication
that defense counsel’s receipt at that time (1) prevented development of important
impeachment evidence or (2) resulted in ineffective cross-examination of any
witnesses or representation of defendant.”). Accordingly, defendant has failed to
demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Wolfe’s limited
rebuttal testimony.
III. Conclusion
Defendant’s allegation that the trial court erred by allowing Dr. Wolfe to testify
in rebuttal due to the State’s alleged discovery disclosure violations raised no issue
requiring we interpret N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-903(a)(2). Accordingly, unlike in Davis,
the usual abuse-of-discretion standard applies to the question presented here.
Although the State failed to disclose, within a reasonable time before trial, Dr.
Wolfe as a rebuttal expert witness, her opinion, or her report, the State explained it
only sought Dr. Wolfe in response to Chartier’s untimely furnished final report, which
it believed differed significantly from his first report. The trial court was in the best
position to determine whether Chartier’s reports differed such that the State would
not have reasonably forecast calling Dr. Wolfe to rebut Chartier’s expert testimony
or the qEEG evidence until after the State had time to review Chartier’s final report.
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Opinion of the Court
Additionally, the defense was afforded the opportunity to fully examine Dr. Wolfe at
Chartier’s voir dire examination; the trial court limited Dr. Wolfe’s rebuttal testimony
and the use of her report; the defense was furnished all required discovery eight days
before Dr. Wolfe testified, and no court was held on four of those days; and defendant
never moved for a continuance of trial or requested additional time to prepare for Dr.
Wolfe’s rebuttal testimony.
On this record, defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s ruling
was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr.
Wolfe’s limited rebuttal testimony and, therefore, that defendant received a fair trial,
free of error.
NO ERROR.
Judges DIETZ and INMAN concur.
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