State v. KuhnsÂ

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA17-519
Filed: 3 July 2018
Alexander County, No. 14 CRS 51446
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
DONALD JOSEPH KUHNS
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 13 May 2016 by Judge Julia Lynn
Gullett in Alexander County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29
November 2017.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General
Kimberly D. Potter, for the State.
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Daniel
Shatz, for defendant-appellant.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Donald Joseph Kuhns (“defendant”) appeals from a judgment entered upon a
jury’s verdict finding him guilty of voluntary manslaughter. After careful review, we
conclude that the trial court committed prejudicial error by denying defendant’s
request for a jury instruction on the defense of habitation, N.C.P.I.--Crim. 308.80.
Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
STATE V. KUHNS
Opinion of the Court
In October 2014, defendant lived across the road from his son (“George”) in the
Johnny Walker Mobile Home Park (“JWMHP”) in Hiddenite, North Carolina.
Kenneth Nunnery (“Nunnery”) and Johnny Dockery (“Dockery”) lived in separate
homes on nearby Ervin Lane. Defendant, George, Nunnery, and Dockery were
friends and frequently spent time together.
After defendant came home from work at 4:30 p.m. on 2 October 2014, he went
over to George’s home to drink beer. Nunnery joined them around 5:30 p.m., although
he does not drink alcohol. Approximately an hour later, the three men were talking
outside George’s home when Dockery and his girlfriend (“Kim”) arrived. Dockery had
a jar of “moonshine” and two shot glasses with him. Dockery and Kim were already
intoxicated and started arguing. After defendant told him to “leave her alone,”
Dockery became angry and “started saying [he] better not catch nobody with his
girlfriend, he’d kill them.” Kim drove away, and Dockery ran after her.
The dispute between defendant and Dockery continued to escalate over the
next several hours. At 8:17 p.m., Dockery called 911 to report that Kim was driving
while intoxicated. When Deputy Terry Fox (“Deputy Fox”) arrived, he heard loud
voices coming from the JWMHP and went to investigate. Dockery was standing in
the middle of the road, shouting in the direction of defendant’s home. Dockery told
Deputy Fox that he was arguing with defendant, but that defendant was his friend
whom he sometimes called “Dad.” During their conversation, defendant exited his
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Opinion of the Court
home, walked over to George’s, and reappeared with a 12-pack of beer. As he returned
home, defendant warned Deputy Fox that Dockery needed to leave before “something
bad” happened. Deputy Fox ordered Dockery to go home and watched him to ensure
that he complied.
However, at 9:15 p.m., defendant called 911 and reported that Dockery was
standing in defendant’s yard, “threatening [his] life” and “running his mouth. He’s
been drinking white liquor and . . . he’s a friend of mine, but today he’s not a friend.”
Defendant explained that he did not want to press charges or “hurt nobody”; rather,
he “just want[ed Dockery] out of [his] face.” When law enforcement arrived, Dockery
was “yelling pretty loud.” He told the officers that “people were being rude to him”
and “called him names.” Defendant warned them to tell Dockery “not to come back
or he would do something about it.” The officers again instructed Dockery to go home,
and followed him to ensure that he complied.
At approximately 10:00 p.m., the argument culminated in a final confrontation
in defendant’s yard, which ended when defendant fatally shot Dockery. However,
conflicting evidence was presented at trial to explain how these events transpired.
Defendant’s next-door neighbor, Angela McFee, testified that minutes before the
shooting, she was sitting on her porch when she overheard defendant taunting
Dockery as he walked home through a nearby field. According to McFee, defendant
said, “[T]hat’s right, take your f---ing a-- home,” and used a racial slur. At that point,
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Opinion of the Court
Dockery walked over to defendant’s yard, and the men began “cursing and fussing.”
Dockery asked defendant “if he had his gun out, and [defendant] said yeah.”
However, according to defendant, he was inside his home, attempting to sleep,
when he heard Dockery yelling, “[C]ome on out here, you son of a bitch, I’m going to
kill you.” Defendant retrieved his .32-caliber pistol and went outside onto the porch,
approximately six and one-half feet above the yard. Dockery was in the yard just
beside the porch, “cussing and hollering” at defendant. Defendant told Dockery to go
home. When Dockery saw the gun, he said, “[Y]ou’re going to need more than that P
shooter, motherf---er, I’ve been shot before.” According to defendant, Dockery was
pacing back and forth, and then “came at [him] really fast.” Defendant took a step
back and fired one shot. The bullet struck Dockery just above his left eyebrow, killing
him.
On 3 October 2014, Alexander County Sheriff’s Office deputies executed an
arrest warrant charging defendant with first-degree murder. Defendant was indicted
for the same offense on 27 October 2014. Trial commenced during the 3 May 2016
session of Alexander County Superior Court. Following the State’s presentation of
evidence, defendant presented evidence, including his own testimony.
At the charge conference, after the trial court included self-defense within its
list of proposed jury instructions, defense counsel requested that the court exclude all
references to defendant as the aggressor. In addition, defense counsel requested that
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Opinion of the Court
the trial court deliver N.C.P.I.--Crim. 308.80, the pattern jury instruction pertaining
to the defense of habitation. After considering arguments from both parties, the trial
court denied both of defendant’s requests. The trial court concluded that there were
“factual issues that must be resolved by the jury with respect to the aggressor issue,”
and that N.C.P.I.--Crim. 308.80 “did not apply because there was no evidence that
[Dockery] was trying to break in.” Following the jury charge, defendant renewed his
objection to the trial court’s denial of his requested instructions.
On 13 May 2016, the jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of the
lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court sentenced
defendant to 73 to 100 months in the custody of the North Carolina Division of Adult
Correction. Defendant appeals.
II. Defense of Habitation
On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying his
request for a jury instruction on the defense of habitation, pursuant to N.C.P.I.--Crim.
308.80. We agree.
“The prime purpose of a court’s charge to the jury is the clarification of issues,
the elimination of extraneous matters, and a declaration and an application of the
law arising on the evidence.” State v. Cameron, 284 N.C. 165, 171, 200 S.E.2d 186,
191 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 905, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1153 (1974). Accordingly, “[i]t is
the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury on all substantial features of a case
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Opinion of the Court
raised by the evidence.” State v. Shaw, 322 N.C. 797, 803, 370 S.E.2d 546, 549 (1988).
In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to entitle the defendant to jury
instructions on a defense, the trial court must consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the defendant. State v. Mash, 323 N.C. 339, 348, 372 S.E.2d 532, 537
(1988). The “trial court must give a requested instruction that is a correct statement
of the law and is supported by the evidence.” State v. Wilson, 354 N.C. 493, 516, 556
S.E.2d 272, 287 (2001) (citation omitted). Whether the trial court erred in instructing
the jury is a question of law, reviewed de novo on appeal. State v. Bass, __ N.C. App.
__, __, 802 S.E.2d 477, 481, temp. stay allowed, __ N.C. __, 800 S.E.2d 421 (2017).
North Carolina has long recognized that “[a] man’s house, however humble, is
his castle, and his castle he is entitled to protect against invasion[.]” State v. Gray,
162 N.C. 608, 613, 77 S.E. 833, 835 (1913). Commonly known as the “castle doctrine,”
the defense of habitation “is based on the theory that if a person is bound to become
a fugitive from her own home, there would be no refuge for her anywhere in the
world.” State v. Stevenson, 81 N.C. App. 409, 412, 344 S.E.2d 334, 335 (1986).
“The principle that one does not have to retreat regardless of the nature of the
assault upon him when he is in his own home and acting in defense of himself, his
family and his habitation is firmly embedded in our law.” State v. McCombs, 297
N.C. 151, 156, 253 S.E.2d 906, 910 (1979). At common law, the use of deadly force in
defense of the habitation was justified only to prevent a forcible entry under
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Opinion of the Court
circumstances where the occupant reasonably apprehended death or great bodily
harm to himself or others, or believed that the assailant intended to commit a felony.
Id. at 156-57, 253 S.E.2d at 910. “Once the assailant . . . gained entry, however, the
usual rules of self-defense replace[d] the rules governing defense of habitation,”
although there remained no duty to retreat. Id. at 157, 253 S.E.2d at 910.
The common-law rule limiting the defense of habitation to circumstances
where the defendant was acting to prevent forcible entry into the home was
eliminated in 1993, when our General Assembly enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.1.
State v. Blue, 356 N.C. 79, 89, 565 S.E.2d 133, 139 (2002). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.1“broadened the defense of habitation to make the use of deadly force justifiable
whether to prevent unlawful entry into the home or to terminate an unlawful entry
by an intruder.” Id. In 2011, the General Assembly repealed N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
51.1 and enacted our current defensive force statutes, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-51.2, -
51.3, and -51.4. See generally An Act To Provide When A Person May Use Defensive
Force And To Amend Various Laws Regarding The Right To Own, Possess, Or Carry
A Firearm In North Carolina, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 268.
Our amended “statutes provide two circumstances in which individuals are
justified in using deadly force, thus excusing them from criminal culpability.” State
v. Lee, __ N.C. __, __, 811 S.E.2d 563, 566 (2018). Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
51.3(a), “a person is justified in the use of deadly force and does not have a duty to
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Opinion of the Court
retreat in any place he or she has the lawful right to be if either of the following
applies”: (1) the person “reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent
imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another”; or (2) under
the circumstances permitted by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2, entitled “Home, workplace, and motor vehicle
protection; presumption of fear of death or serious bodily harm,” provides, in
pertinent part:
(a) The following definitions apply in this section:
(1) Home.—A building or conveyance of any kind, to
include its curtilage, whether the building or
conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile
or immobile, which has a roof over it, including
a tent, and is designed as a temporary or
permanent residence.
...
(b) The lawful occupant of a home, motor vehicle, or
workplace is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of
imminent death or serious bodily harm to himself or herself
or another when using defensive force that is intended or
likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to another if
both of the following apply:
(1) The person against whom the defensive force
was used was in the process of unlawfully and
forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and
forcibly entered, a home, motor vehicle, or
workplace, or if that person had removed or was
attempting to remove another against that
person’s will from the home, motor vehicle, or
workplace.
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Opinion of the Court
(2) The person who uses defensive force knew or had
reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible
entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring
or had occurred.
(c) The presumption set forth in subsection (b) of this
section shall be rebuttable . . . .
...
(d) A person who unlawfully and by force enters or
attempts to enter a person’s home, motor vehicle, or
workplace is presumed to be doing so with the intent to
commit an unlawful act involving force or violence.
(e) A person who uses force as permitted by this section is
justified in using such force and is immune from civil or
criminal liability for the use of such force . . . .
(f) A lawful occupant within his or her home, motor vehicle,
or workplace does not have a duty to retreat from an
intruder in the circumstances described in this section.
(g) This section is not intended to repeal or limit any other
defense that may exist under the common law.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2.
During the charge conference, defendant requested that the trial court provide
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2’s corresponding pattern jury instruction, N.C.P.I.--Crim.
308.80 “Defense of Habitation – Homicide and Assault.” The trial court, however,
determined that defendant was not entitled to the requested instruction because
there was no evidence that he “was trying to prevent an entry.” According to the trial
court, defendant’s evidence demonstrated that he was attempting to prevent injury
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Opinion of the Court
to himself, “not that he was trying to prevent somebody from coming into his curtilage
or home.”
The trial court’s ruling was in error. As explained in the “Note Well” preceding
the pattern instruction, “[t]he use of force, including deadly force, is justified when
the defendant is acting to prevent a forcible entry into the defendant’s home, other
place of residence, workplace, or motor vehicle, or to terminate an intruder’s unlawful
entry.” N.C.P.I.--Crim. 308.80 (emphasis added). This language accurately
summarizes the presumption accorded to the lawful occupant of a home who utilizes
deadly force to defend the habitation. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2(b). Moreover, for
purposes of the statute, “home” means “[a] building or conveyance of any kind, to
include its curtilage, whether the building or conveyance is temporary or permanent,
mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it, including a tent, and is designed as a
temporary or permanent residence.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2(a)(1) (emphases
added).
On appeal, the State concedes that Dockery was “standing beside the porch on
the ground, within the curtilage” of defendant’s property when defendant fired the
fatal shot. However, the State contends that defendant was not entitled to the
requested defense of habitation instruction, because Dockery “never came on
Defendant’s porch and never tried to open the door to Defendant’s trailer.” We
disagree.
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STATE V. KUHNS
Opinion of the Court
The State’s interpretation defies the plain language of the statute. “If the
language of a statute is free from ambiguity and expresses a single, definite, and
sensible meaning, judicial interpretation is unnecessary and the plain meaning of the
statute controls.” State v. Holloman, 369 N.C. 615, 628, 799 S.E.2d 824, 832-33 (2017)
(citation omitted). The language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2(b) is clear: the same
rebuttable presumption of lawfulness applies if the person against whom defensive
force is used “was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had
unlawfully and forcibly entered, a home,” and the person using defensive force knew
or had reason to believe that “an unlawful and forcible entry . . . was occurring or had
occurred.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2(b)(1)-(2) (emphases added).
Viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, the evidence supports a jury
instruction on the defense of habitation. Despite numerous requests to leave and
multiple orders from law enforcement, Dockery continued to return to defendant’s
property while repeatedly threatening him with bodily harm. As the State
acknowledges, it is undisputed that Dockery was within the curtilage of defendant’s
property—and therefore, within his home, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2(a)(1)—when
defendant utilized defensive force against him. Accordingly, we hold that the trial
court erred by denying defendant’s request for a jury instruction on the defense of
habitation, N.C.P.I.--Crim. 308.80.
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Opinion of the Court
Furthermore, defendant was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to provide
the requested instruction, because a person who uses permissible defensive force
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2 “is justified in using such force and is immune
from civil or criminal liability for the use of such force[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2(e)
(emphasis added). Moreover, our Supreme Court has noted that a jury instruction
on the common-law defense of habitation “would be more favorable to a defendant
than would an instruction limited to self-defense.” McCombs, 297 N.C. at 158, 253
S.E.2d at 911. This remains true pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-51.2 and 14-51.3.
See Lee, __ N.C. at __, 811 S.E.2d at 566 (“The relevant distinction between the two
statutes is that a rebuttable presumption arises that the lawful occupant of a home,
motor vehicle, or workplace reasonably fears imminent death or serious bodily harm
when using deadly force at those locations under the circumstances in [N.C. Gen.
Stat.] § 14-51.2(b). This presumption does not arise in [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 14-
51.3(a)(1).”).
III. Conclusion
The trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to provide defendant’s
requested jury instruction on the defense of habitation, N.C.P.I.--Crim. 308.80.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment entered upon the jury’s verdict finding defendant
guilty of voluntary manslaughter and remand for a new trial. Because we have
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Opinion of the Court
reversed and remanded for a new trial, we need not address defendant’s remaining
arguments on appeal.
NEW TRIAL.
Judges DAVIS and TYSON concur.
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