In re J.R.

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-1019
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 6 May 2014
IN THE MATTER OF:
Mecklenburg County
Nos. 10 JT 305-06
J.R. and J.R.
Appeal by respondent-mother from orders entered 11 April
2012, 15 June 2012, and 14 June 2013 by Judge Regan A. Miller in
Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 14 April 2014.
J. Edward Yeager, Jr., for Mecklenburg County Department of
Social Services, Division of Youth and Family Services,
petitioner-appellee.
Smith Moore Leatherwood LLP, by Carrie A. Hanger and Kip D.
Nelson, for guardian ad litem.
Mark Hayes for respondent-appellant mother.
ERVIN, Judge.
Respondent-Mother Latricia D. appeals from the trial
court’s orders authorizing the Division of Youth and Family
Services of the Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services
to cease efforts to reunify her with her minor children, J.L.R.
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and J.A.R.,1 and terminating her parental rights in John and
James. After careful consideration of Respondent-Mother’s
challenges to the trial court’s orders in light of the record
and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court’s
orders should be affirmed.
I. Factual Background
On 12 May 2010, the YFS filed a juvenile petition alleging
that John and James were neglected and dependent juveniles. On
14 September 2010, the children were adjudicated neglected and
dependent juveniles and continued in YFS custody, with YFS being
ordered to make reasonable efforts to reunify the children with
Respondent-Mother and with Respondent-Mother being ordered to
comply with the provisions of a Family Services Agreement.
After a review hearing held on 2 December 2010, the court
found that Respondent-Mother had “made no substantial progress
toward reunification” and ordered that the children remain in
YFS custody. On 2 February 2011, the court adopted a permanent
plan providing for the reunification of John and James with
Respondent-Mother and a concurrent plan for the children of
guardianship and adoption. The permanent plan for the children
remained unchanged until a permanency planning hearing held on
1
J.L.R. and J.A.R. will be referred to as John and James,
pseudonyms used for ease of reading and to protect the
juveniles’ privacy.
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14 March 2012, at which point the trial court found that
Respondent-Mother had “made little progress” and “has too much
to accomplish for the children to be placed with her within six
months.” By means of an order entered on 11 April 2012, the
trial court changed the permanent plan for John and James to
adoption and ordered YFS to initiate a termination of parental
rights proceeding within 60 days. After a subsequent permanency
planning hearing held on 15 June 2012, the trial court
authorized the cessation of efforts to reunify Respondent-Mother
with John and James.
On 2 May 2012, YFS filed a petition seeking to have
Respondent-Mother’s parental rights in John and James terminated
based upon allegations of neglect, willfully leaving the
children in foster care for more than twelve months without
making reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to
their removal from the home, willfully failing to pay a
reasonable portion of the cost of the care provided for the
children, and willfully abandoning the children. At the
conclusion of a multi-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court
entered an order finding the existence of all of the grounds for
termination alleged in the YFS petition, determining that
termination of Respondent-Mother’s parental rights in John and
James would be in their best interests, and terminating
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Respondent-Mother’s parental rights in the children.2
Respondent-Mother noted an appeal to this Court from the trial
court’s order.
II. Substantive Legal Analysis
A. Cessation of Reunification Efforts
1. Appealability
As an initial matter, we note that, although the trial
court explicitly ordered the cessation of efforts to reunify
Respondent-Mother with John and James in the 15 June 2012 order,
the 11 April 2012 order changing the permanent plan from
reunification to adoption and ordering YFS to initiate a
proceeding terminating Respondent-Mother’s parental rights in
the children implicitly authorized the cessation of
reunification efforts. See In re A.P.W., __ N.C. App. __, __,
741 S.E.2d 388, 391 (holding that the trial court implicitly
authorized the cessation of reunification efforts when it
directed the Department of Social Services to petition for the
termination of a parent’s parental rights and changed the
permanent plan to one of adoption), disc. review denied, __ N.C.
__, 747 S.E.2d 251 (2013). For that reason, the operative order
for purposes of our review of the trial court’s order is the 11
2
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the
children’s father, who has not sought appellate review of that
determination.
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April 2012 order, in which the trial court implicitly authorized
the cessation of efforts to reunify Respondent-Mother with John
and James, rather than the 15 June 2012 order, in which the
trial court explicitly authorized the cessation of such
reunification efforts.
As a result of the fact that her notice of appeal did not
challenge any of the trial court’s orders other than the order
terminating her parental rights in John and James, Respondent-
Mother filed a petition seeking the issuance of a writ of
certiorari allowing for appellate review of the order
authorizing the cessation of efforts to reunify Respondent-
Mother with the children. Although YFS contends that
Respondent-Mother failed to preserve her right to seek appellate
review of the order authorizing the cessation of reunification
efforts, we conclude that Respondent-Mother has properly
preserved her right to challenge the order authorizing the
cessation of efforts to reunify her with the children, obviating
the necessity for us to consider whether to issue the requested
writ of certiorari.
“At any hearing at which the court orders that
reunification efforts shall cease, the affected parent,
guardian, or custodian may give notice to preserve the right to
appeal that order in accordance with [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 7B-
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1001.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(c). According to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1001(a)(5)(a):3
a. The Court of Appeals shall review the
order to cease reunification together
with an appeal of the termination of
parental rights order if all of the
following apply:
1. A motion or petition to terminate
the parent’s rights is heard and
granted.
2. The order terminating parental
rights is appealed in a proper and
timely manner.
3. The order to cease reunification
is identified as an issue in the
record on appeal of the
termination of parental rights.
As the record presented for our review in this case reflects, a
petition to terminate Respondent-Mother’s parental rights in
John and James was heard and granted, Respondent-Mother noted an
appeal from the trial court’s termination order in a timely
manner, and Respondent-Mother identified the order authorizing
3
Effective for actions filed or pending after 1 October
2013, 2013 N.C. Sess. L. c. 129, s. 41, the General Assembly
amended N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1001(b) to provide that “notice to
preserve the right to appeal [an order authorizing the cessation
of reunification efforts] shall be given in writing by a proper
party as defined in [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 7B-1002 and shall be
made within 30 days after entry and service of the order in
accordance with” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 58. 2013 N.C.
Sess. L. c. 129,s. 31. As a result of the fact that the orders
at issue in this proceeding were entered well in advance of 1
October 2013, however, the amendment to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1001(b) worked by 2013 N.C. Sess. L. c. 129, s. 31, does not
apply to this case.
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the cessation of reunification efforts as one which she wished
to challenge before this Court in the record on appeal. As a
result, in light of our conclusion that Respondent-Mother has
properly preserved her right to challenge the order authorizing
the cessation of reunification efforts on appeal, we dismiss her
petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari as moot and
will proceed to an examination of Respondent-Mother’s challenge
to the validity of the trial court’s decision to end YFS’
responsibility for attempting to reunify Respondent-Mother with
John and James.
2. Sufficiency of Trial Court’s Findings
In her brief, Respondent-Mother contends that the trial
court erred in the course of authorizing the cessation of
efforts to reunify her with John and James on the grounds that
the trial court failed to make the findings of fact required by
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b). More specifically, Respondent-
Mother contends that the trial court’s decision to authorize the
cessation of reunification efforts should be overturned on
appeal on the grounds that the 11 April 2012 and 15 June 2012
orders lack any findings of fact addressing the futility of
further efforts to reunify Respondent-Mother with John and James
or the consistency of such reunification efforts with the
children’s health, safety, and need for a permanent home within
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a reasonable period of time. We do not find Respondent-Mother’s
argument persuasive.
The trial court may authorize the cessation of efforts to
reunify children with a parent in the event that it makes
written findings of fact to the effect that “[s]uch efforts
clearly would be futile or would be inconsistent with the
juvenile’s health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home
within a reasonable period of time.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
507(b)(1). As the Supreme Court has recently held, however, a
trial court’s findings of fact “need not recite the statutory
language [of N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 7B-507 verbatim,” so that the
ultimate task faced by an appellate court reviewing a challenge
to an order authorizing the cessation of reunification efforts
is determining “whether the trial court’s findings of fact
address the substance of the statutory requirements.” In re
L.M.T., __ N.C. __, __, 752 S.E.2d 453, 454 (2013).
In this case, the trial court found as a fact in the 11
April 2012 order that Respondent-Mother was “depending on
receiving [d]isability to secure what she needs to establish a
safe home for the children”; that Respondent-Mother “ha[d] made
little progress during this review period”; that Respondent-
Mother “must secure housing and stable income”; that Respondent-
Mother “was the victim of domestic violence” and “must address
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that concern, too”; that “[i]t is not possible for the children
to be returned to either parent within six months”; and that
Respondent-Mother “has too much to accomplish for the children
to be placed with her within six months.” In light of these
findings, we conclude that the trial court adequately addressed
the issues specified in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b),
necessitating the further conclusion that, since the trial court
did not err by authorizing the cessation of efforts to reunify
Respondent-Mother with John and James, its decision to terminate
Respondent-Mother’s parental rights in John and James was not
undermined by the issuance of an invalid order authorizing the
cessation of efforts to reunify her with the children.
B. Termination of Parental Rights
In her second challenge to the trial court’s order,
Respondent-Mother contends that the trial court erred at the
dispositional stage of its termination of parental rights order
by finding that John and James did not have a strong bond with
Respondent-Mother and determining, on the basis of that and
other findings, that adoption was in the children’s best
interests. More particularly, Respondent-Mother argues that the
undisputed record evidence established that John and James loved
Respondent-Mother and had a strong bond with her and that the
trial court’s unsupported finding to the contrary rendered its
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determination that termination of Respondent-Mother’s parental
rights in John and James was in the children’s best interests an
abuse of discretion. We do not find Respondent-Mother’s
argument persuasive.
“After an adjudication that one or more grounds for
terminating a parent’s rights exist, the court shall determine
whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s
best interest.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a). As part of the
dispositional process, the trial court must consider the factors
enunciated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) and make written
findings relating to such of those factors as are relevant to
the case under consideration. Id. “We review the trial court’s
decision to terminate parental rights for abuse of discretion.”
In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602
(2002). “A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion
only upon a showing that its actions are ‘manifestly unsupported
by reason.’” Davis v. Davis, 360 N.C. 518, 523, 631 S.E.2d 114,
118 (2006) (quoting Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 129, 271
S.E.2d 58, 63 (1980)).
In the dispositional portion of its termination order, the
trial court found that “[t]he children recognize [Respondent-
Mother] as their mother, but do not have a strong bond with
[her], as characterized by their need for the therapeutic
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support of [their therapist] prior to preparation for an
extended visitation over the holiday period of December 2012.”
In spite of Respondent-Mother’s arguments to the contrary, we
believe that this finding of fact has adequate evidentiary
support. Among other things, the record contains evidence
tending to show that John and James had been out of Respondent-
Mother’s custody for approximately twenty-eight months by the
time of the termination hearing. During that twenty-eight month
period, Respondent-Mother visited the children nine or ten
times. A social worker assisting Respondent-Mother testified
that, prior to an extended visit scheduled for December 2012,
John and James “were going through some anxiety,” so that an
additional therapy session for the children was recommended.
John and James’ foster mother testified that, while the children
have a bond with Respondent-Mother, they do not ask when they
might be able to return to her home. In addition, the
children’s therapist testified that the children had been out of
Respondent-Mother’s care for two years, that John and James are
not the same children that they were when they were removed from
Respondent-Mother’s custody, and that they would need to
reconnect with Respondent-Mother in the event that they were
returned to her care. Thus, although the record does, as
Respondent-Mother notes, contain evidence tending to support a
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different determination with respect to the issue of the
strength of the children’s bond with Respondent-Mother, the
challenged finding has more than sufficient evidentiary support.
As a result, given that Respondent-Mother’s sole challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s
findings of fact lacks merit and the fact that our review of the
dispositional portion of the termination order demonstrates that
the trial court appropriately considered and made written
findings concerning the relevant dispositional factors, we have
no basis for overturning the dispositional portion of the trial
court’s termination order.
III. Conclusion
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, none of Respondent-
Mother’s challenges to the trial court’s orders have merit. As
a result, the trial court’s orders authorizing the cessation of
efforts to reunify Respondent-Mother with the children and
terminating Respondent-Mother’s parental rights in the children
should be, and hereby are, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Judges ROBERT N. HUNTER, JR., and DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).