State v. Davis

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 15-222
Filed: 20 October 2015
Wake County, No. 09CRS213782
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JAMES PRESTON DAVIS, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 25 July 2014 by Judge Reuben F.
Young in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 August
2015.
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Neil
Dalton, for the State.
Irons & Irons, PA., by Ben G. Irons II, for Defendant.
DILLON, Judge.
James Preston Davis (“Defendant”) appeals from a judgment convicting him of
driving while impaired. For the following reasons, we find no error.
I. Background
Police responded to a one-car accident on 28 December 2009 in Wake County.
When they arrived, Defendant was seated in the driver’s seat and appeared to be
disoriented. Defendant vehemently refused to perform field sobriety tests or to give
a blood sample. At his request, Defendant was transported to the hospital via
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Opinion of the Court
ambulance. One of the responding officers obtained a search warrant for a sample of
Defendant’s blood. At the hospital, this officer gave Defendant a copy of the warrant
and explained its contents. Defendant again declined to give blood voluntarily.
Therefore, based on Defendant’s refusal to cooperate, the officer held Defendant’s arm
still in order to ensure his safety while a nurse took two blood samples. Also, a second
officer helped restrain Defendant during the blood draw by placing his hands on
Defendant’s shoulders. The chemical analysis of Defendant’s blood sample showed
Defendant’s blood alcohol content to be .29%.
Defendant was adjudicated guilty of DWI in district court and gave notice of
appeal to superior court.
Prior to his superior court trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress results
of the chemical analysis of his blood sample and a motion to dismiss for speedy trial
violation pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-954(a)(3). Defendant also issued a
subpoena to obtain access to a certain report compiled by the police department. The
trial court denied both motions and quashed the subpoena of the police report.
Defendant was tried before a jury, which convicted Defendant of DWI.
Defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of two years. Defendant gave
timely notice of appeal.
II. Analysis
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On appeal, Defendant alleges error in (1) the trial court’s denial of his motion
to suppress, (2) violation of his right to a speedy trial, and (3) the trial court’s
quashing of the subpoena.
A. Motion to Suppress
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the results of his blood test. We disagree.
The standard of review for a motion to suppress is whether the trial court’s
findings of fact are supported by the evidence and whether the findings of fact support
the conclusions of law. State v. Haislip, 362 N.C. 499, 499, 666 S.E.2d 757, 758 (2008).
The trial court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent
evidence. Id. at 500, 666 S.E.2d at 758. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.Defendant states correctly that the withdrawal of a blood sample from a person
is a search subject to protection by Article I, Section 7 of the North Carolina
Constitution. State v. Fletcher, 202 N.C. App. 107, 111, 688 S.E.2d 94, 96 (2010).
However, Defendant’s blood was drawn pursuant to a valid search warrant. It is
appropriate to require a person to submit to a blood draw when the search is
authorized by a valid warrant. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct.
1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966).
At trial, Defendant testified that the two officers who were present during the
blood draw choked him and twisted his arm behind his back immediately preceding
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Opinion of the Court
the blood draw, and that afterward the officers tackled him to the ground without
provocation. However, in ruling on the motion to suppress, the trial court specifically
found that Defendant’s version of the blood draw and subsequent events was “simply
not credible.”
The trial court’s finding of fact that an officer did not twist or wrench
Defendant’s arm in the process of holding his arm still for the blood draw is well
supported by the competent evidence in the record. Additionally, the trial court found
that after the blood draw, Defendant lunged at one of the officers causing both officers
to respond by “putting him on the floor and handcuffing [him].” These findings of fact
support the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that Defendant’s blood draw was
performed pursuant to a valid search warrant which was executed in a reasonable
manner. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court’s dismissal of Defendant’s
motion to suppress.
B. Right to a Speedy Trial
In Defendant’s second argument, he asserts that his Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy trial was denied due to a three-year delay in bringing his case to trial.
We disagree.
Our Supreme Court has reiterated the four-factor balancing test set forth by
the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182,
33 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1972). See State v. Spivey, 357 N.C. 114, 118, 579 S.E.2d 251, 254
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Opinion of the Court
(2003). The four factors are as follows: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for
the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his or her right to a speedy trial, and (4)
whether the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the delay. Id. at 118, 579
S.E.2d at 255. None of the factors is “a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding
of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial[,]” but rather, “they are related factors and
must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” Id.(quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2193). Courts must balance the
factors to arrive at a conclusion. Id.We apply the four factors to the present case as follows:
1. Length of Delay
The relevant period for this inquiry is the time after Defendant’s appeal from
district court until his trial in superior court. See State v. Friend, 219 N.C. App. 338,
343-44, 724 S.E.2d 85, 90 (2012). In this case, there was a delay of almost three years
from Defendant’s appeal to superior court and the final entry of judgment against
him. The State conceded at the hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss that the
time elapsed was sufficient to require analysis of the remaining factors.
2. Reason for the Delay
The defendant has the burden of showing that the delay was the result of
neglect or willfulness by the prosecution. Spivey, 357 N.C. at 119, 579 S.E.2d at 255.
We have held that the constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial forbids “purposeful
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or oppressive delays and those which the prosecution could have avoided by
reasonable effort.” State v. Washington, 192 N.C. App. 277, 283, 665 S.E.2d 799, 804
(2008).
In this case, the record indicates that the case was continued multiple times
by the prosecution. However, the trial court found that these delays were partially
attributable to the “high volume of cases of criminal dockets” in Wake County and
delays in receiving results of the chemical analysis of Defendant’s blood. See
Washington, 192 N.C. App. at 284, 665 S.E.2d at 804 (stating that “the record
revealed that the [four and one-half-year] delay was actually the result of a ‘neutral
factor’-docket congestion . . .”). Additionally, Defendant concedes that there is no
evidence of “serious prosecutorial misconduct.” Thus, Defendant’s only remaining
argument concerning this factor is that his case was delayed due to prosecutorial
neglect. Although Defendant’s right to a speedy trial does encompass neglectful or
negligent delays, these delays are weighed more neutrally than purposeful delays.
State v. Pippin, 72 N.C. App. 387, 395, 324 S.E.2d 900, 906 (1985). At best, the delay
in Defendant’s trial weighs slightly in favor of Defendant’s assertion that his right to
a speedy trial has been violated.
3. Defendant’s Assertion of His Right to a Speedy Trial
Regarding the third factor, the United States Supreme Court has stated:
Whether and how a defendant asserts his right is closely
related to the other factors . . . . [t]he strength of his efforts
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Opinion of the Court
will be affected by the length of the delay, to some extent
by the reason for the delay, and most particularly by the
personal prejudice, which is not always readily identifiable,
that he experiences. The more serious the deprivation, the
more likely a defendant is to complain.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192 (2008).
In this case, Defendant waited almost three years from the time he gave notice
of appeal to superior court before filing his motion to dismiss for speedy trial
violations. This motion was the only complaint by Defendant regarding the pace of
the proceedings. Defendant asserted his right only two months before his trial and
only one time in the form of a motion to dismiss. See State v. Grooms, 353 N.C. 50,
63, 540 S.E.2d 713, 722 (2000) (holding that a “[d]efendant’s failure to assert his right
to a speedy trial . . . sooner in the process . . . weigh[s] against his contention that he
has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial”). This inaction weighs
against Defendant’s claim of a speedy trial violation.
4. Prejudice to Defendant
Finally, the defendant must show actual, substantial prejudice. Spivey, 357
N.C. at 122, 579 S.E.2d at 257. In Spivey, this court recognized that the right to a
speedy trial is meant to (1) prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, (2) minimize
anxiety and concern of the accused, and (3) limit the possibility that the defense will
be impaired. Id. at 122, 579 S.E.2d at 256.
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Here, Defendant argues that he has suffered prejudice because of his anxiety
related to his inability to secure a job; however, throughout the majority of the period
of Defendant’s involvement in this case, he also had two additional driving while
impaired charges pending.
Defendant also argues prejudice because critical witnesses were unavailable
at the time he filed his motion to suppress. Defendant, however, has neither
specifically identified these “critical witnesses” nor the content of their potential
testimonies. See State v. Goins, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 754 S.E.2d 195, 199 (2014).
Defendant had ample opportunity during the two years prior to his trial in superior
court to seek out these witnesses and has not offered any evidence that he did so.
Weighing these factors, we hold that Defendant’s right to a speedy trial has
not been violated.
C. Subpoena of Personnel File
Finally, Defendant requests that we review the trial court’s decision regarding
a certain police report, referred to as a “blue team report,” compiled by the Raleigh
Police Department. This report qualifies under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-168 as a
personnel record and is, therefore, privileged and protected from disclosure unless the
trial court balances a defendant’s right to access the information with the State’s
interest in the confidentiality of its files and determines that the information is
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material to the fairness of the trial. State v. Bailey, 89 N.C. App. 212, 222, 365 S.E.2d
651, 657 (1988).
In this case, the trial court conducted an “in camera” review of the blue team
report and denied Defendant’s request for production of the report. See Pennsylvania
v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987). After reviewing the
blue team report, we concur with the trial court’s determination that the report “does
not contain any exculpatory evidence or information,” and therefore Defendant is not
entitled to its disclosure.
NO ERROR.
Judges HUNTER, JR., and DIETZ concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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