Norberg v. Norberg

FILED
IN THE OFFICE OF THE
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
JANUARY 5, 2023
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
2023 ND 1Alonna Knorr f/k/a Alonna Knorr Norberg, Plaintiff and Appellant
v.
Jon David Norberg, Defendant and Appellee
and
State of North Dakota, Statutory Real Party in Interest
No. 20220064
Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District,
the Honorable Steven L. Marquart, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by VandeWalle, Justice.
Charles A. Stock, Crookston, MN, for plaintiff and appellant; submitted on
brief.
Jon D. Norberg, self-represented, Maple Grove, MN, defendant and appellee;
submitted on brief.
Norberg v. Norberg
No. 20220064
VandeWalle, Justice.
Alonna Knorr, formerly known as Alonna Knorr Norberg, appealed from
a money judgment entered in favor of Jon Norberg for Knorr’s share of unpaid
expenses assigned to her under the divorce judgment. Knorr argued the district
court erred by denying her motion to dismiss or vacate the order granting
Norberg’s motion to amend the judgment because the parties had a global
settlement agreement that resolved the issues in this case. In Knorr v. Norberg,
2022 ND 139, 977 N.W.2d 711, we retained jurisdiction and remanded for the
district court to consider the settlement agreement and for an explanation of
the basis for its decision.
Our prior decision sets out the relevant facts and history, and we will not
repeat that information. Knorr, 2022 ND 139, ¶¶ 2-5.
On remand, the district court considered the parties’ settlement
agreement and again denied Knorr’s motion. The court stated Knorr had the
burden of establishing sufficient grounds for relief under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)
and she simply pointed to the settlement agreement. The court concluded the
agreement alone was not sufficient to grant relief, explaining:
Knorr still needed to establish sufficient reasons for relief
under Rule 60(b). A Rule 60(b) motion is not to be used to relieve a
party from free, calculated, and deliberate choices. See, e.g., First
Nat. Bank of Crosby v. Bjorgen, 389 N.W.2d 789, 796 (N.D. 1986).
If the parties had entered the Agreement before the entry of the
Order, Knorr should have informed the Court of such in response
to Norberg’s Motion. By failing to provide an explanation for why
she chose not to respond and by failing to provide an explanation
for why she chose to wait to inform the Court of the Agreement,
Knorr failed to establish sufficient grounds to set aside the Order.
Moreover, nothing in the record established that the
Agreement entitled Knorr to relief. Under the Agreement, Norberg
was to withdraw his motion upon—the Agreement becoming
“effective and fully enforceable”—being paid in full. (Ex. 1 to
Motion, Docket No. 1572, pp. 3 & 6). If Norberg failed to do so,
1
Knorr was permitted to use the Agreement to have the motion
withdrawn. (Id. at p. 3). But nothing in the record (that the Court
had at the time) indicates that the Agreement was fully
enforceable and Knorr was permitted to enforce it. The one actual
case she cites as additional proof is of no help. By failing to
establish that the Agreement was enforceable, Knorr failed to
establish that the issues raised in Norberg’s Motion had indeed
been resolved.
The district court’s decision on a motion for relief from a judgment or
order under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) is reviewed under the abuse of discretion
standard. See Paulson v. Paulson, 2021 ND 32, ¶ 8, 955 N.W.2d 92. A court
abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unconscionable manner, it misinterprets or misapplies the law, or when its
decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned
determination. Id.Knorr argues the district court abused its discretion by denying her
motion. She claims the settlement agreement resolved the issues in this case;
she supported her request for relief by quoting language in the agreement
indicating the agreement was intended to dispose of Norberg’s motion for an
amended judgment; and she cited other district court cases as additional proof
that the settlement agreement was enforceable and operative and the parties
were carrying out its terms. She asserts that the money judgment is for debts
the parties expressly agreed were covered by the settlement agreement and
that the record reflects that there is no dispute the parties reached the binding
and enforceable agreement before the court entered its money judgment.
The district court provided two reasons for denying Knorr’s motion for
relief. The first reason was the timeliness of the motion, stating Knorr should
have informed the court about the settlement agreement in response to
Norberg’s motion and she did not explain why she chose to wait to inform the
court. We do not need to determine whether this first reason alone is sufficient,
because the court also determined Knorr failed to establish that the settlement
agreement is enforceable and that she is therefore entitled to relief.
2
The settlement agreement requires Knorr to pay Norberg $500,000 and
states, “The terms of this Settlement Agreement do not become effective and
fully enforceable until Norberg receives payment and assignment of NW
Mutual payments [from Knorr].” The agreement also specifically addresses
Norberg’s motion to amend the judgment and states, “Upon execution of this
Agreement and being paid in full, Norberg shall withdraw his Motion in the
District Court and Knorr shall not contest, in any way, Norberg’s move to
Maple Grove, MN.” (Emphasis added). There is no evidence in the record that
Knorr paid Norberg in full as required by the settlement agreement and that
the agreement became effective and fully enforceable.
Knorr had the burden to establish sufficient grounds for relief under
N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b). See Kukla v. Kukla, 2013 ND 192, ¶ 24, 838 N.W.2d 434.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying her motion. We affirm
the judgment.
Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
Gerald W. VandeWalle
Daniel J. Crothers
Jerod E. Tufte
Kari M. Agotness, D.J.
The Honorable Kari M. Agotness, D.J., sitting in place of McEvers, J.,
disqualified.
3