State v. Lonechild

FILED
IN THE OFFICE OF THE
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
JUNE 8, 2023
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
2023 ND 112State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee
v.
Evan Donald Lonechild, Defendant and Appellant
No. 20230032
Appeal from the District Court of Ramsey County, Northeast Judicial District,
the Honorable Donovan J. Foughty, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Jensen, Chief Justice.
Beau M. Cummings, State’s Attorney, Devils Lake, ND, for plaintiff and
appellee; submitted on brief.
Ulysses S. Jones, Devils Lake, ND, for defendant and appellant.
State v. Lonechild
No. 20230032
Jensen, Chief Justice.
[¶1] Evan Donald Lonechild appeals a criminal judgment finding him guilty
of escape under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-08-06 after entering a conditional plea of
guilty. Lonechild was charged with escape after being placed in the Lake
Region Residential Reentry Center (“Reentry Center”) following a probation
violation and subsequently failing to return to the facility while exercising
work release privileges. Lonechild argues he was not in “official detention” as
defined by N.D.C.C. § 12.1-08-06(3)(b) because he was on probation when he
left the Reentry Center. We affirm.
I
[¶2] Lonechild was convicted of aggravated assault and interference with an
emergency telephone call. His sentence included three years of incarceration
with two years suspended, and he was placed on supervised probation for a
period of two years.
[¶3] Following a petition to revoke Lonechild’s probation, Lonechild was
placed into the custody of the Reentry Center. While at the Reentry Center,
Lonechild left the facility while participating in a work release program and
failed to return to the facility. As the result of failing to return to the facility,
he was charged with escape under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-08-06.
[¶4] Lonechild sought dismissal of the escape charge arguing he was not in
“official detention” while at the Reentry Center because he was on probation—
a condition he argues is excluded from “official detention” under N.D.C.C. §
12.1-08-06(3)(b). The district court denied Lonechild’s motion to dismiss after
finding Lonechild to have been in “official detention.” Lonechild entered a
conditional plea of guilty preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion
to dismiss the charge.
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II
[¶5] This Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation under a de novo
standard of review. State v. Houkom, 2021 ND 223, ¶ 7, 967 N.W.2d 801.
“Construction of a criminal statute is a question of law, fully reviewable by this
Court.” Id. (quoting State v. Buchholz, 2005 ND 30, ¶ 6, 692 N.W.2d 105).
“Words in a statute are given their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood
meaning, unless defined by statute or unless a contrary intention plainly
appears.” Id. (quoting State v. Bearrunner, 2019 ND 29, ¶ 5, 921 N.W.2d 894(citing N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02)). “We interpret statutes to give meaning and effect
to every word, phrase, and sentence, and do not adopt a construction which
would render part of the statute mere surplusage.” Id. (quoting Buchholz, at ¶
6).
[¶6] The escape statute, N.D.C.C. § 12.1-08-06(1), provides:
A person is guilty of escape if, without lawful authority, the person
removes or attempts to remove himself from official detention or
fails to return to official detention following temporary leave
granted for a specified purpose or limited period. A person who is
subject to official detention under this section is guilty of escape, if
while outside the state of North Dakota and without lawful
authority, the person removes or attempts to remove himself from
official detention, or fails to return to official detention following
temporary leave granted for a specified purpose or limited period,
when at the time the person is in the legal custody of a warden of
the penitentiary, department of corrections and rehabilitation, or
other competent authority by virtue of a lawful commitment to
official detention.
The statute further defines “official detention” as:
[A]rrest, custody following surrender in lieu of arrest, detention in
any facility for custody of persons under charge or conviction of an
offense or alleged or found to be delinquent, detention under a law
authorizing civil commitment in lieu of criminal proceedings or
authorizing such detention while criminal proceedings are held in
abeyance, detention for extradition, home detention as authorized
by chapter 12-67, or custody for purposes incident to the foregoing,
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including transportation, medical diagnosis or treatment, court
appearances, work, and recreation, or being absent without
permission from any release granted while under custody of a
sentence such as work or education release, community
confinement, or other temporary leaves from a correctional or
placement facility. Official detention does not include supervision
on probation or parole or constraint incidental to release.
N.D.C.C. § 12.1-08-06(3)(b) (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
[¶7] Lonechild argues he was on probation or “constraint incidental to
release” when he left the Reentry Center, and was therefore not in “official
detention.” He argues the exceptions found in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-08-06(3)(b) that
state “[o]fficial detention does not include supervision on probation or parole
or constraint incidental to release” apply to him and exclude his situation from
the definition of “official detention.”
[¶8] This Court clarified in State v. Stenhoff, 2019 ND 106, ¶ 13, 925 N.W.2d
429, that a defendant can be placed into custody at a correctional facility for a
probation violation, and that placement therein does not terminate or suspend
a defendant’s probation. “Official detention” as defined by N.D.C.C. § 12.1-08-
06(3)(b) precludes only “supervision on probation” and “constraint incidental
to release.” The definition of “official detention” does not preclude custody
while on probation. See Estate of Christeson v. Gilstad, 2013 ND 50, ¶ 12, 829
N.W.2d 453 (“[T]his Court has consistently recognized that it must be
presumed the legislature intended all that it said, said all that it intended to
say, and meant what it has plainly expressed.”). Furthermore, Lonechild’s
constraint at the Reentry Center was not “incidental to release” of any kind.
Lonechild was ordered to the custody of the Reentry Center which constitutes
a “facility for custody of persons under charge or conviction of an offense[.]”
[¶9] The district court found “[Lonechild] was in custody at the time when he
at the halfway house [sic] when he walked away from the halfway house[.]”
The court did not err by finding Lonechild was in custody at a “facility for
custody of persons under charge or conviction of an offense” when he was
ordered to reside at the Reentry Center. The court properly determined
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Lonechild was in “official detention” as defined by N.D.C.C. § 12.1-08-06(3)(b)
and did not err by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of escape.
III
[¶10] The district court’s judgment denying Lonechild’s motion to dismiss is
affirmed.
[¶11] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
Daniel J. Crothers
Lisa Fair McEvers
Jerod E. Tufte
Douglas A. Bahr
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